Surveillance, Power and Social Order:
A Case Study of Closed Circuit Television
in Liverpool

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Acknowledgements and Dedication

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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Jean Furness – gentle, kind and always interested.

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Abstract

This thesis is primarily concerned with a study of social control in Liverpool city centre. As a case study the thesis explores the development of, and meaning attributed to, social control practices by those at the centre of the implementation and management of these practices. In this sense the thesis is a study of the locally powerful, their organisation through the local state, and their perceptions of order and disorder in the city centre. Liverpool's closed circuit television network is focused on as emblematic of the developments in social control that the thesis wishes to explore. As an investigation in contemporary social control, the thesis fulfils three aims.

First, it contributes to the theoretical debates around social control, in particular, by placing the analysis of closed circuit television within an understanding of the social relations in which the technology emerged. In this instance the thesis examines the contours of city centre or urban rule that underpin an understanding of the trajectory of power relations that shape the urban form, give it meaning and strategic direction.

Second, it analyses close circuit television as a normative tool of social control and not merely as a piece of crime prevention technology. This analysis stresses a qualitative understanding of control processes, sensitive to the articulations of locally powerful agents involved in the management of city centre space and the instigation of control measures. In deconstructing the ideological outlooks of those
powerful groups and individuals the thesis places social control within social and political struggles occurring within a locality, and challenges understandings of social control that have focused on the merely technical aspects of control strategies and, therefore, decontextualised the wider social significance of such strategies.

Thirdly, it considers how social scientists and criminologists think about and understand social control in the contemporary setting. Far from closed circuit television being able to empower a local citizenry, the thesis argues that it has emerged out of interests with particular concerns and visions for order. Following this, an argument is made for an understanding of these visions for order as vested in and indicative of a neo-liberal state form from which contemporary social control strategies are rendered practicable and meaningful.
Power fortifies itself not just by what it destroys, but also by what it creates. Not just by what it takes, but by what it gives (Arundhati Roy, 1999: 100).
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Chapter One

Introduction

LIVERPOOL, England - it was just before 3 P.M. when the call came crackling over the walkie-talkie in the control center: four young males walking through the downtown shopping area, behaving suspiciously. “There we go”, the guard said, staring at a crystal clear picture of four youths as they swaggered down the street, stealing apples from street vendors, unaware they were being watched intently. [...] The main concern of the guards on duty ... was tracking the movements of known shoplifters, prostitutes and muggers. For 20 minutes the cameras followed the four young men. Several times, one of the men would enter a store, while the others stood outside as if standing watch. The guards in the control room watched carefully for any signs of stealing [and] on this afternoon radioed the police. Then as the young men rounded a corner, they ran into a waiting police officer. He took down their names and asked by radio if arrest warrants were outstanding on any of them. He seemed to give them a bit of a chewing out, and then sent them on their way. They trudged away from the downtown area, out of sight of the cameras, a bit less swagger in their step ('They’re Capturing Suspects on Candid Camera', New York Times International, 11 March, 1995).

[In Liverpool] the moral hangover from Victorian England, as well as the demands of the respectable shopkeeping class, required that street life be policed – whether it be passing the time ‘doing nothing’ on the street corner or threatening the profits of the shopkeepers by itinerant trading (Brogden, 1991: 118).

The material reproduction of urban society depends on the continual reproduction of space in a fairly concentrated geographical area. Certainly the prime factors have to do with land, labour and capital. Yet the production of space depends in turn on decisions about what should be visible and what should not; concepts of order and disorder; and a strategic interplay between aesthetics and function (Zukin, 1996a: 44).

The pulp fiction narrative in the opening quote represents a view of modern visual surveillance in Liverpool as an unproblematic surveyor of the public realm – targeting the wrongdoer, trapping and removing the villain and petty criminal so
that “people feel safer on downtown streets, even at night” (New York Times International, op. cit.). All of this, the article reported, facilitating wider changes in Liverpool - “a gritty, industrial port city” that “has worked hard to revive and clean up its downtown”, into a “gleaming new shopping center” (Ibid). In this sense the ‘role’ of closed circuit television (CCTV), as some writers have noted, has been more than a tool in crime prevention (Bannister et al, 1998: Norris and Armstrong, 1999). Instead CCTV has played a part in a broader schema of contemporary urban management and ‘renaissance’, and acted as an important signifier in ideologically positioning ‘crime’ and ‘disorder’ as key managerial priorities of effective urban rule. Indeed, developments around CCTV have taken place under a shift towards ‘entrepreneurial’ forms of urban rule underway in the UK since the early 1980s (Hall and Hubbard, 1996). As a prolific discursive form of representation, the ‘entrepreneurial city’ has prioritised a politics of competitiveness between city regions, along with the re-imaging and re-design of the urban form. With these shifts have been changes to the institutional mechanisms and relations of power at the local level deemed appropriate for urban rule that have included the mobilisation of private expertise and knowledge in order to govern the urban centre and shape decision-making through the notion of ‘partnership’. Many writers have characterised these shifts as neo-liberal and, for Jessop (1997: 29), this “strategically selective” institutional terrain has thrown up problems in the political sphere where attempts have been “made to (re)define a ‘collective will’ and to (re)articulate various mechanisms and practices of government and governance in pursuit of objects deemed to serve it”. It is the contention of this thesis that the
development and use of CCTV as a contemporary technique of social control be placed within an analysis of the political and ideological terrain of the locally powerful and of how their articulation of local order has been organised through the local state.

The desire and drive for the social control of the streets in the centre of Liverpool has been a feature of political and economic rule in the growth of the city since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The concept of social control has itself, to varying degrees, been associated with, and positioned as a key mechanism in, the development and rule of modern industrial and post-industrial cities. It is here where images and the organised filtration and pursuit of the 'dangerous', the 'criminal' and 'deviant' have been most acute within official and popular discourse. In general historical terms therefore, concerns around the city as a governable entity have dovetailed with strategies of social control. Furthermore, developments in social control techniques geared towards the demarcation of space and the policing of social boundaries have played their part in the political domination and material reproduction of the urban centre. Governing agents in the urban realm, bestowed with material and ideological power, have attempted to shape the 'meaning' of the city – its preferred function and form. Such city 'visions' have sat alongside processes that have identified and attempted to counter those individuals, groups and behaviours perceived to hinder progress toward an 'orderly' urban centre as defined by locally powerful actors. The linkage between images and discourses of crime and images of the city are nothing new when
considering the management and organisation of space in the nineteenth century city (Taylor, 1999). Since that time debates about urban malaise have at the same time been debates about the ‘quality’ and ‘experience’ of the urban form, its utility and potential for disorder and criminality.

In the light of these points, the advent of CCTV to monitor urban public space in the late twentieth century has posed problems in the interpretation of contemporary social control; in particular, debates concerning its nature, rationale and relationship to wider social relations have continued to “demonstrate ... the vitality, richness, and importance of the study of social control” (Hudson, 1997: 467). Moreover, this ‘vitality’ has continued to highlight stark differences in the interpretation of the relations between social control, power, the state and social order. In examining the development of a local CCTV network, this thesis will seek to contribute to these interpretive debates in exploring the nature and direction of social control at the beginning of the twenty first century.

Since 1994, when the first major public CCTV systems were established, official discourses on CCTV surveillance have continued to proffer the view that the technology has provided policing agencies with an effective tool in the fight against crime and a harbour of public safety (Home Office, 1994).¹ From 1994

¹ At the same time these developments were coupled with rises in recorded crime alongside an increased public anxiety about becoming victims of crime. Such observations have dovetailed with a broad acknowledgement that policing and criminal justice agencies alone are limited in combating crime alongside an expansion in expectations of what the public and other agencies can contribute in this area (Garland, 1996).
Liverpool city centre and surrounding areas have been wired up to a CCTV network with the aid of public and private financing. In 1998, the legislative framework of the Crime and Disorder Act provided the means for the extension and formalisation of the network. Launched in 1994, the privately monitored 20-camera city centre system was extended in October 2000 through a £1.7 million injection of government money under the Crime Reduction Programme (Citysafe, 2000). The long-term aim of this expansion has been the integration of comparable CCTV systems linked to a master control room overseeing 240 cameras in the city centre and outlying areas of Kensington, Old Swan and Dingle, as well as links to cameras in stores, public houses and night clubs (Daily Post, 22 August, 2000). Within the city centre this will incorporate “revolutionary talking cameras” so the “operators will be able to shout at would-be attackers to warn them they are being filmed” (Liverpool Echo, 24 March, 2001). In Liverpool and at national level the ‘friendly eye in the sky’ has been depicted as a neutral observer in the fight against crime and social incivility; a technical-fix for an unease about urban disorder and degeneration.

Local level developments concerning CCTV have been mirrored at the national level. Under both John Major’s Conservative administration and then New Labour, CCTV has played a key role in crime control policy. Between 1994 and 1999 £38.5 million was dispensed from the Home Office with an estimated £51 million from the private sector to establish CCTV systems (Hansard, Written Answers, 2nd November, 1999, Column 112). Under New Labour in particular the allocation of
£170 million of Home Office funds to extend CCTV by 40,000 extra cameras was announced in 1999 (Home Office, 1999). Competitive bidding for the money has involved the building of local partnerships involving private sector expertise and finance (Coleman and Sim, 1998), making the UK the largest market for CCTV in Europe (Graham, 2000: 45). During the 1990s politicians, police, security pundits and media personnel have all contributed to a largely uncritical discourse on the need for, and unproblematic effectiveness of, CCTV systems. This more expansive crime control agenda, that has placed CCTV at its kernel, began to be identified for many writers as signalling an ‘advanced liberal’ project concerned with bestowing responsibility upon a range of agencies in the task of regenerating the urban centres and, in the process, reconfiguring how urban spaces were governed. But what do these developments signify about the nature of social control in contemporary society?

It is the contention of this thesis that the development of street surveillance cameras in the UK has reinforced processes tied to the reconfiguration of agents, institutions and accredited bodies in the task of urban rule and, as a consequence of

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2 These developments have contributed to shifts in the institutional terrain of criminal justice alongside an intensified politicisation of law and order, underway since the early 1980s, and can be placed within both right and left political agendas which have been concerned to deregulate the market economy (Hay, 1996) whilst increasing control and regulation in the social sphere (Gamble, 1988; Elliott, 1996).

3 It has been argued that such projects, involving public and private partnerships, media and public opinion indexes have “not simply … [been] … attempts to govern crime and criminals” but a set of initiatives towards “government through crime” (Stenson, 2001: 22). In this context the salience of street crime and other forms of disorderly conduct thought to be blighting the public realm have received sustained attention by local and national authorities under the Crime and Disorder Act (1998).
this, relocated the tasks and responsibilities for social control. According to McMahon (1992: 205-206), “the locus of social control in the penal sphere” has shifted during the second half of the twentieth century “beyond the ambit of criminal justice popularly conceived”. This has led to the fostering of new areas of intervention, novel strategies and technologies of control culminating in a form of social surveillance engaged with “the pursuit and management of actual, and potential, petty violations” (Ibid: 206). From McMahon’s observation, three interrelated processes can be identified as pivotal in the contextualisation of this thesis. First, new geographical areas have been opened up for monitoring and surveillance (the private malls, shopping complexes and publicly accessible consumption zones of the urban centre); second, new control strategies have been created involving partnership building between public and private powers and the reordering of responsibility for the identification and management of crime and deviance; and third, in this process, new technologies of surveillance and control have been utilised, notably the development of CCTV networks. Scholars have been concerned with these related processes, which have formed the broad context for thinking about contemporary social control – a context which Sumner surmised as a shift from a post liberal-welfare social control to one based on a free market-enterprise culture (1997a: 132-133). In broad terms social control analysts have asked what is novel about contemporary control strategies and what, if any, are the marked differences in the organising rationale underpinning current control initiatives. Contemporary social control has been thought to intensify the blurring of distinctions between public and private authorities, and fundamentally altered
the nature of social control as conceptually understood by theorists in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century and by later critical theorists from the 1960s
onwards.

Debates around contemporary social control have highlighted problems concerned
with formulating research aims regarding CCTV and the questions asked of it. For
example, is CCTV representative of a form of social control outside the scope and
influence of the state? Does the development of this technology present a shift
away from normative rationalities of control? What is the relationship between
CCTV and social order – how, where and by whom is ‘order’ articulated?

These questions will be elaborated upon and will remain central guiding themes
within the thesis. A number of interrelated aims underpin the thesis. The first aim
will be to provide a material account of the development of CCTV in one city
centre as an instance of social control located within the powerful coalitions of
interest that emerged in the 1990s to instigate a strategy of rule under the auspices
of ‘regeneration’. Thus CCTV will be understood not as a mere technical
development of social control nor as representing a watershed in the rationale of
control practices, but rather in terms of its potential as a vehicle for the ideological
and normative ordering of physical and symbolic space. Thus CCTV will not be
analysed in terms of its effectiveness as a crime prevention tool but as part of a
more broadly conceived set of ‘social ordering practices’ (Lacey, 1994) which have
involved the participation of locally recognised ‘primary definers’ outside of
criminal justice popularly understood, but who, never-the-less, make up a network of powerful agents within a neo-liberal state form.

The second aim will be to identify and illuminate the social relations within which social control strategies are developed and enacted. Thus in Liverpool city centre this will involve an exploration and mapping of the partnership forms of rule and the normative terms of that rule articulated by the locally powerful. This will highlight the problem of developing an understanding of the local state that has undergone a process of ideological and institutional restructuring (Peck and Tickell, 1995). The input of business interests through public-private partnerships has carved out a political space for ‘new primary definers’ to articulate the meaning attributed to city centre space, its rule and legitimate uses. Thus as a forerunner to understanding the CCTV network the ideological terms of ‘order’ and ‘rule’ more broadly will be explored. What is the meaning of ‘partnership’ in the city centre? How is ‘regeneration’ articulated? What is the meaning of ‘order’ – how is it signified, for example, through whom and what has been defined as ‘responsible’? In other words the thesis aims to illuminate the “proper objects of power” (Fiske, 1993: 235) as articulated by key partnership players involved in the implementation and definition of a local politics of growth (Molotch and Logan, 1985) and, related to this, of how visions of renaissance for the city have produced a context for the identification and targeting of groups and behaviours deemed to hinder the regeneration project.
Thirdly the thesis aims to provide a local case study of social control in order to avoid an ahistorical and universalised account of social control that has plagued much of the literature (McMahon, 1992; Sumner, 1997a). The thesis will develop a theoretically informed analysis of CCTV as a social ordering practice, which will be interrelated with extra-local developments and issues in contemporary social control. In this sense the thesis can be contextualised within a wider set of considerations affecting the rule of cities more generally, and the practices of social control therein, in that:

Research is ... beginning to examine the way that entrepreneurial landscapes – both real and imaginary – are ideologically charged and, moreover, to consider how urban regimes are capable of organising space and mobilising its meaning so as to give a semblance of democratic legitimacy to their activities (Hall and Hubbard, 1996: 163)

Within much of the social control literature the ‘rationalities’ or ‘mentalities’ of control, as characterised particularly within the ‘governmentality’ literature, have been assumed rather than demonstrated. The reading of official texts and pronouncements - what Cohen (1979) identified as ‘social-control talk’ - can be an important source of understanding the activity of ‘social control agents’ or the proclivities derivative of neo-liberal rule. However, a more qualitative understanding of ‘social control’ would require moving beyond assumptions found only in official discourse. The development of CCTV in Liverpool will therefore be illuminated through the use of qualitative interviews undertaken with those at the hub of city centre management and rule. In adopting this line of inquiry the thesis will seek to explore critically the ‘mentalities’, social processes and ideologies of those agents in the social ordering process. This will further reinforce
the focus of the thesis upon not just the technologies and techniques of social control but also their deeper social and normative rationalisation.

In order to achieve the aims outlined above the thesis will be organised as follows.

Chapter Two will provide an overview of the theoretical issues surrounding the concept of social control with particular reference to post-Foucauldian contributions. More particularly, the chapter will focus on how the relations between social control, power, state and social order has been theorised within and between perspectives. Within the post-Foucauldian literature a shift in understanding social control and social order hinged around a ‘post-statist’ conceptualisation has had an important bearing on an understanding of what drives contemporary control practices. These new theorisations deemed social control to be underpinned by an a-moral and risk bound rationale within a conceptualisation of power that is diffuse and multiple. These important theoretical assumptions will be outlined before being critically examined in the next and subsequent chapters.

In the light of material in Chapter Two it will be important to set out the theoretical framework for this study. In order to analytically approach CCTV in Liverpool and materialise its position within particular social relations, Chapter Three will set out the theoretical framework for rethinking the relationships between the state, power and social order. The power of the state, and its scope for action, has never followed a static or fixed strategic path but has constituted a creative field of
institutional arrangement and experimentation with the aim of managing and ordering social relations. The chapter will identify the processes of material and ideological power and their manifestation within the public-private partnerships of neo-liberal rule. Indeed, it is a contention of the thesis that these partnership arrangements have rescaled the state form and reconfigured the power to define and enact local social ordering strategies within which CCTV has played a central part.

Chapter Four will provide a methodological discussion concerning the rationale adopted for the study of CCTV which, in the thesis, moves beyond an evaluative methodology and into a critical investigation of the normative nature of social control practice. The chapter will provide a critical examination of social ordering agents - the locally powerful. In ‘studying up’ the research asked ‘who are the powerful’? This is particularly important given the reconfigured field of power discussed in the previous chapter and in the next.

Chapter Five will provide a general discussion of the growth of the modern city from the nineteenth century to the present and the development of social control therein. In particular the chapter will focus on the rise of the ‘entrepreneurial city’ of the late twentieth century and what many writers have identified as an intensification in the discourses and practices of ‘security’ and ‘order’ within this city form. Within the UK a number of government initiatives have appeared to reflect these broad trends and set in place various mechanisms for urban partners to
engineer and formalise social control strategies. The chapter will discuss how various writers have understood changes in urban rule and social control.

Chapter Six will begin the case study by providing an overview of social control and governance in Liverpool between 1800 and the 1980s. The chapter will illustrate the particular problems of controlling the streets of Liverpool and the targets of control, as perceived by various writers. This will be important in illuminating historical continuities and discontinuities in social control practice. The chapter will conclude with a focus on the ‘image problem’ peculiar to Liverpool. The label of ‘problem city’ became an issue for neo-liberal city managers, marketing strategists and policing agencies concerned with restructuring the city’s political economy towards the millennium.

In seeking to place the CCTV network within wider social relations, Chapter Seven will utilise interview material to discuss the development and trajectory of the neo-liberal state in Liverpool city centre. This will be done in order to illuminate the problems that were identified by the locally powerful in bringing ‘partners’ together, and to how those problems were managed, in part, through the formulation of strategic city visions and the promotion of an idealised urban aesthetic and function. These broad visions of city centre rule form the normative backdrop and the context within which to understand the development of the CCTV network.
Having explored the wider social relations and strategies of rule in contemporary Liverpool, Chapter Eight will focus on the development and rationale for the CCTV network. Utilising interview data, the chapter places CCTV within the wider material and ideological repositioning and re-imaging of Liverpool through the local state. The chapter will focus upon the management and targeting of the camera network as articulated by the locally powerful and urban security managers. As other writers have suggested, the practice of social control has rarely or ever unfolded in a seamless and always coherent manner. In recognition of this, Chapter Eight will discuss the tensions and contradictions within the surveillance network of the neo-liberal state that produced fractures and conflict within and between locally powerful networks.

In conclusion, Chapter Nine will revisit and draw together the central themes and arguments of the thesis. The chapter will provide a discussion of the implications arising from this local study in terms of their contribution to contemporary debates around the interrelationship between social control, social order and power.
Chapter Two

Social Control, Social Order and the City

The aim of this chapter is to shed theoretical light upon the key concerns of this thesis through an examination of conceptions of social control that emerged particularly in the second half of the twentieth century. As mentioned in the Introduction, central to this investigation are the processes of social control that have increased in their sophistication and complexity in the modern city (Davis, 1990; Fyfe, 1995)

This chapter will briefly review the early social scientific literature on social control before focusing upon contemporary debates inspired by governmentality theorists who have radically shifted our understanding away from these earlier formulations.

**Liberal and functionalist theories of social control**

Social control has been and remains a historically and politically informed concept tied to utopian and dystopian visions of social order (Sumner, 1997: 6-7). Early writings formulated the problem of social control within a broader political drive to secure a popular commitment to the social and moral order. The “dizzying effects of rapid change” in the early twentieth century pointed to “the apparent lack of an overweening moral force to guide people towards co-operative, peaceful and harmonious adaptations to this maelstrom of modernity” (Sumner, 1997: 1-2). The
new sociologies of social control were concerned with the breakdown of traditional communal ties and controls in the face of a laissez-faire and unregulated capitalism. The lack of regulation and order within complex industrial societies proved a central focus for a liberal sociology that viewed “the powers of the state” as performing an effective role in reconciling or regulating conflicts between ‘interest groups’ within the framework of capitalism” (Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1975: 129).

Armed with new conceptions about the nature and role of the state, community and the individual, and the relationships between them, the sociologies of social order developed the concept of social control. These developments underpinned liberal and functionalist perspectives that dominated the field of social control up until the 1960s. The work of Emile Durkheim was indicative in this respect, in its focus on the necessity of social solidarity through moral unity, provided an analytical context within which early trajectories of social control developed.

For Durkheim the great ‘industrial centres’ or cities represented the rapidity of social change and possibilities for destabilising social order. For him, the problem of modern industrial society was to be found in the weakening of earlier communal collective sentiments in the face of growing sectional solidarities associated with the complex division of labour under industrialisation. The complex and functionally differentiated inter-human relations found in the city were characteristic of organic solidarity and it was here that the ‘anomic’ character of
modern societies is most apparent. The development of the modern city was thought to undermine traditional moral ties and segment them into less unified and isolated moral communities.

In the first half of the twentieth century, writers after Durkheim further stressed the relations between the city, disorganization and social control. These concerns were developed in the work of the ‘Chicago school’ in the 1920s, where a sociological critique was pioneered to explore the prevailing social conditions in the expanding cities. The ‘social ecology’ approach to the understanding of cities, particularly in the work of Park, highlighted the notion of social control as “the central fact and the central problem of society” (Park, 1921 cited in Sumner, 1994: 45). The inevitable ‘march of progress’, changes in industrial organization and movements in population were thought to correspond to shifts in “the habits, sentiments and character of the urban population” (Park, 1967a: 23). The processes of atomisation and individualism dissolved the moral order as it was spontaneously derived through the family and church (Park, 1967a: 24). The problem of social control became pronounced as the growth of the city loosened traditional moral ties to produce both “good and evil in human nature in excess” (Park, 1967a: 46). The progressive aspect of city growth brought with it a downside in the form of “social junk” as evidenced in poverty, vice and crime amongst those who “have fallen out of line of industrial progress” (Park, 1967b: 109). In this way, Park echoed those nineteenth century concerns with the ‘dangerous classes’ when he wrote of the de-
moralized city zones, where the population tended “to suppress characters which unite them with the normal types about them” (Park, 1967a: 45).

The work of Durkheim and Park postulated social control as a reaction to the fragmentation of morality and culture associated with modern urbanism. These writers presented a subtle criticism of laissez-faire policies which were seen to encourage economic, political and moral de-regulation. The concept of social control after 1945, however, was developed in a qualitatively different way through the work of Talcott Parsons. Parsons stated that; “deviance if tolerated beyond certain limits will tend to change or disintegrate the [social] system” (1951: 206).

Put simply, social control was necessary as a “preventative” or “forestalling” mechanism in order to re-motivate “the actor not to embark on processes of deviance” (Parsons, 1951: 298). The normative patterns of “common culture” were “more or less institutionalized” (1951: 250) and, following Durkheim, were also reflected in the integrative functions of law and other social control mechanisms (Cotterrell, 1984: 88).

The liberal and functionalist proponents of social control argued for a moral and/or rational binding between the individual and the social. Indeed, without such bonds the idea of ‘the social’ would collapse. Such visions of social control expressed a desire for social harmony and consensus. Within the liberal and functional traditions, ‘social control’ has been depicted as a set of more or less co-ordinated practices that arise to reflect ‘community values’ and ‘social norms’ that are usually
perceived as uncontested social entities. Through all express a concern with the means and ends of social control, these theorists are less concerned to investigate the powerful forces underpinning communal fragmentation and social disintegration, i.e., the very process they lament.

Social reaction and neo-Marxist theories of social control

During the 1960s and in contrast to liberal and functionalist perspectives, social control came to be theorised as sectoral, serving particular powerful interests at the expense of the collective good (Cohen, 1983). Liberal and functionalist accounts were questioned forcefully by social reaction theorists for their view of social control that “started and finished with the lack of control-leads-to-crime causal sequence” (Hudson, 1997: 454), Becker (1963), Lemert (1967) and Goffman (1961), challenged the orthodoxy of previous control theories in order to raise a different set of questions around the nature of social control. The focus switched from the deviant act itself to those moral entrepreneurs, rule makers, and rule enforcers that operated inside and outside of the state and served to create deviant categories as pre-requisites in the processes of criminalisation (Becker, 1963; Gusfield, 1963). The power to label some acts as deviant and others as not necessitated a reconsideration of social control not as a neutral reactive force but as an active process that selectively defined deviance in line with the particular interests of controlling agents and institutions. The activities of control agents in

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1 This view of social control in many respects mirrored how the locally powerful represented control practices in Liverpool city centre – namely, as reflective of an idealised ‘common good’. Chapter Seven discusses the articulations of the locally powerful more fully.
influencing the criminalisation process, legislative change and patterns of enforcement need not necessarily reflect a consensus of interest amongst the wider population (Becker, 1963). Within this perspective, social control intensified and amplified deviance through the organs of a wider ‘control culture’ that bestowed key roles for the media, community ‘leaders’, as well as formal control agents in the generation of moral panics and the identification of societal folk-devils (Cohen, 1972).

In recognising the advances made by social reaction theory in focusing on the activities of control agents, the emerging neo-Marxist analysis in the early 1970s sought to broaden the theorisation of social control and deviance in order to explain how:

... particular historical periods, characterized by particular sets of social relationships and means of production, give rise to attempts by the economically and politically powerful to order society in particular ways (Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973: 220).

Thus the activities of control agents needed to be situated within a broader recognition and critique of capitalist power and inequality along with an acknowledgment that the power to label “is determined extraneously” (Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973: 161). In situating the problem of social control within the reproductive processes of capitalist social relations, neo-Marxist theories incorporated a revisionist critique of control strategies that further challenged the progressive perspectives associated with liberal and functionalist accounts. For these writers the disciplinary regularities of the nineteenth century factory system
served as a basis for the development of more widely situated forms of social control aimed at producing a disciplined existence upon the workforce through placing time and space constraints within the school, prison and other institutions.

Other neo-Marxist analysts within a structuralist tradition stressed the wider role of the state and law as lying at the centre of understanding control strategies in the twentieth century. Important in this respect was Poulantzas (1978) who drew attention to the monopoly of physical violence within the capitalist state and its role in keeping internal social order. This particular form of neo-Marxist analysis has sought to straddle the problems of consent and coercion in understanding the relationship between social control and the popular masses. Neo-Marxists have tended to stress the coercive aspects of social control (Poulantzas, 1978: 81). More accurately, the latter concept has been conceptually subordinated within Marxism to state control.

This form of analysis was not acceptable to all Marxists who sought a complex theorisation of the combinations “of force and authority, of regulation and liberties, of coercive habit and legitimate consent” which had become dissolved in perspectives that caricatured police, social workers, teachers, philanthropists and reformers as “simply and solely the unconscious agents of state repression” (Hall and Scraton, 1981: 470). The neo-Gramscian approach of Hall et al (1978) offered a more sophisticated analysis of social control within a more general theorisation of the capitalist state. Consent does not arise spontaneously as in liberal theories; it is,
on the contrary, something which is organised through powerful institutions charged with managing the social terrain. Such institutions of the state thus become important sites for an investigation of the organisation of social control and the form it may take. Hall et al (1978) developed this view of the state in terms of how it enlarges the cultural and social basis of its rule. For these authors the concept of social control served only a “general descriptive” purpose and lacked historical specificity. Previous social control theories were thought to be limited in that they were not “premised on a theory of the state … of a particular phase of capitalist development” (Hall et al, 1978: 195). The specific form of the state must be understood not only for its legal and coercive capacity but in its “role of leadership, of direction, of education and tutelage - the sphere, not of domination by force, but by the ‘production of consent’” (Hall et al, 1978: 202). This led to forms of analysis of the ideological aspects of social and/or state control - of how popular consent for state coercion was produced and struggled over; of how the hegemony of ruling economic and political alliances was established through negotiation and compromise; and of how, ultimately, in times of economic crisis, the popular masses come to support the “processes of criminalisation through which consensus is forced rather than forged” (Sim et al, 1987: 63). Shifts in the control apparatus of the state are underpinned by processes of criminalisation fuelled by recurring moral panics, law and order crusades, and a more intensive penalization aimed at

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2 In illuminating this point Chapter Three will discuss the theoretical framework adopted in this thesis for thinking about the state, its form and role in shaping the contours of contemporary social control.
'enemies within' - 'the underclass', criminals, the 'workshy', illegal immigrants, militant feminists and those with alternative lifestyles. More repressive legal censures against such categories have been built upon and legitimated by a social authoritarianism that has fed a growing 'fear of crime' buttressed with a decline in social discipline. Thus state control, within the parameters of a 'critical criminology', has served to manage dissent within an established order rooted in the 'determining contexts' of class relations, patriarchy and neo-colonialism (Scraton and Chadwick, 1991). ³

However, critical theories of social control that emerged from the 1960s were subsequently challenged from the late 1970s by perspectives with radically different questions and approaches to thinking about social control, social order and power. The 1980s witnessed a proliferation of post-structuralist and post-Marxist theories that attacked the theoretical tenets of the critical social science that emerged in the post-war period, particularly for: its focus on the relationship between class power and social control; its prioritisation of state activity; its universalistic explanatory framework; and the typically negative view conferred on crime.

³ In contrast 'left-realist' perspectives have challenged the 'idealism' within the above account - particularly in terms of the omnipresent authoritarian state. Left realists have stressed the reality of rising crime rates as a consequence of economic marginalisation affecting lower working class communities (particularly in black areas) in the inner cities in the 1980's (Lea and Young, 1984). The authors acknowledge penal severity as a feature of state responses towards the economically marginal. However, left realists have retained a notion of social control in what they have described as a progressive multi-agency strategy towards the creation of welfare interventions, community associations and a 'democratic' policing policy in the deprived areas of the city (Young, 1991).
upon social control processes. It is to these theoretical developments that the next part of the chapter turns.

**Neo-Foucauldian Perspectives on Social Control**

In his concern to construct a ‘micro-physics of power’, Foucault (1977) focused upon the ‘technologies’ of ‘disciplinary power’ that were developed as new rationalities for punishment in the prisons that emerged between 1760 and 1840. In studying this earlier particular period and beyond, Foucault set out to examine the shifts in the nature, rationale and techniques of punishment - from the public spectacles of torture and execution (monarchical punishment) to the techniques of ‘soul training’ towards the production of obedient individuals (carceral punishment). Disciplinary power, aimed at training the ‘soul’ of criminals and delinquents, developed in the new prisons where human existence through space and time became subject to processes of classification, surveillance and routinisation. Underpinning these mechanisms of control was the exercise of a normalising judgement carried out by emergent professional groups armed with a new scientific knowledge developed within the disciplines of psychology and criminology. With the development of the prison, the professional gaze instilled a new form of disciplinary power under the principle of panopticism. This ensured a more intense, efficient and automatic functioning of power (Foucault, 1977: 206). Panopticism was built into the architecture of the prison, but was also primarily a “political technology” that provided a laboratory to monitor, train and correct individual behaviour (Ibid: 203-205). Under a panoptic prison regime “of conscious
and permanent visibility”, inmates were encouraged to regulate and discipline their own behaviour under conditions of constant, yet unverifiable, observation (Foucault, 1977: 201). Thus panoptic power functioned ‘automatically’:

> He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection (Foucault, 1977: 202-203).

For Foucault, disciplinary power displayed a tendency to become operative outside of the prison walls as a new instrument of government that sought “not to punish less, but to punish better”, and with “more universality and necessity; to insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body” (Foucault, 1977: 82). The spread of disciplinary power brought with it the possibility of “the utopia of the perfectly governed city” (Foucault, 1977: 198), where the process of normalisation would proliferate and spread throughout carceral institutions.

