3 Motives for American democracy promotion

Chapter Three situates and identifies the democracy promotion of the Clinton and Bush administrations within the context of the post-Cold War era and the pursuit of US national interests and values. This chapter provides a discussion of the motivation for democracy promotion policies under the Clinton and Bush administrations.

The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the intentions of Clinton's and Bush's democracy promotion. Clarifying what they sought to accomplish makes it possible for the research in later chapters to evaluate the product of these missions. The chapter first outlines the foreign policy changes heralded by the post-Cold War era. Next, the question of what motivated the two administrations to pursue a democracy promotion strategy is discussed, considering both national interests and values. This detail provides valuable information on which analysis of all three research objectives can draw. For Phase One (Chapter Four) this chapter is important because it identifies what elements of democracy were deemed necessary by Clinton and Bush's democracy promotion policies. This knowledge provides evidence that the cases of USAID's missions in Bosnia and Afghanistan are representative of both administrations respective attitudes to democracy promotion. The present chapter also provides a background for examining the two administrations' perceptions of what is necessary for successfully consolidating liberal democracy, which is essential information for answering Phase Two (Chapter Five). For Phase Three (Chapter Six), situating the Bosnian and Afghan missions within the applied theoretical-political-context of realism and idealism establishes the framework by which America's foreign policy ambitions are evaluated.

Having established that both administrations had the same understanding of what constituted democracy promotion and saw it as fulfilling a combination of US interests and values, the groundwork is provided for a deeper consideration of the viability of parachuting democracy into a country. This chapter highlights that often the results of the policy combining values/idealism and interests/realism has been disharmonious. This raises the possibility that US democracy promotion does not in fact provide the accommodation of both sets of goals as it claims, thus challenging this practical application of the theoretical synthesis of idealism and realism through interests and values.

POST-COLD WAR US FOREIGN POLICY

According to US democracy promotion critic William Robinson, in the late 1970s the US government began to develop and organise democracy assistance in order to establish a democratic system that would contain social tensions within a framework of managed dissent and co-option (1996: 6). US democracy building programmes began replacing military, economic and political support of non-democratic regimes as the key policy in its foreign relations. This shift in policy did not preclude the US from actively supporting authoritarian or dictatorial regimes in certain circumstances. However, the general policy was predicated on the belief that democratic, rather than dictatorial, states were more likely to be reliable long-term partners for the United States, and that the promotion of these would have economic and security advantages (Robinson 1996: 15-16).

US policymakers and academics in the late 1980s and early 1990s attributed the collapse of the Soviet empire not only to the policy of containment, Reagan's military build-up and the

inability of a planned economy to function in a globalising world, but also to the appeal of Western democratic institutions. In 1983, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was established in Washington, DC to promote the American ideal of democracy abroad. Other examples of American influences included high and low cultural exchanges. Be it through visiting students and academics to American universities, or the export of the music and the movies of Hollywood, the American economic, social and political way of life was filtered back to the Soviet Union and other Communist states. All these cultural exchanges and more, attracted people to American life. Both Joseph Nye and Walter Russell Mead suggest that these factors are examples of soft power. Mead defines cultural exchanges as a sub-category of soft-power which he calls 'sweet power'; the 'power of attraction of American ideals, culture, and values that draws others around the world more or less spontaneously to support or at least accept American power and American policy' (Mead 2005: 36). In responding to 'hawkish theoreticians', Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State during the Clinton administration, confirms that the Cold War was 'won' and the Soviet communist system collapsed not just because it was contained by 'Western military power' but also the appeal of US liberal democracy. Regarding the pull of democracy, Talbott argued that the Soviet Union 'was penetrated and ultimately subverted by information and ideas, including the big idea of democracy' (Talbott 1996: 54-55). He suggests it is ironic that, 'after the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact, and the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., the domino theory operated in reverse: one formerly communist country after another held free elections' (Talbott 1996: 54-55).

At the end of the Cold War the US did not want another superpower rival to emerge as its bi-polar opponent. President George H. W. Bush set out to prevent this scenario by establishing a 'new world order' that maintained America's hegemony whilst accepting its capability and

responsibility for improving the living conditions and standards of the world's population. In his 1992 UN address, the President spoke of the end of the Cold War and his belief that there was

> a unique opportunity to go beyond artificial divisions of a first, second, and third world to forge instead a genuine global community of free and sovereign **nations**; a community built on respect for principle of peaceful settlements of disputes, fundamental human rights, and the twin pillars of freedom, democracy and free markets (G. H. W. Bush 12 September 1992).

A strict and conservative assessment of national interest was no longer permissible. US promotion of democracy and involvement in multilateral engagements in resolving the world's problems was seen to serve the new interpretation of national interest. This new order began with the US invasion of Panama in 1989. American troops removed the military dictator General Noriega, a one-time CIA agent, from power. Previously, the American government had accepted Noriega's drug-peddling gangsterism in exchange for an anti-communist regime and America's *de facto* control of the Panama Canal. This strategy was a traditional realist-based understanding of national interests because the domestic identity of the Panamanian state was unimportant to America; it was Panama's commitment to US policy in the area that was important. But the new emphasis on democracy promotion as a means to securing national interests had changed things. The internal political dynamics of a state were now seen as important to the US acquiring its national interests. The Panama invasion was followed by US-led international ejection of Iraq, under President Saddam Hussein, from Kuwait in 1991 and US engagement in the UN humanitarian operation in Somalia in late 1992. The new world order seemed to be going well, the UN could now

operate without the usual Cold War posturing. But, as the section below will argue, no sooner than it was set-up, it seemed to unravel during President Clinton's first term in office.

