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1 **“In Weapons We Trust?” Four-culture analysis of factors associated with**
2 **weapon tolerance in young males**

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25

26 **Abstract**

27 Addressing the under-researched issue of weapon tolerance, the paper examines factors behind
28 male knife and gun tolerance across four different cultures, seeking to rank them in terms of
29 predictive power and shed light on relations between them. To this end, four regression and
30 structural equation modelling analyses were conducted using samples from the US ($n=189$),
31 India ($n=196$), England ($n=107$) and Poland ($n=375$). Each sample of male participants
32 indicated their standing on several dimensions (i.e., predictors) derived from theory and related
33 research (i.e., *Psychoticism*, *Need for Respect*, *Aggressive Masculinity*, *Belief in Social*
34 *Mobility and Doubt in Authority*). All four regression models were statistically significant. The
35 knife tolerance predictors were: *Aggressive Masculinity* (positive) in the US, Poland and
36 England, *Belief in Social Mobility* (negative) in the US and England, *Need for Respect*
37 (positive) in India and *Psychoticism* (positive) in Poland. The gun tolerance predictors were:
38 *Psychoticism* (positive) in the US, India and Poland, *Aggressive Masculinity* (positive) in the
39 US, England and Poland, and *Belief in in Social Mobility* (negative) in the US, *Belief in Social*
40 *Mobility* (positive) and *Doubt in Authority* (negative) in Poland. The Structural Equation
41 Weapon Tolerance Model (WTM) suggested an indirect effect for the latent factor *Perceived*
42 *Social Ecological Constraints* via its positive relation with the latent factor *Saving Face*, both
43 knife and gun tolerance were predicted by *Psychoticism*.

44 *Keywords:* attitudes, culture, individual differences, guns, knives, tolerance

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50 Although violence in human cultures is typically seen as normal [1], the factors
51 associated with its inception and expression can vary widely, likely shaping attitudes towards
52 carrying weapons, such as guns and knives, which are the focus of this paper. Some of the
53 main factors argued to influence violence include: poverty and inequality [2], levels of
54 disadvantage in the community [3], socio-geo-cultural elements associated with religion [4],
55 collective memory of intergroup conflict [5], scepticism about the rule of law [6] and perceived
56 threat [7]. Whilst the concept of culture has been often associated with values seen as worthy
57 of defending [8], some newer approaches suggest viewing culture as a repertoire of strategies
58 for negotiating social situations [7, 9, 10, 11]. Thus, in the current paper, we adapt this more
59 recent approach.

60 Acknowledging that violence is dependent on context and shaped by culturally-
61 determined factors [12], we respond to the need for the search of aggression patterns across
62 different nations suggested by Archer [13]. Specifically, we address a gap in comparative
63 research on young males in the US, England, India and Poland, which are respectively
64 associated with individualistic, collectivist and mixed cultural values and different attitudes to
65 violence and weapons [14]. The choice of the first three cultures was driven by the common
66 language – the three most populated English-speaking nations. The choice of Poland, a non-
67 anglophile country, was driven by the links that it has with the first three, like collectivist
68 cultural elements - similarity to India - increasing individualism and relatively unregulated
69 economy - similarity to the US and England. Mindful of the research bias towards mono-
70 culturalism, which might be partly down to inherent methodological issues in cross-cultural
71 research [15, 16], we focus on the underexplored theme of weapon tolerance.

72 **The American context**

73 American history books are replete with narratives from the *Wild West*, with larger-
74 than-life characters, like *Billy the Kid*. Hollywood films glorified the unruly, untamed

75 western states in most Westerns, most notably made popular by actors John Wayne and
76 Clint Eastwood. Historically, the Americans' relationship with guns have been politically
77 nuanced. While US gun culture has association with hunting motifs, now it is self-
78 protection that is argued to play a central role [17]. In the regard, Conservative figures
79 present them as tools for keeping their family members safe from threats posed by
80 strangers [18]. While glamorisation has arguably been driven by Hollywood depictions –
81 and the National Rifles Association mythologising weapon-carrying as a symbol of respect,
82 status and courage [17] - commercials romanticise it in terms of affirming safety, freedom
83 and self-reliance [18].

84 Approximately 30% of American adults report owning a gun, with one-in-ten of US
85 adults living in households where there are guns [19]. How many illegal guns remain in
86 circulation is unknown as it is part of the hidden, *dark* numbers missing from crime statistics.
87 That being said, America has more guns than people [20] reflecting a cultural context in which
88 figures such as Old West sheriffs or lawmen are often depicted in a romanticised or aspirational
89 manner. Indeed, this cultural ethos extends to vigilantism, which, under the constitutional
90 framework of *citizen's arrest*, appears to endorse the idea of individuals taking the law into
91 their own hands.

92 The federal law has no restriction on openly carrying a firearm, except for rules that
93 apply to any property that is owned or operated by the federal government [21]. When there
94 have been school shootings, there have even been suggestions that teachers should be armed in
95 the classroom. While most states have no restrictions on knife-carrying in general, certain types
96 and knives (e.g., switchblades) are illegal in some states. While the most common weapon used
97 to commit homicide in the US remain firearms, they are followed by knives that are used to
98 kill, on average, more than 1500 people each year [22].