The project of normalisation was thought to filter throughout the social body and create power-knowledge spirals that have as their object the creation of categories of ‘delinquency’, ‘deviancy’ and a host of other ‘abnormalities’ to be made ‘knowable’ and controlled. Thus the disciplines of the social sciences are implicated in control processes towards the management of entire human populations - what Foucault termed bio-power. Both the sites and targets of social control are understood as varied and involve, for example, the identification and segregation of the sane from the insane, the criminal from the law abiding and the sexually normal from the abnormal (Foucault, 1973; 1977; 1978). For Foucault,
control processes are bound up with the power to label, classify, segregate and rehabilitate towards the production of the correctly functioning and productive individual. The promise of panoptic power is thus the disciplined society — a knowable, regulated and controlled society with a new economy of efficiency:

In each of its applications, [panopticism] makes it possible to perfect the operation of power. It does this in several ways: because it can reduce the number of those who exercise it, while increasing the number on whom it is exercised. Because it is possible to intervene at any moment and because the constant pressure acts even before the offences, mistakes or crimes have been committed (Foucault, 1977: 206).

Foucault’s writings suggested the existence of a set of complex relationships between social control, power and social order. His theorisation of these relationships differentiated him from liberal, functionalist and Neo-Marxist perspectives. Foucault challenged the idea that social control develops in line with prevailing and established political and economic interests. At the very least, the relationship between control mechanisms and wider structures of power was rendered unclear. This in part was due to the way Foucault theorised power in modern societies:

In short this power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the ‘privilege’, acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions - an effect that is manifested and sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated (Foucault, 1977: 26-27).

Power is also conceived of as creative and not merely repressive and negative in its effects: “power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (Foucault, 1977: 194). For Foucault, an analysis of social control and its disciplinary mechanisms must therefore direct attention to those local,
regional and “relatively autonomous” institutions in order to try and “locate power
at the extreme points of its exercise, where it is always less legal in character”
(Foucault, 1984: 211). Furthermore, “let us not, therefore, ask why certain people
want to dominate, what they seek, what is their overall strategy” and instead
“attempt to study the myriad bodies which are constituted as peripheral subjects as
a result of the effects of power” (Foucault, 1984: 212). This view radically altered
how the state is positioned in theories of social control and its role in reproducing
relations of domination. It is not that the state is irrelevant as a centre of power, but
neither is it to be accorded a privileged location from where power and social
control emanate.

A unitary and unifying concept of social control is, therefore, rejected with
particular reference to the determinism identified in Marxist theories of the state
(Lacombe, 1996: 540). Within Foucault’s writings, a strict separation can be
identified between powerful interests in society and circulating forms of
disciplinary control (Garland, 1990). Indeed, the interests and values which may
underpin social control practices (a central concern of all previous theories) are not
the prime focus of analysis at all, in that:

The bourgeoisie could not care less about delinquents, about their
punishment and rehabilitation, which economically have little
importance, but it is concerned about the complex of mechanisms
with which delinquency is controlled, pursued, punished and
reformed etc (Foucault, 1984: 216).

It is precisely these mechanisms, diversely situated and de-centred, that provide the
focus for an “ascending analysis of power, starting … from its infinitesimal
mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own trajectory, their own techniques and tactics ...” (Foucault, 1984: 213). The fragmentary and complex networks of social control with their “methods of observation, techniques of registration, procedures of investigation and research, apparatus of control” are distinguished from a “juridical edifice of sovereignty” (the state) and as such cannot be considered “ideological constructs” that fulfil the requirements of a “generalized bourgeoisie” (Foucault, 1984: 215-216).

Foucault was always at pains to point out the localised and autonomous forms of social control that lie beyond the state and which are targeted at a range of ‘illegalities’. His work undermined the differences thought to exist between punitive and non-punitive institutions, as the spread of disciplinary power invests itself deeper into the social body in creating “hundreds of tiny theatres of punishment” within the geography of the “punitive city” (Foucault, 1977; 113).

These theoretical insights have been refined, developed and adapted by various writers within criminology. It is to these ‘post-Foucauldian’ perspectives that the chapter will now turn.

**A dispersal of discipline?**

In a range of work, Cohen (1979; 1983; 1985; 1987) critically developed Foucault’s ideas around what became known as the ‘dispersal of discipline thesis’. This thesis focused on: a move away from state control and intervention towards informal
control; a move away from the impulse to rigidly classify and segregate the ‘dangerous’ towards de-professionalised and less remote forms of control; the gradual replacement of the closed institution with more benign forms of community controls; and a shift in the understanding and response to crime from rehabilitation to behavioural forms of control. For Cohen (1985: 79), “the most fundamental fact about what is going on in the new agencies is that it is much the same as what went on and is still going on in the old systems”. Thus the dispersal of social control into various sites - community corrections; intermediate treatment; neighbourhood watch; private security patrols and the use of surveillance cameras to monitor public space - had produced a number of developments of which Cohen was highly critical. Firstly, the move to informal, private and communal controls was thought to be ‘widening the net’ of the formal system and bringing about “an increase in the total number of deviants getting into the system in first place”. Secondly, this led to a ‘thinning of the mesh’ and increased “the overall level of intervention, with old and new deviants being subject to levels of intervention (including traditional institutionalization) which they might not have previously received” (Cohen, 1985: 44). Thirdly, the dispersal of social control had blurred the ‘old’ boundaries between formal/informal and public/private forms of control, and this has further amplified the problem of disorder.

Finally, the upshot of these developments was thought to be the enhanced ‘penetration’ of the state into ever more areas of social life. Through these developments “community control has supplemented rather than replaced
traditional methods” of social control (1985: 44). The dispersal of discipline, it was thought, would attempt to keep the deviant within the community through preventative measures and monitoring, and promote a “utopia of the invisibly controlling city” (1985: 230).

These developments also worked around an “exclusionary” impulse towards the stigmatization and segregation of those deviants who cannot or will not be absorbed. This represented the “utopia of the visibly purified city” with suitable “metaphors of banishment … separation …reservations and barriers” (Cohen, 1985: 230). The ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ edges of social control were seen to work towards inclusionary and exclusionary ideals in order to segregate the ‘undesirable’ and incapacitate the persistent criminal, thus reassuring the public “that the state means business” (1985: 234).

Thus the dispersal of discipline thesis has pointed to important developments in the nature of social control. Following on from Cohen’s observations these debates have focused around the supposed intensification of economic and political ‘globalisation’, and the impact this is thought to be having on the restructuring of the relations between the central and local state and consequently the shifts occurring in the provision of policing and social control. The pressures emanating from managerialism, privatisation policies and the competing forces of ‘globalisation’ and ‘localisation’ are thought to be undermining the central state’s ability to co-ordinate and manage a range of social programmes - a form of
'governing without government' - that amounts to a 'hollowing out' of the state (Rhodes, 1997). For Jessop (1993: 22), "the hollow state metaphor" has displayed two trends. Firstly, the national state retains its 'headquarter functions' of executive authority and national sovereignty. Secondly, the translation of this authority into control is "becoming limited by a complex displacement of powers".

For many scholars, state intervention and power has been considerably curtailed in the decades running up to the twenty-first century. Other writers, however, have been less committed to the idea of a demise in the importance of the state. The proliferation of 'new', and local, policing and crime prevention 'partnerships' during the 1990s between community, voluntary, corporate and policing agencies may not amount to a demise in state power but rather "may be better understood as representing new, partial elements within the existing economic and political formation which co-exist alongside other (older) modes of administration and regulation" (Crawford, 1997: 233). Overall, these debates have highlighted the difficulties in theorising developments in policing and social control at the local level and render improbable generalised perspectives on these changes. The state has never assumed an outright monopoly on policing and social control (Johnson, 1992) and those theories that posit a definite break with previous developments are limited in this respect. However, it is clear that an understanding of these shifts and their possible direction entails an understanding of what is meant by 'the state', along with an understanding of the changes in the state form. Thus the emergence and meaning of specific 'partnerships' and the local socio-political landscape
through which they operate will remain important for state theorists. These issues will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.

The social scientific debates highlighted in this section have pointed to late twentieth century changes in the political economy of social control that ushered in ‘new’ institutional arrangements and domains of expertise and blurred the boundaries between formal/informal, public/private and coercive/consensual. The increase in ‘security’ patrols, closed circuit television, consumer surveillance and the ubiquitous spread in responsibility for crime prevention has led a number of writers to theorise a ‘new’ social control in a manner which has been influenced by the writers discussed in this chapter so far. It is to these theoretical developments the chapter now turns.

Social control and ‘risk’

Cohen (1985) identified the seeds of a “new behaviourism” that emerged during the 1970s to challenge the hegemony of rehabilitation and treatment of offenders. The new behaviourism’ was increasingly being used to legitimate a form of preventative social control. This ‘new realism’ was not concerned with the motivations and causes of crime and instead concerned itself with formulating strategies toward the containment and surveillance of intractable environments and groups. Within this discourse, crime became no more than a legal infraction, while deviance became conceptualized as that which strayed from ‘natural’ majoritarian values. If crime was perceived as an inevitable and normal social fact then the agencies of social
control, it was argued, would come to be concerned with the minimisation and containment of ‘criminality’ and its harms.

Feeley and Simon (1992; 1994) crystallised these developments in risk based social control. They identified an emerging scepticism towards liberal interventionist strategies of social control. Such strategies emphasised rehabilitation and the proportioning of responsibility, regarding “making the guilty ‘pay for their crime’ or changing them” (Feeley and Simon, 1994: 173). For these writers, a ‘new penology’ was under development that was ‘actuarial’, and orientated through “techniques identifying, classifying and managing groups assorted by dangerousness” (1994: 173). The emphasis on the management of crime made this form of control different from disciplinary control:

Disciplinary practices focus on the distribution of a behaviour within a limited population … this distribution is around a norm…[...]. Actuarial techniques seek instead to maximize the efficiency of the population as it stands. Rather than seeking to change people (‘normalize them’, in Foucault’s apt phrase) an actuarial regime seeks to manage them in place (Simon, 1988 cited in Hudson, 1996: 154).

The importation of risk assessment into the field of crime control has a resonance with neo-classical understandings of individual behaviour (Wilson, 1975) and with neo-liberal notions of choice and responsibility (Murray, 1990). The management of the ‘intractable crime problem’ promises greater efficiency through risk assessment and loss prevention strategies.
The rise of actuarialism and risk-based technologies has raised a number of important issues in the conceptualisation and interpretation of social control practices. First, actuarialism is thought to be displacing the moral underpinnings of control and order with new technical modes of intervention that are both “extra-judicial” (Defert, 1991: 212) and concerned with the economics of probability (Ewald, 1991). Shearing and Stenning (1985) argued that disciplinary techniques could assume various forms without necessarily being moral in orientation. The growth of private policing and mass private property is signalling a “reconstruction in the social world” towards “instrumental” ordering practices. The shift to preventive strategies has hinged around the “language of profit and loss” which has, it is thought, replaced questions of right and wrong (1985: 338). This has led to a “restructuring of our institutions for the maintenance of order and a substantial erosion by the private sector of the state’s assumed monopoly over policing and, by implication, justice” (1985: 496). For these authors it has been the rise of large commercial complexes - such as Disneyland - that has undermined the unitary order of a sovereign state. The spread of disciplinary power, confirmed and driven by a new instrumentalism, has sought the maximisation of profit and brought with it “not one conception of order but many” (Shearing and Stenning, 1985: 497).

Secondly, as well as appearing to be uninterested in moral questions, these new penal practices, based as they are within authoritative expert domains, contribute to

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4 The 'apparent' a-morality of these practices will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight and returned to in the Conclusion to the thesis.
an appearance of functioning outside of politics. As will be explored in Chapter Seven these institutional relationships are not merely technical, but are underpinned by a normative set of relations that depict idealised representations of local social order. Indeed, the development of cost-effective risk control strategies has moved crime control to “a de-politicized and hence uncontentious, scientific/technical realm” (Pitts, 1992: 142).

Thirdly, the operation of an amorphous new penological venture has encouraged new sites of responsibility for crime control and questioned once again fixed distinctions between state and civil society, public and private spheres. These developments have informed the theoretical contours of an influential body of literature that has drawn upon Foucault’s ‘governmentality thesis’. In its application this work has challenged the analytical use of sociological concepts such as social control, the state and social order to understand strategies of ‘governmental rule’ in the contemporary setting. It is to a consideration of this literature that the chapter now turns.

**Governmentality: power and social control beyond the state**

In recent years a body of work has emerged under the banner of the ‘history of the present’ group (Barry et al, 1996) that has extended Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’, and provided a broader consideration of his earlier concerns around the spread of disciplinary control throughout the social body. This work has by no means been homogenous in its approach to social control. Indeed, it is more
accurate to see it as a contested terrain around, for example, issues to do with the continuing role of sovereign and coercive techniques of rule (Stenson, 1999) as well as a general neglect in this work of processes of political economy (Stenson, 2002).

Foucault’s later writings laid some of the foundations for an approach to studying what he called governmentality. He argued that in order to understand how societies are governed it is necessary to move beyond an analytical focus on the state:

The excessive value attributed to the problem of the state is expressed ... (in) ... the form of analysis that exists in reducing the state to a certain number of functions ... yet this reductionist vision of the relative importance of the state’s role never the less invariably renders it absolutely as a target needing to be attacked and a privileged position needing to be occupied. But the state, no more probably today than at any other time in its history, does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor ... this importance; maybe after all the state is no more than a composite reality and mythicised abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. Maybe what is really important is our modernity - that is for the present - is not so much the etatisation of society, as the ‘governmentalisation’ of the state (Foucault, 1991: 103).

For Foucault ‘technologies of government’ have allowed the state to survive and as mechanisms of rule do not emanate from ‘a state’ they need to be theorised as “at once internal and external to the state” (Ibid: 103). Thus the focus on technologies of rule re-poses the problem of control as the problem of government – that is, “finding answers to the question of what it is for an individual, and for a society or population of individuals, to be governed or governable” (Gordon, 1991: 36). With
these objectives in mind governmental rationalities can be investigated in terms of how they operate as strategies of power that not only constrain action but also “act upon the possibilities of action of other people” (Foucault cited in Hunt and Wickham, 1994: 24). In broad terms, governmentality refers to the targeting of the population as an object of social scientific knowledge in both social and individual settings, and is orientated towards the maximisation of health, wealth, economic production and social stability. Governmentality operates through a triangle of power: “sovereignty - discipline - government, which has as its primary target the population and its essential mechanism the apparatus of security” (Foucault, 1991: 102). The rationalities and practices of rule towards shaping and regulating conduct represent a “pluralisation of modern government” that is most apparent in forms of liberal and neo-liberal rule. The ‘pluralisation’ of government contributes “towards the relativisation of the notional boundary line between state and civil society”:

Among these processes might be numbered the initiating roles of private individuals and organizations in the exploring and defining of new governmental tasks (many aspects of social hygiene and medicine, social work, the collection of statistics, etc); the cross fertilizing interplay between different agencies and expertises, public and private alike (criminal anthropology and accident insurance; industrial sociology and psychotherapy); the propensity of public institutions of government to secrete within themselves their own multiple spaces of partly autonomous authority; the different forms of delegation represented by the ‘quango’ ... whose functioning as governing institutions rests on their positioning exterior to the state apparatus (Gordon, 1991: 36).

Investigations into these forms of rule have developed a focus on how sovereign power is checked and consequently how rule through ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ can be encouraged beyond the state within a range of institutional settings. ‘Freedom’ is
not viewed as an “ideological fiction nor an existential feature of existence” but as a vehicle for government through procedures that attempt to enact a ‘responsibilised liberty’ (Barry et al, 1996: 8). In this sense neo-liberal rule attempts to mobilise the individual citizen as ‘player and partner’, to maximise self-potential as a consumer who makes choices in the market. Self-regulation, ‘care of the self’ and individual training are the optimising technologies of rule within neo-liberal government strategies (Gordon, 1991). Rose and Miller (1992: 175) have developed this further, to argue that neo-liberal:

... government is intrinsically linked to the activities of expertise, whose role is not one of weaving an all-pervasive web of ‘social control’, but of enacting assorted attempts at the calculated administration of diverse aspects of conduct through countless, often competing, local tactics of education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation and encouragement (Rose and Miller, 1992:175).

Miller and Rose (1990), Rose and Miller (1992) and Barry et al (1996) have elaborated the governmentality thesis through the linked notions of ‘power beyond the state’, ‘action at a distance’ and the role of expertise in understanding neo-liberal forms of political regulation. These writers have considered governmentality as being first of all a discursive activity: “a kind of intellectual machinery or apparatus for rendering reality thinkable in such a way as it is amenable to political programming” (Miller and Rose, 1990: 42). Forms of reasoning produce technologies of government which under “advanced liberalism” include government by audit, marketisation, privatisation, quangoisation and the devolution of responsibility for the management of various risks - “for health, wealth and happiness” - to non-state institutions and private individuals (Rose, 1996: 54-57).
Studies in this area have focused on the objects of governmentality - the city (Hunt, 1996), welfare (Rose and Miller, 1992), empire (Barry, 1996), the school (Hunter, 1996) - that in becoming knowable lend themselves more “amenable to intervention and regulation” (Miller and Rose, 1990: 5). Technologies of rule aimed at regulating the movement of goods, persons, the health of the population and criminality have become pluralised across a range of expert domains, and this has important implications for understanding political power and the possibilities for realising social order. Under neo-liberal conditions, therefore, a state centred model of power is inadequate where “centres of government are multiple” (Rose and Miller, 1992: 185). Furthermore:

The technologies and devices that are assembled into the apparatus of a state have neither the functionality nor unity often ascribed to them. The ‘power of the state’ is a resultant not a cause, an outcome of the composition and assembling of actors, flows, buildings, relations of authority into relatively durable associations mobilized, to a greater or lesser extent, towards the achievement of particular objectives by common means. This is not a matter of the domination of a ‘network’ by ‘the state’ but rather a matter of translation (Rose, 1996: 42-43)

‘Translation’ refers to the process of linkage between “loose and flexible” political programmes within specific localities whereby “diversity becomes composed” and actors forge common interests, understandings and goals through flexible networks that establish commonality regarding the “nature, character and causes of problems facing various individuals and groups” (Rose and Miller, 1992: 184). Under neo-liberal conditions, ‘community’ or the plurality of communities becomes the means of government in encouraging self-responsibilisation, choice and empowerment. Thus ‘social control’ is really to be understood as something exercised not on a
fully social and inclusive terrain (‘the death of the social’), but through diverse moral and/or lifestyle-based communities whose power of self-regulation can be nurtured through neo-liberal rule. Furthermore, centres of government are multiple and “seek to employ forms of expertise in order to govern society at a distance, without recourse to any forms of direct repression or intervention” (Barry et al, 1996: 14). The notion of ‘distance’ is viewed as “real as well as metaphorical” (Ibid).

The literature in this area has highlighted key problems for the study of regulation (government) and political cohesiveness in focusing on the emergence of alliances of authority that foster relations of expertise both within and beyond the state. It is not social control that is being dispersed here but rather political authority that seeks positively to enable, responsibilise and empower “sectors and agencies distant from the centre, yet tied to it through a complex of alignments and translations” (Barry et al, 1996: 12).

Within this work there are those who have explicitly rejected the analytical concept of ideology in favour of an analysis of the technical aspects of neo-liberal rule (Ibid: 11). The governmentality literature has thus forced a reconsideration of social control: its relationship to the exercise of power, the state and social order.

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5 More generally the governmentality thesis of Rose and Miller (1992: 177) has rejected the ‘realist’ traditions within sociology that have attempted to identify relations of causation, unearth ‘real’ interests behind political regulation or seek out ideological frameworks. Those analysts working in this area admit that studies in governmentality will not “help us know if we should be ‘for’ or ‘against’ the
Conclusion

In summary the analysis of contemporary social control has, following Foucault, developed around the concept of governmentality. This form of analysis has been influential in the attempt to understand forms of rule that appear to have complex relations to, or fall outside of, forms of state rule. This chapter has outlined this analysis of 'government' that has drawn attention to the localised public and private coalitions that employ "tactics rather than laws" and "the use of laws themselves as tactics" (Foucault, 1991: 95).

The theoretical contours and insights of the governmentality literature and the literature around risk will be further assessed in the next chapter. This will be done in relation to a series of questions at the heart of this thesis. Thus the key theoretical insights discussed above will be placed in the context of the emergence of partnerships developed between public and private bodies charged with urban rule generally and the instigation of control strategies in particular. How are these developments to be understood? Do they, conceptually speaking, fall outside of an analysis of the state? What is their relationship to the exercise of power and, following this, the exercise of social control in the contemporary city? The next chapter will make a series of theoretical arguments that challenge some of the assumptions of the social control literature discussed in this chapter. In according the state a central theoretical position, this thesis will argue for a material analysis present; such judgement should be left to other, perhaps more immediate, contexts and occasions" (Barry et al, 1996 16).
of social control that is attentive to the ideological, normative and sovereign/territorial components of social control strategies as developed through a neo-liberal state form. It is to a consideration of these issues that the next chapter will turn.
Chapter Three

Social Control and the Neo-Liberal State: A Theoretical Discussion

Some commentators have ... confused a hollowing-out of the state form with a hollowing-out of state power (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999a: 522).

... state management should be understood as completing some circuits of power and disrupting others (Ling, 1998: 218).

This chapter will set out a theoretical framework for analysing contemporary social control practices within a neo-liberal state form. In doing this a number of critical steps will be taken to move the analysis away from the risk and governmentality theorisations of social control, discussed in the previous chapter. The literature around risk and governmentality has made a number of important contributions to understanding contemporary social control. Not least of these has been to draw attention to the nuances in the techniques and rationales applied in the exercise of social control. Allied to this has been the attention given to a range of private ('non-state') authorities involved in the development and construction of risk categories as the driving force for strategies of social control. In short, social control within public spaces has been understood as decentred and responsibilised across a range of agencies who possess and act upon divergent institutional logics.

Given this dispersal of power in the field of social control, the possibilities for a

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1 Neo-liberalism is understood here as a political force that has been as ideologically unified as it has been contradictory, in its role in recasting the politics of locality. It is however “a class relation and a product of class struggle, an attempt to impose value discipline into society” (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1998: 761). This is in contrast to largely descriptive and technical understandings of neo-liberalism discussed in Chapter Two. In this thesis neo-liberalism will infer recognition of political and moral struggle at the centre of strategies of rule.
coherent and unified social order and a sovereign power over territory have been
minimised both between and within particular locations. In the light of
theorisations of risk and contemporary governmentality a number of related
theoretical questions and difficulties remain for those investigating social control:
do developments towards a ‘new penology’ present a fundamental break with
previous control strategies; are we witnessing a ‘death of the social’, with the
development of private and local domains of governance; are sovereign and
disciplinary control strategies redundant with the rise of risk management?
Furthermore, is the category of the ‘state’ outmoded as an object of inquiry when
investigating the operation of power and rule; and what is the material
manifestation of this power – its ideological orientation in aiding the process of
constructing and sustaining particular social relations and powerful representations
of social order? These latter questions will inform the empirical material presented
in Chapters Seven and Eight, where interview data accrued from ‘new’ state
managers in Liverpool will be discussed. This chapter, in seeking to ‘bring the state
back in’ (Thomas, 2000), will argue for a focus on the ideological reference points
and material context in researching the relations between surveillance, power and
social order in the dual sense of how these categories have been socially defined
and institutionally embedded. Therefore, the location of technologies and
programmes of social control within ‘the political’ will necessitate an analysis of
the latter as social relations (Pearce and Tombs, 1998: 568). This position
reinforces an argument made elsewhere in that “studies in governmentality
[should] occasionally stand back from the technical and engage with the political”
(Ivison, 1998: 562). Therefore this chapter will argue for revisiting the relations between social control, the state form, sovereign power and normative conceptions of social order.

Revisiting these relations will be important because, as will be argued, it is not the ‘technologies’ or ‘programmes’ that possess the power to act, but the social interests and forces that articulate, organise and render as operational particular technologies and programmes in a manner deemed to serve the broad purposes of a ruling social bloc - however contingent, contradictory and fragmented these interests might be. Thus, particular political programmes (their predominance in articulating and organising space within a locality) will be reflected and reinforced within processes of state formation, ideological representation and restructuring.

Chapters Seven and Eight will analyse the formation of locally powerful alliances that came together to instigate a strategy of rule for Liverpool’s regeneration. The public and private authorities involved in this process not only set out a programme of ‘orderly regeneration’ but in this programme, reordered – through the idea and practice of ‘partnership’ – the state form itself. Analytically, the thesis is concerned with mapping the contours of social control within the neo-liberal state form. The power to shape the urban form and forge an ‘urban identity’ through the imagery of ‘regeneration’ – “a powerful and particularly encompassing metaphor” (Furbey, 1999: 420) – has sat alongside the power to shape and administer social control strategies in the ‘reconstituted’ urban centre. This chapter discusses the neo-liberal
state form and its links to sovereignty, social order and strategies of social control in the urban centre. It is important to note that the discourses and practices that have given shape to this neo-liberal state have been indicative of a ‘managerial state’ form explored by Clarke and Newman (1997). Foregrounding the discourses of ‘business expertise’, ‘entrepreneurialism’ and ‘effectiveness’ has reshaped the rationale for state action and power but also, at the same time, mystified – through a technicist aura – the diktats of state power. This point will be particularly important when exploring CCTV in Liverpool which, as an ‘entrepreneurial’ form of state rule, cannot be understood simply for its technical character, but rather through how it has been positioned within a highly political process of urban restructuring. Thus the agents and agencies in the contemporary neo-liberal state have been “getting on with ‘business as usual’” but this has “always [implied] some conception of a social settlement: a normative view of the social order” (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 159).

In exploring these issues in contemporary state formation and rationale this chapter is divided into four interrelated sections. The first section will explore the relationship between state institutions and strategies of territorial control. Secondly, the chapter will explore the state as a set of institutions charged with the responsibility for sovereign control over territory. The third section will explore contemporary state restructuring towards the rule of ‘entrepreneurial’ cities or regions. Fourthly, the chapter will explore the empirical basis for analysing the contemporary state and strategies of social control within it. These strategies will
be understood as constituted by particular normative frameworks of power, which endow the state and social control with meaning and strategic direction.

**State and sovereignty**

The literature in the previous chapter has opened up a series of debates in thinking about social control and its relationship to state sovereignty. While important, this literature has been limited in its theorisation of this relationship and neglected to explore social control and its interrelationship with strategies of sovereignty located within state processes. Some writers have questioned any ‘clean break’ thought to be underpinning a ‘new’ penological venture and devolved forms of rule. For example, Stenson (1997: 12) has argued that “while the recognition of a renewed emphasis on governing the local spheres is important, it is misleading and over-simplified to characterize this within a narrative which exaggerates a shift from the social to the local and communal”. He has pointed to the co-existence of sovereign control over territory with the devolution in responsibility for preventive and risk management strategies. Thus he has argued that a more critical approach to understanding liberal forms of rule will be required than the ‘governmentality thesis’ and its over-emphasis on the ‘freedom to act’ has allowed:

> The price paid for the entrepreneurial and individualist consumerist freedoms of the majority may be a growing reliance on the more punitive disciplinary and sovereign powers used to contain the recalcitrant and disaffected minorities. Whilst we may not want to embrace a full functionalist theory of the state, *it may be necessary to recognise some of the key strengths of … the reconstituted state, in helping us to grasp the changing character of liberal rule* (Stenson, 1997: 13, *emphasis added*).
Similarly O’Malley (1996) argued against the idea that sovereign punitive power is incompatible with ‘new’ actuarial techniques, seeing them as “mutually supportive” systems of power (1996: 198). The state is not ‘giving up’ its claims to territorial dominance or moral authority, and indeed neo-liberal attacks on collective and universal social provisions are couched within a highly developed political and moral rhetoric. These observations are, according to O’Malley, lost in much of the actuarial and governmentality literature:

In such models there is no recognition of the increasing severity and scope of the sovereign dispositions that have accompanied the changes in the delivery of welfare. As levels of imprisonment now surpass those extant for generations, and the rationales for imprisonment increasingly tend towards the punitive and away from the correctional (especially in resurgent philosophies of ‘just deserts’ and ‘truth in sentencing’), it is unsatisfactory to see actuarial forms of power as efficiently managing the population, and other forms (disciplinary and sovereign) merely as ‘surviving’ or ‘persisting’ in the face of a tide of actuarial power (O’Malley, 1996:197).

For others, governmentality theorists have remained silent on “the endless forms of coercion deployed by [a] repressive state apparatus” against those who show dissent and resistance towards neo-liberal forms of rule (Frankel, 1987: 83).

More broadly, ‘sovereignty’ can be thought of not just in terms of coercive power, but also in terms of the power to define and administer a given territory. Useful here has been what Latham (2000) has called “social sovereignty” which historically has been the outcome of the interaction between state forces and economic forces working in contingent “term setting” alliances, able to make claims for sovereignty over particular domains. The contemporary fracturing of
sovereignty through a range of institutional sites and practices should not be mistaken for a disempowered state (Ibid: 1). In other words the analytical focus should move beyond zero-sum dualities between state and non-state actors to explore instead, “forms of cooperation and conflict between various agents in constructing and maintaining social sovereignties” (Ibid: 13). This important theoretical point will be illuminated in Chapters Seven and Eight, which investigate how the powerful coalitions that have underpinned CCTV have been engaged in setting the ideological and material limits for establishing and sustaining a social sovereignty in Liverpool city centre. In this sense, sovereignty may be achieved through the mobilisation of discourses pertaining to a contemporary demarcation of city spaces and their ‘legitimate’ uses. In mobilising such discourses, state actors can be understood as engaged in the designation of responsibility for sovereign control over territory. In other words, responsibilisation strategies are defined and articulated within the field of power relations that constitute the state form. The power to responsibilise actors in the field of social control points to processes of ideological closure and censure - a point explored in Chapter Seven.

The state and ‘responsibilisation’

Some writers have claimed that the contemporary neo-liberal drive to responsibilise actors and agencies in the sphere of crime control has led to a situation characterised by ‘government at-a-distance’ – ‘distance’, that is, from ‘the state’ in the drive to shape individual and institutional capacities and conduct. However, within this literature normative questions remain unanswered. Who and
what is to be responsibilised, for what purpose and aims? How do relatively enduring forms and sites of power shape these processes?

Garland (1996) has provided a detailed account of shifts within crime control, which remains sensitive to the changing character of central and local relations in interpreting emergent forms of control. His analysis begins with the recognition among formal crime control agencies that crime has become a normal social fact and has assumed the status of an everyday risk - rather than a moral deviation that requires explanation - to be managed on a par with other 'unavoidable' risks such as road accidents and food safety. The rise of 'the new criminologies of everyday life', therefore, have sought to move the programmes for crime control away from a concern with the individual offender towards a concern for vulnerable victims and the environments that create opportunities for crime. Implied in these emergent discourses, and coupled with widespread disaffection with the capabilities of formal criminal justice agencies, is the recognition that the state is no longer primarily responsible for crime control (Garland, 1996: 450-452). In attempting to 'adapt to failure' with rising crime rates and steady recidivism rates the crime control agencies of the state are faced with "new problems of legitimacy and new problems of overload" (1996: 455). In this context, central government has sought "to act upon crime not in a direct fashion through state agencies (police, courts, prisons, social work, etc.) but instead by acting indirectly, [through] seeking to activate action on the part of non-state agencies and organizations" (ibid: 452). The proliferation of 'multi-agency' and 'partnership' initiatives towards crime
prevention has been encouraged through schemes such as Safer Cities, the Crime and Disorder Act, funding criteria within the Single Regeneration Budget and Closed Circuit Television initiatives. These have been characterized by Garland as “responsibilization strategies”, where by the state is “experimenting with ways of acting at a distance, of activating the governmental power of ‘private’ agencies, of co-ordinating interests and setting up chains of co-operative action” which create new problems and difficulties as crime prevention and responsibility become diffused into ever more disparate parts of the social body (ibid: 454). In this climate of “responsibilization” the state is not simply being “hollowed out”:

The state does not diminish or become merely a nightwatchman. On the contrary, it retains all its traditional functions - the state agencies have actually increased their size and output during the same period - and, in addition, take on a new set of co-ordinating and activating roles, which in time develop into new structures of support, funding, information exchange or co-operation. Where it works - and one should not underestimate the difficulties involved in making it work - the responsibilization strategy leaves the centralized state machine more powerful than before, with an expanded capacity for action and influence (Garland, 1996: 454).

This expanded capacity of the state is not to be confused with Cohen’s (1985) ‘net-widening’ thesis in that what is occurring is a ‘defining down’ of deviance in the context of fiscal stringency. This means that minor offences are increasingly outside of official interest and there is a growing reluctance to process and penalize minor offenders. This process is also about the scaling down of expectations in relation to what the state can do, but the process is contradictory in that state sovereignty over the problem of crime is simultaneously denied (hence the preference for responsibilization strategies) and symbolically reasserted (the salience of law and order rhetoric, the evocation of ‘folk-devils’ and common
enemies, and the contemporary rise in incarceration rates) (Garland, 1996: 459-461). It will be argued in Chapter Seven that ‘responsibilisation’ has been important not for denying state sovereignty but for restructuring it, along the lines denoted by Latham discussed above. Thus responsibility for the enactment of social control can be understood as a definitional process arising from particular relations of power prescribed within the development of the local state form. The chapter will now turn to the theorisation of this state form.