NATIONAL INTERESTS

This section discusses both presidents' definitions of national interests. These definitions are used in Chapter Six, which investigates what interests were fulfilled by USAID's democracy promotion in Bosnia and Afghanistan.

The Clinton administration

During the 1992 presidential election campaign, Governor William Jefferson Clinton set forth his grand foreign policy strategy. The inexperienced Clinton defined the need for a three-pronged foreign policy in order for America to reap the 'unparalleled opportunities to make our nation safer and more prosperous' (Clinton February 1995: i). First, the military needed to reorganise by focussing on regional security issues. This strategy was a substantial shift from the bi-polar world of the Cold War; national security no longer entailed support for proxy wars against the Soviet Union. Second, economic affairs were to be intrinsic to US foreign policy. No longer would shuttle diplomacy be the only focus of the State Department; even the Pentagon would have economic affairs desks. Third, and of principal importance to this research, democracy promotion was to be a key tool for serving US national interests, including world stability and maintenance of the *status quo*. These elements were all backed-up by a policy of active engagement with the international community through

multilateralism. Under Clinton, the plan was for the US to act in unison with its international allies.

Following President George H. W. Bush into office, President Clinton expanded the US military's role in the UN operation in Somalia, halted the Yugoslav war, and under the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) committed troops and nation-building support in Bosnia and Croatia. US military engagement in resolving national problems in other countries was repeated in Kosovo in 1999-2000 when the US-UK alliance (under NATO auspices) bombed the Serbian state infrastructure to ward off further Serbian attacks on ethnic Albanian Kosovans. In arguing his case, Clinton adopted the language of the previous administration concerning an expansion of the definition of national interests and their acquisition.

By February 1995, the Clinton administration had developed a foreign policy strategy which considered the realities of the post-Cold War political environment. In *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* Clinton acknowledged that the 'central security challenge of the past half century — the threat of communist expansion — is gone', but warned of the development of other dangers (February 1995: i). These new dangers were 'diverse', and included the threat posed by ethnic conflict and rogue states to the stability of various regions. Further, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and 'large scale environmental degradation, exacerbated by rapid population growth' could 'undermine political stability in many countries and regions' (February 1995: i).

It was obviously in the US government's interests to create a safer and more prosperous nation and world. The Clinton administration sought to achieve these goals through the

application of its ‘vital’ and ‘important’ national interests and a third strand labelled ‘humanitarian and other’ interests. ‘Vital interests’ were the most important. These concerned the ‘physical security’ of the country, and its allies, as well as ‘the safety of our citizens, our economic well-being and the protection of our critical infrastructures’ (USG October 1998: 5). The 1998 National Security Strategy (NSS) stated that America would ‘do what we must to defend these interests, including—when necessary—using our military might unilaterally and decisively’ (USG October 1998: 5). ‘Important national interests’ came next. The report offered three examples: American involvement in NATO operations in Bosnia; restoring democracy to Haiti as well as halting the flow of Haitian refugees; and its efforts to ‘protect the global environment’ (USG October 1998: 5). The administration accepted that:

> These interests do not affect our national survival, but they do affect our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live. In such cases, we will use our resources to advance these interests insofar as the costs and risks are commensurate with the interests at stake (USG October 1998: 5).

The final category concerned ‘humanitarian and other interests’, and was a calibration of American values into an interest-based dynamic. This category confirmed that universal values alone were in certain circumstances a legitimate explanation for US intervention (USG October 1998: 5). These included, ‘responding to natural and manmade disasters or violations of human rights, supporting democratization and civil control of the military, assisting humanitarian demining, and promoting sustainable development’ (USG October 1998: 6). Significantly, the report stated that in some cases the US would act if its’ ‘values [alone] demanded it’ (USG October 1998: 6).

The Bush administration

In the eight months before the terrorist attacks on America, September 11, 2001 the visible policy plans of President Bush were realist-based. His foreign policy was orchestrated on a strategy that sought disengagement from an overtly active agenda; less a retreat into the borders of isolationism, and more a movement away from the apparently idealised Clintonian multilateral management of the world's problems. However, after the terrorist attacks Bush's noted plan for US relations with the world changed course towards an aggressively engaged internationalism that debased containment and deterrence and came to be known as the Bush Doctrine.

The National Security Strategy document published in September 2002 (NSS-02) defined the new neo-conservative foreign and security policy of the Bush administration. Integral to this document, and future US policy, was the acknowledgement that promoting democracy around the world would promote US security and other national interests. These national interests were also to be promoted through free trade, strong alliances with like-minded democracies and a protective missile-blanket covering the geographical United States (USG September 2002: 12). The US was sceptical about whether its national security interests would be met by international and regional institutions; therefore, Bush declared that America would act, if need be, unilaterally and pre-emptively (Dockrill 2006: 344-73).

The language of the National Security Strategy of the Bush administration differed from that of the strategy of the Clinton administration in that it did not explicitly distinguish between different hierarchies of interests. It was less definitive in its priorities of interests. In the initial chapter of the 2002 report, it identified that its national interests were

> based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity (USG September 2002: 1).

To achieve these goals, the Bush administration outlined the eight arms of its national security strategy, stressing that this project was open to all. The US government wanted to:

> Champion aspirations for human dignity; Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; Work with others to defuse regional conflicts; Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century; and Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization (USG September 2002 1-2).

Although NSS-02 included previous US government methods for achieving national interest objectives, such as the promotion of democracy and free markets for security, economic and moral reasons, it also included a complete rejection of the policies of containment and deterrence, and a radical re-interpretation of previously held legal

definitions. In the post-9/11 world the Bush administration saw containment and deterrence as no longer suitable for the security concerns facing America. A new pre-emptive strategy incorporating preventative war was required to deal with rogue-states and non-state terrorists who had obtained or attempted to obtain Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) (USG September 2002: 13-16).

