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Wan, C, Yang, Z, Yang, Z and Yu, Q

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### Article

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1 **Abstract**

2 Port State Control (PSC) inspections have been implemented as an administrative  
3 measure to detect and detain substandard ships and thus to ensure maritime safety.  
4 Advanced risk models were developed to investigate the impact of factors influencing  
5 ship detention. Although showing much attractiveness, current studies still reveal a key  
6 challenge on how such analysis can improve the ship performance in PSC inspections  
7 and aid PSC detention risk control decision. By incorporating a data-driven Bayesian  
8 network (BN) into the Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to an Ideal  
9 Solution (TOPSIS) method, this paper proposes a new ship detention risk control  
10 methodology, in which the decision criteria are generated from the root risk variables,  
11 and the alternatives refer to the established strategies adopted by ship-owners in their  
12 practical ship detention risk control. Along with the new methodology, the main  
13 technical novelty of this paper lies in the quantitative measurement of the effectiveness  
14 of each strategy in terms of the reduction of detention rate in a dynamic manner. Its  
15 practical contributions are seen, from both ship owner and port authority perspectives,  
16 through the provisions of useful insights on dynamic evaluation of rational control  
17 strategies to reduce ship detention risk under various PSC inspection scenarios.

18 **Keywords:** *Port state control, Bayesian network, TOPSIS, detention risk, maritime*  
19 *safety, maritime risk*

20

## 1 **1. Introduction**

2 Traditional flag state control has its limits in ensuring the implementation of maritime  
3 safety regulations, particularly when ship owners choose open registration. Port State  
4 Control (PSC), which renders port authorities the ability to inspect foreign vessels in  
5 their own ports, was set up in 1982 as an effective complementation of flag state control,  
6 to avoid the entries of sub-standard ships into their waters and prevent the occurrence  
7 of maritime accidents. Since its implementation, PSC has been gradually viewed as one  
8 of the important safety lines of defending sub-standard vessels and improving maritime  
9 safety. As a result, PSC effectively reduces the appearance of the vessels that are not  
10 obeying the relevant maritime safety regulations to a satisfactory level.

11 Practical lessons, in the meantime, reveal the shortcomings of PSC in its practical  
12 applications such as no risk stake on the involved ship management companies. Every  
13 year there are still a large number of vessels that do not comply with the inspection  
14 regulations and fail to pass the inspection, according to the Paris MoU detention records  
15 (Paris MoU inspection database, <https://www.parismou.org>). In the old PSC inspection  
16 system, ship management companies are third-party managers who, for a negotiated fee  
17 and with no shareholding ties with their clients, undertake the responsibility of  
18 managing vessels in which they have no financial stake (Mitroussi, 2003). They  
19 accepted and managed ships on behalf of ship owners without much concern on their  
20 technical soundness given that they had no responsibility on vessels' failures of passing  
21 PSC inspections, which is a big issue in supervising vessel quality (Yang et al., 2018b).

22 To improve the PSC inspection efficiency, New Inspection Regime (NIR) was launched  
23 in 2011 by Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). It is so far viewed as the most  
24 significant change that transforms and modernizes the PSC inspection mechanism in  
25 recent years (Paris MoU, 2011). Under the NIR, a foreign vessel visiting a port will be  
26 attributed with a ship risk profile (SRP) through a risk associated information system  
27 containing some essential factors such as vessel age, vessel type, and flag state  
28 performance (Xiao et al., 2020), which is used to determine the priority of ship  
29 inspections, the intervals between the inspections of a ship and the type of the  
30 inspections. Based on the feedback from the information system, port authorities will  
31 assign PSC Officers (PSCOs) to inspect those vessels with high priority or having  
32 overriding or unexpected factors that may pose threats to maritime safety (Wan et al.,  
33 2019b). Once the inspection is completed, an inspection report including the detected  
34 deficiencies, detention results, and detention periods is issued. The vessels are required  
35 to rectify their deficiencies in different time periods according to their status  
36 (<https://www.parismou.org/>). The Paris MoU expected that the implementation of NIR  
37 could efficiently improve the performance of PSC inspection system and the overall  
38 vessel quality of the shipping industry. In fact, through the analysis on the statistics

1 provided by the Paris MoU annual reports, the implementation of NIR indeed improves  
2 the PSC system, which is reflected from the aspects such as the reduction of detention  
3 rate, deficiencies per inspection, detainable deficiencies per inspection, and the  
4 detainable deficiency rate (Yang et al., 2020).

5 Since the implementation of PSC inspection, several revisions and improvements have  
6 been undertaken to make the rules stricter, leading to various concerns posing on  
7 different perspectives. However, the issue on how to strike a balance by rational ship  
8 detention control strategies remains to be further addressed in both academic and  
9 industrial communities. A high number of ship detention means the existence of a large  
10 substandard ship fleet sailing at sea, not only bringing potential hazards to maritime  
11 safety, but also causing huge losses and negative impacts on shipping productivity. For  
12 port authorities, they need to allocate more resources to monitor these poor-quality  
13 vessels until the identified deficiencies are rectified to a satisfactory level under the  
14 NIR, as the inspection intervals for high-risk vessels are between 5-6 months, much  
15 shorter than standard (within 10-12 months) and low-risk vessels (within 24-36  
16 months). Such condition poses high pressures and inspection burdens on port  
17 authorities within the Paris MoU region. Furthermore, an international shipping  
18 management company becomes a key stakeholder under the NIR. When a ship is  
19 detained, the delay puts a high cost on the company, and the punishment helps raise its  
20 attention on ship quality under its management. Moreover, a high rate of ship detention  
21 will also weaken the competitiveness of a shipping company in the international market,  
22 and even seriously affected the reputation of shipping companies and flag states.  
23 Therefore, studies on rational detention risk control measures will essentially be highly  
24 valuable to address the above concerns practically and trigger the thoughts on new risk  
25 control frameworks that enables the evaluation of risk control measure(s) based on  
26 dynamic risk scenarios.