**State rescaling**

The discussion so far has been predicated on the assumption that the state provides an arena for the organisation and implementation of control strategies in accordance with the circuits of power organised and articulated through the state form. Political geographers and other social scientists, more so than criminologists, have maintained an analytical scrutiny regarding the state, which has been understood as “a rapidly moving target” (Hay, 1996: 3). Some have grappled with the ‘problem of the state’ and how it can be theorized in relation to contemporary penal practices and control processes. In an analysis that attempts to understand legal pluralism within a range of contexts - ‘popular’ and informal justice, private government and ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ – De Sousa Santos (1992: 133) argues that the state has become a “more problematic social actor”:

> The analytical focus must therefore be on the state as contested terrain, a social field in which state and non-state, local and transnational social relations interact, merge and conflict in dynamic and even volatile combinations … To a certain extent this analytical strategy means ‘bringing the state back’ but, in a sense, the state is brought back to a ‘place’ where it has never been before. Under
current conditions the centrality of the state lies in the way the state organizes its own de-centering, as in the case of the state sponsored back-to-the community policies. The state may thus reproduce itself and indeed expand itself in forms which, by their novelty appear as non-state, political forms.

The devolution of authority to ‘extra-state’ agencies, local crime prevention ‘partnerships’ and local security networks may be viewed as a “heterogeneity of state action” that results in inconsistencies and disjunctions that makes patterns of coherence more difficult to identify. This position needs development, not least in terms of identifying both the ‘logic’ of decentering (though Garland’s analysis is useful here) and what it is that “holds together the configuration of micro-states” (De Sousa Santos, 1992: 134). Weiss (1997) argued that although it has become less fashionable to theorize the state in an era of ‘globalisation’ it has remained a key actor in building collaborative power arrangements - with other states, transnational institutions and private organisations - to meet new challenges to economic stability and social security:

... both domestic and regional coalitions imply that the state is not so much ‘devolving’ power - in a negative sum manner - to other power actors from whom it then maintains a passive distance. Rather, the state is constantly seeking power sharing arrangements which give it scope for remaining an active centre, hence being a ‘catalytic’ state (Weiss, 1997: 26).

These writers have highlighted the ‘elasticity’ of the state, which in turn has raised the problem of the nature of state boundaries and the authorization of the power to act within a given territory and thereby manage and shape social relations. The ‘state’, as Jessop (1990: 366-367) has reminded social theorists, is not a ‘thing’ that acts or exercises power, but rather its power and action are characteristic of “definite political forces in a specific conjuncture” where power is organised and
activated by sets of politicians, officials and managers whose power of action defines the state’s capacity for action and intervention in social relations. Rather than “trying to define the core of the state”, research would be best directed to analysing how state boundaries “are established through specific practices within and outside of the state” (Ibid: 366). In the contemporary setting this argument points to the rescaling of the state in terms of its shifting institutional boundaries, institutional ensembles and scope for intervention. This has meant theorising state power as processual and analysing its boundaries as a product of historically variant spatial scales (within and between the local, regional, national and supranational). In other words, state power must be contingently analysed as “socio-spatial activity” that represents “a series of context-specific – but actively constructed – processes” (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999a: 505). The urban and regional restructuring underway from the late 1980s across Western Europe has become the means by which state rescaling has been implemented in order; “to control and mediate, social relations among individuals, classes, class fractions and social groups in the context of the maelstrom of perpetual shifts in the global economy” (Swyngedouw, 1996: 1502). ‘Traditional’ state forms were deemed inadequate to make possible the creation of ‘competitive’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ cities and regions. This is important for thinking about the means by which space is rendered meaningful for urban managers within partnerships and how such space is ordered. The orchestration of partnership rule in Liverpool - shaped by ‘competitive’, ‘entrepreneurial’ philosophies - will be elaborated in Chapter Seven. Placed alongside this will be an exploration of social control within a broader
accumulation strategy – which itself may never be fully or coherently realised. However, such strategies “are always informed by particular models of the capitalist economy and its extra-economic preconditions and a particular understanding of the logic of capital” (Jessop, 1990: 354). It is these ‘extra-economic’ preconditions in particular that, it will be argued, have been articulated through, and formed the rationale of, the neo-liberal state form, and set the context for the implementation of social control strategies in Liverpool city centre.

Thinking about state rescaling and its processual nature can provide a corrective to theoretical traditions that have wrought fixed distinctions between state and civil society. Some theorists have based their analysis of state/society relations “on the degree of domination, control or penetration of ‘civil society’ by ‘the state’” (Frankel, 1987: 203). Such theoretical and conceptual distinctions have served to oversimplify social control processes through their failure “to recognise that state institutions are not mere political-administrative apparatuses (that is, there is much more to states than the parties, bureaucrats, etc., who make laws), and will continue to be involved in many social relations normally defined as belonging to ‘civil society’” (Ibid). This view has echoed Antonio Gramsci’s (1971: 259) expansive view of the state as an ethical set of activities and “a multitude of other so-called private initiatives and activities” that constitute an “apparatus of ‘hegemony’ or civil society” (Ibid: 261). The contemporary forms of ‘responsibilisation’, ‘enrolment chains’ and ‘empowerment’ that have acted as ‘distancing’ techniques of advanced liberal rule (Barry et al, 1996: 11-12) are also political processes
involved in the realignment of state power, form and ideological representation. Thus the representative individuals whose ‘expertise’ and professional status have been so important in instigating ‘partnerships’ and in activating ‘power at a distance’ can in fact be understood as ‘new primary definers’ (Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994: 17-21) imbued with an institutional power and authority to act upon and order social relations. These new state functionaries and their ideological power in shaping the meaning of the ‘orderly’ urban form will be analysed in Chapter Seven. Theoretically, the ascendance of this group and their role within a neo-liberal state form can be understood as “constructor[s], organiser[s], ‘permanent persuader[s] and not just simple orator[s]” (Gramsci, 1971: 10). Such intellectuals, for Gramsci, provide leading social groups with a degree of “homogeneity” and “awareness of [their] own function” in organising, for example, “the confidence of investors” in business, “customers” for particular products and the articulation of a new legality and cultural plane (Ibid: 5). As participants in the building of a particular social bloc, itself always contradictory and discordant, the new primary definers can be understood as engaged in local political struggles designed to forge a “hegemonic project” (Jessop, 1990: 260) between the institutional components of a neo-liberal state form. The building of a responsible economic, political, intellectual and moral leadership across the rescaled state form may be possible to the extent that a “representative regime” can be consolidated (Ibid: 345). Such a regime may be realised through the mobilisation of key territorial and functional agents, political parties, state managers and the organs of popular opinion, namely the local media. It is these processes in state development
and formation that form the backdrop for thinking about the nature of social control in Liverpool city centre – its authorisation and normative articulation among key ‘representational’ players. Having discussed the theoretical framework for understanding the neo-liberal state, the chapter will now turn to a discussion concerning the location of social control practices within this state form, along with a more precise outline of how these control practices are to be understood.

**Researching the contemporary state: power and normative ordering**

Thus far the chapter has outlined a set of arguments for thinking about the practice of contemporary social control. The latter will be understood as organised and initiated through a state form that provides the arena for the actualisation of sovereignty over a given territory and the designation of responsibility for maintaining that sovereignty. In developing these interrelationships this section will outline an approach to the state conceived of as a set of institutions geared towards the normative ordering of social relations.

Jessop (1990: 426) has argued that it is only through empirical analysis that the state can be understood and theorised. The state cannot be taken as given and an analysis must be directed towards those:

- state practices and projects which define the boundaries of the state system and endow it with a degree of internal unity. The state does not exist as a fully constituted, internally coherent, organizationally pure and operationally closed system but is an emergent, contradictory, hybrid and relatively open system. Thus there can be no inherent substantive unity to the state qua institutional ensemble: its (always relative) unity must be created within the state system
itself through specific operational procedures, means of co-
ordination and guiding purposes.

This is not an argument for an all-powerful, everywhere present and monolithic
state but one that urges a careful analysis of changing state forms, fields of action
and operations of power. Theoretical attention needs to be focused on the
contingent strategic processes of intervention that endow unity and generate
fractures within forms of ‘partnership’ that seek to align social interests, enact
social control and bring about a relatively coherent social order. Therefore the
focus should be upon:

The discourses which define the illusory community whose interests
and social cohesion are to be managed by the stage [state] within the
framework of a given historic bloc and hegemonic project. The
latter provides political, intellectual and moral guidelines for the
conduct of state policy. This may subsume an accumulation strategy
but there is no necessary relationship between hegemonic projects
and accumulation strategies (Jessop, 1990: 346).

Thus Jessop has offered a framework for understanding state forms and the
exercise of state power that is neither reductionist, functional nor monolithic but
relatively open and contingent. The work above suggests that in order to
understand ‘partnership’ forms of rule in the field of crime control it is necessary to
place these alliances within the processual changes impacting on the effectivity of
state power and the forms of action open to state actors and agencies to adapt to
meet challenges in governance. This, as in the case in Liverpool, may mean
working with the private sector through relatively novel alliances and means of
communication; for example in the input of the private sector through resourcing
Closed Circuit Television schemes, the provision of uniformed patrols, and other
investments in crime prevention. The ‘rise’ of the private sector therefore should
not be exaggerated as something new in that the state and public organs have never enjoyed a monopoly in the field of crime control (Johnson, 1992). However, within Britain’s city centres the challenges for state management are increasingly entwined with the ongoing struggles to regenerate local economies, which are underpinned by the desire to create secure, and safe city spaces (Oc and Tiesdell, 1997). This is leading to high investment levels by local businesses, police and political elites who are working in partnerships that are unified by the common threat of crime as hindering processes of urban regeneration (Taylor, 1997).

Crucially, another aspect that is often missing from governmentality and new penology theories are the processes that construct the problems that governmental or risk strategies respond to and seek to remedy. In other words, what are the political and moral considerations that inform the work of ‘partnerships’ in the identification of problems and strategic responses towards a secure city centre? To borrow Fiske’s (1993: 235) phrase, who are the “proper objects of power” that are targeted in the attempt to render the city centre secure? To return to these political and moral questions means acknowledging yet moving beyond the post-Foucauldian concerns with the ‘efficient’ deployment of technologies of control and re-entering questions regarding their legitimacy and general moral underpinning. As Garland (1990: 170-1) argued, the Foucauldian conception of power is problematic in that it:

... is strangely apolitical. It appears as a kind of empty structure, stripped of any agents, interests, or grounding, reduced to a bare technological scaffolding.
Partnerships involved in the regeneration and reconfiguration of social control therefore have to be understood both in terms of the technologies of control they employ and the interests and guiding purposes that are integral to their functioning. These alliances can be understood as “the outcome of political and moral struggle, which will continue to be the objects of major conflict” (O’Malley, 1996: 194). The return to ideology, then, is not a reductionist argument per se, but is vital for investigating how ideas “facilitate” social relations - “how they come to be accepted as true, how they rationalize the strategies of groups and institutions … and … how they can lead to the establishment of particular mechanisms of … social control” (McLennan, 1996: 60). The post-Foucauldian rejection of a state-centred analysis - rightly directed at reductionist and homogenizing tendencies - and its replacement with a conception of multiple power centres has left itself open to the charge of depicting rationalities of power as “free-floating, not anchored in relations of domination and subordination, exploitation, or indeed any conditioning material conditions” (Curtis, 1995: 586). Thus, for one writer, the role of neo-liberal technologies of rule in ordering unequal social relations and preserving private wealth at the expense of collective social provision has been ignored in the governmentality literature (Frankel, 1987). Of particular concern for this thesis is how ‘chains of enrolment’ and ‘responsibilisation strategies’ are cemented – and themselves articulated – across authoritative institutions that constitute the neo-liberal state. Indeed, the concept of ideology is useful here for its facilitating role in instituting and coordinating intra-state relations and informing the kind of entrepreneurial strategies of rule discussed in Chapter Five. Building “a hegemony
of vision” (Zukin, 1996b: 223) across the rescaled state form not only facilitates the “channelling of capital into the built environment” but may also assist in “producing, controlling and surveilling social and physical spaces” designed to construct “a relative crisis-free and cohesive civic order” (Swyngedouw, 1996: 1504).

The above writers have been useful in thinking about partnerships between powerful local interests and how these need to be situated within their political and economic conditions of emergence. Partnerships can be rendered intelligible through understanding their constituent interests and orientation towards the problems they have identified as obstacles to good government that is enacted and articulated through frameworks of ‘normative orders’. In his analysis of urban policing Herbert (1997) noted how territorial control and power are at the heart of the policing enterprise. Furthermore, he drew attention to how territoriality is constructed and construed through the normative orders that constitute the institutions charged with policing space:

Indeed, all organizations or subcultures might be best understood in terms of the constellation of formal and informal normative orders that constitute them ... Normative orders often cohere, but they just as frequently clash. For this reason state agencies are best understood not as machines but as dynamic and conflict ridden organizations in which different agents define situations differently based upon their particular normative orientation (Herbert, 1997: 399).

This brings the analysis to the problem of partnerships and social control and how agents both plan for and act upon an ‘orderly space’ within a particular locality. Social control, as understood in this thesis, needs to be theorized as a set of “social
ordering practices” within an extended notion of criminal justice in both its formal and informal settings, and within sites that identify and respond to crime and deviance in “a related but not entirely co-ordinated set of practices geared towards the construction and maintenance of social order” (Lacey, 1994: 28). The conceptual frame of ‘social ordering practices’ is useful here; they do not operate within any one agency, and transgress the boundaries of formal criminal justice institutions and, in this sense, they are pertinent to the study of the control strategies within the local partnerships that form part of the rescaled state. The concept can not only link diversely constituted criminal justice practices to strategies of social order - “in a symbolic sense: with a society’s sense of itself as a cohesive, viable, and ethical entity” – but can also point to the conflictual ideologies, norms and values that exist within and around criminal justice. This is important not only because it renders possible a critique of an ordering strategy “on the basis of its own legitimating ideas as well as on the basis of values external to it” (Lacey, 1994: 29), but also in pointing to the precise social relations within which normative ordering occurs. The strength of this theoretical method over the post-Foucauldian perspectives is that it not only re-introduces the normative and value-laden aspects of control but it also, in line with a ‘social analysis of penalty’, stands outside those terms of reference and official discourses that orientate, define and legitimate penal practices (Garland and Young, 1983). ‘Social ordering’ can also imply a certain specificity and attention to ‘local’ practice - a feature that was lacking, as the previous chapter noted, in those homogenizing prescriptions of
social control. These issues will be returned to in the next chapter in the discussion of the methodology utilised in the thesis.

To return to the focus of this chapter, it is the city centre where responsibilisation strategies are being tried and tested through the re-alignment of public and private agencies - local authorities, business, developers, public and private police - towards the implementation of regeneration strategies within which formal and informal partnerships emerge to create secure and safe city spaces as a key part of the rejuvenation process (Davis, 1990; Coleman and Sim, 1998; Taylor, 1997). Thus an analysis of the complex relations of social control that operate within a particular locality will need to consider the emergent rationales of ‘risk’ based strategies of control alongside ‘disciplinary’ and ‘sovereign’ techniques. Furthermore those who manage and make decisions within so-called ‘multiple’ and ‘authoritative power centres’ - their values, visions and interests - must be considered as an important aspect in properly theorizing contemporary social control. This variable has been omitted by those who have argued within a ‘dispersal of discipline’ framework, as well as by those who have stressed the dispersal of a risk management strategy and the efficacy of neo-liberal rule. These latter approaches have retained a focus on the technical and practical aspects of control or rule, or in the case of the ‘dispersal of discipline thesis’ have assumed rather than investigated the “correspondence of interests” (Hall and Scraton, 1981: 474) that instil social ordering practices with meaning and purpose. In short what is missing are the wider power relations and social relations upon which partnerships
ground their capacity to intervene and act, through the moral as well as the technical, and the frameworks within which partnerships construct the objects of their power. If risk is a socio-political construct and not merely an objective technical term (Douglas, 1992; Sparks, 1992; Adams, 1995), then a social analysis must not take the term for granted and instead contextualise it - along with concepts such as ‘security’ and ‘responsibility’ - within the configuration of partnership agencies and underlying interests that operationalise these concepts as part of social ordering strategies. This broader framework of social ordering would involve both a wider understanding of social relations of which criminal justice is a part, as well as making connections back to the early and expansive conceptions of social control - Durkheim, Park and Ross - that sought an integrative, non-coercive and civilizing function in the drive for social order. In this sense linking the notions of ‘social ordering’ and the institutional ensemble of partnerships can help to make sense of an increasingly varied terrain of criminal justice, which McMahon (1992) identified in the introduction to the thesis. The focus on social ordering,

... entails that criminal justice studies can contribute to our more general understanding of societies. It draws our attention to criminal justice as an index of how civilized a society is, and to general questions of how negative, repressive, or socially disintegrative criminal justice power has to be, and to what degree if any it can have positive, socially integrative functions (Lacey, 1994: 34).

Thus the catch-all category of social control that has meant all things to all theorists can potentially gain theoretical and analytical clarity in asking what is social about social control; whom does it control and for what purposes?

The constituent elements of social control are always in need of specification in each and every instance; it is not a concept that speaks for itself with much volume or clarity. What is necessary if
we want to continue using the category ... is a relational analysis of the forces that are clashing, an account of the circumstances and conditions that colour the prejudice of that clash, and a theory of the ideological and cultural mediation of those forces and circumstances through the categories of social censure (Sumner, 1997b: 142).

This chapter has presented a theoretical base within which to place Sumner’s analytical request. Thinking about the contemporary meaning of regeneration, its institutional embodiment within a neo-liberal state form and the circuits of power it has drawn upon will provide an appreciation of the wider social relations within which a mapping of the ideological contours of contemporary social control in the urban centre is possible. CCTV – as a contemporary aspect of social control practice – can be thought of as more than a piece of crime prevention technology. It mediates, and is mediated by, wider social relations. This chapter has provided a theoretical map to interpret these social relations as organised through state institutions that are concerned with the administration and ordering of physical space. In this sense the state can only be understood “relationally” (Jessop, 1990: 269). Furthermore:

The state as such has no power – it is merely an institutional ensemble; it has only a set of institutional capacities and liabilities which mediate that power; the power of the state is the power of the forces acting in and through the state (Ibid: 269-270).

In Liverpool, locally powerful networks constitute such forces that have characterised the power of the local state. These forces will be discussed in the next chapter and interview material gathered from them used extensively in Chapters Seven and Eight. It is within these contemporary processes in urban rule that the trajectory of social control, and more particularly CCTV, will be placed. In the next
chapter the methodological issues and questions arising from the theoretical discussion in this chapter will be discussed.
Chapter Four

CCTV as a Social Ordering Practice: Investigating the Social Control Agents within a Neo-Liberal State

We need ... to have detailed studies of the ‘locally powerful’ to understand how powerful positions in the family or in the workplace or in the streets are sustained (Smart, 1984: 151).

... elites need to be interviewed. The best way of finding out about people is talking to them. It cannot guarantee to secure the truth, especially by people well published in the art of discretion, but is surely superior to any alternative way of discovering what they believe they do (Crewe, 1974: 42-43).

The previous chapter outlined a set of theoretical arguments for bringing conceptions of the state back into an analysis of developments in social control in the contemporary city. However, on first embarking on this research project notions of ‘the state’ and ‘the locally powerful’ were not immediate concepts that sprung to mind. The project in which I was employed was entitled ‘Security and Insecurity in the Modern City’. My first impression was how broad a title this was. One initially thought, what does this title mean? Research questions began to take shape as I asked what kinds of ‘security’ I could look at. I decided the research should be more than a quantitative counting of ‘security measures’ in the city, nor should it merely be about how ‘effective’ such measures may or may not be. As with the term ‘insecurity’, these broad concepts potentially pointed to processes outside of formal criminal justice practices. Initially, this led to thinking about interviewing different audiences. This led to ideas of interviewing ‘the public’ to get at different meanings given to these concepts mediated through categories of ‘race’, gender, sexuality and age. Also, the question of how the terms would be defined by
different regulatory agencies in the city was a possible avenue to explore because what quickly became clear was that my thesis would explore meaning – how terms like ‘security’ and ‘insecurity’ were defined and made meaningful by the locally powerful: though clearly, for reasons of time and resources, the research was never going to investigate ‘meaning’ derived from all potential subject populations. Thus the sample population needed to be chosen in line with factors and issues that sprung from my observations of the place (geographically speaking) where the research was to be grounded and my own theoretical reasoning. First of all, ‘the City’ in question (i.e., where the research was based) was Liverpool; a city in which I was raised in and the ‘fortunes’ of which I followed. As of August 1995, I began to scan the local press to pick up any news and information about what was happening in the city. What struck me instantly were the notions of ‘regeneration’ and ‘renaissance’ articulated in the local press. Alongside this lay local and national coverage of Liverpool’s closed circuit television (CCTV) scheme, which was placed within the context of the recent high profile murder of a local child. What was striking was the fact that the same people and agencies were being routinely accessed and hailed in the press to talk about ‘regeneration’, ‘security’ and ‘safety’ in Liverpool city centre. In other words, the same named agencies and individuals were speaking authoritatively and publicly about the development and use of CCTV as well as the rationale for regeneration in the city. What was also striking was the seemingly indefinable institutional make up and political location of these agencies within the framework of local governance, indicated by their ‘new’ sounding names. These individuals and groups I later understood as ‘new primary
definers’ who, being located within what the previous chapter identified as a neo-liberal state, were responsible for articulating a governing strategy for the city centre. These initial reflections, along with a need to narrow down and refine the research, led me to think about ‘the locally powerful’ as the target group to focus upon. It was this group who seemed to be most vocal about the issues in the initial project title. Secondly and related to the above points, this focus also offered the prospect of plugging gaps in previous criminological research and theorising around social control. In short, one gap to be filled was recognising how social control practices are made possible in a qualitative sense and are inseparable from meaning – in this case the meaning attributed to control practices by those who conceived of and established the practices in question. Furthermore, focusing up the social and political hierarchy aided a reintegration of thinking about the state and ‘the powerful’ into research around contemporary social control strategies. In this way I had begun to make connections between my theoretical reasoning and my chosen sample frame as I orientated my research towards the locally powerful rather than the ‘public’.

Building upon this initial discussion, what follows in this chapter will be the methodological processes involved in this thesis. In particular the chapter will discuss the methodological rationale that was adopted in order to gather qualitative data pertaining to the meanings attributed to social control practices as expressed by powerful agents within the local neo-liberal state. In developing the earlier discussion, a key aim of the research was to map the development of a local
security network that emerged as part of the local state in order to gain an understanding of the normative frameworks that underpinned the development and trajectory of the closed circuit television system. More particularly an emphasis was placed upon gaining an understanding of the strategic driving forces and ‘visions of order’ that underpinned the security network and the social control initiatives that were put in place alongside an exploration of how problem populations were identified as hindering local social order. Thus the research wanted to investigate the development and consolidation of CCTV cameras in the city centre as part of a wider set of social relations bound up with the problem of urban rule. This chapter will discuss the particular research methods that were deemed suitable for a study of the normative contours that underpinned the security network and as they informed the visions of the ‘locally powerful’. The chapter will explore firstly, the broad relationship between criminological research and questions of power. Secondly, the chapter will discuss the basis for approaching the study of CCTV as a component in a set of social ordering practices. Following this, the final section of the chapter will discuss the particular methodological procedures adopted for this thesis.

**Politics, power and criminological research**

The main investigative contours of criminological knowledge have been directed at the search for the causes of ‘the problem of crime’. This endeavour has assumed rather than analysed the conceptual, behavioural and politically charged problems existing around the category of ‘crime’ (Muncie, 1996). From the nineteenth
century, and under the broad auspices of positivism, criminology has tendentiously aligned itself with the agents and agencies of power in an attempt to confer legitimacy and credibility for a discipline seeking practical relevance in the field of policy and state sponsored crime control strategies (Garland, 1985). Thus the belief in the search for the ‘objective’ causes of crime and its scientific treatment belies deeper motivational reasoning behind the development of criminology understood as:

A product of the prison, of the institutions and ideologies which individualised and differentiated the criminal, and of the desire to do so in a thorough and rigorous image (Garland, 1985: 3).

Thus mainstream criminology up until the 1960s was dominated by a pragmatic empiricism, aimed towards a particular notion of correction and underpinned by a positivistic social science (Cohen, 1981). During the 1960s positivism came under increasing criticism from radical and right realist criminologies. Such critiques pointed to perceived failures in the machinations of “social democratic positivism” (Young, 1994: 73). From the late 1970s a new orthodoxy emerged to challenge the ideal of individual rehabilitation and collective welfare ‘solutions’ to crime. The predominance of what has been commonly called ‘administrative criminology’ (Young, 1986) consolidated a technical and managerial orientation in the research process. Such an approach has appeared to take rising crime rates ‘seriously’ but in a manner which has rejected predispositional theories in favour of the search for situational and preventive measures that promise more ‘efficient’ and ‘effective’ administrative mechanisms to aid the practicalities of controlling crime (Clarke, 1980). Thus mainstream criminology underwent a theoretical and methodological
refinement in the 1980s that dovetailed with wider political and ideological developments in its marginalisation of structural factors towards an increased concern with fiscal stringency and cost effectiveness in a range of policy areas including criminal justice (Walklate, 1997: 44). In this sense criminology has further limited its analytical horizons in terms of the questions it asks, the manner in which it asks them and in its reluctance to raise or engage with problems and issues external to the policy process. Crawford (1997: 1) pointed to some of the consequences of this when he stated:

It is often as a result of the quest to produce research findings which have an impact upon immediate (short-term) policy debates that criminologists have ignored the larger canvas upon which are inscribed more enduring processes of change. Criminology, too often, has become disconnected from social and political trends, their implications and the theoretical debates aimed at their explanation. This narrow focus of criminology, for some, may mark the maturing of the discipline but, for others, it constitutes its capture by a discourse of administration, whereby criminologists increasingly respond to the desire to find more efficient means of control. In the consequent battle over ‘what works’, wider arguments have become lost.

In nourishing the “penal-welfare” complex (Garland, 1985) or, more recently, in establishing “the new criminologies of everyday life” (Garland, 1996), criminological theorising and research, whether in its positivistic or administrative guises, has maintained close working relationships with the organs of formal and informal state power. Such close relations will be highlighted in the next chapter, when discussing twentieth century criminological interventions concerned to understand and respond to crime in the city. Current criminological interest in the ubiquitous phenomenon of ‘crime prevention’ has been dominated and encouraged
by administrative criminology and its specific interest in situational strategies of
crime control (Jupp, 1996; Hughes, 1998). Bottoms and Wiles (1996: 7) pointed to
four major types of contemporary crime prevention activity, which have
exemplified the extent and ubiquity of ‘crime prevention’. First there are ‘defensive
strategies’ which include target hardening, self-help programmes and
neighbourhood watch. Second there are guardianship and monitoring initiatives
that include targeted policing, the use of surveillance cameras and the forms of
private control indicative within the spaces of mass private property. Third the
creation of new forms of social order, including the growth of partnerships between
police and other agencies, public safety schemes and family orientated prevention
initiatives. Fourth there is ‘criminality prevention’, which includes diversion
schemes aimed at ‘at risk’ young people and ‘offence specific’ prevention
programmes. It is argued that research around these forms of prevention has
focused upon ‘what works’ in terms of reducing crime. Such work has been
empirically led rather than developing any strong theoretical frameworks (Jupp,
1996: 27). Crawford (1997) suggested such research fails to engage with normative
sets of questions and problems. This failure, along with the concerns of policy
makers and practitioners of crime control, linked in with the development and
evaluation of recent crime prevention initiatives such as Neighbourhood Watch,
target hardening programmes and the use of closed circuit television. Seminal in
directing and funding this research agenda has been the Home Office Research and
Planning Unit that has issued grants to academics and private research consultants
as well as directly employing its own research staff. Therefore, explanations of the
rise of ‘organised’ crime prevention have, as Bottoms and Wiles (1996: 4-6) noted, been understood as a result of academic research that has encouraged a disinterest in causation allied with a scepticism directed toward the capabilities of traditional forms of preventative police work in preventing crime. In looking to what is feasible and pragmatic much of this work has been ‘successful’ in terms of attracting funding (and therefore generating employment for researchers), but also in sustaining a deeper appeal. This kind of research has been,

... also linked to the important ideological and organisational work which it does for the state and other corporate interests. It offers the prospect that what ‘we’ can do can make a difference and thus moves on from criminology’s pessimism of the 1970s (Hughes, 1998: 65).

In line with these developments other changes have led to the centralisation of research and to a restriction in the scope of research questions asked. This has been referred to as the ‘commodification’ of the research process as has been widely propagated in the academic circles. The narrowing down of the research exercise has been fuelled by state funding regimes that prioritise ‘managerial pragmatism’ in the drive for ‘relevant research’ that has perpetuated and not challenged legal-technical discourses (Hillyard and Sim, 1997). The move towards a managerial kind of pragmatism within criminological research is exemplified through research in the sphere of crime prevention. This shift has marginalised a number of important research questions, namely: those questions concerning what crime is to be prevented, and whose interests are represented within crime prevention strategies? (Walklate, 1997). As Croall (1998) observed, official crime prevention discourses and practices have focused exclusively upon conventional crime and
offenders while at the same time leaving out crimes that are the cause of widespread victimisation committed by powerful agents. Consequently, the technical and administrative momentum in criminology has denoted a denial of political processes and problems within and external to the research process, and prioritised instead a particular and tendentious perspective on 'the problem of crime':

... we have witnessed the development of a body of technical and pragmatic knowledge aimed at helping those in power to put their ideas into practice through technical evaluations ... This 'technicist' orientation thus sees crime as a technical and practical problem needing an administrative and apolitical 'solution'. This 'administrative' aim has been prioritised over the broader critical questioning of the main assumptions, principles and social consequences of the different approaches to crime prevention associated with the state and (increasingly) the private sector (Hughes, 1998: 4). 1

In light of the concerns raised in this section, the next part of the chapter will discuss the approach taken in this thesis, particularly with regard to the aim of moving beyond a narrow technicist focus in order to ask a wider range of questions that bring the problem of power into the analysis.

**Approaching CCTV as part of a local security network**

At the outset this thesis wanted to investigate a CCTV scheme not in isolation, but as part of the development and functioning of a local security network as it

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1 With the field of multi agency crime prevention partnerships, exceptions to this line of enquiry have included the work of Crawford (1995; 1997), Crawford and Jones (1995) and Sampson et al (1988). Broadly, this work has been concerned to investigate the power relations between and within state institutions, multi-agency and 'partnership' initiatives around crime prevention. Such research has been contextualised within broader sets of questions regarding: "... where society may be presently heading, either by default or by design, under the influence of the emerging forms of governance of crime, and secondly, what alternative avenues are, or may be, available?" (Crawford, 1997: 2).
emerged as part of the local state in Liverpool city centre. CCTV, therefore, was positioned in relation to other policing and security initiatives found within a locality and as part of a combined effort towards the enactment of what Lacey (1994) called a 'social ordering strategy'. Exploring such a strategy enabled a wider social understanding of the development of a local security network within the political, ideological and economic imperatives that informed the strategies of powerful coalitions and partnerships involved in the regeneration of the city centre. Therefore the investigation did not concern itself with the quantitative analysis of control strategies but rather the meaning of 'order' and 'control' that emerged within and informed the work of the security network at those nodal points where public and private control agents met and collaborated. Although some of the research cited above does excavate data from local settings it is the nature of the local - its peculiar ideological, economic and political context, and its significance for the precise development of a security network - that is missing from the literature. However, in noting the importance of 'the local' the thesis will not argue for closure in terms of a contribution to wider empirical or theoretical debate that has emerged around the nature of contemporary social control. Neo-Foucauldian approaches to social control discussed in Chapter Two stressed the micro techniques of power. These studies have been, at best, contingent and, at worst – in the call for attention to the 'local' and 'particular' – so particularistic “that we can never know when any particular is particular enough” (McLennan, 1996: 70). “Ultimately”, Ward (2000: 171) has argued, “concrete empirical observations must be supplemented by, and integrated in, theoretical developments”. Thus in setting
out the research aims here, and the research findings in Chapters Seven and Eight, the thesis will contribute to contemporary debates into the nature of social control and its relationship to power and social order. In this sense, as Bryman (1988: 18) has argued, “case studies are indeed capable of generality if understood in theoretical rather than statistical terms”. Given these points it is recognised that a study of a local security network is also a study of ‘the locally powerful’ as organised through the public and private partnerships and alliances that constitute the local state.