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION UNDER THE CLINTON AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS

This section considers the reasons stated by both administrations for employing a policy of democracy promotion. Both presidents stated that liberal democracy was required to instil international, regional and national stability. This was beneficial to the citizens of the country in question because a stable democracy is less violent towards its people. The policy was also considered to be in the interests of the national economic and security interests of the United States. A stable regime becomes a more reliable trade partner and an investment area for US business. The security interests of America are fulfilled because, under the terms of the democratic peace, a democracy does not go to war with another democracy. Democracy promotion also addresses the fear that apparently distant wars can lead to situations when a country can unintentionally become embroiled; a community of democracies that do not go to war with each other reduces the opportunity of being dragged into a conflict (see Democratic Peace context in Chapter Two). Other security interests benefit from a policy of democracy promotion through its capacity to ensure the geo-strategic dominance of America as the leader of the democratic world in the international and regional arenas.

The Clinton administration

President Clinton was the first US president in over fifty years who did not have to contend with an ideological, military and economic superpower rival, but he was also the first US president to have to deal with a post-Cold War world with its emergent and resurgent nationalist internal and external tensions. Douglas Brinkley declared that, irrespective of who was president, it was certain that they would 'face a slew of post-Cold War problems' (1997: 112). In light of these problems, Clinton identified the need to increase the number of nations in the democratic community. The solution was to promote democracy and free markets in the mould of the US liberal democratic system. In the 1994 State of the Union Address he contended that this would simultaneously serve the interests of democracy and US national security and economic interests (Clinton 20 January 1994). This drive was predicated on the American mission's cultural, political and social superiority-complex (see American Mission context in Chapter Two). Underlying this policy were two fundamental beliefs: firstly, the superiority of America's cultural, political and social values and secondly, that, with American assistance, any state could develop the US model.

The Clinton administration gradually institutionalised and prioritised democracy promotion within government departments and agencies by 'reorganiz[ing] the international affairs budget around strategic priorities, and made democracy building one of those priorities' (Carothers 2000: 3). In a speech commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Marshall Plan, and referencing the work to be done in Central and Eastern Europe, Clinton outlined the importance of developing democratic institutions and culture:

> We must meet the challenge now of making sure this surge of democracy endures. The newly free nations must persevere with the difficult work of reform. America and Western Europe must continue with concrete support for their progress, bolstering judicial systems to fight crime and correction, creating checks and balances against arbitrary power, helping to install the machinery of free and fair elections so that they can be repeated over and over again, strengthening free media and civic groups to promote accountability, bringing good government closer to the people so that they can have an actual voice in decisions affecting their lives. (Clinton 28 May 1997)

The administration feared that, without an institutional framework to ensure that a democratic social contract is respected by both sides (government and people) anarchy would ensue and lead to non-democratic forms of government. What was required was the establishment of 'effective party systems and constitutional structures with legal codes adequate to provide the rule of law' (Smith 1994: 343). In providing support for societal-based organisations, Clinton sought to change the social framework within which individuals operated. Promoting a democratic culture involved empowering

> civil society through encouraging the independent formation of a variety of organizations such as women's groups, bar associations, student movements, labor unions, ethnic associations, the media, religious institutions, peasant leagues, and small business organizations. (Smith 1994: 343)

US democracy promotion in Haiti

US involvement in Haiti is a good beginning from which to reference the Clinton administration's activities in Bosnia because it was the first large-scale post-conflict democratisation mission it initiated. From looking at the implementation of the mission and its subsequent failure to produce democracy, one can use it as a benchmark from which to examine the Bosnian mission and investigate which strategies changed and which stayed the same. In late 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was the first Haitian leader to win the Office of the President in free and fair elections. Aristide won 67.5 percent of the vote and took office in February 1991. By late September 1991 he had been ousted by the military in a *coup d'état* (CRS 21 June 2007: 2-3). By the time Clinton took office in January 1994 a series of international pressures were placed on the military leaders to restore Aristide to office. However, it was not until UN Security Council Resolution 940 was adopted on 31 July, 1994 that the international community was legally capable of removing the military leaders and returning the constitutionally-elected President Aristide to office. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN authorised 'Member States to form a multinational force [...] to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership' (UN 31 July 1994: 2). On 18 September, 1994 the military leaders ceded control of the government and accepted the return of President Aristide. The 21,000 multinational force led by the US landed the next day to ensure compliance, and on 15 October, 1994 Aristide and other exiled leaders returned to office. (CRS 21 June 2007: 3)

The US government plan for supporting Haiti's development was based on a Democracy Enhancement Project (DEP) by USAID, which was split into two phases both of which aimed to 'develop[...] durable democratic institutions, promote political stability, and foster economic recovery' (USAID Congressional Presentation 1997). The first phase came into operation in 1991 during the H. W. Bush administration. In 1994, during the Clinton

administration, the second phase was initiated. There were three strategic objectives to the second phase. In the first objective, USAID supported the development of a civil society, parliament, elections, local government and the administration of justice. In the second objective, it fostered an environment that supported investment such as developing commercial laws, increased access to credit for businesses, encouraged the growth of 'meaningful employment', supported the education system such as teacher training, and finally to 'promote[d] viable and environmentally sound agricultural and reforestation ventures' (USAID Congressional Presentation 1997). In the third objective, USAID focussed on reducing child malnutrition by food distribution, improving the health services and reducing the fertility rate (thus taking pressure of food resources) (USAID Congressional Presentation 1997).