27 The aim of this paper is to establish a new risk decision tool to aid the evaluation and  
28 selection of PSC detention risk control strategies (DRCSs) to reduce the detention risk  
29 of ships under the NIR of PSC. The findings can contribute to the current research in  
30 the following ways. Firstly, it proposes a novel evaluation tool to aid the evaluation of  
31 DRCSs in dynamic PSC scenarios, which can be easily tailored and adopted by a  
32 shipping company facing high ship detention risk. Secondly, it supports rational  
33 shipping safety decision-making through a new theoretical risk control methodology by  
34 incorporating BNs and TOPSIS. Thirdly, it indicates that arranging shipping routes  
35 based on ship risk condition could effectively reduce the detention probability among  
36 possible risk control measures. Fourthly, it provides useful insights for port authorities  
37 when formulating and improving corresponding inspection regulations in terms of the  
38 reduction of detention risk, as well as for ship owners to support their decisions as it

1 provides a way for comparing the performance of different DRCSs in a quantitative  
2 manner.

3 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the existing  
4 risk-based PSC research. Section 3 introduces the main methods used to develop the  
5 novel PSC risk control decision-making model. Section 4 illustrates the proposed  
6 method by conducting a case study, before the conclusion in Section 5.

## 7 **2. Literature review**

8 Since PSC inspections play an increasingly important role in maritime safety, more and  
9 more researchers stepped into this field and conducted works on the risk management  
10 of PSC inspections from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives, especially in  
11 the past two decades. It is evident by the increasing number of relevant papers since  
12 2011 when NIR was initiated. The PSC related studies are therefore critically analysed  
13 below.

14 In 2014, Li et al. (2015) built a bi-matrix game between the port authorities and ship  
15 operators in PSC inspection to quantify the risks existing in PSC inspections to decide  
16 on the optimal inspection policy with an aim to save inspection cost whilst keeping  
17 deterrence pressure on potential wrongdoers. Through a numerical case study, it was  
18 shown that the optimal inspection rate obtained from the model can yield a significant  
19 saving, as well as prevent potential violations by ship operators. Knowing that heavy  
20 maritime traffic may cause significant navigational challenges in the Istanbul Strait,  
21 Kara (2016) applied a weighted point method to assess the risk level of each vessel  
22 experiencing the PSC inspection under the Black Sea MoU. However, the weighting  
23 and scoring methods adopted in these studies were based on subjective expert  
24 judgements, which arguably introduced subjective bias to the obtained results.

25 Extracted from Tokyo MoU inspection database, Tsou (2018) used association rule  
26 mining techniques in big data analysis to examine the relationships between detention  
27 deficiencies and external factors as well as between detention deficiencies themselves.  
28 The findings provided countermeasures and can be used as a reference by ship  
29 management personnel during the corresponding PSC inspection to reduce the  
30 detention rate of ships, improve working efficiency of staff members, and reduce the  
31 adverse influences brought by substandard vessels. Similarly, Osman et al. (2020) used  
32 the same approach to analyse the inspection pattern in Malaysian port and provide a  
33 useful rule to help PSC officers in organizing an effective inspection plan.

34 Realising former risk assessment approaches are not fully competent to tackle dynamic  
35 PSC risk (e.g., ship detention probability) in different environments, Yang et al. (2018a)  
36 pioneered the development of a BN framework to create a detention rate prediction tool

1 for port authorities. The advantages of BN over other approaches in dynamic prediction  
2 are that it provides important insights to seek the optimal inspection policies under  
3 different environments in NIR. Furthermore, based on the BN models in this research,  
4 Yang et al. (2020) conducted a comparative analysis between ‘Pre-NIR’ period and  
5 ‘Post-NIR’ period from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. The results  
6 revealed that it is beneficial to implement NIR for PSC inspection system, vessel quality  
7 and maritime safety.

8 Following Yang et al. in 2018a, Wang et al. (2019) developed a new Tree Augmented  
9 Naïve (TAN) Classifier to identify high-risk foreign vessels coming to the Hong Kong  
10 port. Compared with the Ship Risk Profile selection scheme currently used in practice,  
11 the TAN classifier can discover 130% more deficiencies on average. The proposed  
12 classifier can help the PSC authorities to better identify substandard ships as well as to  
13 allocate inspection resources. Later in 2021, to solve the imbalanced inspection records  
14 issue, Yan et al. (2021) proposes a classification model called balanced random forest  
15 (BRF) to predict ship detention by using 1,600 inspection records at the Hong  
16 Kong port for three years. Compared with the current selection regime at the Hong  
17 Kong port, the BRF model is much more efficient and can achieve an average  
18 improvement of 73.72% in detained ship identification.

19 Understanding the current PSC research and practice are not able to incorporate  
20 deficiency records into detention analysis, Wang et al. (2021) utilize a Bayesian  
21 Information Criteria (BIC) approach to construct a PSC risk probabilistic model to  
22 analyse the dependency and interdependency among the factors influencing detention.  
23 The results reveal that safety condition and technical features are the most influential  
24 factors concerning ship detention.

25 Focusing on the factors behind the detention of vessels, Chen et al. (2019) proposed a  
26 grey rational analysis (GRA) model with improved entropy weights to understand how  
27 much the varied factors influence the decision of ship detention, and identify key factors  
28 of detainment to guarantee shipping safety and environmental protection. The results  
29 could be used by port authorities to develop the suggestions and countermeasures of  
30 reducing ship detention.

31 Another popular method in PSC inspection model development is support vector  
32 machine (SVM). Back to 2007, Xu et al. (2007) presented a risk model based on SVM  
33 to estimate the risk state of vessels before conducting on-board inspection. Recently,  
34 Wu et al. (2021) proposed a SVM based framework to exploit crucial ship deficiencies  
35 and forecast the probability of ship detention. The findings could help port authorities  
36 easily identify fatal ship deficiencies to make more reasonable ship detention decision.

1 Other applied methods like Bayesian search algorithm (Fan et al., 2020) and binary  
 2 logistic regression (Xiao et al., 2020) also play important roles in risk-based PSC  
 3 inspection studies.

4 In light of the above analysis, it is obvious that previous studies are mainly conducted  
 5 for the identification, analysis and assessment of the risks associated with PSC  
 6 inspections, leaving the issues on the management of detention risk under PSC  
 7 inspection unaddressed. To fill the research gap, this study proposed a BN-based  
 8 TOPSIS method to develop rational DRCSs under dynamic PSC inspection scenarios.