Researching the powerful: ‘Studying up’

...sociology that ‘studies up’ often won’t be seen as scientific - funds will be difficult to obtain, sampling frames non existent, access (unlike to the working class) well nigh impossible and so on. Indeed, the whole activity may not even be deemed worthy of the name of science. Legitimating seals of approval may well be withdrawn from a sociology that looks up and not down (Bell, 1978: 29).

Most research within social science and indeed criminology is carried out on the powerless as opposed to the powerful (Bell, 1978; Hughes, 1996). Bell drew attention to the “classic” problems of researching the “locally powerful” that included gaining funding and access to relatively closed institutions (Ibid: 34-37). However, despite the problems involved in ‘studying up’, the powerful have been a figure and subject of research in criminology. At the beginning of the chapter a brief outline was provided regarding the relationship between mainstream criminology and the dominant practices and discourses associated with state and corporate strategies of ‘crime control’. However, this was not meant to suggest that
studies within criminology have failed to 'study up' and fix their gaze upon state, corporate and other sites and mechanisms of power including decoding the actions and articulations of the powerful (Tombs and Whyte, 2002).

Much of the research that attempts to 'study up' can be grouped under the category of 'critical social research' (Harvey, 1990). Harvey attempted to broadly define the parameters of this kind of research that cannot be honed down to a single perspective or discipline:

At the heart of critical social research is the idea that knowledge is structured by existing sets of social relations. The aim of a critical methodology is to provide knowledge which engages the prevailing social structures. These social structures are seen by critical social researchers, in one way or another, as oppressive structures (Harvey, 1990: 2).

A defining characteristic of such research and what may distinguish it from 'non-critical' research is that the knowledge it can generate is seen as knowledge as critique (Ibid: 3).²

Within criminology a critical tradition has been sustained from the 1960s and has been dubbed a ‘criminology from below’ (Sim, Scraton and Gordon, 1987). The thrust of this work has been to challenge the state in particular and associated official discourses, along with a deconstruction, as well as, influence upon social policy in general. In scrutinising key criminal justice agencies, issues of

² Furthermore, in contrast to an administrative research agenda, which may attempt to facilitate existing practices, a critical agenda may mobilise research findings to push for more substantial change to criminal justice practices either in a reformist sense or in suggesting more fundamental changes.
institutional racism, classism and sexism have been raised through, for example, neo-Marxist and Feminist theoretical frameworks that have sought to widen an understanding of the workings of criminal justice as part of the workings of an unequal social order.\(^3\)

The local security network and ‘studying up’: research concepts

The investigation of CCTV took place within what I have termed a local security network and its development within a particular city centre location. The term ‘security network’ has been taken from its use by Shearing as discussed in Johnson (1996). The term has been used to highlight the contemporary complex of problems around policing provision, structures of accountability and legitimacy during the 1990s. The term denotes that the public police “would only be one element within the total network” (Ibid: 68). The term ‘network’ is derived from its use by Rhodes (1997). For Rhodes, the development of ‘networks’ referred to an altered state in the methods and processes of contemporary rule, which he termed “the new governance”:

> Governance blurs the distinction between state and civil society. The state becomes a collection of interorganizational networks made up of governmental and societal actors with no sovereign actor able to steer or regulate. A key challenge for government is to enable these networks and to seek out new forms of cooperation (Rhodes, 1997:57).

Networks, defined as “self-organising”, invoke complex links between public and private sectors that can be “indirectly and imperfectly” steered by the state (Ibid: 68).

\(^3\) An overview of some of this work is contained within Sim, Scraton and Gordon (1987: 7-39) and in
The work of Rhodes and those exploring the notion of Governmentality, discussed in Chapter Two, have both highlighted changes in the mechanisms and processes of rule, which in turn has raised methodological questions about the approach to be adopted in a study of power and, more particularly, the powerful. These problems will be discussed in more detail below.

In referring to a security network, the thesis was particularly concerned to investigate the interconnections, alignments and forms of co-operation that developed between public and private agencies towards the construction of discourses and practices that constituted a wider notion of ‘security’, rather than being focused on ‘policing’ in its formalistic and singular institutional sense. The thesis concerned itself with an investigation into the emergence of a security network not in terms of its administrative efficiency but in terms of the development and trajectory of such a network as part of a strategy of local state rule that, as Chapter Three indicated, is concerned with the formulation and enactment of local social ordering strategies. Thus a number of inter-linked research questions and investigative problems can be posed. The thesis investigates:


Running alongside these observations, but operating a different and wider conceptualisation of ‘government’, the governmentality literature pointed to the need to investigate the neo-liberal technologies and mentalities of rule. Such mechanisms of rule, it was argued, operate through networks and alliances existing beyond ‘a state’ that have to be “analysed in terms of the strategies, techniques and procedures through which different authorities seek to enact programmes of government in relation to the materials and forces to hand and the resistances and oppositions anticipated or encountered” (Rose, 1996: 42).
1 the processes by which a security network evolves and develops within locally embedded ideological, political and economic practices;

2 the key players involved in the network and their role in defining and responding to (through CCTV) local problems that hinder strategic ‘visions’ and meanings for order;

3 the tensions and conflicts within the network pertaining to the ‘appropriateness’ of particular security initiatives in the locality.

These broad investigative concerns make it apparent that the study of the local security network in Liverpool city centre is at the same time also a study of the locally powerful as they are organised through the ‘partnership’ forums of the neo-liberal state. Crawford (1997) has attempted to trace the development of the partnership idea and its meaning for thinking about contemporary control practices. He argued that the discursive and practical “appeal” to ‘partnerships’ in the field of crime control heralds a new era in the governance of crime and disorder (Crawford, 1997: 5):

In contemporary appeals to ...‘partnerships’, crime control is no longer conceived of as the sole duty of the professional police officer or other criminal justice agents. Rather, it is becoming more fragmented and dispersed throughout state institutions, private organisations, and the public. Responsibility for the crime problem, according to current governmental strategies, is now everyone’s. It is shared property (Crawford, 1997: 25).

Crawford went on to state that:

Simultaneously, there is a new found emphasis on informal mechanisms of social control rather than the formal mechanisms of processing offenders. Loss prevention and security management
have been moved to centre stage of the crime control agenda. In sum, there appears to be a move towards a much broader conception of security and policing, which transcends the capacities and competencies of singular modern institutions (Ibid).

This thesis is not concerned with a general analysis of the phenomena of partnerships but more particularly with the conditions of emergence and meanings held by urban mangers and attributed to ‘partnership’ in Liverpool city centre. However, within this broader governmental conception of ‘policing’ and ‘security’ provision - through ‘partnership’ - a number of questions emerge relating to the mapping of particular powerful coalitions in Liverpool city centre and of the changing configuration of powerful interests involved in social ordering strategies. With regard to Liverpool, the nature of these strategies and the techniques of power they mobilise will be discussed in Chapter Seven.

*The security network as a ‘social ordering practice’*

The analytical concerns expressed above point to a “pressing need for criminology to reconnect the ‘empirical’ with the ‘normative’” (Crawford, 1997: 2). In doing this it will be possible for researchers of criminal justice to create critical research spaces within which to ask questions of a wider and more ‘value-laden’ nature, that link the emergence of particular ‘crime control’ strategies with wider problems of governance and the nature and maintenance of social order. This concurs with an imaginative essay written by Lacey (1994) on the need to reconceive the study of criminal justice away from a narrow, technical and purely instrumental set of concerns. This means less stress on a typology of strictly bounded ‘criminal justice’
institutions and more of an emphasis upon criminal justice “as a related but not entirely coordinated set of practices geared to the construction and maintenance of social order” (Lacey, 1994: 28). Viewing criminal justice as a “social ordering practice” (Ibid) has methodological implications:

... approaching criminal justice as a social ordering practice dictates that we pay equal attention to its instrumental and symbolic functions. In other words, it suggests that we must attend to criminal justice practices themselves but also to the meanings they have for their participants, its subjects, their observers, including their appeal to emotional and effective attitudes (Lacey, 1994: 30).

Lacey goes on to state that quantitative and statistical based research is important but will “need to be supplemented by qualitative, agent-centred, and institutionally focused studies” (Ibid: 30). In moving away from an administrative research framework the focus is properly attuned to “practices” understood as: “a relatively structured field of action or agents or groups of agents, which can only be understood in terms of the assumptions, values, goals, and interpretative frames which inform the agents’ actions and infuse the surrounding actions in which those actions take place” (Ibid: 31-32). Thus thinking about and approaching ‘criminal justice’ in this way means attempting to detect and interpret processes that cannot simply be read off from written official policy statements:

... there is a need for research that can investigate the power and interests of criminal justice agencies. The goals of these agencies needs to be discovered by research, and not merely accepted on the basis of a mission statement or set of official guidelines (Sanders, 1997: 195).

Sanders has made the distinction between research which is ‘policy-led’ and fails “to stand outside categories defined for the intellectual rather than by the
intellectual” and more critical research which is “intellectually-led” but still “policy-relevant” (Ibid: 187). In noting that much socio-legal research has been policy-led, Sanders urged researchers in the field to be “theoretically driven” and “not policy driven” (Ibid: 201). Researchers concerned to critically interpret powerful strategies of governance in the field of contemporary social control will need to acknowledge more than the complex alliances and technological innovations that ‘governmentality’ theorists have reified (see Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose, 1996). Understanding the motivations and legitimating ‘logics’ behind the governance and control of ‘crime’ and ‘disorder’ will necessitate taking a methodological step beyond the formal organisation of techniques of rule to focus instead upon the powerful actors and their normative articulations that lie behind this rule.

Thus the interviewing and observation of powerful governmental actors can serve to qualify official statements and discourses, as well as aid interpretation of their techniques of rule. These broad methodological provisos form the framework within which the security network will be understood. The network can be conceived of as a field of action concerned with ideologically representing and practically managing social order, involving both formal and informal networks of agents whose aforementioned activities constitute a extended terrain of ‘criminal justice’.

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The research process

The research process was structured around the completion of 20 semi-structured interviews and regular attendance at a monthly security forum concerned with the management and targeting of the CCTV network. These will be discussed below. The field research took place between November 1996 and February 1998. Prior to and during the fieldwork a number of questions and issues remained pertinent in my mind and served as a source of reflection on the research process whilst it was underway. These were issues around identifying the powerful, drawing a sample, and gaining access for interviews and observation.

Who are the powerful?

In researching a local security network an immediate problem arose regarding exactly what agents and agencies constituted the network. More generally, according to Crewe (1974: 17), one problem with “British elite studies” is that they most commonly only recognise “‘obvious’ elites made visible by their concrete social organisation”. Thus:

... not all elites are embedded in tangible organisations with identifiable staffs, functions, buildings, etc., and not all power is exercised by men (sic) belonging to such elites. This is not a preamble to a conspiracy theory, but a reminder of the number of important decisions that are made by informal or ad hoc bodies [...] which are rarely defined as part of an elite group (Ibid).

In the era of what Jessop (1997) called the ‘entrepreneurial city’ with its new modes of governance, referred to variously as ‘partnership’ (Edwards, 1997), ‘local elite’ (Taylor, 1997) or the ‘networked state’ (Collinge and Hall, 1997), the
observation by Crewe is particularly relevant. The mushroom growth of partnerships aimed toward the governance of a range of local problems has highlighted the problem of locating powerful individuals within often dense and informal alliances which are - in the case of the security network in the city centre - relatively closed off from public access and scrutiny, and involve complex lines of delegation between public and private authorities. Thus research in the field has to recognise the changing material and ideological nature of ‘the powerful’ as those whose institutional status and informal connections make them key “primary definers” (Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994: 17) involved in sets of negotiations over defining and responding to local problems. However, the composition of a group of primary definers is not fixed and will change over time and vary between locations (Ibid). Schlesinger and Tumber have argued:

Writing in the 1970s, it may have been obvious to talk of the CBI and TUC as major institutional voices. But with the disappearance of corporatism in Britain under successive Conservative governments, such interests have lost their one-time prominence. What this point reveals is that certain forces are permanently present in the power structure. It is thus an atemporal model, underpinned by the notion that primary definers are simply ‘accredited’ to their dominant ideological place in virtue of an institutional location. But when these are displaced by new forces and their representatives, it becomes essential to explain their emergence (Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994: 19).

In the case of researching a local security network within the context of the growth of partnership at the local level, new sets of primary definers emerged as the forces engaged in constructing powerful discourses mobilised in the process of defining and responding to problems of crime and disorder changed. The emergence of partnerships and the powerful interests they have mobilised within local
regeneration strategies will be discussed in Chapter Five, and, in the context of Liverpool, Chapter Seven. These powerful groups have included not only established local actors such as the police and local authority but also the public and privately sponsored office of City Centre Manager, Urban Development Corporation representatives, developers, coalitions of local business and private security managers.

Identifying key players and drawing the sample

As noted above the notion of partnership has been at the centre of a changed state in organisational and governmental strategies that reconfigure public and private interests in the processes of governing crime (Crawford, 1997), initiating urban regeneration (Edwards, 1997), and, as Chapter Three argued, in reconfiguring the state form itself. Although the notion has been given statutory status in the local governance of crime under the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act the development, idea and practice of ‘partnership’ has been indicative of the establishment of informal and what Edwards (Ibid: 829) termed “expedient alliances” between public and private interests. It was the nature of these alliances and the meanings attributed by key personnel to them, that the thesis investigated. Thus the meanings attributed to partnership, and the role of partnership in shaping idealised visions of the city centre, were accrued to ascertain the meaning placed on order and social control practices (such as CCTV) in the city centre.
Interviews were conducted between November 1996 and February 1998 at a time when ‘partnership’ in Liverpool was still very much experimental in practice. Interviewees often expressed the notion of ‘experimentation’ in governing of the city centre. In noting these processes the accurate mapping of partnership networks at the local level and precisely listing key players prior to engaging in data collection was not possible given the relatively fluid and inaccessible nature of such alliances.

The imprecise institutional boundaries, relative invisibility and operational flexibility implied in the processes of ‘partnership’ formation in the city centre meant that a precise sample ‘hit list’ of research subjects was not available at the outset of the research. The research had three inter-related target groups as pools from which to interview. First, public and private agencies concerned with regeneration in the city. Second, public and private policing agencies. Third, the business and retail sector. These target groupings had considerable overlap in terms of their linkage within various formal and informal partnership forums. For example, subjects from each target group were members of the Liverpool City Centre Partnership (LCCP), the Government Office for Merseyside and the Stores’ Committee, discussed in Chapter Seven. The first and third target groups established the forums within which public and private police worked together. These agencies, Crime Alert and Town Watch, underpinned the CCTV system and will be discussed fully in Chapter Eight. In establishing these bodies the agents of regeneration were able to directly influence the rationale for the working practices.
of agents working within Crime Alert and Town Watch. In other words, the ‘higher level’ strategic visions for an orderly city centre had a connection with lower level social ordering on the ground. To reiterate: these target sample groups did not have hard and static boundaries. For example, a senior Merseyside Police Officer and interviewee was employed inside the Government Office in the Urban Regeneration Section and was as much a locally recognised ‘spokesperson’ on, and architect of, local ‘regeneration’ as much as ‘policing’. In recognising the fluidity and interconnectedness of the ‘target groups’ the sampling strategy employed here coherers with the theoretical approach, outlined in the previous chapter. In that chapter the neo-liberal state was understood as organised both upon an institutional flexibility and a normative dimension concerning the social ordering of a given territory. Thus it was important to enter these networks and interview those locally powerful orchestrators of regeneration. The second target group (i.e., those who staffed the new security and policing bodies) were not involved in the process of strategic thinking regarding Liverpool’s regeneration, but they were agents employed and redeployed as part of ‘regeneration thinking’ (discussed in Chapter Seven) and within forums whose origins can only be explained as arising out of local higher level strategic decision making.

This is not to say that the activities of lower level social ordering agents were determined mechanically (in any instance) by the locally powerful who were higher up the chain of command. Recognising the political origins of these bodies does not foreclose a research strategy that seeks to enter the world of lower level social
ordering agents to ascertain their views on what it is they think they are doing and for what purpose. Thus the meanings that these lower level ‘foot soldiers’ brought to their work were important to investigate for two reasons: firstly, in order to identify levels of coherence with, and departures from, the locally powerful visions for order that led to the establishment of front-line security networks on the ground in the city centre; and secondly, to avoid a reductionist and non-contingent analysis - as the meanings attached by those working on the ground in the security network need to be demonstrated empirically and not assumed.

Initial contacts were made with more obvious subjects made publicly visible by their prominence in local media reports. These key players were the City Centre Manager (as representative of Town Centre Management), the Chair of the Stores’ Committee and the Government Office for Merseyside. From these initial contacts other contacts were offered to the researcher after informal requests for eligible interviewees. Thus a strategy of ‘network’ or ‘snowball’ sampling proved useful. Network sampling has often been used for identifying people and agencies suitable for study when no obvious list exists from which to select subjects. This method of sampling can apply when “the target sample members are involved in some kind of network with others who share the same characteristic of interest” (Arber, 1993: 74). However:

This is both a strength and a potential weakness of the method. An advantage of snowball sampling is that it reveals a network of contacts which can itself be studied. A potential problem is that it only includes those within a connected network of individuals (Ibid).
Thus the problem of a possible skew or bias in the data collected from this form of sample was raised with a view to undermining the validity of the research. This was offset to some extent by the employment of a range of interdependent research methods towards a process of data triangulation. Thus alongside interviewing, the researcher collected data from regular attendance at meetings and the recording of information through field notes as well as gathering, throughout the research, official publications, pamphlets and press releases emanating from the subject population. These will be discussed below. In this way the concepts and themes to emerge from the interviews could be checked against these other forms of data collection, and vice versa.

In line with the qualitative research strategy of ‘theoretical sampling’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) the sampling process was terminated when it was apparent no new concepts or analytical categories were emerging from the research process. The issues to emerge from interviews (as identified by subjects) were organised by the researcher under broad conceptual themes, which form the basis for Chapters Seven and Eight.

*Approaching subjects and access*

Jupp (1989: 19) referred to the problem of access in criminological research in noting, “many of the institutions of criminal justice are truly closed, particularly to those not doing officially sponsored research”:
Access means being able to obtain data which is considered relevant or appropriate to the research aims of the investigation. The individuals who are most closely associated with problems of gaining access to data are usually known as gatekeepers (Ibid: 138).

For Jupp the power of gatekeepers will vary between formal powers of exclusion and the denial of access to particular sources of information. Either way the problem of access and the role of gatekeepers can have crucial constraining effects on the research process concerning the type of research that gets done and the nature of research questions themselves (Ibid: 19). Problems regarding the gaining of access into organisations reported have also been reported by Bryman (1988). Bryman (1988: 14-16) summarises a number of strategies, not without their problems, to secure access. These include the promise of feedback to the organisation, engendering interest in the research in institutional representatives, and a strategy of top level/managerial permission and access. All of these strategies were relevant to this research along with the promise of organisational and individual confidentiality in the research findings. Cultivating interest among the subject population for this research involved scanning local media and partnership brochures and news letters to get a flavour of what concerned key players and the language they employed in speaking about ‘regeneration’, alongside visions for the city centre and their notions of ‘safety’ and ‘security’ there-in. These were important to digest in order to become familiar with the powerful vernacular of regeneration and to comprehend the ideological mindset of partnership players. In this way the researcher was able to grasp the signifiers of regeneration for urban managers, for example, in ‘talking up’ the city as an ‘forward looking’
entrepreneurial city - economically competitive, ‘politically stable’ and as a security conscious place. These powerful promotional discourses provided the researcher with both a linguistic map with which to forage the ‘common sense’ of partnership players and a linguistic glossary to help in the process of approaching subjects. This was useful in structuring a letter to potential interviewees as well as in structuring the interview itself and avoided the researcher approaching subjects ‘blind’, as someone appearing to be potentially ‘irrelevant’ to the concerns of regeneration agencies. From this initial process of gauging an impression of subject interests a standard letter was drawn up for distribution. Thus all agencies who took part (see Appendix One) were initially contacted by letter (see Appendix Two) addressed to senior management or director level requesting a formal interview that covered three key areas: (1) perceptions of security and insecurity in the city centre; (2) level of involvement in security and policing initiatives and rationale for being involved with them; (3) general views expressed upon the meaning of a ‘secure’, ‘orderly’ and ‘regenerated’ city centre (see Appendix Three for interview schedule).

In all, twenty-eight agencies were contacted through my letter explaining the research and requesting participation by way of interview. Of this number, eight refused. Reasons for refusal varied. Two Retailers (and members of the Stores’ Committee) thought that talking about aspects of ‘security’ would compromise their business. One stated that he did not think it would be wise to disclose how much his organisation contributed annually to Liverpool’s CCTV scheme. After receiving my letter one private developer (who had during the 1980s worked for the
City Council) requested that I phoned him. He asked questions about the research (what it was for), who I was and what I wanted to do with the research. He refused to take part because he could not be persuaded that the research would not identify him and he seemed very concerned about where the research might be discussed. The City Centre Commander at Merseyside Police refused an interview on the grounds that he was too busy. However, I did interview the police officer who was seconded to the Government Office and who provided the main point of contact and liaison between police and other partners at senior level. The other four - two retailers and two developers – believed they would have nothing to contribute to the research as it was explained to them in the letter. There are three arguments as to why this refusal rate did not have any major implications for the research sample. Firstly, the refusal rate itself is numerically small - below 30% of the overall sample. Second, of those I did interview no one thought these refusals particularly important except for one of the subjects mentioned above whom I spoke with over the telephone. His name had cropped up as a potential interviewee from two other interviewees. Thirdly, these refusals came about after 15 interviews had already been conducted and a saturation level (as discussed on page 97) was becoming apparent regarding themes and concepts to emerge from the interviews. For these reasons, the researcher was able to decide that the refusals did not skew the sample or render it problematic for the purposes of developing a network sampling strategy.
Access to the security network involved gaining entry into the networks of the locally powerful in terms of interviewing senior representatives and attending formal meetings to which ‘the public’ would not normally have access. No major obstructions occurred to gaining entry. Thus, representatives from the police, private security, local government, local business and city developers participated in the research by way of formal access to meetings and in granting interviews. A number of points can be made regarding this relative ease of access. Hughes (1996: 67) noted a shift in the 1990s towards “a grudging ‘perestroika’” regarding criminal justice research that has brought a more open system of access for researchers. This in part has been fuelled by the rise of auditing in criminal justice, which has fostered concerns for the legitimacy of criminal justice practices. More specifically, explaining the relative ease of access concerning this research must in part be explained by the fact that the institution within which the research was based was also a key player at corporate level in the partnership forums concerned with regenerating the city centre. The University logo has been highly visible in sponsored forms of political management in the city and appears in many regeneration and partnership brochures. Liverpool John Moores University has been a key representative within Liverpool Vision, a major regeneration agency, through which the University has been involved in bringing derelict land and buildings back into use as well as part-sponsoring city centre projects. Other academics within the University have been involved in partnership work, acting as research advisors in the implementation of security and policing initiatives in the city, as for example in the City Safe initiative, discussed in Chapter Six. The status
of the University as a recognised ideological player was illustrated by the appointment of its ex-Vice Chancellor to the position of Chairman of the Liverpool Culture Company (a body concerned with the city's Capital of Culture Campaign for 2008). These wider symbiotic relations formed the backdrop within which the research fieldwork took place. The time period for this (1996-1998) was characterised by intense debates that were reflected through local media and local conferences concerning the strategic direction and governance of the city centre. Consequently, this researcher often felt that he was being welcomed into these circles as both someone coming from an institution recognised as a partnership player and as an academic who may be 'useful' in some way. For example, one interviewee spoke of the problems as he saw them of instigating partnerships and managing them towards 'security minded' regeneration initiatives:

"Winning hearts and minds can't be done in a day; it's a cultural thing. You coming in here is part of the trust. Your paper and research will be read by people and there may be some fairly powerful messages in it - so the truth needs to come out. It will be interesting ... to see how other organisations perceive this - whether they align or not with what I have said. The difficulty with this [regeneration process] is that we have to tell it convincingly and that's difficult" (Research Interview 1: Superintendent Merseyside Police, Government Office for Merseyside).  

Indeed, openness and candour, particularly from the private sector, marked the responses of partnership players once the interviews were underway. For this group 'red-tape' and bureaucracy – associated with formally accountable political decision making arenas – were a non-issue in terms of impeding their views.

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5 Each research interview will be referenced in the text so that interviewees can be identified by occupational title and/or institution. A full list of all those interviewed is provided in Appendix One.
The confidence of the ‘new primary definers’ was a reflection of their enhanced political power and clout in the city centre, unrestricted by what they described as ‘old style’ politics. In this sense, as Chapter Eight will discuss, CCTV was expressive of that confidence for its role in reclaiming, both physically and discursively, city centre space.

**Attendance of meetings and field notes**

Access was also granted to the monthly meetings of ‘Crime Alert’ based in a suite of a major city centre retailer. These meetings provided a forum for private security and police to collate information and discuss strategies for the coming month. In ‘sitting in’ on these meetings (eight were attended each lasting a maximum of one hour) the researcher was given the opportunity to observe the course of the meetings and talk informally to security and policing personnel (each meeting was attended by between twenty five to thirty five people) as well as to establish further lines of contact. After introducing myself to the meeting at my first attendance I established a pattern at further meetings whereby I would sit at the back to observe and take notes. In this context the role of the researcher cohered with what Gold (1969: 35-36) referred to as “participant-as-observer”. As in other researcher roles adopted in the field, the role of participant-as-observer can bring with it problems, in this case, “the field worker is often defined by informants as more of a colleague than he (sic) feels capable of being” (Ibid: 36). This problem may tend to compromise self-conceptions and role-conceptions and manifested itself for this researcher during one meeting of ‘Crime Alert’ when I was asked by the
chairperson if I would “update the group” on my research, and in particular, whether I could “shed any light” on the “problem” they were discussing, namely identifying and keeping homeless people out of the stores. I answered that I was still interviewing and that no firm findings had emerged as yet. In my field notes I recorded that I was taken aback by this and felt uncomfortable in being asked to contribute ‘positively’ to a ‘problem’, the terms of reference of which I did not agree with. My answer was couched in a way that allowed my researcher ‘role’ to act as protection (Gold, Ibid: 31). This helped the researcher balance the tensions between the irreconcilable perceptions that, on the one hand, I identified my research role as one that was not in collaboration with the security network but, on the other hand, that subjects within the network identified the researcher as ‘colleague’ and ‘collaborator’ in aspects of their work.

This aspect of the research also involved the taking of field notes in order to record the physical setting, those in attendance, the formal agenda, what was said by whom as well as the researcher’s own impressions of the proceedings. Verbatim quotes were also accrued from this recording exercise to be used in data analysis. Field notes were therefore important in helping “keep track of the analysis by documenting thinking processes and capturing the ideas that elevate the descriptions of empirical events to a theoretical level” (Howell, 1994: 99). Along with interview data, my field notes will form the basis of the issues raised in Chapter Eight.
Collecting official documents and attending relevant local conferences

The development of the ‘entrepreneurial city’ has brought with it the production of many materials and texts which themselves can be understood as contemporary “state discourses” (Jessop, 1990: 347-350). As noted above, prior to and during the interview process time was taken to procure a range of literature emanating from the subject population and relevant to their management visions of the city centre. These included promotional materials, marketing documents and conference reports pertaining to Liverpool city centre. It was important to collect this material in order to familiarise myself with ‘regeneration vernacular’ and to enhance my own “cultural capital” and “credibility” when interviewing locally powerful actors (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 123). Furthermore, the attendance at two major local conferences (both of which I was encouraged to attend by several interviewees) provided further cultural capital and supplemented my understanding of the emergence of the particular partnership network in Liverpool city centre. These conferences were organised by and for local regeneration and state managers and provided an insight into the discourses pertaining to ‘regeneration’, the tensions between players arising from this, and the linkages these players made between ‘order’, ‘regeneration’ and processes of social control. The conferences provided another means of identifying potential interviewees (who would be approached informally and then by letter as stated above). I attended two main conferences that took place in Liverpool Town Hall titled, ‘Ambitions for the City Centre’ (August, 1996) and ‘Merseyside: The Future’ (July, 1997).
**In-depth interviews**

In line with the aim to gather qualitative data to access the meanings attributed to 'social control', the processes involved in enacting security initiatives and the obstacles to its realisation in the city centre, twenty semi-structured, in depth interviews were conducted. Each interview lasted between one hour and three hours and each took place at the subject’s working location. The first five minutes of each interview was taken with explaining the research (with reference to the three areas of concern outlined in the letter), my role within it (as a PhD student who would be using interview data for the writing of a dissertation), and to discuss confidentiality and anonymity. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity regarding names and personal details. All interviews were tape recorded with the subject’s permission. Nineteen of the interviewees did not raise questions or issues concerning confidentiality. A minority of this number seemed not to be concerned with confidentiality. As one interviewee stated:

> My views are well known on this, as are others. It’s not a popularity contest, so it does not matter to me whether I am named or not (Research Interview 2: Chairman, Stores’ Committee).

Another interviewee stated: “I hope you realise I am being amazingly frank with you. It’s quite a relief to do it” (Research Interview 3: Home Office Advisor, Government Office for Merseyside). This same interviewee expressed concern about being “misquoted” and “misunderstood”. For him confidentiality was important in that he did not want “open wrangling” between himself and other partnership players.
The use of in-depth, semi-structured interviewing allowed freedom and flexibility in the interview process towards the discovery of meaning consistent with the social processes the research sought to investigate. Therefore, in-depth research interviews were undertaken in order to ascertain the meanings of ‘regeneration’, ‘order’ and ‘security’ that were held amongst key partners. Material from the interviews form the basis of the discussion in Chapters Seven and Eight which will explore the meanings attributed to ‘regeneration’ and ‘order’ that impinged upon the politics of space, or the process of “spatialisation” (Ryan, 1994: 40), in Liverpool city centre. As Ryan argued:

Assumptions and judgements about space become part of the taken-for-grantedness of everyday life. How spaces and places become commonly defined for what they are is rooted in discourses and practices deeply structured in prevailing relations of power (Ibid).

**Conclusion**

This and the preceding chapter have presented the theoretical and methodological perspectives that underpin the research for this thesis into the development and meaning of a local CCTV network for the locally powerful. This chapter has discussed the methodological issues encountered within the research process. The process of ‘studying up’ towards the new primary definers contained particular issues for the identification and approach to subjects at a time of experimentation and renegotiation of the lines of authority bound up with the strategies of rule in the city centre. The ideological character of these strategies, within which the rationale for developing a CCTV network was formulated, were themselves made a subject of the research in order to identify and illuminate the underlying features of local
social order as envisaged by the locally powerful. An examination of the locally powerful, it was argued, will enable an understanding of CCTV not merely as a piece of crime prevention technology but as a key mechanism in a broader social ordering strategy. In studying up, then, the thesis is concerned to situate strategies for contemporary social control within the powerful networks that constitute the neo-liberal state charged with responsibility for the regeneration of Liverpool city centre. Before returning to the case study of Liverpool the next chapter will explore the nature of the contemporary city found within the writings of urban geographers and criminologists. What many of these writers have been concerned about has been the re-constitution of power and rule in North American and British cities and a linking of these processes to understandings of the practice of contemporary social control.
Chapter Five

Social Control in the ‘Modern’ and ‘Post-Modern’ City: The Political and Economic Context

The universal and ineluctable consequence of this crusade to secure the city is the destruction of accessible public space [...]. The privatisation of the architectural public realm, moreover, is shadowed by parallel restructuring of electronic space, as heavily policed, pay-access information orders; elite data-bases and subscription cable services appropriate parts of the invisible agora. Both processes, of course, mirror the deregulation of the economy and the recession of non-market entitlements (Davis: 1990: 226).

Urban scholars and criminologists alike have drawn attention to the processes involved in securing city spaces in terms of the powerful coalitions involved (Davis, 1990; Fyfe, 1995; Taylor, 1997) as well as the consequences this may have for the construction and legitimate uses of city public space (Sorkin, 1992; Goss, 1996; Ruddick, 1996; Sibley, 1995). In the contemporary setting, concerns with crime and disorder have been increasingly linked to economic decline in city centres that, along with the growth of ‘out of town’ shopping, has had a detrimental impact upon investment and lifestyle within cities (Smith, 1989; Beck and Willis, 1995; Fyfe, 1997). Davis argued that there is a connection between the kind of social measures he described and broader political and economic change.1

The previous two chapters outlined the theoretical and methodological course adopted in this thesis in order to explore the nature of contemporary social

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1 If, as Reiner (1992b: 490) noted, police research generally needs to situate itself within processes of social, political and economic change both nationally and internationally then, as the previous two chapters indicated, an understanding of those processes affecting the functioning and form of cities will be a necessary forerunner to a particular study of social control within the contemporary city.
control. Following on from this the current chapter will provide a general overview of social control practices and their scholarly interpretation within the social, political and economic developments purported to be affecting the functioning and form of contemporary cities. What follows therefore is, firstly, a brief historical sketch of the relations between the development of the modern city, crime and order from the middle of the nineteenth century. Secondly, the remainder of the chapter will discuss the contemporary material, ideological and political changes purported to be impacting on the meaning and experience of what various writers have referred to as the post-industrial, post-Fordist or post-modern city. Included here are the forms of urban rule and power relations that have arisen in responses to national and international economic restructuring, and the emergent re-emphasis on social control and security, or what one writer termed the tactics of “risk suppression”, which are “restructuring policing and with that, the way we use space” (Sheptycki, 1997: 312). A consideration of these wider developments will of necessity move away from a narrow focus concerned with crime patterns in the city to instead forge a consideration of the processes affecting how ‘crime’ and ‘disorder’ become particular problems for those charged with the development and implementation of initiatives to promote good order in the city.