99 **The Indian context**

100 India is renowned for having some of the strictest gun laws in the world. While citizens
101 are legally allowed to own and carry firearms, this privilege is not constitutionally guaranteed,
102 and obtaining a gun license is challenging. The application process is lengthy and complex,
103 often requiring legal assistance and numerous documents, such as medical and police
104 certificates. In contrast to firearms, however, India has a rich socio-historical connection to
105 bladed weapons, rooted in one of its greatest material contributions: *Deccani wootz steel*. Often
106 celebrated as the *wonder material of the Orient* [23], this steel was used to craft the famed
107 *Damascus blades*. These high-quality weapons were not only functional but also artistically
108 adorned with carvings and inlays of brass, silver, and gold [24], embedding swords and knives
109 into Indian culture as both tools and symbols of heritage.

110 In comparison to the United States, India has a lower homicide rate, with the United
111 Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reporting 3.22 per 100,000 in 2020 compared to 5.35 in
112 the U.S. But for all that, India's approach to crime data collection differs significantly. The
113 National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), a state agency, does not track knife crime
114 specifically, and its crime categorisation diverges from that of the U.S., England, or other
115 Western nations. Furthermore, India lacks independent, non-governmental institutions
116 dedicated to gathering comprehensive crime statistics. As a result, there is no official data on
117 knife crime, its causes, or its impact, nor on strategies for its prevention and reduction.

118 **The English context**

119 After 2005, a significant rise in knife crimes was recorded in European countries [25].
120 According to the Scottish Crime and Justice Survey, in 2013-14 the knife was the most
121 commonly used weapon (39%), and sharp objects were the most commonly used instruments
122 in homicide in Scotland. Since 2009, over £2.5 million were spent on the "*No Knives, Better*
123 *Lives*" initiative [26] that started with the intention to educate young people about the dangers
124 and consequences of knife-carrying. Glasgow's Violence Reduction Unit (VRU), established

125 in 2005, has also played a significant role by encouraging local firms to hire former offenders
126 and offering mentorship services to jobseekers. Since then, the homicide rate in Scotland has
127 dropped by 60% [27].

128 In England, knife attacks have recently surged to unprecedented levels. In the year
129 ending March 2018, 285 people were killed in knife or sharp instrument-related homicides,
130 marking the highest number since records began in 1946. During the same period,
131 approximately 40,000 offenses involving a knife or sharp object were recorded in England and
132 Wales, an 8% increase from the previous year, according to the Office for National Statistics
133 (ONS). Meanwhile, firearm crime levels in the UK remain among the lowest globally, a fact
134 widely attributed to the country's stringent gun ownership laws. Yet, the UK is not entirely free
135 of firearm offences. According to the National Crime Agency, 5,750 firearm-related offenses
136 were reported in England and Wales in the year ending March 2022. Despite these figures, the
137 UK's overall homicide rate remains low, with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
138 reporting a rate of just 1.20 per 100,000 people in 2020.

139 **The Polish context**

140 Poland transitioned from the Soviet-imposed communist system to a democratic free-
141 market system in 1989, joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1999 and
142 the EU in 2004. The transition was marked by a rapid increase in violent crimes oftentimes
143 committed with smuggled guns, knives and baseball bats, which was attributed to less strict
144 border checks, more limited police powers and a legal system that became more liberal [28].
145 The legal and freely available baseball bat became associated with tracksuit-clad soccer
146 hooligans and extortion gangs demanding protection fees from new private businesses
147 previously banned under communism [29] – a point that remains relevant to research on
148 weapon-carrying in Poland in socio-historical terms.

149 Poland's participation in the Schengen Zone (where most European countries,
 150 abolished their internal borders, for the free and unrestricted movement of people), coupled
 151 with the key drug transit route from Asia to Western Europe, facilitate the flow of illegal
 152 firearms that are mostly held by organised criminal groups. Despite this, and notwithstanding
 153 some of the most liberal laws regarding bladed instruments, Poland's homicide rate in 2020
 154 was half of that of the UK: 0.67 per 100,000. The following Table 1 illustrates the four contexts
 155 in terms of key statistics:

156 **Table 1**

157
 158 Weapons, Violence and Country [30]

159 Factor	160 US	161 UK	162 India	163 Poland
164 Human development index	.927	.940	.644	.881
165 GDP per capita in \$	85,373	58,880	10,123	49,060
166 % of world gun deaths	14.85	.006	5.9	.004
167 Stabbing mortality rate	.60	.08	.64	.49
168 Homicide rate per 100,000	4.96	1.20	3.08	.73
169 Violence rate per 100,000	3.96	.004	.57	.009
170 Guns per 100 people	120.50	5.10	5.30	2.50

170 Despite some obvious similarities between the individualist cultures of the United
 171 States and United Kingdom [31], the attitudes to weapons remain vastly different [32], the most
 172 popular items being respectively guns [32] and knives [33, 34]. Whereas the former are
 173 constitutional – for instance under the US 2nd amendment - the latter remain illegal to carry in
 174 public in the UK, where even a screwdriver may hold criminal culpability without reasonable
 175 plausibility. Largely collectivist India and (to a lesser extent) Poland (generally conservative
 176 Catholic community with increasing individual aspirations) both prohibit personal possession
 177 of firearms without special licenses that are not practically available to most citizens.