9

### 10 **3. Methodology**


#### 11 **3.1 BNs in maritime risk**

12 The BN method was developed based on the well-defined Bayesian probability theory  
 13 and networking technique. A BN is a graphical presentation of probability combined  
 14 with a mathematical inference calculation, which provides a strong framework for  
 15 representing knowledge. It has a good ability in modelling randomness and capturing  
 16 non-linear causal relationships, so that the inference based on imprecise and uncertain  
 17 information can be achieved (Wan et al., 2019a). Taking advantage of causal inference,  
 18 BN has been used to analyse the importance degree of risk variables and the  
 19 relationships between them. Compared to pure Bayesian theory, BN is more visualized,  
 20 while it has a solid foundation of mathematical knowledge. Because of its advantages,  
 21 BN has been increasingly applied in various research orientations in risk assessment of  
 22 maritime related systems, as shown in Table 1. Additionally, a figure illustrating the  
 23 change of number of core journal publications on BN applications (on Web of Science)  
 24 in the maritime field in recent years is presented as well, demonstrating the popularity  
 25 and feasibility of BN applications (see Fig. 1).

26 **Table 1 BN applications in maritime related risk related topics**

<b>Research Classification</b>	<b>Relevant Reference</b>
Occurrence of ship-ship collisions	Kujala, et al. (2009); Klanac, et al. (2010); Hänninen & Kujala (2012); Weng, et al. (2012); Hänninen, et al. (2014); Goerlandt & Montewka (2015)
Navigational safety in shipping	Zhang et al. (2013); Banda et al. (2016)
Maritime accident evaluation and prevention	Antao et al. (2009); Hanninen et al. (2014); Li et al. (2014)
Oil spill accidents & recovery in maritime field	Lehikoinen et al. (2013); Goerlandt & Montewka (2014)
Offshore safety analysis	Eleye-Datubo et al. (2008); Ren et al. (2009);
Sea wave overtopping issue	Tolo, et al. (2015)

1



2

3 *Source: Web of Science, by authors*4 **Fig 1 - Number of publications of BN in maritime field in the recent decade**

5 Normally, the process of developing a BN model consists of four phases: data  
6 acquisition, variable identification, BN construction, and conditional probability  
7 distribution and risk prediction (Yang et al., 2018b). Unlike the traditional ways (i.e.,  
8 human expert knowledge, common sense, historical experience) to develop the  
9 structure of BN, the network structure of this research is purely induced from data. This  
10 kind of data-driven approaches can avoid common issues in traditional approaches,  
11 such as time consuming, heavy burden on experts, and subjective perception (Yang et  
12 al., 2018a; Yu et al., 2020). Additionally, the accuracy of model results can be improved  
13 when comparing with traditional ways involving subjective judgements. Specifically,  
14 various methods for network configuration optimisation were utilised in the literature,  
15 including dependency analysis (Thomas, 2005), search and score approach (Cooper et  
16 al., 1992), genetic algorithm (Novobilski, 2003), chain genetic algorithm (Kabli et al.,  
17 2007). Although BN can be extended into an influential diagram (ID) to incorporate  
18 decision and utility nodes for decision making, ID is usually incompetent to deal with  
19 multiple decision attributes of different characteristics in maritime risk control studies  
20 (Yang et al., 2009).

### 1 **3.2 TOPSIS in maritime risk analysis**

2 Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) problems are frequently encountered in  
3 various aspects in maritime operations. TOPSIS (Hwang and Yoon, 1981), as one of  
4 the well-established methods for solving MCDM problems, has been widely studied for  
5 several decades, and been widely applied in maritime risk management due to its  
6 advantages of being intuitive, easy to understand and to implement. Moreover, it is able  
7 to manage each kind of variables and each type of criteria with data collected from  
8 various sources involving risk, cost, and social benefits. Othman et al. (2015) applied  
9 TOPSIS method to ranking the factors that caused psychological problem of distraction  
10 of seafarers. Wu et al. (2016) introduced TOPSIS for group decision-making in order  
11 to provide a practical decision framework for safety control of ships out of control. Due  
12 to high flexibility of TOPSIS, it can accommodate further extension to make better  
13 choices in different conditions, including fuzzy environment. Liu et al. (2016) proposed  
14 an extend TOPSIS model to facilitate the comparison between fuzzy numbers in the  
15 safety assessment of inland waterway transportation with the ability to dealing with  
16 expected values of different situations. Yan et al. (2017) introduced the cost-benefit  
17 ratio to the fuzzy TOPSIS in order to achieve a rational risk analysis for prioritising  
18 congestion risk control options of inland waterway transportation under dynamic risk  
19 scenarios. Zhang and Lam (2019) combined fuzzy TOPSIS with Delphi and AHP to  
20 identify barriers in emerging technology adoption with a case of maritime  
21 organizations. However, TOPSIS and its extensions are rarely used to model the  
22 dynamic interdependencies among multiple decision criteria with very few previous  
23 studies (e.g. Yang et al., 2009, Fan et al. 2020).

### 24 **3.3 The proposed method**

25 In this research, a new methodology incorporating BN with TOPSIS is proposed to  
26 develop the risk decision tool for the evaluation of DRCSs in PSC inspections. It  
27 combines the advantages of both BN and TOPSIS (as mentioned in section 3.1 and 3.2  
28 respectively). Therefore, the holistic approach is superior over either BN or TOPSIS  
29 (as standing along methods) in a way of:


30 1) A BN for predicting the safety of a system cannot be used to make a decision about  
31 whether or not an action can improve the system safety, when such a decision have to  
32 be made against multiple criteria such as cost and safety. However, the cooperation of  
33 TOPSIS can address this BN deficiency, and extend the function and application scope  
34 of traditional BN.

35 2) Compared to the traditional TOPSIS method, the proposed holistic method can first  
36 be used to predict safety and the result is integrated into TOPSIS in an objective form.  
37 In particular, the outputs of BN (i.e. root variables, mutual information) are used as the  
38 inputs of TOPSIS (i.e. criteria, and their weights), reducing the influence of subjective

1 judgments when making decision. Additionally, the results can be updated accordingly  
2 when new information is incorporated, supporting dynamic decision making.