However, in Haiti USAID's policy failed. Specific programmes and projects failed to deliver democratic stability at both the institutional and cultural levels. The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) produced a report (2006) on foreign aid in Haiti. It detailed a series of explanations for the failure of the Haiti government and foreign aid to democratise the country. Responsibility lay at the feet of foreign aid organisations and the Haitian government (NAPA 2006: 10).

The key point for the foreign aid organisations, including USAID is that the strategies they employed failed to deliver a democratic Haiti, an environment conducive to economic growth or an increase in the wellbeing of the people. A Country Assistance Evaluation report by the World Bank's Operation Evaluations Department (OED) noted that 'the most notable failure of the assistance program over the last 15 years is its negligible impact on the key challenges to Haiti's development' (2002: 16). For example, its Gross National Income in 2000 was

US$480; between 1994-2000 half of the population above 15 years of age were illiterate compared to the average of 12 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in the same period 28 percent of all children under five were malnourished (OED 2002: 22). OED stated that the model used for Haiti was based on a Latin American model. This model presumes a degree of political stability along with 'a supportive government with capacity to partner and implement, a well-functioning economy, and peace and security' (NAPA 2006: 15). Unfortunately this model 'failed to address Haitian politics and governance as the important drivers of success, from which everything else would follow' (NAPA 2006: 14). Employed by the international community, this model was incapable of dealing with the problems that Haiti faced. The model being applied was ineffective due to 'aid suspensions and cutbacks; inappropriate conditionality, unclear policy focus and program design; poor alignment, accountability and harmonization; ineffective capacity building; faulty implementation; lack of coordination; and delusions about what constituted program success' (NAPA 2006: 14).

According to NAPA, donors 'tended to focus on structural reform, security, military demobilization, health and infrastructure, all critically important to be sure. Having said this, a review of donor projects shows increasingly more attention to politics and governance, especially projects funded by the United States, Canada, World Bank, UNDP and IADB.' (NAPA 2006: 14). One specific example of US failure to design and deliver an appropriate programme that listened to local voices as opposed to being donor-driven is the $18.5 million US funding for the 1995 elections. According to NAPA:

> donors equated democracy with Aristide's return. Few equated elections and Aristide's return with legitimacy of a regime, a much larger and more important question. Even

> fewer equated democracy with need for broad opportunities for grassroots citizen participation, not just the right to vote. (NAPA 2006: 16-17)

In analysing why the strategy failed, NAPA stressed that instead of a model that relies on a certain degree of political, economic and social stability it should have implemented a model that recognised the fragility of states that have redundant institutions similar to post-conflict states, and altered its strategy accordingly. The report called this a Sub-Saharan Africa model and noted that 'past approaches simply were inappropriate' to Haiti (NAPA 2006: 15).

The Bush administration

In January 2001, George W. Bush became the forty-third president of the United States of America. President Clinton presented President Bush with a foreign policy that both engaged the world and promoted US democracy as the state-system to emulate. US democracy promotion had increased dramatically under Clinton; it had become a principal foreign policy tool for the attainment of US national interests. However, Clinton also bequeathed Bush a legacy of increasing criticism of the USA. Seen as the epitome of globalisation, America provoked opposition to its capitalist and hegemonic profile. Political Islamists were becoming increasingly active in their opposition to American influence in the Middle East and the rest of the Muslim world. For example, Osama Bin Laden spearheaded extremist Islamic opposition of US policy in the region by organising a loose conglomeration of Muslim organisations called Al-Qaeda.

Bush saw the new pre-emption strategy as necessary because the previous policies of containment and deterrence had not acknowledged that a non-territorial actor had the

potential for large-scale acts of destruction. Examining international relations theory pre-9/11, neo-conservative Francis Fukuyama points out that its 'entire edifice [...] is built around the presumption that states are the only significant players in world politics' (Fukuyama 2006: 67-8). Fukuyama analyses this presumption as 'naivety with hindsight' (2006: 67-8). Attached to the strategy of pre-emption and opposite to Bush's originally stated traditional realist platform, the administration committed itself to thwarting terrorism by promoting democracy. This strategy cemented its belief in a neo-conservative foreign policy by promoting security and foreign policy positions that enforced 'certain global norms [democracy, human rights, and free markets] over state sovereignty' (Mazaar 2003: 507). It justified its disregard for the importance of the Westphalian notion of national sovereignty by noting that this neo-conservative policy would minimise terrorism aimed towards it and its allies. The Bush administration understood democracy to be the best system of government because its positive treatment of its citizens is replicated in its handling of foreign affairs. At the international level, the neo-conservatism of the Bush administration saw 'democracies [... as] more peaceful, more law-abiding, more predictable, more friendly than non-democratic states. A world of democracies might not be a world without war, but it would be closer to it' (Mazaar 2003: 510).

As with Clinton, President Bush's democracy promotion can be divided into two categories; those programmes that focussed on developing civil society, and those that 'sought to create the necessary institutional aspects of a democratic system' (Rieffer and Mercer 2005: 397). In March 2006, the Bush administration outlined its plan to end tyranny in the world and replace it with democracy. This was to be accomplished by speaking out against human rights abuses; supporting democratic reformers; assisting in the development of 'free and fair elections, rule of law, civil society, human rights, women's rights, free media, and religious freedom';

training the militaries of foreign nations to respect civilian control, democracy, and human rights; sanctioning against oppressive regimes; providing disincentives for other nations' support of oppressive regimes; joining with other democracies in promoting 'freedom, democracy, and human rights'; assisting ongoing, and developing new, initiatives to promote the democratic mission; associating with NGOs in fulfilling this mission; working with international organisations such as the UN and regional ones such as the African Union to carry out this mission, and supporting those multilateral organisations that exposed human rights abusers and abuses (USG March 2006: 6-7).