178 **Current research**

179 Notwithstanding the differences in weapon prevalence (e.g., guns vs. knives) between
 180 countries, adolescent weapon-carrying is widely regarded as a global issue [35]. One partial

181 explanation for weapon-carrying tolerance is offered by *Protection Motivation Theory* [36],
182 which covers how people perceive or evaluate any risk and how they adopt protecting
183 behaviours or measures. The theory suggests that four cognitions facilitate motivations for self-
184 defence: *risk severity*, *risk vulnerability*, *self-efficacy at reducing risk*, and the *response efficacy*
185 *of the advocated behaviour*. The theory also proposes that such motivations can be
186 compromised by the apparent costs of risk-reduction and likely benefits of risk-increasing
187 behaviour (e.g., weapon-carrying). The involved processes thus include threat appraisal (i.e.,
188 severity, vulnerability, and benefits) and coping appraisal (i.e., self-efficacy, response efficacy,
189 and costs).

190 Despite a wealth of research on weapon-carrying [33, 35], it is unclear what factors lie
191 behind attitudes towards its tolerance, which may not necessarily imply acceptance of violence.
192 Our present paper aims to address this gap by building upon a structural equation *Knife*
193 *Tolerance Model* (KTM) by Palasinski et al., [33], which covers factors associated with knife-
194 carrying tolerance in England. KTM was partially informed by a systematic review and meta-
195 analysis of cross-sectional and longitudinal research on weapon-carrying [37] and grounded in
196 terms of self-protection (construed as: Physical Defence Ability and Need for Respect). The
197 KTM revealed significant intercorrelations between physical defence ability, limited trust in
198 authority (e.g., in the police), limited control over one's status and the need for respect (i.e.,
199 predictor factors), and how they predict aggressive masculinity (i.e., 'macho' culture).
200 Importantly, the KTM also identified two significant underlying (i.e., latent and not
201 immediately apparent) factors: perceived social ecological constraints (i.e., socioeconomic
202 limitations, like deprivation and few opportunities) and saving face (i.e., honor and inter-male
203 competition).

204 Identifying the complex processes underlying weapon carrying tolerance has both
205 theoretical and practical implications, especially when we seek to develop evidence-based

206 intervention campaigns. Thus, in the present paper, we answer the call for more in-depth
207 research on weapon-carrying [38] and examine the validity of KTM concepts with regards to
208 both knives and guns, as well as their relevance to different cultures.

209 Based on the KTM [33], we hypothesized that our proposed Structural Equation
210 Weapon Tolerance Model (Figure 1; featuring the same main scales as KTM) would also be
211 statistically significant with regards to the two weapons (i.e., guns and knives) and across
212 different cultures. Given the recent research implying some limitations of *Protection*
213 *Motivation Theory* [36], and the absence of personality factors in KTM, we also included the
214 dimension of psychoticism in WTM,

215 Since it is mostly men who engage in physical violence [39] in real life-settings [40]
216 across different cultures [13], and who were experimentally shown to find guns and knives
217 faster than women [41], in the present research all our participants are male. To highlight the
218 distinct differences on the cross-cultural spectrum, reflect separate data collection time
219 windows and to aid readability, the research is presented in the form of four samples. As there
220 is enormous cultural variance in each examined country and our samples are regional, the
221 identified differences should be treated more like an introduction to research on cultural
222 aspects of weapon-carrying whose fuller tapestry should be pursued in further studies.
223 Following the Institutional Review Board, all participants confirmed their written consent on
224 the introductory study page.

225 **Methodology**

226 The anonymous survey study, which involved the same questions and scale items for
227 each country (all presented in English except for the Polish sample faced with a professionally
228 translated Polish version) was introduced to all participants as ‘aspects of aggression’.
229 Participants were recruited via opportunity sampling; it took approximately 10 minutes to

230 complete the survey featuring a number of 5-point anchored Likert-type scales that were
231 presented to participants without any labels.

232 The dependent factors (and their respective 5-item scales were kept deliberately brief
233 to encourage completion rates) were derived from and based on the key concepts from closely
234 related papers on violence and knives [33, 34]. Thus, the dependent factors included: Knife
235 Tolerance (e.g., The mass media exaggerate the dangers of carrying a blade; $\alpha=.73$) and Gun
236 Tolerance (e.g., The mass media exaggerate the dangers of gun-carrying; $\alpha=.71$).