3 As aforementioned, the process of developing a BN model consists of four phases: data  
4 acquisition, variable identification, BN construction, and conditional probability  
5 distribution and risk prediction. While the main steps of applying a TOPSIS method  
6 include constructing decision-making matrix, weighting and normalizing the decision  
7 matrix, calculating the separation measures of the alternatives, determining their  
8 relative closeness to the ideal solution, and finally ranking the alternatives. To avoid  
9 unnecessary repetitions regarding the construction of data-driven BNs (incl. equations  
10 and algorithms) and the application of the TOPSIS method, which are detailed in Yang  
11 et al. (2018a) and Yan et al. (2017), respectively, this paper stresses the key steps of  
12 combining the two in the context of PSC inspection. By doing this, we can emphasize  
13 how the original data-driven BN model and the TOPSIS method can be combined in a  
14 complementary manner for decision making of detention risk reduction strategies under  
15 PSC inspections.

16 As the kernel of the proposed method, a risk-based BN for PSC is constructed to capture  
17 the relationships among different risk factors and then use their risk contribution to ship  
18 detention to calculate their dynamic importance degrees. The risk factors that are  
19 identified as root variables in the BN will be transformed as the decision criteria when  
20 constructing the decision matrix in TOPSIS, while the weights of the selected criteria  
21 will be determined based on their mutual information with the target node, i.e.,  
22 ‘detention’, in the BN. Fig.2 shows the flow chart of the proposed method. It is worth  
23 noting that when the prior probabilities in the BN model are updated to reflect a  
24 particular case scenario (e.g. a particular port in a specified timeframe), the weights of  
25 the criteria (i.e. root causes) will be changed accordingly to respond to the dynamic  
26 feature of PSC to meet a particular ship/ship-owners requirement.



**Fig 2 - The flow chart of the proposed method**

*Source: Authors*

1

2

3

4 The detailed description of the proposed methodology is outlined in the following steps.

5 **Step 1.** Data collection and processing

6 To determine the detention rate of a vessel in a port, it is important to have a list of  
7 historical PSC inspection records from the port region (e.g., Paris or Tokyo MoU).

8 Collected from the Paris MoU online inspection database, 49,328 inspection records

9 from 2015-2017 are extracted to form the research database to train the prior

10 probabilities in the PSC risk-based BN. It is noted that the bulk carriers are selected as


11 the research target in this study due to 1) its dominant role in the global maritime market

1 (making up 15% - 17% of the world's merchant fleets), and 2) the detention rate of bulk  
2 carriers shows a very similar trajectory to general situations, which is proved in a recent  
3 research produced by Yang et al. (2020) through a comprehensive analysis.

4 **Step 2.** Construction of the risk-based PSC BN

5 The construction of the PSC BN consists of variable identification, structure learning,  
6 and conditional probability configuration (Yang et al., 2018a).

7 The variables used in model construction are determined based on the PSC inspection  
8 records and previous studies simultaneously. A PSC inspection record contains  
9 information in two aspects, vessel-related and inspection-related. It is noteworthy that  
10 the factors concerned in this study are those influencing detention (inspection results),  
11 instead of inspections, which means the research is conducted on the whole inspection  
12 process. Major information in inspection records is valuable and selected as the risk  
13 variables in our research, which are vessel flag, vessel age, company performance, type  
14 of inspections, port of inspection, number of deficiencies, and detention. These  
15 variables have been proved to be important factors influencing inspection results  
16 according to previous research, i.e., Yang et al. (2018a). Meanwhile, two intermediate  
17 level risk variables, 'vessel group' and 'inspection group', are introduced to avoid  
18 enormous conditional probability tables (CPTs) and reduce calculation work based on  
19 the principle of divorcing approach (Jensen, 2001). They can be viewed as the overall  
20 level of vessel-related risk and inspection-related risk. For the 'vessel group', based on  
21 the information provided by Yang et al (2018) and Wang et al. (2019), this variable has  
22 two states of 'detention risk higher than 10%' and 'detention risk lower than 10%'.  
23 Three parent nodes of 'vessel group' have a number of different combinations, and  
24 cases correlated with them can all be found in the PSC inspection database. If we select  
25 several cases with different combination of vessel-related nodes and same combination  
26 of inspection-related nodes, when inputting them into BN model, the results reveal that  
27 most cases resulting in detention has a detention rate more than 10%, and other cases  
28 are lower than 10%. In other words, once the detention risk of a vessel is higher than  
29 10%, the inspection records showed it is about to be detained. Therefore, in this study,  
30 10% detention probability is a threshold value of 'vessel group', resulting in two states  
31 of this variable 'detention risk higher than 10%' and 'detention risk lower than 10%'.  
32 The same distinguish criteria goes to the 'inspection group'. More detailed information  
33 can be referenced in Yang et al. (2018a).



1

2

**Fig 3 - PSC BN model**

3

The structure of BN in this study is learned via a data-driven approach, called Tree Augmented Naïve (TAN) learning, the essence of which is actually an optimization problem (Friedman et al., 1997). The TAN learning is chosen in this study because it is proved to be more competitive and accurate than other data-driven approaches (Murphy & Aha, 1995). The detailed process of how the network is derived from TAN is found in Yang et al., (2018a). Through the Netica software, the result is presented in Fig. 3.

9

Once the structure of BN is determined, the conditional probabilities of nodes are required to model the uncertainties of risk variables. To avoid the problems existing in traditional CPT calculation methods (expert judgment) like time-consuming and impractical application in this study, the CPTs are formulated by a gradient descent approach (Bottou, 2010). Its essence is to narrow the distance between the conditional probability and the value of prior information. When the minimum distance is found, the value at this point is selected as the associated conditional probability. The gradient descent approach has good performance when calculating CPTs (Yang et al., 2018a). When the structure and CPTs of BN are properly constructed, the probability of ship detention under the PSC inspections can be predicted by considering different sets of observable evidence.

20

**Step 3. Selection of the criteria for measuring detention DRCSs**

21

Only root variables in the constructed PSC BN model are considered to be the possible criteria for decision-making analysis, as they are derived directly from the PSC

22

1 inspection database, and can be effectively influenced by the stakeholders from  
 2 different aspects via appropriate actions. According to Fig 3, they are vessel flag, vessel  
 3 age, type of inspections and port of inspection. Port of inspection is at large fixed based  
 4 on the charter party that the ship is engaged with and hence beyond the owner's direct  
 5 control and removed from the criterion list. Therefore, the retained three root variables  
 6 are selected as the criteria for measuring and comparing the performance of DRCSs,  
 7 including vessel flag, vessel age, and type of inspections.