Integral to this drive to expand the community of democracies were a number of targeted programmes. The new unilateral Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) was a re-organisation of previous US democracy programmes. Under Section 602 of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, the purpose of MCA was to provide a global development assistance programme 'in a manner that promote[d] economic growth and the elimination of extreme poverty and strengthen[ed] good governance, economic freedom, and investments in people' (MCC 2003a). These programmes included developing a nation's agriculture, education system, enterprise and private sector, running of the government, capacity for trade and investment, rule of law, and the healthcare system (MCC 5 February 2003b: 1).

Another programme, set up in 2002 by the State Department, was the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). It began funding projects that promoted democracy, 'economic reform, quality education, and women's empowerment' in this region (MEPI July 2005: 1). The Broader Middle East and North Africa Partnership Initiative (BMENA) was a multilateral project co-sponsored by America and the other G8 countries (Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, France, Italy, Canada (and European Union

representatives)). The aim of BMENA was to commit the G8 to developing a 'genuine' partnership 'with the governments [of the Middle East and North Africa], as well as business and civil society representatives to strengthen freedom, democracy, and prosperity for all' (BMENA June 2004: 1). A further aim of BMENA was to apply the results of the political, social, and economic development programmes to support the resolution of regional conflict. As well as these new initiatives, the Bush administration also used the Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), the US Aid for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Justice and Department of Defense to fund and provide democracy building programmes.

The 'flush of victory' in Afghanistan and its impact on US policy in the Middle East

The US-led international military involvement in Afghanistan began in earnest in 2002 and was split into two major forces. The first force, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was a peacekeeping stabilisation force employed in order to reinforce the new Kabul government's authority. The US 'hunting' force, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), was the second force and was launched on 7 October, 2001 with the aim of stopping Afghanistan from being a base for future terrorist operations. It was engaged in the destruction of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other insurgents. Its operational mandate was not constrained by peacekeeping duties. By the middle of 2002 the war against Al Qaida and the Taliban forces had been largely won, and was achieved by using limited resources. The Northern Alliance (NA) was already fighting the Taliban, and the US decided its strategy should be to support them as opposed to full military engagement. Therefore, the US provided 'money, airpower, [...] targeting from U.S. Special Operations Forces' and instigated and supported smaller

Pashtun risings in the south' (Dobbins *et al.* 2003: 129-30). As a result of this support, it was the NA that was able to capture Kabul in mid-November 2001.

Dobbins *et al* concluded that 'for a comparatively modest investment of troops and money, the United States succeeded in quickly installing a moderate and reasonably representative successor to the Taliban regime and in forestalling any resumption of large-scale civil conflict' (2003: 147). In fact, taking its analysis further, the RAND Corporation suggested that initially, and 'with rare exceptions, [the] U.S. and international military forces have been well received throughout the country. A national government has been established whose legitimacy, if not effective power, has been widely acknowledged throughout the country.' (Dobbins *et al* 2003: 134). However, this success ignored the long-term stabilisation required for the country to win the peace as well as the war. The US strategy was to have a 'light footprint'. In the first year of OEF there were approximately 5,200 US military personnel in-country, and by 2006 there were only 22,200 military personnel (DPC November 13, 2009; DoD December 2006). In 2002, the ratio of ISAF peacekeepers to population was 0.18 international military personnel to one thousand people. The lightness of this mission is evident when compared to the international peacekeeping force in Bosnia (1995) which was 18.6 peacekeepers per thousand at the start of the campaign, and 20 per thousand population in Kosovo in 1999 (Dobbins *et al* 2003: 136). Even if the OEF international troops are included in the total then the ratio is still '50 times smaller' than these two previous missions (Dobbins *et al* 2003: 136).

The Bush administration supported a light footprint because it saw its engagement in Afghanistan as the first battle arena in the 'War on Terror'. The US 'did not want to tie down significant numbers of U.S. forces or logistical capabilities in Afghanistan' (Dobbins *et al*

2003: 133). As a consequence, the US was reluctant to initially expand ISAF's mission beyond Kabul and be involved in large-scale nation-building in case it got bogged down.

The ease at which the US achieved victory, especially given the fact that a minimal amount of troops was needed to achieve success, gave it confidence that it could pursue its neo-conservative mission in the Middle East with few resources. When planning for Iraq in 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld constantly drove down the amount of troops required for invasion (BBC News 3 February 2003). He maintained that 'precision bombing' through 'shock and awe' would enable 'streamlined military operations' (Hersh April 2003).

The failures of a light footprint in Afghanistan were not apparent to the Bush administration when planning its mission in Iraq. During the first few weeks of the Iraqi operation in March-April 2003 the belief that there would be no 'protracted warfare' was misplaced and 'supply lines [... became] overextended and vulnerable to attack, creating shortages of fuel, water, and ammunition' (Hersh April 2003). According to Dobbins *et al* the 'size, deployment, posture, and command of the occupation forces will greatly influence the peace' (Dobbins *et al* 2003: 197). The RAND report (2003) suggested that if the Kosovo levels of troops were deployed in Iraq there would need to be 526,000 troops until 2005 and if at the Bosnian levels until 2005 it would need to be 258,000. As a consequence, the level of international military personnel, approximately 200,000, was inadequate for dealing with the subsequent insurgency and civil strife (Dobbins *et al* 2003: 197).