237 The key independent factors were based on the same respective 5-item scales used in
238 the KTM paper [33]. They included: Need for Respect (e.g., Being respected by others is
239 important; Cronbach's $\alpha=.77$), Aggressive Masculinity (e.g., Controlled violence can be an
240 asset; $\alpha=.73$), Belief in Social Mobility (e.g., There are opportunities available; $\alpha=.79$), Doubt
241 in Authority (e.g., The authorities are out of touch; $\alpha=.81$). To aid readability for those
242 unfamiliar with KTM, the factors were phrased slightly differently in the WTP that also
243 features Psychoticism (e.g., Most people cannot be trusted; $\alpha=.68$). The internal reliability
244 levels were based on response from all participants.

245 A total of $N=189$ (predominantly White and US-born) male participants' residing in
246 the (North Central) US took full part in the study ($M_{age}=22.12$, $SD_{age}=8.41$). They came from
247 diverse socio-economic (mostly locally defined as lower middle income) family backgrounds
248 and were recruited online (via the university study recruitment system and Facebook by
249 posting the survey link on sites oriented towards male interests).

250 A total of $N=196$ male participants' resident in India took full part ($M_{age} = 21.20$, SD_{age}
251 $=7.68$). They shared the same Hindu ethnicity but came from different socio-economic (mostly
252 locally defined as lower middle income and India-born) family backgrounds and were recruited
253 on a college campus in the city of Pune in the western peninsular state of Maharashtra dominated

254 by Hindus. Given the local restrictions on online studies, a paper version of the survey was
255 administered.

256 A total of $N=107$ male (predominantly White and UK-born) participants' resident in
257 (Northwestern) England took full part ($M_{age}=23.27$, $SD_{age}=97$). They came from different
258 socio-economic (mostly locally defined as lower middle income) family backgrounds and
259 were recruited online (via the university study recruitment system and Facebook by posting
260 the survey link on sites oriented towards male interests).

261 A total of $N=375$ male (White and Poland-born) participants' resident in Southwestern
262 Poland took full part ($M_{age}=21.00$, $SD_{age}=6.99$). Given Poland's proverbial cultural and ethnic
263 homogeneity [42], in this sample we purposefully included young men without official violent
264 record ($n=156$; of locally defined lower middle income family backgrounds (recruited via the
265 university study recruitment system) and those convicted of violent offences ($n=219$; of locally
266 defined low-income family backgrounds who completed the paper version of the survey). This,
267 in turn, will partially reflect some of the diversity featuring in the other three ethnically mixed
268 samples. As such stratification in the Polish sample is skewed towards violent offenders, who
269 are more likely to carry knives [33] and guns [32], its use will also allow us to see if (and how)
270 the mixed Polish sample will differ from the other three samples in terms of regression results.
271 All participants were assured of anonymity and confidentiality, and no personally identifiable
272 information was collected. The uploaded data are also available by contacting the first author.

273 **Results**

274 **The US Sample**

275 The total variance explained by the knife model as a whole was 24.8%, $R^2=.248$, $F(5,$
276 $189)=13.452$, $p<.001$. The only significant positive predictor was Aggressive Masculinity
277 ($\beta=.406$, $p<.001$). The only significant negative predictor was Belief in Social Mobility ($\beta=-$

278 .162, $p=.030$). The total variance explained by the gun model as a whole was 32%, $R^2=.324$, F
279 $(5, 189)=19.157$, $p<.001$. The only significant positive predictors were Aggressive Masculinity
280 ($\beta=.407$, $p<.001$) and Psychoticism ($\beta=.184$, $p=.007$). The only significant negative predictor
281 was Belief in Social Mobility ($\beta=-.226$, $p=.002$).

282 **The Indian Sample**

283 The total variance explained by the knife model was 5.7%, $R^2=.057$, $F(5, 196)=3.38$,
284 $p=.006$. The only significant positive predictor was Need for Respect ($\beta=.24$, $p=.035$). The
285 total variance explained by the gun model was 2%, $R^2=.020$ $F(5, 196)=1.789$, $p=.117$. The
286 only significant positive predictor was Psychoticism ($\beta=.019$, $p=.05$).

287 **The English Sample**

288 The total variance explained by the knife model was 36.6%, $R^2=.356$, $F(5,$
289 $107)=12.807$, $p<.001$. The only significant positive predictor was Aggressive Masculinity
290 ($\beta=.514$, $p<.001$). The only significant negative predictor was Belief in Social Mobility ($\beta=-$
291 $.332$, $p=.001$). The total variance explained by the gun model was 39%, $R^2=.392$, $F(5,$
292 $107)=14.796$, $p<.001$. The only significant positive predictor was Aggressive Masculinity
293 ($\beta=.488$, $p<.001$).