8 **Step 4.** Weighting the criteria according to the mutual information

9 In this research, the weight of each criterion is determined according to the mutual  
 10 information of each node. Mutual information is the information that two variables  
 11 share in a BN, which can be used to calculate the strength of the relationships between  
 12 the target node (i.e. detention) and influencing nodes (i.e. the selected three criteria -  
 13 vessel age, vessel flag, and type of inspections) in this study. One of the advantages of  
 14 mutual information is that it can be computed between variables at different layers. The  
 15 mutual information between 'detention' and other risk variables can be defined as:

$$I(D, \beta) = - \sum_{d,i} P(d, \beta_i) \log_b \frac{P(d, \beta_i)}{P(d)P(\beta_i)} \quad (1)$$

16 Where  $D$  represents 'detention',  $\beta$  represents risk variable,  $\beta_i$  represents the  $i$ th state  
 17 of  $\beta$ ,  $I(D, \beta)$  represents the mutual information between 'detention' and risk variables.  
 18 The value of  $I(D, \beta)$  is only related to the two variables  $D$  and  $\beta$ , and it is independent  
 19 to other mutual information in the model. The larger the value of mutual information  
 20 is, the stronger relationship which exists between variable ' $\beta$ ' and 'detention'. It is  
 21 noteworthy that the amount of mutual information represents the degree of influence,  
 22 not the exact weight of variables.

23 Then, the weight of each criterion can be calculated using Eq. (2).

$$w_j = I_j / \sum_{j=1}^n I_j, j = 1, 2, \dots, n \quad (2)$$

25 where,  $w_j$  is the weight of  $j$ th criterion (or in other words,  $j$ th selected risk variable), and  
 26  $I_j$  is the mutual information between  $j$ th risk variable and 'detention'.

27 **Step 5.** Construction of the decision matrix of DRCSs

28 DRCSs are developed from different perspectives based on multiple sources in order to  
 29 maximally reduce the risk of ship detention, and the performance of each DRCS against  
 30 each criterion under a specific risk scenario is assessed by expert judgement. For  
 31 example, under a high-risk scenario, stricter control measures are usually more

1 desirable; while under a low-risk condition, more attention will be paid on the cost of  
 2 taking countermeasures in order to select a cost-effective one. In this way, the  
 3 performance of each DRCS against each variable under dynamic situations can be  
 4 achieved. A questionnaire survey was designed to collect experts' judgements about  
 5 the performance of DRCSs in terms of each criterion. Experienced staff members who  
 6 have working experience in relation to the PSC inspections of European ports were  
 7 selected for the case study. The subjective probability distributions from multiple expert  
 8 judgments are merged using a weighted average approach (Wan et al., 2018). To  
 9 facilitate subjective data collection and representation of judgements associated with  
 10 the performance of DRCSs, a set of linguistic variables are defined. Three grades of  
 11 performance are considered, and they are described using linguistic variables “low”,  
 12 “medium”, and “high”. Supposing altogether  $l$  variables are used to evaluate the  
 13 performance of DRCSs, then the score of  $k^{th}$  variable ( $C_k$ ) can be calculated using Eq.  
 14 (3) (Yang et al., 2014).

$$C_k = 10^{k-1} (k = 1, 2, \dots, l) \quad (3)$$

16  $k$  is the order of variables and they are listed in an ascending order, which means a  
 17 higher value of  $k$  represents a better performance in this study. Thus, the scores of “low”,  
 18 “medium”, and “high” are 1 ( $10^0$ ), 10 ( $10^1$ ), 100 ( $10^2$ ), respectively, and then the overall  
 19 evaluation can be transferred into a numeric value by using the following utility  
 20 function.

$$u(E) = \sum_{l=1}^L \beta_l u(G_l) \quad (4)$$

22 Where,  $u(E)$  is the total score of the performance of a DRCS,  $l$  is the number of  
 23 linguistic variables used to describe the performance of a DRCS (which is three here),  
 24  $u(G_l)$  is the score of  $l$ th grade of performance, and  $\beta_l$  is the subjective probability  
 25 distributed to  $l$ th grade of performance, ranging from 0% to 100%.

26 Based on the criteria and evaluation on the performance of DRCSs, a decision matrix  
 27  $D = (x_{mn})$  can be established, and normalized as:

$$r_{ij} = x_{ij} / \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^m x_{ij}^2}, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, m; j = 1, 2, \dots, n \quad (5)$$

29 Where,  $x_{ij}$  in matrix  $D$  describes the performance of  $i^{th}$  DRCS with respect to  $j^{th}$  criterion.  
 30  $m$  is the total number of DRCS, and  $n$  is the number of criteria.  $r_{ij}$  denotes the normalised  
 31 value of  $x_{ij}$ .

1 Multiply the columns of the normalized matrix by the associated weights to obtain the  
2 weighted decision matrix  $A = (v_{mj})$ :

$$3 \quad v_{ij} = w_j \cdot r_{ij}, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, m, \quad j = 1, 2, \dots, n \quad (6)$$

4 Where,  $w_j$  is the weight of  $j$ th criterion.

5 **Step 6.** Selection of the optimal DRCSs

6 Once the weighted decision matrix is constructed, the optimal DRCSs can be identified  
7 via employing the TOPSIS algorithm. Firstly, the positive ideal and the negative ideal  
8 solutions, are denoted by  $A^+$  and  $A^-$ , respectively. They are defined as follows:

$$9 \quad \begin{aligned} A^+ &= (v_1^+, v_2^+, \dots, v_n^+) = \{(\max_i\{v_{ij}\} | j \in J_1), (\min_i\{v_{ij}\} | j \in J_2)\}; \\ A^- &= (v_1^-, v_2^-, \dots, v_n^-) = \{(\min_i\{v_{ij}\} | j \in J_1), (\max_i\{v_{ij}\} | j \in J_2)\} \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

10 Where,  $J_1$  and  $J_2$  represent the set of benefit and cost criteria, respectively.

11 Secondly, the Euclidean distances of each DRCS from the PIS ( $d_j^+$ ) and the NIS ( $d_j^-$ )  
12 can be calculated as:

$$13 \quad \begin{aligned} d_i^+ &= \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^n (v_{ij} - v_j^+)^2}, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, m; \quad j = 1, 2, \dots, n; \\ d_i^- &= \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^n (v_{ij} - v_j^-)^2}, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, m; \quad j = 1, 2, \dots, n \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

14 Finally, the relative closeness ( $S_i$ ) to the ideal solution is calculated as:

$$15 \quad S_i = \frac{d_i^-}{d_i^+ + d_i^-}, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, m \quad (9)$$

16 Where,  $0 \leq S_i \leq 1$ .

17 After ranking the DRCSs according the relative closeness, the DRCSs with the highest  
18  $S_i$  are selected to reduce a ship detention rate.