This 'light' strategy failed to manage the violent conflict and impaired the civilian democracy assistance programmes from being fully implemented; it hampered the country's path to democracy.

SYNTHESIS OF IDEALISM AND REALISM – VALUES AND INTERESTS

Both presidential administrations have hinted at the blend of idealism and realism in their democracy promotion policies. The values and interests of the American Mission converged and the decision to promote democracy around the world by the Clinton and Bush administrations was the product of this convergence. Demonstrating the meta-narrative power of the American Mission, US foreign policy went 'from containment to enlargement', without, apparently, too many practical or theoretical difficulties (Lake 23 September 1993). This merger was possible, because in the international political environment, the US no longer had any viable ideological or state opponent. The bi-polar world of US versus the Soviet Union had become a uni-polar world with America the dominant force both in ideological and practical terms.

At the policy level, US practitioners, since the fall of communism, have showed their ability to combine the schools of realism and idealism: G. H. W. Bush, the declared and avid realist, was not carried away by the 'optimistic' moment in history, but the end of communism did encourage him to talk more about democracy promotion and the democratic peace. Clinton is seen to have given in to his liberal instincts and developed a new doctrine that wedded, into a foreign policy, economic liberalisation and political democratisation to the pragmatism of national self-interest. Clinton's first National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, termed this doctrine 'pragmatic neo-Wilsonianism', a policy which determined that the idealism of the democratic peace was in the national, political, security and economic interests of the US (Lake 1993 cited in Durch 1997: 40). In Clinton's second administration, Secretary of State,

Madeleine Albright, explained how both altruistic values and narrow national security interests were served by promoting democracy:

> Promoting human rights is – and must remain – an integral part of US foreign policy. When governments respect human rights, they contribute to a more stable, just and peaceful world. When they do not, they often engender strife, for regimes that run roughshod over the rights of their own citizens may well show similar disregard for the rights of others. Such governments are also more likely to spark unrest by persecuting minorities, sheltering terrorists, running drugs or secretly building weapons of mass destruction. As a global power with global interests, our nation will be more secure, our armed forces less at risk, and our citizens safer and more prosperous in a world where international standards of human rights are increasingly observed (Albright 2000 cited in Rieffer and Mercer 2005: 391).

In the January-February 2000 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, the National Security Advisor-elect Condoleezza Rice discussed what a future Republican foreign policy would look like. She declared that the US would be on the 'right side of history' by promoting free markets and democracy. In defining future republican foreign policy she defined neo-conservatism. Rice disagreed with those who wanted to

> draw a sharp line between power politics and a principled foreign policy based on values. This polarized view – that you are either a realist or devoted to norms and values – may be just fine in academic debate, but it is a disaster for American foreign policy. (Rice 2000)

After 9/11, this combination of idealism and realism, by the Bush administration, was meshed with a more aggressive approach to defending these human, market and democratic rights at the expense of nation-state sovereignty.

This approach by successive post-Cold War administrations was backed up by academic discourse. Ikenberry, for example, disentangled the perception that democracy promotion was exclusively due to the tenets of idealism and instead suggested that it was more an 'American national security orientation' (2000: 103-4). Henry S. Nau (2000: 127-48) is another example of an academic understanding the need to go beyond the constraints of applying only one theory to US foreign policy acts. Nau (2000) combined the self-image of the US with its national interests in order to provide an overview of its relationship with different regime types. Nau concluded that America's dominance in the post-Cold War era has led to its interpretation of economic and political liberalisation being the dominant version of liberal democracy exported around the globe (2000: 147).

Situating US democracy promotion within the values/interests convergence

This section explores the original intentions of Clinton's and Bush's democracy promotion. It considers the debate regarding the level of idealism contained within the two presidents' original democracy promotion intentions. The evidence suggests that, irrespective of which argument you side with, the priorities for both administrations' democracy policies by the end of the first year were based on a combination of idealism and realism, or, to put it differently, a combination of American values and interests. By recognising that democracy promotion was motivated by both idealism/values and realism/interests, this section provides a theoretical framework for defining US democracy promotion and the consequences of this

specific convergence, which will be detailed in Phase III (Chapter Six and the corresponding part of Chapter Seven).

The Clinton administration

Academics, including Terrence Smith (1994), and Barbara Ann J. Rieffer and Kristan Mercer (2005) suggest that Clinton proclaimed a universally focussed democracy policy in the 1992 presidential campaign and in his first months in office. They argue that this should be the benchmark against which to judge his administration's future international actions: if the actions lived up to this rhetoric they would be 'noteworthy attempts'; if not, then they would be 'noteworthy retreats' (Rieffer and Mercer 2005). This perspective does not deny that things changed over the period of the year, but holds that Clinton's policy at the outset was values-minded.

Examples of where this 'noteworthy retreats' benchmark might be applied include Clinton's policies regarding trade with China and maintaining a humanitarian presence in Somalia.[1] During the 1992 presidential election campaign Clinton heavily criticised President Bush's failure to engage fully in the promotion of liberalism, democracy and multilateralism as detailed in his 'new world order'. Bush failed to link reports on China's human rights abuses to trade with America. However, Clinton, while publicly supporting a commitment to interweave human rights into Sino-American trade relations, after winning the election ended up supporting a policy of 'constructive engagement' with China instead (Rieffer and Mercer 2005: 395). This policy resigned the promotion of human rights to 'quiet dialogue'; ensuring that US business was not hampered by Chinese failures to protect the individual's political rights (Rieffer and Mercer 2005: 395).