294 **The Polish Sample**

295 The total variance explained by the knife model was 15.5%, $R^2=.155$, $F(5, 375)=14.71$,
296 $p<.001$. The only significant positive predictors were Aggressive Masculinity ($\beta=.275$, $p=.001$)
297 and Psychoticism ($\beta=.196$, $p=.001$). The total variance explained by the gun model was 13.4%,
298 $R^2=.134$, $F(5, 375)=12.655$, $p<.001$. The only significant positive predictors were Aggressive
299 Masculinity ($\beta=.291$, $p=.001$), Psychoticism ($\beta=.145$, $p=.008$) and Belief in Social Mobility
300 ($\beta=.112$, $p=.049$). The only significant negative predictor was Doubt in Authority ($\beta=-.132$,

301 $p=.024$). The differences between Polish participants with and without violent conviction were
302 not found to be significant.

303 **Multicultural Analyses** First, we examined baseline culture differences between the
304 factors before developing inferential multiple regression and structural equation models. We
305 used this to test how well the variables comprising the two latent factors ‘Saving Face’ (based
306 on Need for Respect and Aggressive Masculinity) and ‘Social Ecological Constraints’ (based
307 on Belief in Social Mobility and Doubt in Authority) would vary by culture. Weapon tolerance
308 (i.e., knife or gun) was regressed on Psychoticism, Need for Respect, Aggressive Masculinity,
309 Belief in Social Mobility and Doubt in Authority.

310 **Baseline culture differences**

311 Using a one-way ANOVA with a four-level categorical Culture variable (US, India,
312 England and Poland) and gun tolerance as dependent variable, shows significant differences
313 between the cultures $F(3, 875)=25.748, p<.001$. More specifically, post-hoc Tukey tests show
314 that Indian participants ($M=4.30, SD=1.13$) had higher gun tolerance than Poland’s ($M=3.32$;
315 $SD=1.51$), US ($M=3.26; SD=1.71$), and England’s ($M=3.02; SD=1.72$) participants, $p<.001$.
316 The differences between the gun tolerance of Poland’s and England’s participants, and
317 Poland’s and US participants were not significant, respectively, $p=.265$ and $p=.968$. The
318 difference between the gun tolerance of England and US-based participants was not significant,
319 $p=.557$.

320 In terms of knife tolerance, the ANOVA shows significant differences between the
321 cultures, $F(3, 875) =50.244, p<.001$. India’s participants ($M=4.47, SD=1.11$) had more knife
322 tolerance than Poland’s ($M=3.45, SD=1.35$), US ($M=3.03; SD=1.44$) and England’s ($M=2.86$,
323 $SD=1.52$) participants, $p<.001$. The differences between the knife tolerance of Poland’s and
324 England’s participants, and Poland’s and US participants were both significant, respectively

325 $p < .001$ and $p = .003$. The difference between the knife tolerance of England and US-based
 326 participants was not significant, $p = .73$.

327 **Multicultural weapon tolerance multiple regression models**

328 The Knife and Gun Tolerance regression models were statistically significant: Knife
 329 Tolerance Model $F(5, 843) = 21.11, p < .001$; Gun Tolerance Model $F(5, 844) = 21.50, p < .001$.
 330 The left-hand and right-hand panels of Table 2 display the standardized and unstandardized
 331 beta coefficients for predictors in the Knife and Gun Tolerance models. As indicated, both
 332 models accounted for 11% of the variance in weapon tolerance. As predicted, the Saving Face
 333 variables (i.e., Need for Respect and Aggressive Masculinity) accounted for a significant
 334 proportion of the variance in Weapon Tolerance over and above Psychoticism or Social
 335 Ecological variables (i.e., Belief in Social Mobility or Doubt in Authority). Table 2 features
 336 the multiple regression results for the entire sample (US, India, England and Poland). Table 3
 337 features the related descriptive statistics.

338 **Table 2**

339

340 Raw and Standardized Coefficients from a Standard Regression in which Weapon Tolerance
 341 (Knife vs. Gun) was Regressed for each culture on: Psychoticism, Need for Respect,
 342 Aggressive Masculinity, Belief in Social Mobility, and Doubt in Authority

343

344

Variable	Knife Tolerance				Gun Tolerance			
	<i>F</i>	B	SE B	β	<i>F</i>	B	SE B	β
Four Culture Model † (N=867)								
Psychoticism	21.11**	.08	.04	.08*	21.50**	.08	.08	.09*
Need for Respect		.77	.04	.17**		.19	.04	.19**
Aggressive Masculinity		.21	.04	.20**		.19	.04	.19**
Belief in Social Mobility		-.05	.04	.05		.01	.04	.00
Doubt in Authority		.00	.04	.00		-.04	.04	.00*
Constant		-.00	.03	—		-.01	-.01	—
USA (N=189)								
Psychoticism	13.45**	.18	.10	.13	19.16**	.29	.11	.18**
Need for Respect		.05	.08	.05		.12	.09	.09
Aggressive Masculinity		.38	.07	.41**		.46	.08	.41**
Belief in Social Mobility		-.16	.07	-.16*		-.27	.08	-.23**
Doubt in Authority		-.10	.07	-.11		-.12	.08	-.11
Constant		2.23	.69	—		1.79	.79	—