**Social order and policing social boundaries in the nineteenth century city**

Traditionally, urban scholars and criminologists have displayed a concern with the uses of urban spaces and the relationship to crime. The social, political and economic processes that have shaped the city from the nineteenth century onwards have never been far away from the study and explanation of ‘crime’ as a
legal construct and ‘dangerousness’ as a related notion linked to concerns with moral and social order.

It was the official and bourgeois depiction of the disorderly nineteenth century industrial city that spurred debates of the time around urban dystopias. These depictions also, as Chapter One revealed, spurred the development of the concept of social control. During the 1840s a discourse of “moral environmentalism” had as its target the urban poor and was enacted through the studies and observations of early modern philanthropists, medical experts and state servants (Mort, 1987). Such ‘expertise’ helped to construct certain places and particular groups as ‘dangerous’ and as ‘other’ – outside of the civilising norms encapsulated within bourgeois thought\(^2\). The complex structure of Victorian morality underpinned programmes of intervention aimed at the “Dickensian city-scape of dirty, crowded and disorganised clusters of urban villages ... where the “Great Unwashed” lived in chaotic alleys, courts and hovels just off the grand thoroughfares” (Walkowitz, 1992: 119). Victorian reformers sought to classify and counter the perceived contagion of the ‘rough’ elements and places within the industrial working class. The multiple threats this group posed were perceived in terms of contagion across a range of fronts, most notably health and sanitation, the growth of ‘dangerous’ political ideas, the immorality found in the life-style of the causal poor, and the ‘rampant criminality’ of those on the margins of economic life (Stedman-Jones, 1981; Pearson, 1975; Walkowitz, 1992).

\(^2\) In this sense “nineteenth century discourses on the metropolis created an urban topography in which the slum, the sewer, the poor and the prostitute were effectively separated from the suburb. This separation enabled the social reformer, as part of a process of validation of the bourgeois imagery, to survey and classify its own antithesis” (Marriott, 1999: 83, emphasis in original).
Since their development in the nineteenth century, cities have often been understood through the use of metaphors and images to promote utopian and dystopian representations (Burden and Percy-Smith, 1995). Underpinning urban reform programmes in the nineteenth century city were the class and gender related polarities that constructed virtue/vice, cleanliness/filth, morality/depravity, civilisation/animality (Mort, 1987: 41). These discursive frameworks and their role in the promotion of social order displayed explanatory tensions between environmentalism and individual morality in understanding the condition of 'the poor'. The role of the emergent state of this time, in dealing with identified problem groups and behaviours, also displayed tensions between criminalization and/or education as the appropriate response (Mort, 1987). The notion of the 'dangerous classes' was central to discussions of crime, criminality and criminalization, and was linked to the discourses and practices regarding what the city is and ought to be. The perception of threats to these visions or urban ideals were bound up with the contestations between powerful interest groups and professions that sought to control, regulate or influence urban life generally and the urban poor in particular.

For each representation depicting an urban utopia ('the heavenly city', 'the city of reason', 'the engineered city', 'the city as organism', as 'ecology', as 'entrepreneurial' and 'post-modern') there has existed its dystopian counter part (Burden and Percy-Smith, 1995). These discourses can be seen as representing both the practical possibilities for the ideal city and the threats to those ideals. Many writers have observed how the city has served and continues to serve as a
metaphor for the condition of society as a whole but also is representative of a
distinguished form of social life (Mumford, 1961; Jacobs, 1961). As Cohen
(1985: 205) put it; “We are haunted by the old idea that the city stands for
something”. The catch-all symbolism of the ‘dangerous classes’ therefore posed a
threat to the visions of an orderly city in the nineteenth century. Such visions of
order were related to the emergent class, gender and racial hierarchies associated
with Victorian morality, which hegemonically constructed ideas of ‘respectability’
to serve as models of behaviour towards thrift, work discipline and sex and
sexuality (Mort, 1987; Walkowitz, 1992).

Fear and benevolence went hand in hand for those reformers concerned to defend
prevailing notions of civilisation and progress.3 Such contradictory sentiments
fuelled the “great fear” of a “bastardized race” within a “class degraded by misery
whose vices [stood] like an invincible obstacle to the generous intentions that
wish to combat it” (Foucault, 1977: 275-276). The ‘problem of crime’ as an
obstacle to the operation of a tranquil and orderly city has been prevalent in the
iconography of the twentieth century city (Cohen, 1985) was not recognised or
formulated as particularly problematic in the eighteenth century. According to
Gatrell (1990) the notion of ‘crime’ prior to the nineteenth century was associated
with personal depravity and did not of necessity pose a threat to social order and
prevailing hierarchical forms of authority. However, by the early nineteenth

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3 As the philanthropist Samuel Smith wrote of the urban poor in 1895: “I am deeply convinced that
the time is approaching when this seething mass of human misery will shake the social fabric, unless
we grapple more earnestly with it than we have done ... The proletariat may strangle us unless we
teach it the same virtues which have elevated the other classes of society” (Cited in Perkin, 1989: 57).
century, and bound up with the developing complexity of penal, police and law reform, problems of ‘crime’ and ‘disorder’ became heightened particularly in the context of London as its population grew along with its importance as a financial and commercial centre (Emsley, 1996a: 17). More broadly the emergent political economy shaping the form of towns and cities demanded the unfettering of the market to establish national and international trading and production centres. One consequence of this, it has been argued, was the increasing emphasis on the stigmatisation and criminalization of ‘legitimate’ communal action and protest that became increasingly debated as law and order problems, and thus subject to criminal sanction (Hobsbawm, 1975: 5-6). In this context therefore:

Crime was fast becoming ‘important’. In the post-war world, and on into the 1840’s the subject came to be cemented into an ideology about the condition of England. Crime was becoming a vehicle for articulating mounting anxieties about issues which really had nothing to do with crime at all; social change and the stability of social hierarchy. These issues invested crime with new meanings, justified vastly accelerated action against it, and have determined attitudes to it ever since (Gatrell, 1990: 249).

Thus from this period onwards, ‘crime’ began to raise general problems for social order and for the order of ‘the city’ in particular. Stedman Jones (1981) provided an illustration of this in his account of *Outcast London* after 1850 where the strategies and perceptions of those involved in moral reform focused upon the interlinking of key social factors. Such factors condensed around the spatial segregation of classes, the casual labour market and the heightening of political class conflict. In this context the uneasy relations between poverty, crime and disorder become increasingly apparent for the Victorian moral crusaders and reformers. Henry Mayhew’s work from the mid-nineteenth century exemplified the increasing emphasis on ‘alien areas’ in terms of the identification of particular
parts of the city as criminal, possessing unorthodox economics and unrespectable cultural pursuits (Mayhew, 1981: 160-172). The processes of rapid industrialisation and urbanism therefore shaped and concentrated the poor into what were perceived to be “intrinsically dangerous masses” who “lived mainly on the proceeds of crime” and “enjoyed a lifestyle different from the bourgeoisie and the respectable poor” (Sharpe, 1984: 94). Within this context of radical class differentiation and social upheaval that hinged around concerns of urban order, the ‘new police’ developed as a distinct institution and qualitatively different in character from the goals of earlier ‘police science’.4

There has been much debate around the role of the ‘new police’ that developed toward the mid-nineteenth century regarding the regulation of such problematic areas of social life. ‘Orthodox’ histories have tended to posit a progressive model of police development that stresses an ‘orderly fit’ between the police function and the needs of an advancing industrial society. The ‘idea’ of the ‘new police’ was to meet “the menace of increase of crime” including stealing, begging and general mob violence that threatened “the dignity of Parliament” and “the preservation of life and property” (Reith, 1938: 188-189). The fragmentation and corruption associated with the parish constables and watchmen were also

4 The search for ‘the good order of public matters’ was epitomised within the domains of ‘police science’ that emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This expanded notion of police was not confined to a particular agency and had as its broad aims the promotion of public tranquillity and security, the maintenance of trade and communications in the city as well as the general health and prosperity of the population which included the policing of the poor (Pasquale, 1991: 110). The application of ‘police science’ with its classificatory schema, modes of observation and devices of measurement was directed at the model of the city, its population and the problems of its administration. As such it is part of a broader notion of ‘governmentality’ (Hunt, 1996; Burchell, 1991).
perceived to necessitate a more disciplined and uniform police institution. In such accounts the introduction of the police institution from its Metropolitan ‘prototype’ served the interests of all social classes and replaced earlier corrupt policing forms with a more uniform and consensus based policing framework. Orthodox models have suggested that police reform was underpinned by a general fear of crime and declining moral standards purported to be adversely effecting the ‘health of the nation’. Any opposition that surrounded the establishment of the ‘new police’ has often been conceived as having no rational basis, despite its location within both the urban working class and the landed gentry (see Reiner, 1992c: 12-24). ‘Revisionist’ histories on the other hand have sought to locate police reform within the political drives to regulate a range of social problems perceived to be hindering capitalist development. In this view the police cannot be understood outside of the particular political and moral interests that sought to maintain social order within which the marriage between constructions of crime and emergent legal regulation was derived. The working ground of the police thus became those problematic areas and activities identified by the locally powerful politicians, state servants and moral reformers. According to one writer, the maintenance of order gave the police the role of “domestic missionary” to serve as an “all purpose lever to urban discipline” and bring state authority to bear upon the custom and popular culture of working class life (Storch, 1976: 481). From the moment of inception, the police became involved in disputes between capital and labour, the control of food protests and anti-Poor Law riots which rendered notions of police impartiality questionable and led to the potential for further hostility between the police and the working class (Emsley, 1996a). For Phil Cohen (1979) the modern police force developed as a direct response to the
crisis of urban administration in the Victorian city where the criminalization of traditional working class street pastimes engendered local hostility to the police whose presence into the twentieth century was only grudgingly accepted (Ibid: 132). Thus, revisionist accounts have questioned the view that the police acted under popular control. Brogden’s (1981) work illustrated how the police function was both enabled and constrained by local political and economic conditions and by the relationship between police chiefs and the local elite power brokers. As others have argued, the enforcement role of the new police “was conspicuous in regulating the movement of people, in delineating ‘appropriate’ belongingness to the city and in compelling compliance to extant hegemonic standards” (McCormick and Visano, 1992: 237).

The official designation of the police role was laid down in the instruction book of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 and stressed “the prevention of crime”, “the preservation of public tranquillity”, and an ever present “vigilance” so as to “render it impossible for anyone to commit a crime” within an area under police charge (cited in Emsley, 1996b: 25). This police role was incorporated into the provincial forces that were established later in the century and became supplemented by the notion of police ‘service’ in the provision of various duties such as the collection of market tolls, the inspection of markets, the changing of street signs, the reporting of unsafe buildings and the collection of money owed on maintenance orders. As Emsley (1996a: 3) noted, this has led to a rarely acknowledged fact that “since their creation the police have become more and more responsible for the smooth running of a variety of different aspects of society”. Further to this argument, the discourse of ‘crime prevention’ and related
‘services’ was less to do with stated intentions of police effectiveness and more a reflection of the drive for police legitimacy (Emsley, 1996a & b; Crawford, 1997). This is particularly pertinent in the light of recurrent criticisms of police effectiveness in crime prevention, detection and prosecution, which emerged in trenchant form in the early 1990s. Unsurprisingly, the drive for police efficiency led to the police targeting of resources towards ‘criminal areas’ and suspect groups - the Irish, prostitutes and the poor generally became the objects of police culture and practice (Emsley, 1996a).

This has not been an exhaustive account of policing history, but merely a discussion to acknowledge that policing ‘the city’, for both orthodox and revisionist perspectives, cannot be divorced from broader perceptions that construct the nature of the city and the problems posed for social order. The development of the modern police and their role in the maintenance of order located policing within the central state and its legal codes that aspired to the maintenance of a unitary order, whilst at the same time reproducing “class, ethnic, gender and other dimensions of inequality” (Reiner, 1992c: 3). Furthermore, this did not mean the complete eclipse of private policing and security provision, though these came to play a lesser role in collectivist welfare strategies into the twentieth century (Johnson, 1992). The modern police brought forward a strict demarcation between themselves as the state’s symbolic representatives of order and guardians of the community in providing ‘policing solutions’ (Loader, 1997) and the array of citizenry who came to depend on them, not least, to keep ‘enemies’ outside. The police therefore developed, with other criminal justice agencies, along professionalized lines, as expert knowledge brokers, specialist
providers and primary definers around ‘crime prevention’ (Ericson, 1994). Thus into the twentieth century the modern police were able to consolidate this powerful position through formal and informal normative imperatives (that imbued rank and file cultures and specialist departments) as primary controllers of territoriality and space in the urban setting (Herbert, 1997).

It is these long-standing assumptions around the police role in maintaining urban order that have become increasingly challenged - both theoretically and practically - by changes wrought within the ideology and practice of contemporary policing in the city. These issues will be returned to later in the chapter but for now can be noted as changes in the perception that state agencies alone cannot deal with ‘the crime problem’. The next section will discuss how the city in the twentieth century became a focus for criminologists in particular, as a place where the notions of crime, disorder and social control could be interlinked and mapped out as central practical problems engendered in the contemporary urban form.

**Mapping the disorderly city: some twentieth century criminological interventions**

Garland (1985) has argued that criminological discourse as a scientific discipline did not develop and expand due to its own internal logic and momentum. On the contrary, the criminological endeavour from the nineteenth century has operated and continues to operate within a broader context:

Criminology is continually transformed and directed by external factors - by the demands of penal policy, political viability and ideological conformity (Garland, 1985: 3).
The aim of a positivistic and value free criminology was to achieve the status of a socially authorised knowledge with which to gain recognition and press claims upon the institutions of the state and criminal justice. Cohen (1985) traced the genealogy of early concerns and investigations around crime and its spatial character, which from the nineteenth century has sustained the urge to differentiate and classify and provided an enduring impact upon criminology and crime control:

At the end of the nineteenth century, phrenologists constructed maps of the head, plotting actual areas of good and evil. Their social-reform counterparts were preoccupied with streets and sewers, plotting out like Mayhew, the domains and contours of poverty, despair and pathology. The Chicago School produced those famous moral maps of the city: concentric zones onto which grids of crime, delinquency, suicide and other forms of social disorganisation were projected. Ecological analysis continued in criminology, and today's urban geographers, town planners and statisticians are all too busy with their maps and target areas, defensible spaces, high-crime zones, robbery-trip routes and spatial patterns of offenders, and in everyday perception and journalistic cliché, we give moral meanings to the territories of slum, downtown, safe streets, public park, suburb (Cohen, 1985: 220).

Traditionally, criminology has devoted considerable investigative attention to the problems of crime, order and the city that can be read as scientific extensions of the moral concerns around the 'dangerous classes' in the urban context. As Chapter Two demonstrated, the concept of social control developed around the end of the nineteenth century as concerns for the disorderly growth of the city came to preoccupy social scientists and policy makers alike, in that the city presented the greatest problems for social control. Thus the extraordinary growth of 'the city' into the twentieth century, through the process often referred to as 'urbanisation', became a reference term for the "extension, succession and concentration" of the urban form (Burgess, 1996: 97). Within criminology and
urban studies, city growth became the context in which the nature of crime could be explained through sophisticated theories that pointed to so-called criminogenic aspects of 'the city'. In this way urban criminology continued the focus upon particular urban locations and behaviours that constituted 'the crime problem'.

The dystopian imagery of the nineteenth century city and the multiple attempts by state and quasi-state agencies at reform, regulation, urban reconstruction and policing implied an interpretative discursive framework hinged around the language of social disorder and disorganisation. Dystopian representations were carried forward into the debates around the social and political order of the modern city (Graham and Clarke, 1996). Unsurprisingly, criminology in its drive for policy relevance (Garland, 1985) in the early twentieth century began to develop sophisticated theories, descriptions and explanations around the nature of order in the modern city and the contours of crime. 5

Graham and Clarke (1996: 145) suggested that the period between 1900 and 1970 could be seen as a time when crime was almost solely understood and responded to as an urban phenomena within the academic and policy arenas. The periodic attempts at reconstructing the city from the mid nineteenth century cannot be

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5 The forms of analysis developed here have been described as 'environmental criminology' (Bottoms, 1994), 'the ecology of crime' (Shaw and McKay, 1942) and 'the geography of crime' (Herbert, 1979). Such work has been concerned with explaining the spatial distribution of crime and the spatial distribution of offenders. This form of criminological enterprise was coupled with a positivistic analysis, which stressed the causal determination of crime, its differentiation from non-criminal behaviour and the pathological states underpinning criminality. Forms of determinism developed around individual, biological and psychological forms of causation (Jupp, 1989) up until the 1920s, when an ecological variant emerged constructing a sophisticated theory of crime and the city environment. The vast bulk of research within this paradigm uncritically relied upon official statistical measures of crime and assumed a conservative and consensual framework of law and socio-legal systems (Herbert, 1979).
divorced from perceptions of problems within urban space of which crime, criminality and criminalization are central.

Early twentieth century attempts to understand the expansion of the modern city laid particular emphasis on social mobility and the social problems this was thought to entail. In examining these issues the ‘Chicago School’ developed zonal models of the city where the modern city became defined by its central business district outside of which residential zones developed in concentric rings of increasing affluence from the centre to the outskirts. Burgess (1996: 95) borrowed ideas from the science of plant ecology to describe the “metabolism and mobility” of the city to argue that where mobility is greatest social controls break down. “The zone of deterioration” was where gangs, vice and demoralisation develop (Burgess, 1996: 96). Shaw and McKay (1942) developed this model to argue that crime - particularly juvenile crime - was highest in the ‘zone of transition’ defined by high mobility, cultural heterogeneity, lack of social controls and normlessness leading to general social disorganisation. The zone of transition lacks the order of use and lifestyle of the central business district and the affluent outer areas and bestows a still familiar areal characterisation of decaying properties, marginal businesses, multi-occupancy and rented accommodation which underpins the notion of social disorganisation and the criminal subculture (Shaw and McKay, 1942). The work of the Chicago School continued and reformulated the nineteenth century visions of the city through the zonal theory of mobility and transition. The theory captured the progressive ideals around the modern city that was able to absorb and assimilate successive waves of migrants who are moved upwards and outwards into the suburbs. On the other hand, the
Down side of city growth was highlighted by the identification of enduring and specific criminal areas which lacked assimilative structures that would link the inhabitants to the wider social order. This analysis can be seen as the scientification of the moral perceptions of dangerous areas and criminal places maintained by empirical study that purport to produce the social/urban 'facts of crime' as determined through natural ecological processes affecting the form of the city. The work of the Chicago School can be read as an early twentieth century attempt to map the risks pertaining to the occurrence of crime (albeit a science of crime tied to a liberal social control project). These risks were geographically distributed and associated with particular economic, social and cultural status indicators.

A number of criticisms have been levelled at this work including: its tautology and determinism; the assumptions it drew upon to link social disorganisation and crime; the marginalisation of wider political, economic and social power effecting city life; the problems in generalising research findings to outside the USA; and the reliance on official measures of crime (Heathcote, 1981). So-called 'Natural ecological processes' could have been read as “unrestrained capitalist development” in the cities of the twentieth century (Bottoms and Wiles, 1994: 7). Alongside these qualifications can be placed the observation that this work - and its subsequent derivations - continues the fascination and focus upon publicly visible street crime, with a particular emphasis on youth (Pearson, 1983). However, the impact of the ‘Chicago School’ cannot be underestimated in influencing the development of spatial or areal studies of crime. Such work was part of a paradigm for thinking about and responding to crime under the rubric of
treatment and rehabilitation. Expert intervention from social workers to town planners underpinned a welfare strategy that worked upon the individual and social pathologies thought to be responsible for crime. A widespread faith in the professional agents working in and through the state to treat and plan away the problem of crime in the most deprived areas represented the victory of the liberal strategy of social control that became inseparable from the government led social and economic programmes of reform after 1945. Thus ‘rehabilitation’, ‘moral training’ and ‘deterrence’ provided the discursive and practical cornerstones of a developing state led modern penal strategy.

From the 1970’s, the assumptions that prioritised social and/or rehabilitative solutions became subject to challenge and scepticism in a climate of rising crime, recidivism and financial crisis. The “crisis of penal modernism” (Garland, 1990: 7) was spurred on by Martinson (1974) when he suggested that rehabilitative efforts have no appreciable effect on recidivism. This was widely interpreted as ‘nothing works’ - nothing, that is, that the state and penal institutions put into practice to counter crime. The work that followed this questioned the long standing idea that crime was determined by social factors outside of the individual’s control, and instead depicted the criminal as ‘opportunist’, a rational creature who made choices in both where and when to engage in offending. Wilson (1975) extended this view to shift the focus towards matters of rapid migration, race and the decline in parental authority in the city that gave rise to the general problem of incivility. In this scenario the most that could be done about crime was expressed in preventative terms (proactive policing, stops, searches, arrests and environmental design) and authoritative punishment. Wilson’s ‘broken
windows’ thesis stood as a metaphor for a wider perception of ‘disorder’ identifiable by the likes of public drunkenness, loitering and urinating in public. In this work, and others that followed it, ‘order’ was constituted as a normative concept that was thought to be underpinned by a consensus in the wider population. For others, however, ‘broken windows’ theory “is attractive because it claims to prevent crime at relatively low cost”. Furthermore, “in arresting, searching, interviewing and warrant checking low level offenders, and by confiscating their weapons, violent crime is prevented without judicial intervention plus imprisonment” (Skolnick, 1999: 239).

Notwithstanding its critics, this kind of approach led to much criminology in the 1970s to concern itself with the location of offences as opposed to the characteristics of offenders. Thus, the environment, as much as the offender, became a focus for corrective practices through criminal opportunity reduction and design (Hough et al 1980; Graham and Bennett, 1995). Wilson and Kelling (1982) have been particularly influential in directing attention towards what they have characterised as the breakdown in informal social controls leading to a general increase of incivilities. The authors pointed to a vicious cycle of decline in particular areas (unrepaired physical deterioration, vandalism, graffiti, gangs of youths) that heightened communal withdrawal, fear and insecurity and further increased the crime rate. In situations where informal mechanisms have become unworkable, the formal control mechanisms become central in stemming disorder and incivility before informal control can be restored (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Studies have developed toward the reduction of the risks in offending through target hardening and surveillance techniques towards making it more difficult to
commit crime. The high population density of the city is a continuous concern, as is the role of policy here in housing, homelessness, employment and transportation which can significantly increase the opportunities for crime, particularly when placed alongside an absence of ‘capable guardians’ to exert informal social control (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Much of this work towards the management of risk has been underpinned by ‘routine activities’ and ‘rational choice’ theories that have promoted situational measures to combat crime and are indicative of the ‘new penology’ identified in Chapter Three. The variety of approaches that constitute contemporary crime prevention (whether situational, social or communal) are less underpinned by theories and ideals regarding ‘the city’ (its dis-spiriting and demoralizing effects) and more about the effective management of a particular city problem - namely ‘crime’. As identified in Chapter Three, such approaches constitute a reworking of the relations between agencies thought to be responsible for crime control and imply that the sovereign state is no longer primarily responsible for crime prevention, nor been successful in the rehabilitation of offenders who are now to be targeted within the environment in which they operate (Garland, 1996). Garland (2000) charted these developments and argued that the ‘routine activities’ approach has been informed by the practices of “countless unnamed security managers and security staff” whose initiatives have grown “out of situated problem solving rather than abstract analysis” (Ibid: 365-366). The interrelationship between the practical/policy domain of ‘relevant’ crime prevention and criminological theorising has remained:

In much the same way the nineteenth century penitentiary practice formed a surface of emergence for the science of criminology ... the present day world private sector crime prevention exists in a
reflexive relationship to the theories and prescriptions of situational crime prevention. It is in this interchange – between the practical recipes of the commercial sector managers and the worked out rationalities of academic criminologists and government policy makers – that one must locate the strategy of preventive partnership and the habits of thought and action upon which it depends (Ibid: 366).

In terms of the analysis undertaken in this thesis, the ‘habits of thought and action’ can be located, as Chapter Four argued, within the locally powerful networks and alliances that underpin contemporary regeneration strategies. The organisation of these strategies was discussed in Chapter Three through an examination of the neo-liberal state form that has sought to govern the regenerated city. Chapter Seven will discuss this wider context more fully.

For now it is important to note how the maps and territories of ‘the city’, identified by Cohen earlier, have, for both policy makers and academics alike, become the site for the development of increasingly complex forms of social control within the contemporary city. Many writers have identified a number of issues associated with the restructuring of contemporary cities and the implications of this for thinking about social control. Research undertaken for this thesis has not been concerned with the spatial distributions and patterns of crime within and between localities - important though such studies are (Bottoms and Wiles, 1994; Taylor, 1997: 59-60) - but with how the wider processes of urban renewal and reconstruction within the late twentieth century city have posed problems for the construction of social order within particular places, and of how the management of threats and risks to that order is exercised. Thus at a time when criminology began to turn its attention to situational crime prevention in the urban setting, so the urban form itself became subject to wider transformations in
economic and political governance. The next section will explore the notion of the entrepreneurial city that emerged in academic debates during the 1990s and the impact, in general terms, this is thought to be having on the trajectory of social control.

The making of the entrepreneurial city: themes and issues

The central tenet of this research is based around the hypothesis that the development of social control in the contemporary city cannot be understood outside of the political and economic processes that affect the social form of the city centre, its conterminal state form and the consequent normative reconstruction of the legitimate uses of city space. What follows will provide the context within which concerns of crime, order and social control have been reformulated in the entrepreneurial city.

The post-war reconstruction of Britain’s towns and cities heralded a period of optimism for ‘the city’ within the ideals of collective welfare state provision, full employment and a rationalised central planning of the urban form. Urban policy was linked to the power and progressivism identified with municipal politics that seemed to promise a “once-and-for-all reconstruction process” (Atkinson and Moon, 1994: 22). However, into the 1960s and 1970s these developments became questioned across a number of fronts that included the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ and pockets of ‘social pathology’, the disaffection with new public housing estates (Ibid), and the increasing salience of contentious debates around race and youth that heightened perceptions of insecurity on city streets (Hall et al 1978; Solomos, 1989). Friend and Metcalf (1981) argued that Britain’s cities into
the 1980s had witnessed an intensification of political and economic divisions in containing significant pockets of those at the margins of society - unemployed youth, the unskilled, single parents and sections of the black community.

The rise of the ‘service city’ underpinned by the flight and decline of large scale manufacturing lead to the growth in the ‘surplus population’ whose perceived unruly presence in the ‘inner-city’ spurred the development of authoritarian state responses (Ibid: 146-174). The ‘urban crisis’ of the 1980s, manifest in severe economic decline and a fiscal and political crisis of urban governance, set the scene for attempts to change the nature of urban political management against a backdrop of global economic restructuring. Since the late 1980s, social scientists and urban scholars have been concerned to document and understand the apparent transformations that have affected western cities often characterised as ‘post-industrial’, ‘post-fordist’ or ‘post-modern’. The 1980s heralded the rise of neoliberal and market approaches to urban government which in Britain developed around a sustained attack on local government by the Thatcher administration underpinned by the crisis of the Keynesian welfare state and Britain’s declining position in the global economic order (Cochrane, 1993; Pacione, 1997). Global economic restructuring was thought to be having a profound impact on social and geographic polarisation in the cities of the west (Graham and Marvin, 1996; Lovering, 1997). The increased recognition that cities in the late twentieth century were globally constituted has been based on the acknowledgement that cities do not operate as isolated localised economics but within global economic trends affecting urban fortunes, futures and lifestyle (Clark, 1996). This process of globalisation has been identified as facilitating new information and
communication technologies coupled with the global mobility of capital, including the growth of multi-national corporations, which have accelerated investment decisions and intensified the movement of capital to more productive and profitable locations (Harvey, 1989). The need for cities to compete in a global market has increased the operation of global economic forces at the local urban level particularly through the property markets. This has involved the transformation of some cities into ‘world cities’ operating core financial markets and specialising in service-based and information technology provision (Fainstein and Harloe, 1992), but has also accentuated volatility and insecurity as inter-urban competition has increased (Harvey, 1989). In this context, ‘new’ modes of urban political rule have emerged to promote local economic development in cooperation with private capital.

**Partnership, power and the neo-liberal state form**

In the UK throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, the ‘partnership’ approach to urban governance and economic management became consolidated through the impact of global economic restructuring and the political and ideological strategies of the ‘new right’. Within the context of national and international competition for investment, the governance of cities has included the forging of new alliances and collaborative arrangements between public and private agencies. In their analysis of American cities Logan and Molotch (1987) depicted the city as a “growth machine” which has re-ordered inequalities between and within cities. Within such a growth machine:

... local actors link parochial settings with cosmopolitan interests, making places safe for development ... The growth ethic pervades virtually all aspects of local life, including the political system, the
agenda for economic development, and even cultural organisations ...

(Ibid : 13).

The local politics of growth has, therefore, led to a blurring of the boundaries between public and private interests with the consequence of consolidating novel alliances between locally powerful interests that have taken an increasingly important role in urban governance and undermined older, post war alliances and constituencies at the local level:

This convergence of private sector (typically business and property) interests and the public sector has inevitably undermined working class constituencies, and resulted in a heightened control of the polity by new bourgeoisie and property interests, almost exclusively consisting of businessmen (Hall and Hubbard, 1996: 155).

Therefore, in response to the increased potential for global market flows (Picciotto, 1996) there has “been a mushroom growth of local state institutions which are not part of (or only loosely related to) elected local governments” (Cochrane, 1993: 121). Such developments have involved the application of management techniques that appear to offer developmental growth as a ‘value-free’ and technical solution to urban problems claimed in the interests of all (Hall and Hubbard, op. cit: 156). In fact, the ‘new’ governance has served to “reflect (and reinforce) new sets of power relations” (Cochrane, op. cit: 108).

The growth of city management coalitions has been shaped by central government policy in Britain, which constrained local government spending during the 1980s and urged urban regeneration along lines which suited the emergent ‘enterprise culture’ (Deakin and Edwards, 1993). Increasingly through the 1980s it was assumed that lasting economic, social and environmental regeneration could best be achieved by the involvement of the private sector in making city regions more
attractive to business investors (Harding and Garside, 1995: 167). These shifts have been encouraged by central government and European funding regimes (the Single Regeneration Budget, City Challenge, European Objective One Funding) which have encouraged competition between urban areas underpinned by fragmented policy networks and specificity in service provision (Rhodes, 1997; Newman and Thornley, 1997). As one writer argued:

This implies a significant change at the local level, since it is competition between places intra-and internationally which provides the driving force for the new arrangements rather than the delivery of a centrally agreed package of more or less universal services (Cochrane, 1993: 95).

Local level recognition of competition for grant funding and national and international investment has lead some to characterise changes in the local state as ‘post-Fordist’ (Stewart and Mossberger, 1995: Jessop, 1994). Savage and Warde (1993: 172) argued that these processes point to “a plethora of state institutions with different spatial scopes” whose primary interests lie in the politics of investment.

The increased role of the private sector in urban decision making and economic growth should not be exaggerated (Harvey, 1985), but has been influential in the ability of city government not merely to respond to market forces but to act as “vary much a part of global restructuring, and a pernicious part” (Lovering, 1997: 79). The ability for locally powerful coalitions to ‘act’ in this context has been through the development of officially designated partnerships. This in turn has raised questions regarding the changing role between central and local state and between business interests and political parties and leaders, the allocation and uses of funding, and the role of a professionalised and technical elite in local
governance processes (Newman and Thornley, 1997: 969). Urban government characterised through partnerships – initially orchestrated through *ad-hoc* alliances between local/city government, property and business groups, utility groups, Universities and local media – has thrown up new problems of urban leadership and consent in relation to local populations (Judd and Parkinson, 1990). The power of partnerships to act is not of necessity dependent on the electoral process but through strategic alliance, informal decision-making and proximity to legal and statutory authority as well as the ability to engage with criteria laid down in funding regimes. Partnerships have become the means by which local government has become ‘fragmented’ and at the same time centrally co-ordinated (Rhodes, 1997) in constituting a process that is deemed essential in promoting successful urban regeneration:

Partnerships (or expedient alliances) between public-private-and voluntary-sector agencies with varying interests and expectations have become a de facto necessity in urban policy for the simple reason that government has written the rules so that you cannot get funding unless you participate in one (Edwards, 1997: 829).