19 **Step 7.** Validation of the proposed method

20 The validation of the proposed method is conducted through its benchmark with some  
21 established methods. In this process, the results from all the investigated methods are  
22 compared to check their consistency.

23

24 **4 Case study**

#### 1 **4.1 DRCSs of ship detention**

2 In this study, DRCSs are developed and taken in response to the risk influencing factors  
3 (e.g., detainable deficiencies of ships) which are directly and closely related to the ship  
4 detention, and will increase the possibility of a ship being detained to a large extent  
5 under PSC inspections. From the perspective of system engineering, a system is usually  
6 composed of three major parts which are human, machine and environment (Lank et  
7 al., 2011). In this study, we substitute management factors for environmental ones  
8 considering the special role management plays in the safety of waterway transportation  
9 and the fact that environmental factors are usually difficult to control, whether natural  
10 environment or political environment. Thus, three main aspects considered here are  
11 human (e.g., crew), vessel, and management (e.g., shipping company, maritime safety  
12 authority, and port authority). By combing this idea with the existing PSC practice,  
13 several generic DRCSs are selected only for the illustrative purpose of the proposed  
14 method<sup>1</sup>.

##### 15 DRCS #1. Strengthen the knowledge promotion of PSC inspection

16 Strengthen the knowledge promotion of PSC inspection for those who work closely  
17 related to the maritime shipping such as managers of shipping companies, senior crew,  
18 and shore-based personnel. For example, the training of seafarers on PSC inspection  
19 can vigorously improve the professional quality of seafarers, and raise the awareness  
20 of safety management as well. Maritime shipping safety is closely related to the quality  
21 of the crew. Thus, many shipping companies have not only required crew members to  
22 conduct performance training, but also developed special training courses for crew  
23 based on the company's conditions, in order to improve their competitiveness in the  
24 shipping market. It should be ensured that captains are full familiar with the company's  
25 Safety Management System (SMS). When PSC officers audit the captain with respect  
26 to performance of the monitoring duties, they will pay attention not only to the written  
27 records of captains such as Navigation Logs, but also their actual monitoring quality of  
28 operation.

##### 29 DRCS #2. Arrange shipping routes based on ship risk condition

30 Several amendments to the maritime safety-related conventions have come into effect  
31 in the past five years, with many different types of inspection items being involved.  
32 Therefore, both management and operation personnel on board should be familiar with  
33 the relevant requirements of the amendments in a timely manner, and take effective

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<sup>1</sup> It is worth noting that the development of specific DRCSs are very complicated, requiring information on operational environments to make it sensible according to the survey of domain experts in the process of identifying valid DRCSs in this work. For the purpose of illustrating the proposed methodology and not losing the generality of the used DRCSs, the following three generic strategies are put forward in this study.

1 measures to ensure that ships meet the new requirements of conventions. It is required  
 2 that more attention should be paid on the ships with a relatively higher risk level with  
 3 respect to maintenance and shore-based support, in order to reduce risks of ships.

4 **DRCS #3. Self-inspection of ships before sailing**

5 It is required that shipping companies should establish reasonable self-inspection  
 6 procedures before the sailing of a ship. An individual agency/department is suggested  
 7 to set up which is responsible for collecting PSC information of the ships abroad. Also,  
 8 we need to clarify the responsibilities of relevant departments, personnel and ships,  
 9 eliminate the defects found in time, and improve the technical status of the ship. Every  
 10 time before the sailing of ships, the crew should conduct self-inspection with respect to  
 11 ship's technical conditions and cargo loading conditions, and fill out the "Self-  
 12 inspection checklist" which needs to be signed and confirmed by the captain in  
 13 responsible before sailing. Shipping companies, regulatory bodies/authorities and  
 14 classification societies need to work together to develop and implement a tripartite  
 15 coordination mechanism for PSC inspection, and strengthen the safety management of  
 16 ships through the implementation of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code.

17 **4.2 Evaluation of the selected DRCSs**

18 First of all, the weights of criteria can be determined based on the mutual information  
 19 between these nodes and target node, as shown in Table 1. It is noted that the value of  
 20 mutual information between all nodes and target node ‘detention’ were calculated, but  
 21 only that of root nodes is presented. According to the mutual information, the weight  
 22 of each criteria can then be calculated using Eq. (2), and the results are listed as follows:

23 **Table 2 - Mutual information between root nodes and ‘Detention’ in 2015-2017**

Node	Mutual Information	Percent	Weight
Detention	0.20388	100	-
Vessel age	0.00669	3.28	0.55
Type of inspections	0.00523	2.57	0.43
Vessel flag	0.00025	0.123	0.02

24

25 The assessment of the three DRCSs with respect to different risk variables influencing  
 26 ship detention under PSC inspection was conducted to demonstrate the feasibility of  
 27 the proposed method in the performance evaluation of DRCSs. A questionnaire was  
 28 conducted with three senior staff from different organisations working related to the  
 29 PSC inspection and ship navigation safety. It is worth noting that all these experts have

1 working experience in European countries (or European shipping routes) to ensure that  
 2 they are familiar with Paris MoU. The qualification of the selected experts is  
 3 summarized as follows:

- 4 • Expert No. 1: Senior Captain, technical safety department; has worked onboard  
 5 ships on different shipping routes for more than 12 years.
- 6 • Expert No. 2: General Manager, marine operations centre; involved in the safety  
 7 and security management of global ship fleets for more than 12 years.
- 8 • Expert No. 3: Senior marine investigator, maritime authority; has worked on  
 9 maritime safety and accident investigation for more than 13 years.

10 This study employed a subjective probability method to collect expert opinions.  
 11 Subjective probability is a probability derived from an expert’s judgment about the  
 12 degrees of a specific assessment level to which one criterion belongs with respect to  
 13 any DRCS. In the subjective probability method, the performance of each DRCS is  
 14 estimated and represented using the probability distribution of the linguistic variables  
 15 (i.e. *Low*, *Medium*, and *High*), provided directly by experts (see an example in  
 16 Appendix A). Due to the similar seniority of the three experts, equal weight was  
 17 assigned to each expert when combining their evaluations, and then the total score of  
 18 each DRCS in terms of each criterion can be calculated by using Eq. (4). The results  
 19 are summarised in Table 3.

