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A risk-based game model for rational inspections in port state control

Yang, Z, Yang, Z, Yin, J and Qu, Z (2018) A risk-based game model for rational inspections in port state control. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 118. pp. 477-495. ISSN 1366-5545

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Abstract

This paper analyses the game relationship between port authorities and ship owners under the new inspection regime (NIR). Based on 49328 inspection reports from Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (2015-2017), we present a Bayesian Network (BN) model to determine vessel detention rates after adding company performance as a new indicator in PSC inspection. A strategic game model is formulated by incorporating the BN model outcomes. The optimal inspection rate from the game model can help improve port authority performance in PSC. An empirical study is conducted to illustrate the insights of the results and provide suggestions for port authorities.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: 0102 Applied Mathematics, 0103 Numerical and Computational Mathematics, 1507 Transportation and Freight Services
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD61 Risk Management
T Technology > TA Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General)
Divisions: Liverpool Business School
Maritime and Mechanical Engineering
Publisher: Elsevier
Related URLs:
Date Deposited: 25 Mar 2019 13:38
Last Modified: 26 Mar 2019 22:42
DOI or Identification number: 10.1016/j.tre.2018.08.001
URI: http://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/id/eprint/10398

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