England (N=107)								
Psychoticism	12.81**	.13	.12	.10	14.80**	.19	.13	.13
Need for Respect		.11	.10	.10		.20	.11	.15
Aggressive Masculinity		.51	.09	.51**		.56	.10	.49**
Belief in Social Mobility		-.37	.10	-.33**		-.51	.12	-.40**
Doubt in Authority		-.02	.10	-.02		.02	.12	.02
Constant		2.19	.83	—		1.81	.92	—
Poland (N=375)								
Psychoticism	14.71**	.20	.05	.20**	12.66**	.16	.06	.15**
Need for Respect		.01	.05	.01		.01	.06	.01
Aggressive Masculinity		.26	.06	.30**		.30	.06	.29**
Belief in Social Mobility		.02	.06	.02		.14	.07	.11*
Doubt in Authority		.01	.05	.01		-.13	.06	-.13*
Constant		1.35	.30	—		1.31	.34	—
India (N=196)								
Psychoticism	3.38**	-.05	.04	-.08	1.79	.11	.05	.17*
Need for Respect		.23	.08	.24**		-.01	.08	-.01
Aggressive Masculinity		.02	.08	.01		.01	.06	.01
Belief in Social Mobility		.02	.03	.02		.03	.04	.06
Doubt in Authority		.30	.09	.07		.07	.06	.09
Constant		3.90	.65	—		4.75	.69	—

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Notes. †Due to statistically significant scale invariance violations between cultures, the data were converted to z-scores for the four culture analyses. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. Multicultural Knife Tolerance Model: (adjusted $R^2 = .11$, $p < .001$); Multicultural Gun Tolerance Model: (adjusted $R^2 = .11$, $p < .001$).

Table 3

Weapon Tolerance Descriptive Statistics

Factor	<i>MD</i>	<i>SD</i>
Knife Tolerance US	3.03	1.44
Gun Tolerance US	3.26	1.71
Knife Tolerance India	4.47	1.11
Gun Tolerance India	4.30	1.13
Knife Tolerance England	2.86	1.52
Gun Tolerance England	3.02	1.72
Knife Tolerance Poland	3.45	1.35
Gun Tolerance Poland	3.32	1.51

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Structural equation weapon tolerance model (WTM)

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The significant Chi Square value of our WTM may be interpreted as a limitation ($\chi^2 = 6.01$, $df = 5$, $p < .05$) in terms of model fitness. However, the Chi Square value is deemed to be oversensitive to model rejection especially with larger samples and the χ^2/df ratio = 1.20. Note, this is taken as a more reliable index when under 3 as in this case). Nevertheless, the

370 focus was put on the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA=.01), comparative
371 fitness index (CFI=.90), values and Akaike information criteria [AIC]=50.01. Acknowledging
372 that SEM indices do not have absolute cut-off point [43], the values indicate a satisfactory
373 (albeit imperfect) fit, particularly if Likert scales are used and if the model is interpreted with
374 caution [44]. The model (Fig 1) is also supported by high factor loadings (.57, .64, .66 & .75)
375 and the moderate parameter estimate between the two latent variables ($\beta=.43$).

376 The model found low to high correlations (.09 to .75) between intercept and slope
377 factors. All direct path correlations were statistically significant ($p<.05$). As anticipated, the
378 latent factor, Saving Face ($\beta=.45$) directly predicted Weapon Tolerance ($\beta=.43$). Unexpectedly
379 Perceived Social Ecological Constraints (PSEC) had a negative effect on Weapon Tolerance
380 (direct standardized coefficient: $\beta=-.18$). While Psychoticism had more effect on Perceived
381 Social Ecological Constraints (standardized coefficient: $\beta=.48$) than on Saving Face
382 (standardized coefficient: $\beta=.11$), the former (PSEC) predicted Doubt in Authority
383 (standardized coefficient: $\beta=.66$) and Belief in Social Mobility ($\beta=.75$). The latter (Saving
384 Face), on the other hand, predicted Need for Respect ($\beta=.57$) and Aggressive Masculinity
385 ($\beta=.64$).

386 There is an indirect effect ($p<.001$) from Psychoticism through Social Ecological
387 Constraints to Saving Face (respectively: .48 and .43). These are multiplied to obtain the
388 indirect effect that becomes (0.21). This combination accounts for an $R^2=.24$ on Saving Face
389 (i.e., 24%), meaning a substantial amount of variance is explained.

390 In addition, there are two other mediated relationships within the model. The direct
391 effect from Psychoticism to Weapon Tolerance (.09) is mediated by its indirect routes through
392 Social Ecological Constraints and Saving Face. The indirect route through Social Ecological
393 Constraints is $.48 \times -.18$ (-.09), and the indirect route through Saving Face is $.11 \times .45$ (.05).

394 These combined explain 18% of the variance on Weapon Tolerance ($R^2=.18$). The model
395 therefore accounts for a non-trivial level of variance.