According to Rieffer and Mercer (2005), the days of proactive US engagement and high-minded assertive multilateralism were over. Clinton attempted to distance his administration from multilateral operations that did not directly and visibly serve US national interests. According to this argument, Clinton's policy in Somalia must be judged as a noteworthy retreat since it failed to match his initially stated policy. On October 7, 1993 in an address to the nation Clinton spoke of the withdrawal of US troops in Somalia within six months (although the military would initially increase its presence to improve security for the eventual withdrawal) (Clinton 7 October 1993). Clinton argued that US involvement in humanitarian assistance in Somalia was due to the policy of the previous US president, and because the initial humanitarian mission had been accomplished, US engagement in Somalia was no longer necessary. To accommodate the US withdrawal its troops were replaced with other nations' forces (Clinton 7 October 1993). In defending the policy of withdrawal, Clinton demonstrated that his initial policy of universalism was being replaced with Lake's 'pragmatic neo-Wilsonianism'. Clinton declared: 'it is not our job to rebuild **Somalia**'s society or even to create a political process that can allow **Somalia**'s clans to live and work in peace. The Somalis must do that for themselves' (Clinton 7 October 1993).

An alternative argument is put forward by academics, including Michael Cox (2002) and Douglas Brinkley (1997). They suggest that the argument that Clinton initially proclaimed an overarching principle-minded foreign policy requires serious revision. They contend that the speeches and policy papers of the Clinton administration, even before its election victory in 1992, never claimed an intention solely towards what is referred to as a universally idealist-minded plan. Although the administration proposed that democracy promotion would play a vital role in US foreign policy, Cox (2002) and Brinkley (1997) argue that it was not the

benchmark that some academics, or critics, would lead people to believe. Directly contrary to Smith *et al*, Cox proposed that, throughout Clinton's administration, the acquisition of 'vital' and 'important' national interests were the overarching policy:

> Clinton was hardly a liberal Rambo in search of new frontiers to conquer. Pragmatic in outlook and keen to assuage key domestic constituencies, ultimately he always viewed democracy promotion as a policy instrument to advance American power rather than as a moral duty. Thus, if he supported the cause of democracy, he did not do so for idealistic reasons, but because he felt this supported US national security and America's economic goals in the wider international system. (Cox 2002: 221)

Both perspectives regarding the origins of Clinton's democracy promotion reach similar conclusions on the eventual role democracy promotion played in Clinton's foreign policy strategy. Whether or not this was his original intention, by the end of Clinton's first year in office, democracy promotion was essentially a realist framework resting on an idealist foundation.

The Bush administration

Scholars of the Bush administration's foreign policy provide two alternate explanations for the origins of its democracy promotion. The first suggests that the terrorist attacks on 11 September, 2001 were the determining factor that drove neo-conservative democracy promotion in the Bush administration. The second explanation suggests that the neo-conservative drive for democracy building was already integral to the plans of the Bush administration and all that 9/11 did was to provide a vehicle for its enactment.

The first explanation proposes that Bush, at the beginning of his term in office, was a realist who was reluctant to interfere with the internal affairs of other states unless there was a requirement to protect America's national interest – an interest that he defined within the traditional security format. Two years after 9/11, Michael Mazaar, commented that 'it is easy to forget, now, that the early conventional wisdom held that President Bush and his foreign policy team in fact embraced realism as their guiding philosophy' (2003: 503). The Bush presidential election team during the 2000 campaign and the Bush administration during its first months in office maintained a rhetorical posture that stood upon core Republican and conservative traditions associated with the Kissinger-realist camp. This realist-based foreign policy was to attain its narrow interpretation of national interest via balance of power politics in its favour and to the prevention of the domestic identity of one foreign state from 'dominating the values of other states' (Nau 2002: 127). The material capabilities of a state were far more important than its domestic political identity. The integrity of other nation-states would be respected, so long as they did not interfere with America.

Classic realist analysis suggests that power will deter aggression, yet too much power will invite others to respond; a security dilemma is born, which results in every state desiring more power but receiving less security. According to Mazaar, recognition of this made classical realists 'more cautious, more humble, and more alliance prone and multilateral than a crude reading of their philosophy might suggest' (2003: 518). He attributes this thinking to a number of Bush administration officials. Before taking office they 'revealed in their writings a very clear recognition of this dilemma. They wrote of the risks of hubris and the importance of collective action. They wrote, in other words, much as classic realists would have done.' (Mazaar 2003: 518). According to the future NSA and second term Secretary of

State, Condoleezza Rice, ‘the world needs a balancer’ but it should not be too heavy handed (cited in Mazaar 2003: 518). She argued that ‘if you are too promiscuous in the use of military power [...] you will deprive the world of a balancer’ (Rice cited in Mazaar 2003: 518). Former Secretary of State, Colin Powell was another exemplar of realism who determined that European and other allies should be consulted on foreign policy issues on a case-by-case basis for pragmatic reasons (Hulsman 2004). It can be assumed that because prominent members of the Bush team applied a realist approach, Bush himself was at least exposed to, and perhaps accepted, the utility of applying the tenets of realism.

According to this perspective, the terrorist attacks on America on 11 September, 2001 forced Bush to change his policy and adopt a more internationalist and interventionist policy as proposed by neo-conservatism. Francis Fukuyama (2006) and Mark Beeson (2004) argue that the 11 September attacks were dramatic in their immediate impact and changed the course of US foreign policy. Beeson suggests this change impacted ‘America’s political elite’, in that they were ‘attempt[ing] to come to terms with new strategic realities’ (2004: 445). This policy included grand democracy promotion projects in other countries – a turnaround from the previously cautious realism. Thus, by the end of the first year, the Bush administration had begun to alter its spoken foreign policy away from a classical version of realism towards a neo-conservative one aimed at maintaining hegemony through military might.