Consequently, the ‘democratic deficit’ in many partnership activities may arguably be consolidating a new authoritarian state form. A danger in the concentration of public funds, state capital and social capital within a small locally powerful network, who have shaped the urban fabric on their own image, has been identified by Swyngedouw:

The ‘hollowed out’ state is characterised ... with a decidedly undemocratic and double authoritarian touch, both at the supranational and local (urban/regional) level. In short, the production of post-Fordist spaces is paralleled by disturbing political transformations and a redefined citizenship (1996: 1503).
The work of partnerships towards local economic development has intensified the commodification of the city and its reinvention that hegemonically attempts to construct the meaning of 'place' and local identity. As Harvey argued:

The active production of places with special qualities becomes an important stake in spatial competitions between localities, cities, regions, nations. Corporatist forms of governance can flourish in such spaces, and themselves take on entrepreneurial roles in the production of favourable business climates and other special qualities (Harvey, 1990: 295).

Further to this process, cities "forge a distinctive image ... to create an atmosphere of place and tradition that will act as a lure to both capital and people 'of the right sort'" (ibid). The marketing of place has thus intensified processes bound up with attempts to lever investment and provide the basis for positive re-imaging through the selling of an area's economic 'benefits' in terms of infrastructure and labour force, the selling of cultural products, tourist attractions, the general quality of life (including crime and safety) and a range of consumption and leisure facilities (Madsen, 1992). These marketing discourses will be discussed in relation to Liverpool in Chapter Seven. As well as attempting to make the city more attractive to potential investors, this 'manipulation of image' has played "a role in 'social control' logic, convincing local peoples as to the benevolence of entrepreneurial strategies" and in providing a framework for the construction and maintenance of partnerships (Hall and Hubbard, 1996: 162). Consensus building is also important in the internal cohesion between members of partnerships in that "the professions become institutionalised in policy networks and their unified view of the world - based on common ideas, values and knowledge - sets the parameters to local decision-making" (Rhodes, 1986 in Cochrane, 1993: 122). Drawing upon 'regime theory', Stoker (1995) has argued that local urban
coalitions formed between public and private interests may develop the capacity
to act and lead depending upon the relationships with broader political and
economic processes. Emerging regimes are characterised by a three-stage struggle
that begins with uncertainty as to a regime’s goals, its ascendency in gaining
support and lastly its ideological and material institutionalisation. The work of
partnerships has been to build symbolic support and appropriate material
resources to pursue selective aims. 6

For Cochrane (1993: 124), understanding the politics of local government can
only be possible within a wider framework of local politics and the local state. He
also argued that whatever the terminology applied – ‘partnership’ or ‘corporatism’
- the structures of local government will vary between localities and display
differences in the strategic balance of power among elected bodies, business
interests and professions. Thus tensions between agencies in the local state form
can arise. Such tensions will be discussed in Chapter Eight as they arose around
the means to ‘secure’ Liverpool city centre. In thinking about this state form, as
Chapter Three illustrated, it would be wrong to conceive of these developments as
the wholesale replacement of the ‘State’ by the ‘Market’. For Savage and Warde
(1993: 187), the state has remained central in local regeneration strategies “as
organiser of new forms of investment, market regulation, new forms of control
and policing and as disorganiser of old forms of welfare and social collectivity”
(emphasis in original). Urban geographers and political scientists, then, have

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6 These developments in governing the city have been criticised for prioritising a market and property
led agenda and for the exclusion of other interests and in failing to empower the poorer members of
the community (Bassett, 1996). Edwards (1997) questioned whether partnerships with their
discursive armoury of ‘community empowerment’ and ‘trickle-down’ wealth creation would offer any
solution at all for urban regeneration in terms of addressing poverty and job creation.
been engaged in understanding these developments in urban governance, the impact of which appears multi-faceted. As Hall and Hubbard (1996: 169) have stated,

... urban entrepreneurialism has ushered in a whole range of changes in the way the city operates at all levels, changes that can only be comprehended with reference to the changing nature of the social, economic and political processes which are operating at the global and local level. These changes are being felt at the level of experience, as the new urban politics forge a new cultural politics of identity at the urban level, changing the ways in which the peoples of the city see themselves and others. New group factions and interests are being thrown up as entrepreneurial policies exacerbate existing social divisions in the interests of the minority. Furthermore, the social inequality resulting from entrepreneurialism is mirrored in territorial inequalities as all sorts of urban spaces are opened up to new types of development.

What may also be included here is how these changes are also making their mark on the ‘urban experience’ in terms of the drive to make cities ‘secure’ and ‘safe’ places. Thus the contemporary meaning and trajectory of social control can be understood through exploring the alliances bringing together factional interests towards the construction and procedural maintenance of social order within the ‘entrepreneurial city’. As will be discussed in Chapter Seven, central to the regeneration process in Liverpool has been the attempt to re-define and regulate a series of negative images of the city, which have emanated from outside and within the locality. Essentially the problem of place management (the selection of ‘desirable’ images and the dissemination of information about ‘place’) has been at the same time the problem of representing and maintaining order within the locality. The problem of defining an orderly regeneration, in a broad sense, and instigating management strategies for its maintenance, will be discussed in Chapter’s Eight and Nine respectively. Thus far this chapter has discussed how the work of urban regeneration partnerships has reflected an agenda driven by
economic growth in terms of levering investment and business into the locality. In promoting the economic growth of the city, ‘place entrepreneurs’ - often represented in provincial media as “local heroes” (Lowe, 1993 cited in Short and Kim, 1999: 120) - have contributed to long term shifts in urban governance, namely around the marginalisation of welfarist objectives in favour of competitiveness and growth, the speeding up of placed-based competition for public and private investment, and the development at the local level of a business-political bloc increasingly visible and proactive in the process of strategic urban management. The promotional strategies of local state managers have set in train and entrenched a series of taken-for-granted assumptions as to the ‘proper’ rationale and procedures for urban governance. These have attempted to appeal to affluent, professional and white-collar sectors whilst marginalising ‘older’ (and by definition less relevant) constituencies within the poorer blue-collar sectors. The marketing of cities has been targeted at business firms, corporate and divisional headquarters, investment capital, tourists, cultural establishments, and established and potential residents in order “to replace either vague or negative images” previously held by the various targets of city marketers (Holcomb, 1993: 133). These general observations, however, have glossed over the peculiarities and contingencies involved in marketing particular places with their distinct socio-economic contexts, political complexions, cultural forms and other issues that fall under the broad category of ‘quality of life’. Although the composition of state managers has shifted under ‘entrepreneurial’ conditions of urban rule, those groups and individuals targeted as problematic for that rule have remained broadly the same. This point will be explored fully in Chapter Eight,
and has underpinned the lack of a deeper historical narrative of social control within theorisations of risk discussed in Chapter Two.

The trajectory of the neo-liberal state form described above will provide the material and ideological grounding from which contemporary social control in the city will be understood. Many writers have, in divergent ways, identified broad trends in social control within cities of the late twentieth century. The next section will explore the broad themes to emerge from this work.

Social Control and the ‘new’ urban order

Amidst its multiplicity of expressions, every city is to some degree a panoptican, a collection of surveillance modes designed to impose and maintain a particular model of conduct and disciplined adherence on its inhabitants. Those who do not, or actively threaten not to, adhere are in one way or another incarcerated in specialised enclosures, be they asylums and prisons or ghettos and skid rows ... The spatial concentration of power for social production and reproduction was what the first cities were primarily for. It has remained central to urban life ever since, even as new functions were added. Such commanding geographical presence differentiates the urban from the rural, adherents from the not yet adherent, polites (citizens) from idiots (hicks, rubes, the uncivilised) ... the major transformations of modern society, especially the growing role of the centralised state in maintaining surveillance and adherence via national citizenship and institutionalised identity politics, should not obscure the continuing power at the city and the citadel (Soja, 1996: 235).

Soja sought to avoid historical generalisations concerning the ‘panoptic city’ and instead pointed to continuities regarding the spatialization of power; those “invisible processes of normalisation” that involve city and state in the attempt to maintain contemporary forms of representative democracy (Ibid). Soja (1995)
utilised the notion of the ‘post-modern city’\(^7\) to interlink several processes of change and continuity affecting the urban form as identified by urban researchers. The first process of restructuring he identified was the shift from a Fordist to a post-Fordist urban economy based on flexible production and accumulation strategies. The impact of this restructuring has not been uniform between cities. Secondly, the restructuring of an expanded global and highly mobile capital has contributed towards the formation of ‘world cities’. The same processes have fundamentally disordered the concentric zonal models of the city associated with the Chicago School discussed above, and are characterised by the third restructuring process, captured by terms such as “megacities, outer cities, edge cities, metrocomplex, technoburbs” (Ibid: 131). The fourth geography of restructuring has condensed the above processes in developing new forms of social fragmentation, segregation and inequality. For Soja this has had both positive and negative impacts in that new alliances across class, cultural and political domains have emerged along with “new landscapes of despair, interethnic conflict, crime and violence” (Ibid: 133). Furthermore Soja argued:

Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the post-modern city is how to build on the former while keeping the latter under control (1995: 133).

The fifth process of urban restructuring has resulted from the above “Kaleidoscopic complexities” of the postmodern city which has made it

\(^7\) These broad observations have echoed a concern with security and social control identified by a range of writers within the contemporary ‘post-modern’ metropolis. The category of the ‘post-modern’ used variously by many writers has been applied to capture some of the developments affecting the city and the urban experience. Although, “no clear understanding separates modern from post-modern cities”, Zukin argued that through the lens of postmodernism, “we sense a difference in how we organise what we see; how the visual consumption of space and time is both speeded up and abstracted from the logic of industrial production, forcing a dissolution of traditional spatial identities and their reconstitution along new lines (Zukin, 1992: 221)
“increasingly ungovernable” under the fragmenting rubric of traditional local government. The result, following Davis (1990), has been the coming to prominence of the ‘carceral city’ - heavily enclaved and policed using spatial surveillance and military technologies (Soja: 133-134). The sixth, last and possibly “most postmodern” urban restructuring:

... involves the intrusion and growing power of an urban hyperreality, of simulations and simulacra (defined as exact copies of originals that do not exist), into the material reality and ideological imagery of urban life (Ibid: 135).

For Soja this development represents a form of behavioural, cultural and ideological restructuring that affects urbanism as a way of life and is becoming part of a developing system of social control (Ibid: 134).

In a very generalised sense many writers have highlighted an increasing concern with security, order and policing in the spaces of ‘the new city’. Sorkin (1992) offered a dystopian description of the “the new American city” and put forward three characteristics that distinguish this emergent city that form the basis for “models for urban development throughout the world” (Ibid, xv). The first characteristic driven by globalised capital, electronic production techniques and mass culture, is repetitively universalising city spaces into the predictable and ‘known’. Secondly, the new city can be characterised as increasingly concerned with security, both technological and physical, leading to new forms of urban segregation and distinction amongst city inhabitants. Thirdly, the new city has increasingly assumed the character of a ‘theme park’ as reflected in its
architecture and imaging which in turn reflects "a spuriously appropriated past that substitutes for a more exigent and examined present" (Ibid: xiv).8

The material and symbolic reinvention of the contemporary city has introduced new urban forms into the built environment. These forms have been characterised as representing a shift from the modernist city of industrial production to the postmodernist city of a new consumerism (Zukin, 1992). The enclosed spaces of the shopping malls, heritage and cultural centres, science parks and conference centres are concentrating the spatial practices of consumption, leisure and entertainment for local inhabitants, tourists and business. These 'new' urban forms including 'flagship' developments, such as the Albert Dock in Liverpool and London’s Docklands, have often been cited as evidence of a shift towards the privatisation of public space, which is thought to be having an impact on how these spaces are regulated, ordered and policed (Bianchini, 1990; Davis, 1990; Sorkin, 1992). For Lovkaitov - Sideris (1993), the 'privatisation of the public open space' has been encouraged by economic stagnation, constraints on local government expenditure, the growth of partnerships and the long-standing perception that public space is 'pathological' and disorderly. The new spaces represented by urban plazas have been a site in which American downtowns have been privately developed, funded and policed toward the creation of 'exclusionary environments' providing protected and comfortable spaces for the target group pursued by developers (Ibid).

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8 For Sorkin, these developments have begun to undermine traditional notions of public space as represented for him through freedom of human interaction and political debate. Sorkin called for a more "authentic urbanity" and claimed that "the effort to reclaim the city is the struggle for democracy itself" (Ibid: xv).
In thinking about the development of these consumerist spaces Goss, (1993) has argued that partnerships between designers, planners and developers have been energised in constructing total consumption environments that have their roots in shopping malls but are also increasingly important in the architectural landscaping of city centres. He argued that a complex control logic has underpinned the reconstruction process:

... developers have sought to assuage the collective guilt over conspicuous consumption by designing into the retail built environment the means for the fantasised dissociation from the act of shopping. [...] ... designers manufacture the illusion that something else other than mere shopping is going on, while also mediating the materialist relations of mass consumption and disguises the identity and rootedness of the shopping center in the contemporary capitalist social order. The product is effectively a psuedoplace which works through spatial strategies of dissemblance and duplicity (Goss, 1993: 19).

These spaces work toward social differentiation through the use of “class based cues” (Ibid). Applying this analysis in Liverpool, for example, the construction of heritage sites, ‘high art’ and public sculpture are placed alongside, and within, ‘normal’ consumption spaces in the attempt to collapse any distinction between art, history and commodities. The contemporary built environment can be understood as “as a system of signification that gives symbolic expression to the cultural values of consumer capitalism” (Ibid). The creation of idealised environments – ‘spontaneous’, ‘spectacular’ and naturalised – are themselves ideological representations of ‘the city’ that underpin contemporary urban management strategies that attempt to foster a particular experiential mode or urban ambience. These broad strategies of urban rule through ideological and idealised representations of the city, its design and image management will be
illuminated in Chapter Seven. Such ideological representations as articulated by
the locally powerful emerge from and reinforce a particular set of social relations
within which can be placed specific practices of social control that have
developed around camera surveillance networks.

For Goss, the perception of these spaces as orderly and secure is integral to the
realisation of profits. Thus these strategic spaces strictly curtail and police
demonstrations, leafleting and picketing which threatens the contrived retail
carnival atmosphere (Ibid: 28). Furthermore, “those without shopping bags and
other suspicious individuals (teenagers, single men and the unkempt, and social
science researchers) will draw the attention of security, who use the charge of
loitering as grounds for eviction” (Ibid: 35).

In a broader commentary on the economic, political and social changes affecting
the late modern city, Bottoms and Wiles (1994) argued that increased social
differentiation is leading to the growth of ‘defended locales’ whether situated
within individual retail houses, malls or “tourist bubbles” (Ibid: 48-49). The rise
of predictable, sanitised and secured urban environments has, for one writer, been
bound up with the process of ‘boundary erection’, constructed through individual
and institutional conceptions of abjection and hostility towards difference (Sibley,
1995). Reflected within the built environment such boundaries of separation are in
part moral boundaries (Ibid: 39-43) underpinned by a fear of the ‘other’ and
constructed along class, gender, ethnic, sexual, age and disability lines. The urge
to purify and dominate space may be a relatively “unnoticed” feature within “the
spatial separations of city centre development” (Ibid: xiv). Although, for Sibley:
It appears that the boundaries between the consuming and non-consuming public are strengthening, with non-consumption being constructed as a form of deviance at the same time as spaces of consumption eliminate public spaces in city centres (Ibid: xii).

Christopherson (1994) explored urban security within the relationship between material conditions and changes in values and meanings that have re-worked the 'urban experience'. The rise of the “post-Fordist fortress city”, at least in the American context, has displayed continuity and innovation in intensifying the administration of urban space. The meaning and practices of security are being propelled by an increasing commodification along with the need to maintain property values and extract profits in the contemporary city (Ibid: 419). The possibilities for an increasingly privatised and segregated city have been underpinned by changes in the meaning of citizenship that have privileged individual consumer values and consumption activity (Ibid: 416). In the contemporary city the security of property has presided over the security of people (Ibid: 420) and the city streets have become abandoned to the unhoused, the poor, the undesirable and the unprofitable (Ibid: 421). On the one hand “the street has become a gauntlet to run between safe places”, but the city has also become dominated by “security cages” within which whole areas are protected using video surveillance (Ibid: 421).

Mike Davis (1990) offered a possible future scenario of cities in his analysis of Los Angeles as ‘the bad edge of postmodernity’. It is here that one can find “fortress cities, brutally divided between fortified cells of affluent society and places of terror where the police battle the criminalized poor” and where “the market provision of security generates its own paranoid demand” (Ibid: 224).
Davis depicted the convergence of public and private police, property developers, planners and politicians in the creation of ‘fortress cities’, complete with ‘pseudo public space’ and a refinement in the processes of security, segregation and ghettoisation.

The above writers have highlighted an increase in concerns with social control and order in the contemporary city that are part of a reworking of the boundaries between public and private space and a re-ordering of the uses of that space. Goss (1996) has issued caution in analysing these ‘new’ city spaces as being recent advances in privatisation and over-determined by capitalist economics that “collapses the dialectic of social control into a totalizing mechanism” (Ibid: 240). For him these spaces are “contradictory” and “organised by capital and state in public-private partnerships for instrumental effect” (Ibid).

This section has discussed, in very broad terms, social control practices within the broader economic, political and social changes in the contemporary city. The broad, even ‘global’, trends outlined above may not apply uniformly in particular localities and social contexts. This point will be carried forward more fully in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, which detail the case study of social control in Liverpool city centre. For now the chapter turns to a general contextual discussion of the contemporary British city in terms of the debates that have informed a restructuring of social control in the British urban setting.
The search for order in the contemporary British city

In *City of Quartz*, Davis (1990) captured the shift from social welfare to social warfare in post-liberal Los Angeles where “one observes an unprecedented tendency to merge urban design, architecture and the police apparatus into a single comprehensive security effort” (Ibid: 224). His work has pointed to a dystopian - albeit critical - vision of the contemporary city where urban renaissance continues to go hand in hand with the reconstruction of policing and security towards the maintenance of brutal and unequal social boundaries. Davis cogently highlighted the interconnections between agencies involved in social control in the city. However, the extent to which it is possible to generalise from such an analysis has remained open to empirical and theoretical debate. ‘Fortress LA’, like Cohen’s (1979) ‘punitive city’ or the pathological zones of the Chicago School, cannot be read as representative of urban policing, strategies of social control or patterns of urban crime respectively. As Taylor (1997: 59) argued, global prescriptions of change, whether formulated in terms of a ‘risk society’ or ‘post-modernism’, have failed to connect “global change to local expressions” regarding the emergence of local partnerships that have placed ‘crime prevention’ as a core concern. Within Britain during the 1990s at both national and local government levels it has become a matter of official recognition that problems of local crime are increasingly infringing on the efforts made at the local level to provide sustained social and economic regeneration. This recognition came at a time when public anxiety about crime was heightened, not least through debates around the effectiveness of the criminal justice system to deal adequately with the crime problem.
The application of CCTV in the cities of the United Kingdom intensified during the mid-1990s at a time when recorded crime continued to rise from the post-war period, with notifiable offences up from 2.4 million in 1979 to 5.5 million in 1992. By 1995, 5.1 million crimes were recorded by the police (a fall of 2.4% on the previous year), though crimes of violence increased by 5% on 1994 and robbery by 14%. Police clear up rates have declined from 41% in 1979 to 26% in 1995. Furthermore, there has been increasingly intensive public and official scrutiny of police effectiveness. In 1996 an Audit Commission report indicated that 80% of the public were unhappy with the level of foot patrols (The Times, 29 February 1996). In their defence the Association of Chief Police Officers argued that although crime had doubled since 1980 and 999 calls had risen by 133%, police manpower had only increased by 8% (Ibid). This led to an acknowledgement that policing and criminal justice agencies alone are limited in terms of combating crime with a consequent expansion in expectations in what the public and other agencies can contribute in this area. The growth of the private security industry has been particularly evident. Figures show that from 1970 its turnover had grown from £55 million to £1.2 billion in 1990. During the 1990s, estimates of the numbers of private security personnel began to show that they out-numbered the police by as much as 12,000 employees (The Independent on Sunday, 11 June, 1995). The increasing politicisation of law and order since 1979 can be placed alongside a rise in public concern around safety and security

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9 The Association of Chief Police Officers in Britain was eager to point out that this rise in private and unregulated security provision was set to continue if cuts in police manpower budgets were not reversed (The Guardian, 25 January, 1995). By 2000 the private security industry had grown to be worth £4 billion (The Observer, 2000, 23 April). At the same time, police detection rates have continued to fall to an all time low of 24% (The Guardian, 2002, 12 July).
that, according to the 1994 British Crime Survey, is manifest in public anxiety about becoming victims of crime over and above worries to do with job insecurity and illness. Alongside this the 1995 British Social Attitudes Survey reported that the majority of those surveyed believed that the court system was too lenient on criminals, that increased public support existed for police surveillance measures, that concern for civil liberties was declining and that the fear of crime was rising, particularly amongst the young and women (*The Guardian*, 22 November, 1995).

Interpreting any rise in crime from official criminal statistics is widely accepted as problematic in that they offer more an index of police practice and citizen reporting behaviour than any objective long term measurement (Lea and Young, 1984). Neither have such figures been collated in such a way as to comparatively study ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ trends (Smith, 1989: 273). The wider concerns of crime surveys are also limited in their failure to pick up ‘invisible’ crimes whether corporate, domestic, sexual or racial in origin. With these and other drawbacks in mind Smith has commented that:

> No amount of political rhetoric or elaborate policy-making can overcome the fact that, empirically, there are major gaps in our knowledge of just what the problem of urban crime *is* (1989: 274, emphasis in original).

However, statistical measures, along with criminological research both past and present, have helped reinforce a common sense perception that crime is a city problem (Taylor, 1999: 91). More particularly it is a problem for “the policing of the working class city than the policing of the City” (Levi, 1987: 137). Statistical measures have served to ‘mystify’ the crime problem and reinforce popular and official perceptions of visible danger and risk in the public sphere that in turn
provide a legitimacy for legal, punitive and policing strategies aimed at securing public order (Box, 1983). Nevertheless, during the last twenty years of the twentieth century official statistics in particular have fuelled both ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ political agendas in their attempts to monopolise the law and order mantle within a broader concern to deregulate the market economy whilst increasing regulation and control of the social sphere. The politicisation of crime is therefore not a straightforward matter singularly related to empirical measurement, but a selective and partial process in the designation of risks and victims. It is within this context of academic and political concerns around increases in recorded crime, police ineffectiveness and heightened public anxiety that:

The material and symbolic significance of ‘crime’ and ‘fear of crime’ in different conurbations is increasingly linked with other issues to do with ‘urban fortunes’, as understood locally in past, present and future terms (Taylor, 1996: 332).

Crime, Social Control And The Regenerated City: The Governmental Response

‘Urban fortunes’ in a deregulated economic climate have become increasingly linked and ‘thought out’ in relation to ‘the problem of crime’ as it arises in particular local contexts. These concerns have fuelled a renewed perception that the city centre is an increasingly insecure place both economically and socially, for business and consumers alike, and have been acknowledged within central government which has sought to target potential victims, vulnerable environments and all those who are capable of exercising responsibility for reducing criminal opportunity (Hough et al, 1980). Under the Action for Cities initiative launched in 1988 a range of problems were identified in Britain’s cities and targeted under this new initiative which sought to: improve investment and enterprise; tackle dereliction and improve development; improve transport; development of the arts;
and make city areas safe and attractive places to live and work in. From this initiative the *Safer Cities Projects* emerged, which by 1998 operated in 55 cities and towns. This programme represented the Home Office’s centrepiece crime prevention initiative and has had three main aims - "to reduce crime", "to lessen the fear of crime", and "to create safer cities where economic enterprise and community life can flourish" (Safer Cities, 1991: 2). The programme provided Home Office support through central coordination, advice, expertise and the funding of partnerships at the local level. The funds made available are also used as a leveraging device to attract other local funds, particularly from the business community, for the purposes of crime prevention. Though control over the process is firmly located within the central government domain, it is managed locally by non-profit making organisations such as the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders and Crime Concern. The latter body was established in 1988 by central government to encourage private sector funding and involvement in crime prevention through acting as an ‘independent’ consultant to local partnerships and encouraging ‘good practice’. Central government also established the *Crime Prevention Agency* in 1995 to co-ordinate national objectives by bringing together the Home Office, police, business leaders, Crime Concern and academics (*The Guardian*, 23 November, 1995).10

Alongside these developments has been the increasing deployment of surveillance cameras in non-residential environments as a central component of current ‘crime prevention’ thinking and practice. In Britain during the 1990s, the drive to secure

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10 The work of this agency was maintained under New Labour’s *Crime Reduction Programme* in 1998.
urban space became big business with the market for closed circuit television (CCTV) doubling since 1989 to an annual spending of £300 million. The British Security Industry Association (BSIA) trumpeted an observation that CCTV was becoming an acceptable and “permanent fixture” on the streets of Britain and that on a “typical day” each one of us is viewed by 8 different surveillance cameras (BSIA, 1997: 23). Under John Major’s Conservative administration, CCTV took a central role in government thinking around crime prevention and, as the Introduction to the thesis observed, this thinking was maintained and intensified under New Labour. In encouraging this growth the Conservatives removed the need for planning permission to install CCTV systems (Home Office, 1994: 17-18). Furthermore, as the Home Office publication ‘Crime Prevention News’ (April-June, 1996) made clear, CCTV was to be placed as a central component of the Conservative law and order strategy. John Major’s desire “to make every street safe” underpinned the intention to generate 10,000 extra cameras by making £15 million available in a CCTV Challenge Competition (Home Office, 1995). The bidding document made funding available only to those schemes that: could demonstrate a ‘partnership’ approach; were “broadly representative of the community”; have the support of local police; could clearly identify a ‘crime problem’; and could secure private sector funding to maintain a CCTV scheme (Ibid: 1-2).11

11The criteria to receive funding laid down in this document have remained unchanged under New Labour’s funding arrangements for CCTV through the Crime Reduction Programme.
These developments within the city and town centre have emerged at a time when retail crime is reported to be on the increase with retailers' costs soaring to £2.15 billion per annum. The 1996 British Retail Consortium estimated that £580 million was spent on retail crime prevention - a 40% increase on the previous year. This is reported to be adding an extra £140 per annum, per household, on shopping bills to cover the costs of crime while denting overall retail profits by 23%. Crimes included here are burglary, robbery, vandalism, attacks on staff and terrorism. Overall, as little as 2% of retail crime finds its way into police statistics.

In Britain, the police and the Home Office are actively encouraging private industry to invest millions in crime prevention including the sponsoring of police cars and the establishment of surveillance cameras. This has been necessary, argued the Police Federation, in a climate where crime costs £1000 a second and £31 billion a year (The Guardian, 19 May, 1997).

Thus a political shift has occurred towards ‘partnerships’ that emphasise the shared responsibility for crime prevention and have provided evidence for Garland’s (1997) observation, discussed in Chapter Three, that what is occurring are centrally coordinated ‘responsibilisation strategies’. These strategies have been exemplified under the Crime and Disorder Act (CDA) (1998) that was aimed at public concern with issues of crime, disorder and nuisance that the police cannot deal with alone. The Act aimed to formalise and coordinate, with central government guidance, the work of local crime prevention partnerships. The Act depicts local crime prevention through the language of ‘community safety’ and can be seen as an attempt “to solve the problem of ‘who owns the community safety problem?’” (Audit Commission, 1999: 20). The CDA has allowed a certain
level of continuity regarding local discretion for the identification and solution of local problems. Home Office Guidance has stressed "maximum flexibility for local freedom":

... the Act does not prescribe in any detail what the agenda for the local partnership should be, nor what structures will be needed to deliver the agenda (Home Office, 1998: Forward).

However, the Act imposed a legal duty on police and Local Authorities to work with other 'responsible authorities' in order to conduct three yearly crime and disorder audits as a means for setting strategic priorities. In line with this, computer technology known as Geographical Information Systems (GIS) have been developed in order to map high-risk areas or crime 'hot-spots'. The formalisation of business involvement in strategic partnerships was pushed by the Act. Local Chambers of Commerce and privately sponsored Town Centre Management consortia should be incorporated into local strategic partnerships, not merely as "a source of funds" but as educators in the skills of "project management and technical know-how". Local crime and disorder strategies must therefore seek the active participation of the business sector that has "a legitimate expectation that the strategy will address issues of concern to them" (Home Office, Ibid: Sec. 2.33). In allowing for local discretion, the CDA has been criticised for its lack of clarity and coordination, and insensitivity to public needs (Audit Commission, 1999). The Audit Commission National Report for 1999 noted that "community safety" - a buzzword underpinning the CDA - had no agreed definition other than, as the Report defined it, "an issue of major public concern", which is central "to people’s quality of life and can make the difference between people wanting to live and work and stay in area or not" (Ibid: 6).

'Community safety' can mean more than ‘crime’ and contains those things "most
disruptive to people’s quality of life” (Ibid). It is important to note here that ‘quality of life’ has been central to regeneration vernacular and played an ideological role in cementing relations between authorities within the neo-liberal state. Issues concerning locally powerful definitions of ‘quality of life’ will be explored in Chapter Seven.

Further criticism from the Audit Commission focused upon police dominance of local crime prevention (Ibid: 43). Also, the over reliance on situational measures such as CCTV was criticised because of central government pressure to adopt such measures through the allocation of funds, and they were seen as easier to sell to the public (Ibid: 36). Furthermore, ‘partnership’ suffered from the failure to understand different cultures and working practices of partner organisations coupled with a “lack of ability of those around the table to commit their organisations” (Ibid: 45). These tensions highlighted in the Report are, for the purposes of this thesis, to be understood as tensions and contradictions of state restructuring which, when examined, will highlight the ideological work undertaken across the neo-liberal state to shape both the boundaries of the state form and its legitimation in Liverpool city centre.

Interpreting these developments in the shift to ‘community’ based crime prevention has left questions for scholars in the field. The reinvigoration of appeals to community has sat alongside the ‘democratic deficit’ following the curbing of local authority power by central government during the 1980s (Hughes, 1998: 147). As Hughes has suggested, “the ‘unfinished business’ around appeals to the ideologically volatile vision of community” (Ibid: 129) has left the concept
more open and contestable than some have argued. Evoking ‘community’ may serve “countervailing forces … on the wider social fabric/body politic” in terms of provoking “the possibility of ‘unsettlements’ of the state’s dominant agenda on crime control” (Ibid: 128). ‘Unsettlements’ of dominant crime control (and social control) agendas will come up against powerful official discourses proliferated by local elites towards setting the parameters around what is and what is not relevant to the strategy of ‘partnership’ (Atkinson, 1999). These discourses have shaped the meaning of regeneration and partnership strategy in Liverpool city centre and will be explored in Chapter Seven.

*Partners against crime and the impact on city centre space*

The ‘partnership’ approach characterised by the CDA has for a longer period been developed within and across a range of social sites including Neighbourhood Watch and city regeneration coalitions or growth machines that, for Taylor (1997), are indicative of defensive social movements. This point was underscored by van Swaaningen (1997: 175), who characterised contemporary risk orientated crime and safety initiatives as increasingly defined through the targeting of ‘nuisances’ that have mirrored the urban social defence practices of the 1880’s.

Contemporary practices of securing urban space have been encouraged by studies that have pointed a decline in the use of public space, accompanied by negative perceptions of urban centres. Bianchini (1990) echoed these concerns when calling for a more holistic approach to urban planning that required investment from both public and private sector and should include economic revitalisation (to stimulate retailing and the night time economy): social strategies of ‘natural
surveillance’ aimed at encouraging a greater public mixing of diverse groups, and
political initiatives that coordinate cultural policy with policies on transport,
policing and environmental improvements. Bianchini noted that the fear of crime,
along with the expansion of low income groups and cuts in welfare benefits, was
leading to the decline of public social life in the city. However, Bianchini warned
that the increase in the privatisation of public space through “malling” and the
need to promote “safe shopping” may be leading to “the virtual
disenfranchisement from city life of young people with low spending power and
of other - generally low income - residents, whose appearance and conduct did not
conform to the moral codes of well-ordered consumption enforced by shopping
centre managers” (Bianchini, 1990: 5). Beck and Willis’s (1995) study reported
that town and city centres are facing decline because consumers are increasingly
expressing a preference for out-of-town shopping and enclosed malls which offer
the reassuring presence of private security and surveillance cameras. The public
survey conducted for their study identified a number of ‘nuisances’ that the public
perceive as obstacles to consumption in the city centre:

The term nuisance is widely used as convenient shorthand for members of the public being upset in any way whilst shopping. This may include shoppers being subject to behaviour which causes them distress, or it may involve the unwelcome or unwanted presence of certain persons in the shopping environment. It may be manifest through unpleasant or offensive gangs of threatening youths; children hanging around in town centres and shopping centres; people selling things on the street; and distress caused by prostitutes, vagrants, beggars, drunks or buskers (Beck and Willis, 1995: 31).