20 **Table 3 - Summary of the evaluation results from different experts**

RCS	Criteria	Evaluation of DRCSs			Total score
		<i>Low</i>	<i>medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
No.1	Vessel age	63%	37%		4.3
	Type of inspections	40%	60%		6.4
	Vessel flag	67%	33%		4.0
No.2	Vessel age		17%	83%	85.0
	Type of inspections	17%	47%	36%	41.5
	Vessel flag	17%	57%	26%	32.5
No.3	Vessel age	63%	37%		4.3
	Type of inspections		40%	60%	64.0
	Vessel flag		43%	57%	61.0

21

1 Based on the above information, the weighted normalized decision matrix for the  
 2 evaluation of DRCSs can be constructed using Eq. (5) and (6), which is shown as  
 3 follows.

$$4 \quad D = \begin{pmatrix} 0.0257 & 0.0385 & 0.0017 \\ 0.5087 & 0.2494 & 0.0141 \\ 0.0257 & 0.3846 & 0.0264 \end{pmatrix}$$

5 Finally, the DRCSs can be ranked according to the value of relative closeness, as shown  
 6 in Table 4.

7 **Table 4 - Ranking of the DRCSs**

	$d^+$	$d^-$	$S_j$	Rank
DRCS 1	0.613	0	0	3
DRCS 2	0.127	0.557	0.815	1
DRCS 3	0.521	0.324	0.383	2

8

9 As aforementioned, the results from Table 4 indicate the preference of each DRCS  
 10 with respect to the overall dry bulk ship detention data of MoU Paris in the period  
 11 of 2015-2017. Due to the difficulty of accessing individual port/ship company level  
 12 information on the operational environment, the DRCS ranking and functionality  
 13 analysis are kept at the generic level. From the managerial implication perspective,  
 14 it helps ship owners/management companies to understand that without further  
 15 specific port level information, they could implement the above three strategies in  
 16 a sequence to reduce the ship's detention rate in European ports. It also serves as  
 17 the base line to observe how the methodology can be used to deal with dynamic  
 18 situations when specific data becomes available.

19 **4.3 Performance of DRCSs under dynamic situations**

20 In this section, the performance of the DRCSs under dynamic situations is demonstrated.  
 21 To explore this dynamic feature, new evidence is collected and entered into the  
 22 proposed method. An extended database of over 2000 inspection records in 2018 is  
 23 collected. Based on the same group of experts, the performance of three DRCSs under  
 24 new environment is presented as follows. Table 5 is the updated mutual information  
 25 between root nodes and 'Detention' in 2018.

26 **Table 5 - Mutual information between root nodes and 'Detention' in 2018**

Node	Mutual Information	Percent	Weight
Detention	0.18495	100	-

Vessel age	0.00280	1.51	0.44
Type of inspections	0.00344	1.86	0.54
Vessel flag	0.00017	0.0926	0.02

1 For illustration purpose only, we use the same evaluation results of each DRCS as  
 2 presented in Table 2 to reflect the dynamic features of the proposed model in decision-  
 3 making under a different scenario (for this case, it is a different time period)<sup>2</sup>. Under  
 4 this situation, the weighted normalized decision matrix for the evaluation of DRCSs in  
 5 2018 can be constructed as follows.

$$6 \quad D = \begin{pmatrix} 0.0156 & 0.0560 & 0.0012 \\ 0.3092 & 0.3632 & 0.0094 \\ 0.0156 & 0.5602 & 0.0176 \end{pmatrix}$$

7 Finally, the DRCSs can be ranked according to the value of their relative closeness

8 **Table 6 - Ranking of the DRCSs in 2018**

	$d^+$	$d^-$	$S_j$	Rank
DRCS 1	0.582	0	0	3
DRCS 2	0.159	0.485	0.753	1
DRCS 3	0.417	0.407	0.494	2

9

10 It can be seen from the above results that although the same order of ranking of DRCSs  
 11 are obtained in 2018, the numerical gap ( $S_j$  value) between DRCS 2 and DRCS 3 is  
 12 much reduced, which indicates that the performance of these two strategies tend to be  
 13 similar under this circumstance. It is believed that with more PSC inspection data  
 14 derived from other time periods, the changing trend of the role that these DRCSs play  
 15 in different time periods can be revealed.

#### 16 **4.4 Validation and analysis of the results**


17 Since the criteria in the decision matrix are generated from risk variables in the PSC  
 18 BN, the evaluation of the DRCSs with respect to each criterion from expert judgement  
 19 can also be explained as the effects of DRCSs on the mitigation of each risk factor.  
 20 Thus, the performance of the DRCSs in terms of each criterion will be transformed into  
 21 the reduction of probability of relevant risk factors in the BN model. This kind of  
 22 transformation is achieved according to the total score that a DRCS obtained. For  
 23 example, the total score of DRCS #1 in terms of vessel flag is 4.0, it means that a share  
 24 of probability of 4.0% is reassigned in node “vessel flag” moving toward the maximal

<sup>2</sup> It is worth noting that the proposed model is able to deal with both dynamic weights and evaluations under different scenarios when more evaluation results from experts are collected.

1 decrement of detention risk (from status “black high” to “white”). In this way, the  
 2 performance of DRCSs can be reflected in the form of variation of detention rate of  
 3 individual vessels in the BN model, and then the DRCSs can be ranked according to  
 4 their effects on reducing the ship detention rate under PSC inspections.

5 Figure 4 shows the result of detention analysis based on the BN model. It indicates that  
 6 the detention rate of a bulk carrier is estimated to be 3.19% given the input data covering  
 7 the period of 2015-2017. If we calculate the detention rate from the database directly,  
 8 it is 3.23%, which shows a harmony with the result delivered by the model (a similarity  
 9 of 98.8%). The model is verified in terms of prediction of detention rate of bulk carriers.