396 INSERT FIGURE 1

397 Structural Equation Weapon Tolerance Model

398 **Sample-specific Discussion**

399 **The US Sample**

400 In the US, both knife and gun models turned out to be statistically significant, thus
401 lending credence to the original British knife-tolerance model [18]. The positive predictor role
402 of Aggressive Masculinity and negative predictor role of Belief in Social Mobility applied to
403 both knives and guns, suggesting little distinction between the tolerance of the two weapons.
404 Given the rising social inequality, both Aggressive Masculinity and Belief in Social Mobility
405 make sense in the US context. Here, a shared psychological process seems to underline both
406 knife and gun tolerance, questioning the link between a specific ‘gun culture’, vs. a generalist
407 ‘weapons culture’.

408 **The Indian Sample**

409 In India, only the knife model was statistically significant, which corresponds to the
410 Indian tradition of swords dating back to the antiquity [45], as well as to the current Indian
411 legislation that heavily restricts civilian possession of firearms. The positive predictor role of
412 Need for Respect can be understood in the traditional Indian values that emphasize honor,
413 respect and family name [46]. The India results are also consistent with the previous work on
414 knife-carrying tolerance [33], specifically, the structural equation Knife Tolerance Model
415 showing a positive correlation between Need for Respect and knife-carrying acceptance in
416 England. Thus, saving face (i.e., honor) may be cross-culturally important in human
417 interpersonal violence [8, 46].

418 **The English Sample**

419 Like in the case of US results, both knife and gun models were statistically significant
420 in England, which may be reflected by the relative cultural similarity of TV shows, movies and
421 music. Such cultural similarity can also help explain the positive predictor role of Aggressive
422 Masculinity and low British social mobility [47]. This lends weight to the socio-cultural
423 similarities with the US, including generally conservative individualistic values and media
424 portrayals of masculinity in terms strength and power [48].

425 **The Polish Sample**

426 Both knife and gun models were statistically significant, echoing their joined relevance
427 found in both the US and English samples. The resemblance can also be traced to the positive
428 role of Aggressive Masculinity, which probably reflects the heavy presence of convicted
429 violent offenders in the sample. The roles of Psychoticism and Doubt in Authority, however,
430 appear to be more complex and may warrant a separate follow-up study that is likely to be more
431 illuminating than speculation without additional data. Future work in Poland should attempt to
432 replicate the culture-specific associations to determine if it is part of a systemic self-report bias,
433 repressive coping [49], or sampling variation. As the differences between Polish participants
434 with and without violent conviction were not found to be significant, this may be down to our
435 inclusion of relatively minor violent offences (which were far more common than the more
436 serious ones involving grievous bodily harm).

437 In the next sections, we discuss our multicultural findings, i.e., multiple regression and
438 structural equation models, covering the comparison between KTM and WTM.

439 **General Discussion**

440 The main purpose of this paper was to address the deficit in cross-cultural research on
441 factors associated with tolerance of knives and guns across different cultures. Overall, the
442 results support the cross-cultural relevance of the KTM, presenting a new structural equation
443 Weapon Tolerance Model whose constructs go beyond the limited Protection Motivation

444 Theory and beyond a simple KTM replication study. While Aggressive Masculinity and Need
445 for Respect showed cross-cultural importance, some other factors (such as Belief in Social
446 Mobility) showed cultural, and also weapon-specific effects. More specifically, in case of the
447 US, English and Polish samples, both knife and gun models were statistically significant (in
448 case of the Indian sample, only the knife model was significant).

449 While the exact reasons for this difference are unclear, it is likely down to the very
450 distinctive Indian culture, which compared to the other three cultures is much older and whose
451 tradition is steeped in ornate bladed weapons [23, 24] rather than firearms. Avoiding
452 speculation unwarranted by data, disambiguating this difference would likely require a separate
453 study involving a broader range of psychological and cultural factors, which might also be
454 partially informed by an additional qualitative study. Thus, such a culture (potentially coupled
455 with other unexamined factors) likely played a bigger role in the resulting difference than the
456 stratified nature of the Polish sample featuring violent offenders and non-offenders.

457 Despite some idiosyncrasies (like the positive predictor of Need for Respect in the
458 Indian sample and other predictors in the Polish sample), an overlap of certain predictor factors
459 was found, the positive one being Aggressive Masculinity (US, England, Poland) and negative
460 one being Belief in Social Mobility (US, England, Poland).

461 We cautiously speculate that the lack of significant differences in reported gun
462 tolerance between US, England and Poland-based participants, along with the lack of
463 significant differences in knife tolerance between US and England-based participants might be
464 down to the widespread cultural influence of violence-glamorising mass media [48] dominant
465 in the three cultures. In such productions, the main *good guy* underdog protagonists are
466 generally less violent than their usually better-armed adversaries. Such influence contrasts
467 sharply with India's post-colonial Bollywood themes of less graphic but more justified violence
468 [50, 51] that have been already associated with contributing towards juvenile delinquency [52],

469 which might potentially shed some, but limited, light on Indian participants' higher levels of
470 gun and knife tolerance.