Such a wide range of ‘incivilities’ were “seen in themselves, irrespective of their actions, as contaminating the environment” (Beck and Willis, 1995: 1bid). The survey advocated the greater use of surveillance cameras and uniformed security
that reassures the consuming public. The research concluded that retailers and town centre managers will have to be prepared to fund “safer shopping” strategies as part of the drive to maintain profitability in the city centre. The drift away from the city centre has concerned local authorities and local private interests since the late 1980s. A report found that noisy youth, fear of drunkenness and violence coupled with litter-strewn streets, toilets and car parks were driving people away from town centres at night. In order to combat these fears - particularly amongst women - the report advocates a range of cultural and leisure activities to attract people of all ages back into the city centre at night in order to “dilute” troublemakers (*The Guardian*, 16 May, 1991).  

The fusion of regeneration strategies with ‘crime prevention’ has been exemplified in the growth of city and town centre management techniques that have broadly aimed to promote an improvement in the quality of the environment of the city centre. Such management techniques are indicative of the entrepreneurial forms of rule discussed in the previous section. The concept of Town Centre Management (TCM) originates from the recognition by local authorities and business interests that the economic viability of a town centre is on the decline and draws upon the model of the commercial management of large out-of-town shopping complexes. The pooling of resources from both public and private sources has been used to establish the office of Town Centre Manager, a position usually filled by seconded business personnel from one of the major retail

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12 This resonated with what Jacobs (1961: 45) termed “natural surveillance” as a process to revitalise city space: “there must be eyes on the street, eyes belonging to those we might call the natural proprietors of the street”.

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chains. The impetus therefore has been towards the enhancement of the commercial viability, through publicity and partner mobilisation, of the city or town centre. Studies have indicated that in attracting investment and consumption to particular locations, TCM prioritises the targeting of non-consumptive activities through environmental improvements and CCTV that aims to discourage begging, roaming youths and unlicensed street vending (Reeve, 1998). The management of safer city centres has become a growing academic specialism that has broadly encouraged the implementation of a range of situational measures open to city centre managers as a means towards greater civility and a reduction in criminal opportunity (Oc and Tiesdell, 1997). The latter authors state that although opportunity reducing measures are crucial to safer city centres, they will not prevent crime and must be placed alongside measures to encourage moral responsibility:

What is therefore also needed is the curbing of social incivilities by better personal behaviour and conduct within the space of the city centre. Rather than a culture of excuses for poor behaviour in public places, what is required is a culture of expectations for more civility (Oc and Tiesdell, 1997: 238).

Discourses of civility and civic responsibility punctuated the views of urban managers in Liverpool and formed part of their visions for an orderly city centre. These views will be discussed more fully in Chapter Seven. Critical writers have observed that strategies enacted under TCM schemes in city centres have highlighted an increasing divergence of control tasks between public and private sectors and opened up "the development of crime prevention projects which are

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13 The development of TCM has been a feature of Liverpool's regeneration. Personnel working within with such bodies were interviewed for this thesis, the data from which will be discussed in Chapter Seven.
not necessarily directed at 'crime' in the legal sense of the word”, thus instigating a process of bringing “people under penal control under whom no legal suspicion is established” (van Swaaningen, 1997: 196). The developments discussed here can be understood as a merging of ‘crime control/prevention’ with a broader notion of ‘quality of life’ that is reflective of a process to re-image and construct a particular city’s ‘place’ in the regional, national and international urban hierarchy. At the local level, this has been accompanied by a move towards ‘public order’, ‘zero tolerance’ or ‘quality of life’ policing that has been aimed at groups “perceived to degrade the urban aesthetic and make life difficult for the ‘law abiding’” (Stenson, 2000: 216). It has been argued that targeting the homeless, drunks and vandals has been underpinned by a widespread tolerance of social exclusion:

There is a widespread acceptance of harsh methods of controlling and disciplining the poor and the deviant. It reflects a sense of being ‘fed up’ with troublesome people - people who are just unsightly and irritating as well as those who actually pose some real danger to life and limb (Currie, 1997: 136).

As noted earlier, ‘quality of life’ has formed a thread in regeneration discourse and has acted as a key discursive device utilised across partnerships in the formation of place marketing initiatives for the purposes of attracting inward investment. The concern with ‘quality of life’ increasingly has incorporated local crime indexes and those local, national and international reputations and identities that particular places are perceived to engender. Thus partnerships between local business, police, local government, developers and local media are becoming increasingly geared towards the management of local problems and threats deemed to destabilise a local risk-calculus increasingly used as an important
source of information in investment decisions.\textsuperscript{14} This ‘recognition’ of the salience of ‘crime’ amongst local elites and its importance in the competitive re-positioning of ‘global cities’ has been reflected in central government initiatives such as \textit{Safer Cities}, which since its demise as a discreetly funded programme has seen funds transferred to the Single Regeneration Budget (1994). This transfer has made ‘the control of crime’ a central component of urban regeneration policy, making crime prevention an element that must be competitively bid for alongside and as part of any ‘successful’ regeneration strategy. Thus the identification of a ‘crime problem’ becomes a key strategy in gaining scarce central resources. This has been reinforced by legislative and official guidance documents that have stressed a linkage between crime and disorder and ‘successful’ regeneration. The CDA and Local Strategic Partnerships (2000) have provided examples of what officially has been recognised as moves towards ‘joined up’ government. ‘Joined up’ government has been taking shape under a neo-liberal ideology of managerialism and intensified a process towards the subordination of social policy to sustaining economic competitiveness and fighting ‘crime and disorder’ (Crowther, 2000: 151).\textsuperscript{15} Managers and proponents of CCTV, in shaping how the technology is ideologically represented and targeted, have further reinforced the link between orderly urban space and urban revitalisation. This point will be explored more fully in Chapter Eight. For now it can be noted that in the attempts

\textsuperscript{14} The processes involved in defining the police role and their positioning in local investment strategies will be highlighted in Chapter Seven with regard to Liverpool.

\textsuperscript{15} ‘Joined up government’ has been New Labour’s attempt at coordinating the partners within a neo-liberal state. This has been enacted “through a combination of inducements ... and sanctions” under a mantra of “corporate populism” which has assumed and consolidated a key role for business, in coalition with other ‘responsible’ partners, in the provision of local ‘services’ (Fairclough, 2000: 121).
to coordinate agents and agencies in the neo-liberal state, through initiatives described in this section, a ‘third way’ politics has been inaugurated:

A running thread of these initiatives is to enable the police and other governmental agencies to regain control over the neighbourhoods of the so-called ‘socially excluded’, the problem housing estates and poor inner city areas. In this way the aim is to provide congenial conditions for social and economic regeneration (Stenson, 2000: 229).

This thesis will examine the ‘congenial conditions’ and strategic visions propagated within a developing neo-liberal state form in the city centre of Liverpool as a means of exploring social control practices within that setting.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored some of the historical continuities and discontinuities that have existed around ‘the city’ as a problematic site in the negotiation and construction of social order. Since the development of the great industrial cities of the nineteenth century, the concern to reconstruct the social and spatial character of the urban form has involved debates around social order within which struggles over the definition of ‘crime’, ‘risk’ and ‘dangerousness’ have been central. The formal organisation of these concerns has changed with shifts in the management of the urban social form that have reflected wider economic restructuring and politico-ideological preferences of urban governance within the state form. The above discussion indicated the links between ‘crime’ and social change that Gatrell (1990) identified as central to the interpretation and response to those turbulent urban transformations in the 1840s. The overlapping categories of ‘crime’, ‘disorder’ and ‘incivility’ have again become central to contemporary urban discourses. Scholars have begun to explore these processes involved in the
construction and representation of social order and the consequences for social control strategies as cities have engaged in programmes to regenerate, re-invent, re-position and re-image themselves. The material and ideological conditions have shifted towards ‘new’ entrepreneurial governance strategies alongside the development of particular technologies and rationales of control. It would be incorrect however to take the ‘entrepreneurial state’ and its ‘responsibilised’, efficient, risk avoidance strategy at face value. van Swaaningen (1997: 90) warned of the dangers in losing a normative framework that would help make sense of the contemporary ‘politics of prevention’: “It is crucial to reveal the gut reaction populism on which this politics is actually based, and to place criminal justice politics in a socio-economic framework”. Furthermore, the pairing of ‘risk avoidance’ through ‘partnership’ in the contemporary urban setting forces a consideration of wider local material conditions. “The vast new industry around crime prevention” has been,

... attempting to legitimize and manage the changes in the post-industrial form, and provide the conditions of existence for further capital accumulation and growth in a locality, in a display of apparently coordinated action against national and local crime problems (Taylor, 1997: 66).

Taylor pointed to shifts in political rationale that have impacted on processes of rule at the local level. The coordination of this rule and its consequences for social control has for some, as Chapter Three illustrated, been interpreted via a rejection of ‘state centred’ analyses with a focus instead on a plurality of power manifest cross-institutional boundaries (via expert alliances and partnerships). As Chapter Three discussed more fully, this work has downplayed the consolidation of particular powerful interests within state organs and the salience of normative constructions that state actors and agencies are able to articulate and invoke in
their authoritative appeals to leadership in civil society. Gramsci made this point when arguing against ‘organic’ distinctions between state and civil society and for a view of the state that privileges particular political rationalities and programmes of rule. Any such distinctions between state and civil society are ‘methodological’ and furthermore,

... since in actual reality civil society and state are one and the same, it must be made clear that laissez-faire too is a form of state ‘regulation’, introduced and maintained by legislative and coercive means. It is a deliberate policy, conscious of its own ends, and not the spontaneous, automatic expression of economic facts. Consequently, laissez-faire liberalism is a political programme, designed to change - in so far as it is victorious - a state’s leading personnel, and to change the economic programme itself - in other words the distribution of the national income (Gramsci, 1971: 160).

As this chapter has demonstrated, the growth of partnerships and expedient expert alliances at the local level needs to be placed within a broader understanding of political and economic change that does not take the authority of prevalent political programmes for granted. The ascendancy or ‘victory’ of particular programmes of rule should not be mistaken for a hegemony based on an unproblematically ‘correct’ analysis of problems that are troubling society at any one time. Indeed, the thesis will explore processes involved in re-shaping the urban form within which problems thought to hinder the emergence of a ‘new’ urbanity are identified, articulated and responded to. The focus will therefore be upon powerful neo-liberal political programmes, which have reconfigured the boundaries and scope of local state action. In turning the research process upwards towards a local state’s leading personnel, some of the themes identified by others in this chapter, regarding an analysis of the trajectory of ‘partnership’, can be explored more fully. In exploring these social relations in Chapter Seven, the
context will be set for investigating social control in Liverpool city centre in Chapter Eight. The thesis will now begin the case study in the next chapter with a focus upon the historical interrelationship between historically prevailing economic, political and social relations in the city of Liverpool and the processes of social control.
Chapter Six

Social Control in Liverpool: An Historical Overview

Liverpool’s trades union leaders of 1991 crowing atop piles of stinking rubbish like cockerels on dung heaps, its welfare mentality growing upon the destruction of wealth producing jobs ... poverty and crime nourished on the thin gruel of welfare, the whole mess financed by borrowing whose costs choke any tentative industry or commerce, was the world’s image and the terrible reality of Britain in the 1970s (Tebbit, 1991: 23).

Morphocity is now undergoing a cultural and contextual revolution. The city is reinventing itself and tuning in with the requirements of modern learning curves. Morphocity is now informed by a new and different set of values: openness, meritocracy, social diversity, plurality of skills, youth culture, transparency, vision, change, experimentation and cosmopolitanism (Humphreys and MacDonald, 1995: 50).

The two qualitatively different quotes above point to the historically nuanced representations of place – in this case Liverpool – and the positioning of a particular place within wider economic and political processes. The quote from Norman Tebbit encapsulated for many political and media commentators what appeared to be ‘wrong’ with Liverpool from the 1970s onwards: a political, economic and cultural backwater, a disorderly city at odds with the cutting edge of neo-liberal discourse and practice, and the maker of its own demise. Such representations of the city are not isolated and emerge out of popular myth as much as concrete political and economic struggle. In contrast the notion of ‘Morphocity’ emerged from a document that spoke of the ‘new’ Liverpool; a city in renaissance, forward looking, replete with the latest technologies of urban management and reminiscent of one view of the urban form characterised as “playful space”, full of spontaneity and creativity (Christopherson, 1994: 409). The contemporary regeneration of Liverpool encapsulates these two contrasting positions and will be illuminated more fully in Chapter Seven.
Suffice to note for now that the struggle to re-image the city for local state managers has thrown up a clear contrast (and indeed a contest) between dystopian and utopian discourses of 'place'. Such reimagining has sat alongside attempts to manage a range of locally identified problems that were perceived potentially to disqualify the city from the shares in a global market place.

The previous chapter broadly considered the political and economic processes that have impacted upon the drive to regenerate city centres within which discourses and practices of social control have become a central strategic feature. Other writers have argued that the centrality of mechanisms geared towards effective social control in the reformation of the city have displayed both "global" and "local" characteristics in the marketisation of security provision (Sheptycki, 1997). In this sense, "the multiplicity of tactics for risk suppression" will display peculiarly local characteristics:

Underlying these developments is the discourse of insecurity and the practices of risk suppression [...]. The distribution of risks depends on the segregation of suspect populations (which will be differently defined in different locales but which will, in any case, be those without access to the economic and political levers of power) (Sheptycki, 1997: 312).

Similarly, Taylor (1997) has pointed to the uneven local expression and constitution of crime and anxiety about crime that have informed the emergence of local elite partnerships concerned with the re-positioning of cities in the global market place. It is the local expression of social control in the city on which this chapter will focus with reference to historical developments in Liverpool city centre. What follows is an overview of social control and policing in Liverpool that takes into account historical themes and issues that broadly illuminate the rationale underpinning social control strategies, policing
and their targeting. In drawing attention to these historical processes the chapter will begin the case study of this thesis and facilitate an appreciation of continuities and discontinuities in the formulation and targeting of social control in the city so that more recent debates around the ‘newness’ and strategic novelty of contemporary social control can be assessed in later chapters.

Political-economy in Liverpool from the early nineteenth century to the 1980s: an overview

There is no city in the world, not even London itself, in which so many foreign governments find it necessary to maintain consular for the safeguarding of the interests of their exiled subjects. It should, however, be noted that this amazingly polyglot and cosmopolitan population, consisting of races which are backward in many ways, and maintaining itself largely by unskilled labour, vastly increases the difficulty of securing and maintaining the decencies of life (Muir, 1907:305-306).

The political economy of Liverpool in the nineteenth century was established around the largest and most complex dock system in Western Europe that, along with the city’s identification as a commerce centre, placed Liverpool as the second city of industrial Britain and of the Empire. It is not often recognised that the prosperity and growth of the city was built on slavery, with over 40% of all slaves traded from Africa by European countries transported using Liverpool based ships (Gifford et al, 1989: 25). Indeed, without the slave trade Liverpool’s economic prosperity would not have been possible (Williams, 1964: 63). The town contained around 1,000 inhabitants in 1670 and 7,000 in 1710. Between 1811 and 1861 the population growth in the city multiplied five times with 22% of the local population in 1851 being migrants from Ireland (Morris and Rodger, 1993: 2-3). The population was largely transient. In 1872
the Chief Constable John Greig estimated that at any one time the city possessed a shifting population of about 20,000 (Lane, 1987: 34). Local manufacturing had a minor role in economic development which relied on the Liverpool port, which by 1857 was responsible for approximately half of Britain’s exports and one third of its imports (Merseyside Socialist Research Group (MSRG), 1980: 28). In the 1860s, the local Chamber of Commerce presented with pride an image of Liverpool that was based not on the industrial factory system but upon the ‘gentlemanly’ pursuit of commerce. The dominant mercantile class accrued its wealth and profits through overseas trade on the back of a vast, and significantly immigrant, casualised labour force divided by work opportunities, culture and race (Brogden, 1982: 46). Up until the mid-nineteenth century Liverpool was dominated politically, economically and culturally by ‘the old families’ who were organized through “three or four handed partnerships” that combined the business interests of merchanting, shipowning and insurance whose considerable influence in the governance of the city was maintained through involvement in sitting on various committees that promoted ‘civic duty’ and improvements in the local ‘quality of life’ (Lane, 1987: 53-82). By the early twentieth century, family firms and partnerships had been absorbed into larger corporations that progressively became detached from Liverpool. Of necessity, these enterprises looked beyond the city for their continued prosperity though evidence of their economic and cultural hegemony can be seen in the spectacle of Georgian and Regency Architecture that remains in and around the city today. Liverpool produced more wealthy families in the nineteenth century than any other English city and this wealth became closely connected to local politics through the Liberal and Tory parties and various
philanthropic organizations which procured for the local elite "some intelligence of the other Liverpool" (Lane, 1987: 131, emphasis added). Up until the mid-nineteenth century, Liverpool was a town "in which the public good was equated with commerce" and accordingly the water supply and refuge collection were left to private enterprise, while no responsibility for building regulation and sewerage was bestowed upon the Liverpool Corporation (Power, 1992: 35). Merchants dominated the town council up until municipal reform around 1835 - "what it lacked in accountability Liverpool more than made up for in its single minded devotion to furthering commerce" (Ibid: 25).

The 'second industrial revolution' by-passed Liverpool, whose economic structure drifted away from national trends and the majority of whose labour force stood outside permanent and stable work. By the 1920's, 37% of Liverpool workers were involved in production as compared to the national average of 67% (Belcham, 1992: 3). After the first world war, the docks had started to decline though over half of Liverpool's working population were involved in shipping, dock-work or in related transportation. For male workers in the city there had always been limited opportunities for employment outside of the port. Women's exclusion from this arena meant that they if they worked outside of the home they were mostly employed as domestic servants for the merchant and professional classes. Between 1921 and 1931, around 30 women in every 100 was engaged in servant-based occupations at a time when such work was steadily in decline as the wealthy moved out of the city centre area (MSRG, 1980: 31).
In conjunction with these processes the trajectory of the political economy of Liverpool during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries “ensured a classic lumpen-proletariat, low skilled and outside the disciplines of industry and the predictable security of a weekly wage packet” (Brogden, 1991: 3). Casualisation and a low skill economic base underpinned this residuum. The composition of the working class in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was divided organisationally and culturally on sectarian and racial grounds. The Tory Party controlled the city council and governed the city for most of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century in a manner that reinforced these divisions through the appeal to “religious-cum-national stereotypes” (Waller, 1981: 18). Sectarianism divided the working class and helped ensure that radical alternative politics did not develop in the city during the period¹ (Taplin, 1994: 19). It was not until the Liverpool General Transport strike of 1911 that the waterfront unions grew in numbers and influence. However, before and after the First World War the contraction of British capital was increasingly evident in the decline of export based industries which had a particularly devastating impact on the docks and related industries in Liverpool. The shift to manufacturing and service based industries in the 1920s brought some growth in Liverpool’s traditional commercial and financial sector along with increases in seasonal work through the employment of shop assistants (MSRG, 1980: 33). By 1929, a relative boom year, the number of Merseyside people living below the official poverty line stood at around 30% with another

¹ The political hegemony of the city was thus assured through the dominance of the Tory Party that was able to gain substantial working class support by playing the Protestant card and appealing to the small numbers of skilled workingmen (Waller, 1981: 18).
14% just above this. During the 1920s and 1930s the male unemployment rate on Merseyside remained higher than the national average and stood above 20% (Ibid, 1980: 32). The over-reliance on the docks and the predominantly unskilled and casual workforce left Liverpool in a particularly vulnerable situation in the depression years, and this was recognised in the special powers granted through Parliament in the Liverpool Corporation Act (1936) and sustained in the Merseyside Plan (1944) which enabled the local authority to buy up land on the city’s outskirts in order to build factories, relocate the population and offer incentives for inward investment (Meegan, 1989). It was not until the 1960s that large scale manufacturing moved to the region in the form of multinational ventures by the likes of Ford, General Motors and Standard Oil. The impact of this restructuring was negligible in that traditional industries continued to decline and unemployment remained higher than the national average. The ‘growth years’ only really served to stave off even greater catastrophe for the region as a whole and Liverpool in particular, as increasingly local economic fortunes relied upon decisions made outside of the area and on national and international market conditions. Between 1961 and 1971, the Merseyside Region - dubbed “the Bermuda triangle of British capitalism” (MSRG, 1980: 9) - lost 76,000, jobs while a further 40,000 manufacturing jobs were lost between 1979 and 1984. Employment in the docks fell from 1 in 5 of the workforce in the late 1940’s to 1 in 3 in the 1970’s. By the mid 1990’s the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company employed just 900 workers.
Policing and social control in Liverpool: late eighteenth century to the 1930s

No town ... contains so difficult a population as that of Liverpool (Chief Inspector of Reformatories, 1898 cited in Waller, 1981: 170).

... the stress of sheer necessity bore hard on a crowded cosmopolitan port - Liverpool had to have a more effective police force than practically anywhere else (Midwinter, 1971: 66).

The local *Liverpool Mercury* newspaper in 1851 commented “that the centre of the town of Liverpool is becoming more and more a place of business only” (18 July, 1851). This was in sharp contrast to the vast un-enfranchised groups who lived in cellars around the dock areas. The popular concerns of the masses did not effect the hegemony of the mercantile aristocracy. Indeed, they were usually ignored up until the mid-nineteenth century:

The division between the political concerns of the Liverpool masses and the elite was never more evident than during the 1840s. The social control of the elite, achieved by their monopoly of political and economic power, was seldom challenged. At one level the masses could be contained by coercion; the mobilisation of volunteers and militia was not uncommon in Liverpool but electorally the various mechanisms of patronage were generally sufficient to ensure order (Collins, 1994: 67).

Writing of the masses, in his early and influential ‘*A History of Liverpool*’, Ramsey Muir contrasted the great wealth of the city evident by the late eighteenth century with a distinctly ‘uncivilised’ drunken and riotous history swelled by Irish and Welsh immigration (Muir, 1907: 273). The population stood at 54,000 in 1790 (Marriner, 1982: 70) with 6,780 living four to a cellar room (Muir, 1907: 272). For Muir, the misery of this “wretched population” was increased by the “extraordinary number of licensed houses which the slackness of the magistrates had allowed to grow up” (Ibid: 273). He
characterised a sizeable proportion of the city’s population around the turn of
the eighteenth century as:

A population so degraded and so drunk sodden ... inevitably
turbulent and unruly. The streets of Liverpool were constantly
the scenes of riots and open fights, especially in the days of the
press-gang; at night they were unsafe. For there was no adequate
police (Ibid).

In 1811, the Town Council reorganised the police in appointing 21 constables
and 7 head constables to patrol the 7 boroughs of the city. The wealthy residents
of Toxteth Park financed their own force to patrol the line between their estates
and parks and the city centre (Ibid: 274). By the 1840s, the ‘other’, poorer
Liverpool consisted of a shifting mass of migrants, both under-and unemployed,
who formed a casual residuum segregated from the respectable working class
and artisans who had gained new housing which conformed to public health
standards. This residuum came to occupy the living space in the waterfront.
Although the old families had began to desert these areas they where still the
space that the machinations of “commerce and industry ... occupied by day”
(Lane, 1987: 87). The hovels and alleyways of the dockland area grew into “a
city within a city” and contained a quarter of a million people by 1901 (Ibid).
For the police this area was known as the ‘Scotland Division’ and contained in
the words of one Chief Constable “the failures”. He went on to state that this
was a largely:

... Irish population, with the reckless, violent disposition of that
people, and with the unfortunate taste of preferring whiskey,
which makes them dangerous, to beer, which would make them
sleepy. There were many absolute ruffians amongst them,
brought up in poverty, without education or religious influence,
wearied with the struggle of life, with a hatred of society, and
none of the surroundings which might wean them from drink,
and vice, and violence. There were streets in the Scotland
Division that were unsafe for respectable persons to enter, and
where even the Police could not carry out their duty without patrolling in couples ... (Nott-Bower, 1926: 148).

Squalor and disease were endemic. The city was the first in Britain to appoint a Medical Officer under The Liverpool Sanitary Act in 1847, that also gave powers to the local Health Committee to evict around 30,000 people from illegally occupied street cellars. The removal of people onto the streets put greater strain on the poor at a time when alternative accommodation was extremely scarce (Midwinter, 1971: 97). Coupled with these concerns were the 390,000 Irish who arrived in the city in 1846 and 1847 which led to “such turbulence that 20,000 townsmen had to be sworn in as special constables, and 2,000 regular troops camped at Everton” (Muir, 1907: 305). Within this context one local historian has commented:

After London, Liverpool was the saddest example of industrialism and urbanisation creating a choking, swirling maelstrom of humanity, with which came an intensification and a reorientation of crime. As dockland expanded, theft and prostitution tightened their grip, often with thief and whore working in evil concert ... Property was sacrosanct. It was the mundane, day-by-day theft that troubled shopkeepers, merchants, and owner-occupiers of Liverpool (Midwinter, 1971: 56-57).

Writers on this period refer to the alarm with which ‘respectable’ citizens viewed the streets of Liverpool that were perceived to be filled with a range of pathological pursuits and immoral activities the scale of which threatened to overwhelm the ideological construction of the city as a centre of civic and commercial propriety. It was widely perceived that the great commercial wealth “had not brought civilization in its train” and instead had let fester “a sordid and degrading misery, stunted and brutalised” (Muir, 1907: 270). The sheer scale of this growing problem of urban ungovernability meant that:
Reckless seafarers from all over the globe, together with thousands of thieves, prostitutes, vagabonds and juvenile delinquents crowded into the dockland areas and those insanitary parts of the town nearest them. Here, numerous receivers of stolen property, brothel keepers and managers of beer houses and beer taps earned a steady income. In 1836, for example, more than 1,000 known male thieves lived in the town, whilst 500 others “stole at intervals”. Some 600 more operated at the docks and upwards of 12,000 children, less than 15 years of age, worked as thieves for adults (Cockcroft, 1991: 4).

In the light of these concerns “something drastic had to be done to protect Liverpool’s law abiding citizens” (Ibid: 4) and so the Liverpool City Police force was established in 1836. For Brogden (1982), the formation of the modern police in the city has to be placed alongside the mode of production as it had developed up to this point. The volatility in the mode of production and the casualised labour process that flowed from it underpinned the growth of a huge ‘illegal’ secondary economy that operated to serve the casual poor in the streets and included street traders, gaming houses, pubs and brothels. This created a “peculiar problem of control for the merchant class” (Ibid: 46). Thus what spurred the formation of the Liverpool City Police in 1836 was neither “mob eruption” as Midwinter (1971: 57) saw it, nor the desire “to suppress the manifestations of direct economic conflict” (Brogden, 1982: 52). For Brogden (1991: 87), the emergence of the new police extended and reformulated older practices established by the Corporation, Town and Dock Watches. The New Police gained a substantive legal remit and acted under a series of directions from a newly formed Watch Committee (that swayed between Liberal and Tory domination) that, taken together, granted the police considerable autonomy in enacting “social control of the streets” as “the major historically derived police function” in the city (Brogden, 1991: 88). Furthermore:
The New Police were used directly to demarcate the territories of the dominant classes in the city - the merchants, the shopkeepers, and the new professional and white-collar strata - from the territories of the poor. The preponderance of requests (some 90%) and subsequent commands - were for the control of the streets, and associated recreational contexts (Brogden, 1982: 62).

Between 1836 and 1910 the policing mandate was for the most part uncontroversial and the aim of police action remained fairly constant: “to divide off, to map out, the lower class areas” (Brogden, 1982: 52). Thus:


Communications from merchants, shopkeepers and other businesses to the Watch Committee between 1836 and 1872 show that demands for police deployment were targeted overwhelmingly at “disorderly street behaviour” followed by “sabbatical disorder”, “traffic obstructions”, “street traders”, “thieving”, “brothels and prostitutes”, “gambling and street games”, and “public houses” (Ibid: 65). Such police practices became routinised and amounted to ‘moving on’ and street cleansing which meant that officers operated “as a kind of uniformed garbage-men” were “arrests, other than for minor misdemeanours were rare” (Brogden, 1991: 1). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Liverpool Police’s sense of moral purpose was strengthened due to its closer working contact with other public and private agencies in developing various local campaigns against beer-houses in the 1870s and vice in the early twentieth century. In particular, officers aligned with the courts and purist organizations (notably the National Vigilance Association) in working towards closing down brothels, prosecuting under obscenity laws and investigating abduction cases. In 1874, the most popular meeting places of the lower orders - public houses, beer
houses and off-licences - outnumbered all grocery, chemist, furniture and stationery shops in Liverpool. This numerical imbalance outraged local temperance groups and members of the Vigilance Committee (Waller, 1981: 23). During the 1870s a number of partnerships emerged to promote moral hygiene in the form of temperance movements that underpinned social reform in the city and attempted to tackle the perceived relationship between drink and crime, and more particularly drink and prostitution. Such movements aimed to improve the condition of the poor in setting up sports clubs, domestic science classes and friendly societies. Exemplifying these trends, the Police Court and Prison Gate Mission was established in 1879 and was the first of its kind in the country to be followed by the establishment of the Women's Shelter in 1887. These early experiments in social control, which sought to remould working class morality, assumed "that poor people would cease to frequent public houses or join street corner gangs if they were provided with alternative recreational facilities or had contact with well intentioned middle class citizens" (Waller, 1981: 23). However, the predominant response on behalf of local elites remained one of brisk street cleaning carried out by the police.  

In 1890 the purists, who saw criminal law as a key tool for improving public morals, gained much political influence in siding with Liberals in Liverpool to successfully overturn the Tory administration who were deemed too

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2 The drive against drink and prostitution in 1876 resulted in rises in arrests for all crime to 27,529 (20,551 for drunkenness alone), of which 12,156 were women (Waller, Ibid: 24 and 109). Over 5,000 drunks who were convicted were aged between 12 and 21. Stealing, violence, riots and drunkenness were often depicted within police, media and reforming circles as peculiarly Irish crimes (Waller, 1981: 25). This led a prominent local reformer to observe that "this human despot of vice and poverty is hereditary" and that assisted emigration should be encouraged forthwith (Samuel Smith cited in Waller, 1981: 24).
sympathetic to publicans and brewers (Mort, 1987: 135). The attempt to drive vice and prostitution off the streets also demonstrated conflict between local businesses and moral organisations. Thus cleaning the streets of such 'unsavoury' and 'immoral' practices associated with vice was not supported by a consensus of opinion among local elites in that such practices sustained the secondary economy which was integral to the balance of class forces in the city. As Brogden (1982: 69) argued:

The mode of production, especially the dependence of the merchants on seamen, created the demand for prostitution, and the profits from prostitution promoted the well-being of small-scale capitalists in the city.3

The strategy described above regarding the policing towards Liverpool's poorest and most dispossessed communities had particular resonance with the city's black population who have been identified as constituting a particularly 'dangerous' section of the population. Liverpool's black population, concentrated around the south docks and in Toxteth, has been continually discriminated against and subordinated by local government, police and media (Murphy, 1995; Gifford et al, 1988; Fryer, 1984). The endemic institutional racism in the city, fuelled by competition over increasingly scarce employment in the docks, spilled onto the streets - most notably in 1919 and 1948. The black population attempted to defend itself from organised racist violence which the police, at best, ignored but more usually aggravated by 'swamping' black areas and raiding meeting places and arresting suspects (Fryer, 1984: 298-303; Murphy, 1995: 60). During the 1920s, the police even became involved "in the

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3 However, the social control of the streets did have a significant impact on levels of incarceration in the city. By the end of the nineteenth century, the prisons in Liverpool held one-ninth of the total prison population of England, 1 in 7 of all those sentenced aged between 16 and 29, 1 in 3 of all reformatory inmates and just under 1 in 3 of all reconvicted ex-reformatory inmates (Waller, 1981: 170).
agitation for repatriation of ‘undesirable’ racial groups” in the city (Murphy, 1995: 62). Institutional, organised and individual racism was downplayed by the media who instead ‘explained’ the disturbances by painting a threatening picture of ‘animalistic’ black men harassing respectable white women on the streets or, as the case in 1948, referring to black people as ‘welfare scroungers’ (Murphy, 1995: 43-52 and 126-127).