The alternate argument ignores the importance of the Bush administration’s realist rhetoric during the election campaign and the initial months of government and the apparent impact of 9/11 by suggesting that the administration’s original intention was to promote a neoconservative influenced foreign policy. Mazaar notes; ‘the Bush administration’s assumptions, doctrines and policies stem generally from a very different world view from that

proposed by classical realism' (2003: 503). In fact, this was the exact same policy that Fukuyama and others maintain Bush adopted as a consequence of 9/11.

The continuity of this world view to past foreign policy ideas can be traced to the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) review and the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). They illuminate links between Bush's election campaign and early administration team to the ideas and personnel of neoconservatism. The existence of DPG and PNAC suggests that neo-conservatism would have dictated US foreign policy irrespective of the terrorist attacks. Under President George H. W. Bush the classified DPG review was drawn-up by the Pentagon to discuss the future path of American foreign policy in a uni-polar world.[2] In March 1992 a draft copy of this report was leaked to the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*. The report described the 'fundamentally' new international political environment as a cause for this new path:

> This Defense Planning guidance addresses the fundamentally new situation which has been created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the internal as well as the external empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and influence. The new international environment has also been shaped by the victory of the United States and its coalition allies over Iraqi aggression the first post-cold-war conflict and a defining event in U.S. global leadership. In addition to these two victories, there has been a less visible one, the integration of Germany and Japan into a U.S.-led system of collective security and the creation of a democratic 'zone of peace' (Wolfowitz draft of DPG 1992).

The Pentagon indicated two objectives for America in this new world: to ensure that no

other state obtained political, military or economic parity, and to address the 'sources of regional conflict and instability' in a manner conducive to developing a 'respect for international law, limit international violence, and encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic systems' (Wolfowitz draft of DPG 1992).

With the criticism that the Pentagon received from the public disclosure of the DPG draft and the removal of the H. W. Bush administration from the White House this review was shelved. The authors of the review lost their ability to dictate US foreign policy direction and strategy. However, these authors and other like-minded people founded PNAC in 1997 to develop these ideas further.[3] The PNAC was effectively the next republican government in waiting. The June 1997 Statement of Principles declared that the Clinton administration's foreign policy was 'incoherent' whilst also criticising conservatism for not offering an alternative that kept the US in its position of superiority (PNAC 1997). PNAC argued that the 'American peace' – the creation by America of a peaceful, stable and durable international environment through its domination of world affairs – could be maintained only by increasing military expenditure and making fundamental changes to foreign policy. In the 1990s this 'American peace' provided 'the geopolitical framework for widespread economic growth and the spread of American principles of liberty and democracy', but in a 2000 report it warned that the US could lose this 'historic opportunity' to continue its leadership of a 'coalition of free and prosperous states' (Donnelly 2000: 1).[4]

The continuity of personnel provides further evidence that neo-conservatism had a place in Bush's foreign policy before 9/11. The line begins with the authors of the DPG in the H. W. Bush administration, continuing through to the founders of PNAC, and finally, to the personnel of the G. W. Bush administration, such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld.[5]

In spite of the differences contained within these two arguments, both perspectives suggest similar conclusions to the eventual role democracy promotion played in Bush's foreign policy strategy. Although Bush's strategy was more aggressive than Clinton's, it was similar in that it was essentially a realist framework resting on an idealist foundation.

When ideals and interests converge

Potential problems can arise from this synthesis of idealism and realism. These American ideals and interests have had serious problems accommodating each other, whilst maintaining their integrity. Thomas Carothers (2000), a critic of contemporary US foreign policy, labels this convergence 'semi-realism' and suggests that problems regarding US foreign policy for both Clinton and Bush were borne from this disharmonious relationship between American ideals and interests. In spite of the post-Cold War world being ripe for an idealist-realist convergence, democratic interests are at times in conflict with American economic or security issues, including 'access to natural resources [... and] regional security issues' (Carothers 2000: 3). According to Carothers:

> Where democracy appears to fit in well with U.S. security and economic interests, the United States promotes democracy. Where democracy clashes with other significant interests, it is downplayed or even ignored. And where the United States has few identifiable economic or security interests of any real consequence – as in large parts of Africa, for example – the United States will give some attention to democracy out of a general idealistic impulse but usually not commit major financial or human resources to the task. (Carothers 2000: 3)

CONCLUSION

After the fall of communism, the international arena became an American dominated system. No longer was there a viable competing ideology capable of standing against American liberalism. In this new era, America was able to obtain its interests and act on its values at the same time. This led academics and practitioners alike to describe this as a paradigm shift away from seeing American foreign policy as dictated by either realism or idealism and towards a synthesis of the two. For both the Clinton and Bush administrations the new synthesised policy that provided America with its interests and values was democracy promotion. The evidence in this chapter has also provided detail into the general democracy promotion policies of the Clinton and Bush administrations, identifying that both understood the need to implement democracy programmes that addressed the establishment of democratic institutions and a supporting culture.

Having established that both administrations had the same understanding of what constituted democracy promotion and saw it as fulfilling a combination of American interests and values, the groundwork is provided for a deeper consideration of the viability of parachuting democracy into a country. The research in this monograph will assess whether the two presidents' policies sufficiently provide for the attainment of both interests and values. This chapter has highlighted that often the results of the policy combining values/idealism and interests/realism has been disharmonious. This raises the possibility that American democracy promotion does not in fact provide the accommodation of both sets of goals as it

claims, thus debasing the practical application of the theoretical synthesis of idealism and realism through interests and values.