10



11


12

**Fig 4 - Results of BN model**

13

Source: Author

14 Taking DRCS #1 as an illustration, the total scores of it in terms of criterion vessel age,  
 15 type of inspections, vessel flag are 4.3, 6.4, 4.0 respectively, which means that the  
 16 probability reassigned in node “vessel age”, “type of inspections”, “vessel flag” are  
 17 4.3%, 6.4%, and 4.0% respectively, moving towards the maximal decrement of  
 18 detention risk. For example, in node “vessel age”, the probability of “over 20 years”  
 19 will be decreased from 6.05% to 1.75%, while that of “0 to 5 years” will be increased  
 20 from 27.5% to 31.8% accordingly. In a similar way, the effect of each DRCS on the  
 21 reduction of ship detention risk can be calculated according to the BN model, as shown  
 22 in Fig 5, 6, and 7, respectively.




1

2

**Fig 5 - Risk of ship detention under DRCS #1**

3




4

5

**Fig 6 - Risk of ship detention under DRCS #2**

6



1

2

**Fig 7 - Risk of ship detention under DRCS #3**

3 It can be seen from the BN results that, after the implementation of these DRCSs  
 4 individually, the detention rate of a bulk carrier is reduced to 2.60%, 0.96%, and 1.30%  
 5 respectively. The results reveal that DRCS #2 performs the best in in this case, followed  
 6 by DRCS #3 and #1. This is consistent with the results obtained from the proposed  
 7 method, validating the model to a certain degree.

#### 8 **4.5 Managerial insights**

##### 9 **4.5.1 Perspective from the port authorities**

10 Port authorities usually aim to regulate the behaviour of ship owners in order to avoid  
 11 potential accidents and ensure ship safety through their PSC inspections. Vessels with  
 12 different risk levels will be provided with different safety-improve suggestions.  
 13 According to the results of the proposed models, the DRCSs which show better  
 14 performance in terms of the reduction of detention risk of ships can be collected and  
 15 taken as a reference for port authorities when formulating and improving corresponding  
 16 inspection regulations. This in turn will also improve the overall quality of ships to be  
 17 inspected, and thus enhance the safety of maritime transportation.

##### 18 **4.5.2 Perspective of the shipping companies**

19 Once a vessel was detained, all the identified deficiencies need to be fully addressed as  
 20 required. Different from port authorities, shipping companies care more on profits and  
 21 are more likely to know whether the implementation of a DRCS could help them to  
 22 reduce detention cost, and how effective it is. In this regard, the proposed model is

1 helpful to support their decisions as it provides a way for comparing the performance  
2 of different DRCSs in a quantitative manner, making it possible to carry out cost-  
3 effective analysis of DRCSs if needed. Furthermore, the effectiveness of one DRCS on  
4 different ships can also be calculated so that DRCSs can match different ships under  
5 different conditions more appropriately.

6 **5 Conclusion**

7 Although BNs have proven to be a powerful technique for reasoning under uncertainty  
8 and have been widely applied in the prediction of ship detention risk under PSC  
9 inspection, they cannot be used directly to make a decision in terms of the selection of  
10 the most effective countermeasures since such a decision are usually based on some  
11 certain criteria other than a single goal of safety. To solve this problem, this paper  
12 proposes a novel method by incorporating a data-driven BN with the TOPSIS method  
13 in a complementary manner for selecting risk control options of ship detention under  
14 PSC inspections.

15 The proposed model in this research is proved to be able to deal with both dynamic  
16 weights and evaluations when more evaluation results from experts are collected. The  
17 novel method can be used to quantitatively analyse the performance of different risk  
18 control strategies under PSC inspections, so as to provide stakeholders with helpful  
19 reference on the evaluation of DRCSs from different aspects and identify the most  
20 effective one under different situations. Moreover, the proposed model has the potential  
21 to be adapted to different application scenarios. On one hand, it helps collect and  
22 analyse the current information of ships under PSC inspection to model the  
23 relationships between different variables; On the other hand, based on the results of  
24 analysis, it can evaluate how much one DRCS can reduce the detention probabilities  
25 after being applied to reduce future detention risk. It is well reflected by the BN ability  
26 of supporting forward risk prediction and backward risk diagnosis.

27 It is worth noting that the ranking of DRCSs is mainly used to show the feasibility of  
28 the proposed model and methodology. When port/management company level data  
29 becomes available, the methodology can be tailored and applied to evaluate more  
30 specific DRCSs. The findings from the case should be further interpreted to meet the  
31 individual stakeholder requirements. Any implications from the discussed DRCSs  
32 should be carefully reviewed to avoid any misleading insights being disseminated  
33 inappropriately. In future research, with the proposed method being gradually applied  
34 in real world and more detailed information of the detainable deficiencies from PSC  
35 inspections being collected, more specific stakeholder-related DRCSs can be developed  
36 accordingly to guide the action of shipping companies, so that the safety of maritime

1 shipping can be improved. Besides, the performance of these DRCSs can also be  
2 evaluated and compared to further validate and improve the proposed method.

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10

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29

1 **Appendix A**

2 *Questionnaire Survey*

3 Three grades (using linguistic variables “*low*”, “*medium*”, and “*high*”.) of performance  
4 of DRCSs are considered in terms of their influence on each detention risk parameter  
5 (or criteria). Linguistic grade *Low* means the investigated DRCS has a slight impact on  
6 the selected criteria, *Medium* indicates a moderate impact, and *High* indicates a strong  
7 impact.

8 The performance of each DRCS is estimated using the probability distribution of the  
9 linguistic variables provided directly by experts. For example, if an expert thinks that  
10 DRCS #1 has a slight impact on the vessel age with a belief degree of 20%, and a  
11 moderate impact on the vessel age with a belief degree of 80%. Then the performance  
12 of DRCS #1 with respect to vessel age will be 0.2 *Low* and 0.8 *Medium*. An example  
13 of the judgement on DRCS #1 with respect to each criterion is show in Table A1.

14 In a similar way, performance evaluation results of DRCSs from different experts can  
15 be obtained and merged together for case study.

16 Table A1 Example of judgement from an expert

DRCS	Criteria	Performance of DRCSs		
		<i>Low</i>	<i>medium</i>	<i>High</i>
No.1	Vessel age	20%	80%	
	Type of inspections		50%	50%
	Vessel flag	90%	10%	
No.2	Vessel age			
	Type of inspections			
	Vessel flag			
No.3	Vessel age			
	Type of inspections			
	Vessel flag			

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