471 Although the four samples come from separate countries that represent distinct regional
472 cultures, the data were collected in selected places that may not fully represent the nations'
473 attitudes and fully capture their diverse elements. Given the role of socialisation environment
474 [53], we argue that the samples used are more representative of the specific national regions
475 rather than the four countries at large, meaning that the models based on different samples from
476 the American 'Bible Belt', Northern states of India (such as Muslim-dominated Uttar Pradesh,
477 West Bengal and Bihar) and England's most ethnically diverse areas (Luton, Slough and
478 Newham) would likely result in different models shaped by their unique cultural values.
479 Although the used convenience sampling method may imply a certain recruitment bias, the
480 involvement of densely populated urban areas in four countries entails a level of randomness
481 that allows for a reasonable degree of external validity (at least when it comes to the same
482 targeted regions).

483 There did appear to be cultural and societal differences that may help explain the
484 observed variations across the four countries. Indeed, as shown in Table 1, the U.S., England,
485 India, and Poland, showed differences in development, economic conditions, and violence-
486 related metrics that likely shaped the predictive outcomes. In this context, the U.S., for
487 example, reported the highest GDP per capita (\$85,373) and gun ownership (120 guns per 100
488 people), as well as a disproportionate share of global gun deaths (14.85%). These factors,
489 perhaps uncoincidentally, align with its elevated homicide rate (4.96 per 100,000) and general
490 violence rate (3.96 per 100,000). In contrast, the United Kingdom exhibited a higher Human
491 Development Index (HDI) score (.940), but much lower rates of gun deaths, violence, and
492 homicide, suggesting a societal context with stricter gun control measures and potentially
493 stronger institutional mechanisms to mitigate violence.

494 Interestingly, India presented a markedly different profile, with the lowest HDI (.644)
495 and GDP per capita (\$10,123), coupled with the highest stabbing mortality rate (.64) among
496 the countries reported. This suggests that resource constraints and differing cultural or societal
497 norms regarding weapon use might play a role in the patterns of violence observed. Meanwhile,
498 Poland occupied a middle ground, with an HDI (.881) and GDP per capita (\$49,060) that
499 reflected its transitional economic status, and relatively low rates of gun ownership (2.50 per
500 100 people) and homicide (.73 per 100,000), which might be attributed to effective violence
501 prevention policies and cultural attitudes toward weapon use.

502 Thus, further research should involve more national regions and bigger samples with
503 more internal variance, which would be particularly relevant to large and diverse countries,
504 like the US or India, and which might even result in regionally specific models. Such research
505 might go beyond the current cross-sectional design, include other weapons (such as the baseball
506 bat that is popular in Poland), focus exclusively on violent offenders and include female
507 participants as exploring the sex difference within the culture and across cultures in acceptance
508 for weapons carrying could be interesting in theoretical and practical terms.

509 Despite assurances of anonymity and confidentiality, the paper administration of the
510 survey in the Indian and partial Polish sample may have resulted in some more ‘socially
511 desirable or acceptable’ responses. The significance of the knife (all 4 samples) and gun (US,
512 English and Polish samples) suggest that the survey mode did not play a major role, and
513 apparently neither did the difference in recruitment via Facebook and on the campus although
514 more caution is advisable when comparing the four samples, generalising from them and
515 drawing implications.

516 Despite considerable differences between the explored cultures, the proposed Weapon
517 Tolerance Model showed a pattern of (mostly) overlapping predictors and some factors that
518 appear to be culture-specific (such as apparently higher weapon tolerance by Indian men).

519 Further research might incorporate more of such specific factors to build even more elaborate
520 and sensitive models structured around other types of violence. From a theoretical standpoint,
521 this means that the overlap between theories that pertain to weapon-carrying in general [e.g.,
522 54] and those that focus on specific weapons [55] should be considered further.

523 The results might potentially inform interventions aimed at reducing the male
524 acceptance of guns and knives, e.g., through challenging aggressive masculinity in
525 educational settings and popular culture. This might take the form of showing how
526 counterproductive aggressive masculinity can be in comparison with more sensitive
527 masculinities [56]. Such sensitive masculinities, however, would need to be presented as
528 potentially more powerful face-saving tools than physical aggression, which could be
529 promoted by role models who manage to stay calm in distress and under pressure [34, 57].

530 Importantly, to be effective practical implications should endeavour to tap into
531 culturally-specific values, which as in case of India's Need for Respect, can play a large role.
532 By identifying some cross-culturally important factors (Need for Respect and Aggressive
533 Masculinity), this paper supports the development of campaigns that might have a wide-
534 spread appeal across a range of cultural contexts. At the same time, it also appears that in
535 weapon tolerance can be driven by different concerns in different cultures, which requires
536 further investigation.

537 Overall, the presented results support the proposed Weapons Tolerance Model cross-
538 culturally, but with some culture-specific idiosyncrasies. One potential reason for this might
539 be the similarity of the generally monolithic cultural themes that tend to glamorise hegemonic
540 themes of masculinity and violence. To make communities safer, policy makers need to
541 question such themes and promote non-aggressive forms of manliness like emotional control
542 or learned expertise.

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
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696 Figure 1
 697 Structural Equation Weapon Tolerance Model

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