During the inter-war period, the police in Liverpool underwent dramatic changes as a consequence of the police strike in 1919 over pay, promotional structures and the government’s failure to recognise the National Union of Police Officers. Over half of the Liverpool and Birkenhead police and three quarters of those in Bootle went on strike and were subsequently dismissed to be replaced by a well paid ‘scab’ force constituted of ex-servicemen and a majority of new recruits brought in from the regions of Scotland (MSRG, 1992: 92). Police violence against the organised working class during the Liverpool Transport Strike in 1911 and towards unemployed demonstrators in the city in 1921 demonstrated the existence of more general fears on behalf of elites as to the rise in working class militancy. In the 1920s and 1930s, the police continued to play a key role in maintaining order in the city so that:

Outside working class areas, in commercial or suburban districts, police powers could be used freely against those who obviously did not belong there, to impose a kind of unofficial curfew on the working class (MSRG, 1992: 93).

The attempt to maintain orderly city space was carried out on a number of fronts. Firstly, a form of bourgeois morality was imposed upon women in public space, particularly those thought to be prostitutes (that is, women alone on the streets and without the company of men). Police harassment focused
particularly on the increasing number of women thought to be frequenting public houses and thus blurring the boundaries between 'respectable' and 'tainted' womanhood. Flower sellers also became the target of police action and were sometimes prosecuted for prostitution rather than obstruction (MSRG, Ibid: 94-95). Secondly, other policing priorities gauged from Chief Constables reports of the time focused on raiding and harassing gay meeting places and the clubs frequented by black people. Again, fears of interracial sexual contact seemed to underpin police concerns here as the Chief Constable noted of one meeting place in 1935:

The club was frequented by white, coloured and half-caste men and women. Nightly this place was the scene of excessive drinking, foul language, filthy conduct and dancing during which the greatest indecencies took place. Between and during the dancing indecent conduct between men and women was openly indulged in. The sanitary arrangements in this club were of the most primitive character (cited in MSRG, Ibid: 96).

Thirdly, youth were targeted. During the 1930s there was an increase in charges being brought against young people, despite the 1933 Children and Young Persons Act (Pearson, 1983: 46-47). One magistrate in Liverpool in 1935 pointed to a 'new' danger in the city when he complained of:

The startling rise in the number of cases of hooliganism and assaults on the police in Liverpool [...]. Today the youth of the city is out of hand. Every night the police come into contact with lawless youth (cited in MSRG, 1992: 88).

In Liverpool, during the 1930s, the 'problem' of youth on the streets and rises in recorded juvenile delinquency can be contextualised within the climate of casualism particularly affecting young people so that by 1934 there were 13,000 unemployed 14 to 20 year olds in the city (MSRG, 1992: 24).
Finally, there was the targeting of those groups who posed a threat to public order. During the 1930s the police developed a number of novel tactics - such as the baton charge and driving sidecar motorcycles into crowds - for dealing with demonstrations, including the hunger marches and local strikes. The intensification of public order policing towards the social control of the streets in the inter-war years served to further demarcate and marginalise the poorest sections of the population from the city's commercial and political structures:

In 1928 ... the police deprived over 3500 people of their liberty, albeit temporarily, for drunkenness; over 600 for 'street obstructions and nuisance'; almost 600 for offences concerned with prostitution and further criminalised over 700 people for gaming and betting and 400 for begging, both being crimes without victims (MSRG, 1992: 105).

Policing and social control in Liverpool: 1945 to the 1980s

So far the discussion has focused upon policing practices toward designating the proper objects of power upon which the battery of legal powers that the police possessed were brought to bear in regulating the economic, cultural and leisure pursuits of the lower orders. The old Watch Committees provided the vehicle by which the mercantile class could insure the containment and regulation of the 'criminalised poor' in and around the city with very little conflict recorded between Committee members and Chief Constables (Brogden, 1982).

With the slow decline in port trade, from the 1930s, came the decline of the political class in Liverpool. With the increasing importance of the multinationals to the British economy in the 1960s, both local and central state strategies increasingly embraced extra-national economic interests. At the local
level these changes in economic dependencies, underpinned by a succession of fiscal crises, manifested themselves in the rise of corporate managerialism in an attempt to exercise greater control over council finance, local services and the local workforce (Cockburn, 1977). In terms of policing, the upshot of these broad developments in urban management was the enhanced autonomy of chief constables within the new arrangements for local police governance under the 1964 Police Act. The authority and independence of the chief police officer was thus enhanced by “his corporate management status” and in his/her local “specialist knowledge of the threat to social order”, thereby leaving the local Police Authority - now composed of the elevated ranks of small business owners and self-employed professionals - with control of policing resources for local strategies (Brogden, 1982: 91).

According to one commentator the development of the Liverpool police in the post-war period marked a continuation of efficiency, despite insufficient manpower, towards curbing the established problems of crime and disorder in the city - juvenile delinquency, drunkenness, prostitution and maintaining the public peace (Cockcroft, 1991: 8-30). During the Second World War, indictable crimes committed by juveniles in the city increased by 25% and continued at a high level after the war. The police pioneered the Juvenile Liaison Scheme in 1949 which, along with the established practice of cautioning youths in the city, was designed to work closely with welfare agencies in order to “learn of potential delinquents at an early stage and take immediate action to prevent them developing criminal tendencies” (Chief Constable, Charles Martin cited in Gordon, 1987: 124). After the establishment of the scheme it was perceived as a
success by the proprietors in the city, in particular “managers of the larger city stores - formerly plagued by swarms of children seeking a chance to steal, reported a great drop in such incidents” (Cockcroft, 1991: 13). By 1965, almost half of the total recorded crime in Liverpool related to petty theft and in 1966 the reported value of stolen property exceeded £1 million - a new ‘record’ in the city’s history. In contrast, local press reports painted a picture of increasing violent crime and supported police led campaigns for a ‘war on crime’ (Ibid: 81). In 1964, the Liverpool City Police were among the first to experiment with camera surveillance: under “Operation Commando”, a mobile camera was active in the city centre (alongside fifty-four plain clothes officers) in order to halt “attacks on ... persons and property” (Liverpool Chief Constable, 1965 cited in Williams, 2002: 3). According to Brogden (1982), the Police Authority consistently bowed to police requests supported by crime statistics for increasing resources so that, by the middle of the 1970s, Merseyside police had the highest recorded crime rate, the greatest number of employees and highest costs per capita than any other force in Britain excluding Northern Ireland (Brogden, 1982: 88). Between 1974 and 1981, Merseyside police had grown by 27% (compared to a national average of 15%) and the yearly budget exceeded £80 million (Liverpool Echo, 1 April, 1981).

**Legitimacy and Policing in Liverpool from the 1980s**

For Brogden (1982), the effects of the mercantile economy in the post-war period left a ‘sizeable’ proportion of the city’s population excluded from the

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4 Some years later the police in Liverpool acknowledged that the camera experiment resulted in no arrests though “the effect was preventative but largely psychological and therefore the camera had to be moved around” (Home Office report of 1969, cited in Williams, 2002: 3).
local economy and political structures so that “policing that residual strata, and opposition to that form of control had always been a major manifestation of that continuing exclusion” (1982: 241). Most notably - though not exclusively - the black community in Toxteth Liverpool 8 continued to be on the receiving end of particularly hard policing methods. As one community representative from Toxteth noted:

The black community is fed up of being hounded. No-one is safe on the streets after 10pm. One gang we know has given the police an ultimatum to lay off within two weeks or they fight back. It could lead to civil war in the city (Simey, 1971 cited in Scraton, 1985: 72).

Through subsequent Chief Constable’s reports the police, on the other hand, referred to the increasing rates of violent crime and ‘inter-gang’ wars that posed difficulties in policing the area and which had led to a number of confrontations between police and residents (Report to the Merseyside Police Committee, Chief Constable Kenneth Oxford, 1981: 6). In July 1981, Toxteth along with 19 other areas in the Merseyside district witnessed several major confrontations between the public and police (Ibid). The confrontations in Toxteth were particularly ferocious and a total of 781 police officers were injured with 1070 recorded crimes and 705 arrests (Kettle and Hodges, 1982: 162).5

Lord Scarman himself noted that relations between Merseyside police, the Police Authority and sections of the local population were in a state of crisis (Scraton, 1985: 80). In response, a special police unit known as the ‘Toxteth

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5 The disturbances in Liverpool drew witness to the spectacle of the Liberal leader of the City Council unsuccessfully petitioning the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, to send troops to defend the city centre. During these events 59 CS gas projectiles were fired by police to disperse crowds - its first use against British civilians outside of Northern Ireland. Officers believed that the city centre was about to be taken over by rioters. Four people were seriously injured after
Section' was set up in 1982 to police the 11,000 people in Toxteth that amounted to a curious mix of hard and soft policing in the locality. Margaret Simey, Chair of the Police Committee, pointed to a continuation in hard line and racially abusive policing in the Toxteth area, adding that:

We have this utter folly of an official policy of softly, softly backed up by a strong arm. The people do admire the local police for their courage ... we talk about 'our Don'. But the minute there is trouble they are sent out of the neighbourhood, and what we regard as trained thugs are brought in to impose control (cited in Gifford et al, 1989: 165).

During the 1980s, the crisis of legitimacy in the force intensified through further disturbances in 1985 after which the Police Authority was accused of being “anti-police” for challenging police tactics in policing the streets (Daily Post, 16 October, 1985). Nearly 10 years after the initial 1981 disorders the Gifford Inquiry recommended the “eradication of racist policing on Merseyside” (Gifford et al, 1989: 190).

If the police institution seemed to be fighting a losing battle - particularly after the mass street disorders in Toxteth in 1981 and 1985 - it could justify its policing practice by reference to the ‘peculiar characteristics’ of the policed in the city. Quoting from Ramsay Muir’s A History of Liverpool, the then Chief Constable Kenneth Oxford stated that; “it is a matter of historical fact that Liverpool has been beset by problems of violence and disorder throughout the centuries” (Oxford, 1981: 3). Such representations formed part of Oxford’s evidence to the Scarman Inquiry. In his evidence he referred to what he perceived to be the historical threads that formed the “aggressive nature” and

inhaling gas along with one disabled man who was killed, with others injured as the police drove Land Rovers up onto pavements and into the crowds (Kettle and Hodges 1983: 173).
“belligerent attitude” of the “true Liverpudlian”. Such criminogenic tendencies as constructed by the Chief Constable have always “found expression in violent disturbances similar to, though perhaps in minuscule, to recent outbreaks in Toxteth” (Oxford, 1981: 4). Oxford argued that waves of immigration into the city up to the mid-twentieth century had “brought with them associated problems, disputes and tensions” and that Liverpool “has for many years fulfilled her (sic) reputation as a tough, violent city, to the present day” (Oxford, 1981: 4-5). In his report Oxford (Ibid: 54-56) defended the “frequent use” of stop and search powers as “an essential operational requirement” to stem the rising tide of local violent crime variously referred to throughout the report. Constructing this negative stereotype of sections of the Liverpool population, with its undertones of genetic and cultural pathology, denied the legacy of casual labour, high rates of unemployment and a police force that was out of control (Simey, 1988), as well as the previously unacknowledged “uniquely horrific” racism pervading every aspect of the city’s life (Gifford et al, 1989: 82). The Gifford Inquiry reported that the geographical demarcation of Liverpool’s black population was particularly “staggering”. Formal and informal racism was combined with the established form of aggressive and hostile policing which further reinforced the exclusion of the black population:

Even in the city centre, only a mile away from Liverpool 8, the absence of black people is strikingly noticeable to the visitor from any city with a substantial black population ... Black people are not even doing the low-level jobs like sweeping the streets (Ibid: 71).

During the 1980s the struggle for the control of the streets in Liverpool became subject to a series of debates that scrutinised the police role. In 1986, a local report recommended a variety of measures for police adoption to reduce further
damage to police/public relations that included: overhauling relations between police and other public agencies; disbanding the Operational Support Units; paying closer attention to community needs; improving relations with young people, blacks and women; and a general move to improving conduct in public order situations (Kinsey, 1985). These recommendations were made in the light of other findings suggesting Merseyside has one of the highest rates of victimisation, a high fear of crime and one of the least satisfactory rates of public co-operation with the police (Ibid). In the decade after 1974 recorded crime increased by 60%, compounded by a fall in detection rates which were down 23% between 1983 and 1985. The use of stop and search powers were seen to be particularly ineffective in and around Liverpool with only 4% resulting in arrest with a resultant increase in resentment towards the police (Kinsey, 1985: 52). Within this context of rising crime, falling detection rates and disaffection felt by significant sections of the local population a wider mistrust developed between police on the one hand and council officers and local media on the other.

These developments took place within the continuing economic and political difficulties faced by the city - not least in terms of its reputation and image as a strike-ridden, bankrupt and derelict area. As the Daily Mirror reported in 1982: “They should build a fence around [Liverpool] and charge admission. For sadly it has become a ‘show-case’ for everything that has gone wrong in Britain’s major cities” (cited in Lane, 1987: 12). During the 1980s the peculiarities of the local economy set in motion a cycle of decline which was manifested in the rise in vacant land and buildings, population loss (from 750,000 in 1961 to 490,000
in 1985), decreasing personal income and spending, local authority revenue loss, declining taxation, and increases in social security spending to meet the Liverpool unemployment rate of 26.1% compared to the national average of 14% (Parkinson, 1985: 14; Liverpool City Council, 1987). In this climate of economic instability the service sector dominated Liverpool’s economy into the late 1970s and accounted for 70% of all occupations (half of these in the public sector with a third of this category employed by the City Council). Within this context Liverpool City Council challenged central government fiscal policy in the 1980s under the banner of defending local jobs and services. Between 1983 and 1987 the city council was dominated by the Militant Tendency, which had gradually gained control of the local Labour Party through the 1970s. Their strategy was one of confrontation with central government through threatening to bankrupt the city if extra public funding was not forthcoming. During this period the council funded - from central grants and foreign bank loans - a “constrained” Urban Regeneration Strategy that focused on its working class heartland and paid little attention to the retail and tourist potential of the city centre. This created a marked gulf between the city’s political and business elites (Parkinson, 1990: 250-251). By 1987, the 47 Militant labour councillors had been pushed from office and were replaced by a more moderate Labour group who sought to reverse the climate of hostility towards the private sector that had meant local ‘regeneration’ lagged behind national trends in developing the increasingly fashionable public and private partnerships.

Against the backdrop of structural decline local and national commentators continued to reinforce commonsensical understandings of Liverpool’s demise
as a city without order and embroiled with violence, self-pity, militancy and communal self-destruction (Scraton et al, 1995: 270). Such negative images became a major obstacle for regenerative partnerships working towards promoting the city as a business and tourist destination (Madsen, 1992). Three particularly outstanding events, and the consequent media reporting of them, helped reinforce the image of a city beyond control. The 1985 Heysel Stadium Disaster resulting in the death of 39 Juventus football fans and the 1989 Hillsborough Disaster resulting in the death of 96 Liverpool fans marked a watershed in the representation of Liverpool people as ‘riotous’, ‘violent’ and beyond redemption (Scraton et al, 1995: 226-292). After the events at Heysel Liverpool was held up by those on the political right as the model of an ill-disciplined society as Richard West argued in *The Spectator*:

> The collapse of teaching and discipline in our schools ... is nowhere more evident than in Liverpool ... (where) a whole generation of pampered, undisciplined children has grown up with the habit of petulance, envy, greed and wanton cruelty - as seen last week on the television screens of the world (cited in Edgar, 1985: 26).

The third event - the abduction of two year old James Bulger from a local shopping precinct and his subsequent murder by two 10 year olds - became the pinnacle of the extensive media campaign that focused on Liverpool as the centre of Britain’s perceived moral and social decline. The interweaving of the city’s ‘unique’ problems was encapsulated in headlines such as ‘Heysel, Hillsborough and Now This …’ (*The Guardian*, 20 February, 1993).⁶ During 1996, a spate of drug-related shootings in the city led to national headlines

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⁶ This kind reporting helped establish a negative national and international reputation for the city which allowed the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to comment that the unification of East and West Germany was “like inheriting twelve Liverpools” (cited in Scraton et al, 1995: 226).
reporting the ‘mean streets of Liverpool’ encapsulated in The Independent’s (23 August 1996) ‘Greetings from Gun City, UK’. Again, the article linked a number of themes in reinforcing the special ‘nature’ of the problems in the city that are depicted as representative of urban disorder generally:

It seems to be Liverpool’s destiny always to be setting new benchmarks for urban barbarity. The city that brought you the Toxteth riots, Heysel, the murder of James Bulger and, last spring, the rape of a five year old girl by a 14 year old boy, has in the past year staked a plausible claim to being the gun capital of the country (Ibid).

Such representations have weaved a maze of ‘problems’ at all levels of Liverpool life that are perceived as uniquely ‘self-inflicted’ by the people and place. The construction of the city as a ‘problem place’ aided its positioning as an icon for national de-civilisation. One article, as part of a supplement on Liverpool, summarised the problems facing investment managers in the city during the 1990s:

Merseyside has long suffered from an image problem, much of it self-inflicted from events in the past: the Toxteth riots of 1981; the vicious political infighting between left-wing groups which all but wrecked the Labour party in the 1980s; the Militant Tendency’s orchestrated confrontations with the second Thatcher government; the Liverpool city council workers strike of 1991; crime, gang warfare; and the apparent inability of a divided community to help itself (Financial Times, 3 April, 1997).

The impact of such high profile constructions upon strategies of local economic recovery became increasingly apparent in the 1990s. The label of ‘problem city’ became a problem in itself for city managers, marketing strategists and policing agencies concerned with restructuring the city’s political economy under the auspices of regeneration. The perceptions of the locally powerful, working through Liverpool’s partnerships, towards managing the city and striving for an orderly regeneration will be elaborated in Chapters Eight and Nine. Before that,
the next and final section introduces and outlines the contours of contemporary policing and social control in Liverpool city centre that were developed during 1990s.

**Partnership and policing in Liverpool city centre: the 1990s**

Liverpool city centre has a lot going for it [...]. There is a natural partnership of interests between the public sector, like Liverpool City Council, Merseyside Police and Merseytravel, and the private sector. Neither can succeed without the other ... over the next year exiting new developments will come on stream. Alongside these we must see ‘zero tolerance’ within the city centre of anything but the highest standards. Promoting and planning special events and attractions is important. So too is the more mundane responsibility of keeping streets clean, policing unauthorised collectors and street sellers ... (Editorial, *Liverpool Echo*, 14 October, 1997).

The establishment of the CCTV surveillance network in Liverpool will be discussed in Chapter Eight. This network developed at a time when other policing initiatives were being implemented under the broad political auspice of regeneration. The surveillance network developed at a time when Merseyside Police and other partners launched a series of initiatives under the umbrella of *Citysafe* that organised and concentrated efforts toward order and control of the streets of Liverpool. *Citysafe* brought together a number of agencies including Merseyside Police, the City Council, Merseytravel, Liverpool Chamber of Commerce and John Moores University. Launched in 1997, the initiative anticipated the Crime and Disorder Act in 1998 and instigated a series of policing initiatives aimed to “improve quality of life” within Liverpool (Liverpool City Council, Press Release, 10 February, 1999). In order to tackle crime and disorder in Liverpool, partnerships were established between police and other agencies to implement what was identified as “neighbourhood
policing, which can encourage ownership, reduce the fear of crime and bring new investment to the city” (Merseyside Police, Press Release, 2 February, 1999). In drawing up its Crime and Disorder Strategy for Liverpool, Citysafe produced an audit purporting to show an increase in disorder related calls to the police, from 51,390 in 1995 to 57,844 in 1997 (Citysafe, 1998: 2). The release of these figures forms the basis for understanding developments in policing the city centre during the 1990s.

The changes in the local state that have impacted on the material form and management of the city centre will be discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine. Part of this process of change has been transformations in the organisation and rationale underpinning policing. Concerns expressed for social order in Liverpool city centre have to be placed alongside a number of region-wide initiatives that have included local police resourcing projects and wider partnership schemes that emerged in the 1990s. During this time, Merseyside Police began seconding senior police officers to engage in local partnerships including the Safer Merseyside Partnership and the Urban Regeneration section in the Government Office for Merseyside. Merseyside Safer Cities (with an annual budget of £100,000) and the Safer Merseyside Partnership have worked at responsibilising and encouraging cooperation between public and private agencies by targeting resources for crime prevention towards vulnerable individuals and communities. The latter partnership brought together Merseyside Police Authority, Merseyside Police, Merseyside District Council and a range of voluntary and statutory agencies to secure £10 million between 1994 and 1997 through local fund raising and successful bids from the Single
Regeneration Budget. During the 1990s, Merseyside Police engaged in a number of fund raising exercises that included encouraging local businesses to contribute to the under-funded Crimestoppers phone line and to take up seats on the Crimestoppers board (*Liverpool Echo*, 28 January, 1997).

In 1997 Merseyside Police embarked on more fund raising and unveiled a “pioneering cash for constables scheme” for patrols to be made available to specific institutions and residential areas that would be prepared to pay for the service. In 1998 a “unique” trust fund to raise £1 million was established by the Chief Constable and the High Sheriff of Merseyside to “enable businesses to make a contribution to community safety and crime prevention” (*Liverpool Echo*, 25 February, 1998). Such developments have to be seen in the light of dwindling local police resources compounded by a 1997 public perception survey undertaken by the police that purported to show the majority of those surveyed thought that Merseyside as a whole was ‘unsafe’, a significant proportion only felt safe at home, 72% wanted to see more officers on the beat and that the numbers of those dissatisfied with their dealings with the police had risen on 1995 figures (*Liverpool Echo*, 7 March, 1997). Furthermore, the cost per head of policing on Merseyside was the second highest in the country, at £152 per person. In addition, throughout the 1990s, the council tax police precept for Merseyside remained at over £29 million. In terms of the levy imposed on residents, these policing costs were the fifth highest in the country.

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7 A local Chief Inspector justified the proposal in that it would be preferable “to have trained and accountable police officers patrolling the streets than private security officers” (*Liverpool Echo*, 15 October, 1997).

8 Since late in 1999 the office of High Sheriff has been filled by an ex-Vice Chancellor from John Moores University where my research was based.
In 1997, Merseyside Police came top of a national ‘sickness league’ that was reported to be costing the force £12 million a year (Liverpool Echo, 27 August, 1997). Merseyside Police Authority (MPA) predicted a loss of 500 officers up to the year 1999. As a consequence the police would be denied £19.5 million funding in real terms up to the year 2000 (MPA Annual Report, 1996). From 1995, and in response to this situation, the Police Authority, the Chief Constable, a group of local MPs and Liverpool Chamber of Commerce engaged in a campaign directed at central government “for a fair and reasonable distribution of resources for Merseyside” (Ibid: 1). In the light of fiscal constraint Merseyside Police continued to maintain high operating costs in more ‘traditional’ policing arenas and engaged in a number of high profile policing strategies. The police invested in hand-held video cameras to film “overtly in areas identified ... where there is a problem with youths misbehaving” on the principle “that there is a wealth of evidence to show that filming people has a strong deterrent effect” (Merseyside Police Inspector cited in Liverpool Echo, 10 April, 1996). Under ‘Operation Tranquility’ committed to “keeping unruly youngsters off the streets” the police targeted and filmed youthful disturbances associated with under age alcohol consumption and showed the film to parents. The Operation was thought to have been a success as police reported a drop in residents’ complaints and “the number of gangs on the streets has fallen” (Liverpool Echo, 17 October, 1997). As part of a £315,000 government and European funded scheme, the City Council and the police launched Liverpool’s “biggest crackdown on school truants” that involved a massive advertising campaign aimed at young people and their parents. As part of the crackdown, the police
role was to “round up pupils in the city centre and major shopping areas” (Liverpool Echo, 19 April, 1998). The police helicopter played its part in looking “for pockets of school crime” in order to monitor “school vandals” and “teenage thugs” (Liverpool Echo, 27 July, 1998). During the 1990s, the police invested millions in pro-active policing that included a £1.5 million surveillance helicopter, £600,000 spent on bullet proof vests for 2,500 officers, and the piloting of CS gas (Liverpool Echo, 16 January, 1996). From 1996 Merseyside Police, under the flag of ‘Operation Goldwing’, deployed 11 armed response vehicles and 72 trained marksmen carrying semi-automatic weapons supported by riot vans from the Operation Support Division containing snatch squads and teams of special dog patrols. Such visible and paramilitary policing tactics caused tensions between the police and other partnership players (these tensions will be discussed in Chapter Eight). This show of force, focused on the city centre, was justified through local newspaper headlines such as: “Crackdown on armed raiders” (Liverpool Echo, 31 January, 1996), in combating “Gun law on the streets” (Liverpool Echo, 17 April, 1996), as a response to a “Christmas bombs offensive” by Irish Republican groups (Liverpool Echo, 4 December, 1996), and as part of a general ‘safety’ initiative:

This is not in response to any specific threat … This is all part of our policy of a safer Merseyside. Crime has the potential to increase over the Christmas period but we want people to feel safe to come and shop and socialise in Liverpool city centre (Assistant Chief Constable cited in Liverpool Echo, 23 December, 1996).

In 1997, in Birkenhead, half a mile from the city centre, the police regularly deployed 100 officers on the streets in an £800,000 ‘Townsafe’ initiative to target ‘anti-social behaviour’ that included rowdiness, truancy, prostitution,
shoplifting and drug selling. The ‘experiment’ in zero tolerance style policing was:

... set against a backdrop of massive investment in the town. But the regeneration was - and is - threatened by the perception of rising crime. So we had to confront this (Superintendent, Merseyside Police cited in *Liverpool Echo*, 11 March, 1998).

At the same time, there were important parallel shifts in Liverpool city centre. The Stores’ Committee, working with local police and the Association of Chief Police Officers, established a ‘Town Watch’ scheme comprised of up to 20 uniformed guards recruited from the long-term unemployed. Town Watch was developed through the partnership between local police and businesses and was a key component in the CCTV network (see Chapter Eight for a fuller discussion of this point). In August 1995 the local press reported that the ‘City Plans Clampdown on Beggars’ in bringing together police and council to, as one Councillor put it, “improve the city’s image”. The City Centre Commander commented, “we would be happy to work with the city council to get rid of them” (*Liverpool Echo*, 11 September, 1995). The police also worked closely with Merseytravel to improve safety on public transport through schemes such as ‘Travelsafe’ and more pro-active initiatives like ‘Operation Forensic Cult’. These policing developments were consolidated and extended in 1999 by the launch in the city centre of the ‘Citysafe War on Crime’. As well as unveiling a number of signs publicising the presence of CCTV, the launch set out an

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9. This involved a month long “purge” involving police carrying out 911 station checks and 2,322 spot checks on buses resulting in 29 arrests for criminal damage or possession of drugs, 206 passengers “thrown off” buses and trains and 1,011 fare increases made after ticket inspections. More operations were planned in conjunction with Merseyside Transport’s Rapid Response Unit (*Liverpool Echo*, 19 February, 1997).
agenda to tackle “yobbish behaviour”\textsuperscript{10} in the city centre which included truancy, street muggings, drunkenness and vandalism (Liverpool Echo, 10 May, 1999). The initiative underpinned a move towards zero tolerance policing strategies in and around the city centre in an “all out war on street crime”, financed by £30 million from the Home Office Crime Hotspot fund (Liverpool Echo, 13 November, 1998). This sat alongside a liaison scheme initiated in 1998 between Senior Merseyside Police and Council Officials and the New York Police Department to learn lessons in New York style “quality of life” policing. As one senior police officer put it, the initiative was important because “from Liverpool’s point of view we need to keep crime low to encourage tourists to keep on coming” (Liverpool Echo, 15 August, 2000).

In summary, rationalisation for policing street order in Liverpool during the 1990s has been informed by discourses of regeneration and urban revitalisation. As this chapter has charted, it has been the struggle for street order and control over unruly groups that has been a characteristic feature of the political and economic development of Liverpool city centre. The contemporary vernacular of regeneration has re-orientated concerns of ‘safety’, ‘crime’ and ‘disorder’ in the city centre and tied them in with a more all-encompassing notion of ‘quality of life’. These discourses emerged out of the strategic thinking of state managers in Liverpool during the 1990s and will be explored the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{10} Under the Crime and Disorder Act, partnerships in Liverpool have utilised sophisticated Geographical Information Systems used to create so-called “yob maps” that have detailed a “top 130 yob zones” each with an estimated one youth disorder incident for every 40 people (Liverpool Echo, 16 March, 2001).
Chapter Seven

Partnership and Power: Neo-Liberal Rule in Liverpool City Centre

We are talking about the drive toward a twenty-four hour city. What we mean by that is that people will come here for perhaps a day’s business and then do some shopping and then go for a meal, go to a show, then go onto a night club and then to a hotel to stay overnight. That’s what we are after - all of it generating wealth and prosperity in Liverpool and improving the quality of life here for people who live and work here (Superintendent Merseyside Police, Government Office for Merseyside [GOM]).

Unless we constantly ask ‘who builds, develops and governs; and why?’ , we shall not understand the scope and limits of present institutions and programmes or appreciate why every definition of a social problem or its solution should trigger in our minds the further questions: ‘A problem for whom?’ ‘A solution for whom?’ ‘Whose city is this?’ (Donnison and Soto, 1980: 185).

Introduction

The previous chapter began the case study of the thesis by providing an historical overview of social control practices in Liverpool city centre from the early nineteenth century up to the 1990s. The chapter explored the shifts in political economy alongside particular discursive representations of the city of Liverpool that have underpinned social control strategies. This chapter will focus on the strategies of rule that emerged in Liverpool during the 1990s. Such rule was indicative of the trajectory of the neo-liberal state discussed in Chapter Three. In charting these strategies the chapter will map out the institutional matrix of the state form in Liverpool and the underlying normative sense of order that the ‘new primary definers’ articulated to imbue this state form with meaning and strategic direction.
It will be argued more fully in the next chapter that the camera surveillance network in Liverpool was central in the development of a social ordering strategy, the impetus of which emerged out of the locally powerful visions for order discussed in this chapter. These definitional processes may not have always been successful in terms of mobilising action against problematic categories but they did represent an attempt by the locally powerful to bring problematic activities and people under surveillance and control. Therefore it will be argued that the camera network can be understood as a social ordering practice. As discussed in the following chapter the agents involved in the network were engaged in a process of “interpretive construction” (Lacey, 1994: 30) regarding the identification of suspiciousness, wrongdoings and illegality that involved information sharing and intervention. These latter activities were interpretive decisions understood within the broader social relations of urban rule that will be discussed in this chapter. They can be understood therefore, using Lacey’s theoretical framework, as normative decisions “made in the context of underlying features of the social order” which also contain “locally dominant ideologies” pertaining to the nature of that order (Lacey, 1994: 30-31). The preferred meanings of an orderly city centre expressed by the locally powerful articulated problems for the ‘rational’ and ‘proper’ governance of the city. The representatives of the neo-liberal state not only indicated preferred techniques of control but their responses also denoted the persistence and reworking of long standing moralising discourses of censure aimed at problematic categories. As Chapter Six outlined, the streets of the city centre have historically provided the modus operandi of policing alongside discourses of censure and order. The contemporary attempts, therefore, to promote order in
the city – illuminated by the material presented in this and the next chapter - demonstrate both continuities and discontinuities in who and what is to be targeted and the means by which targeting has taken place.

Prior to detailing the developments in policing and social control in Liverpool city centre in the next chapter, this chapter will focus upon the linkages and interrelationships between local regeneration agencies, together with an understanding of the ideological frameworks underpinning the notion of regeneration. It is the local state framework that provided the context within which the locally powerful have sought to co-ordinate the various agencies brought together in partnership. More critically, it was the formal and informal normative orders constructed in the neo-liberal state ensemble that drove ‘regeneration’ and ‘partnership’ and permeated them with meaning, a measure of coherence and direction. Thus these interpretive normative discourses played a role in the construction of social order and endeavoured to “command the support of a critical mass of citizens or officials who see the relevant norms as expressing quasi-moral judgements” (Ibid: 31). The chapter will present a deconstruction of the interests and cultural sensibilities of locally powerful actors in order to reveal the dynamics of ideological unity and fracture across the neo-liberal state form. In this sense the chapter will seek to provide a contextual understanding of the wider social processes out of which practices of social control were implemented, articulated and made meaningful in Liverpool city centre.
The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section outlines the development and relations between the formal and informal partnerships in the city centre. The focus here will be on how local ruling interests re-orientated themselves (institutionally and ideologically) in relation to each other, and in doing so constructed and fostered relations of power in the trajectory of city centre regeneration. The second section will explore the process of "spatialisation" (Ryan, 1994: 40) discussed in Chapter Four, which encapsulated the broad visions for order that were identified by locally powerful players and which were deemed to promote the objects of partnership and regeneration.

**Orchestrating partnership**

It is a common recognition that we have got to get a grip of the situation and do something about it. We can't all sit around saying 'it's not my problem, I'll look after my little bit' (Chairman, Merseyside Development Corporation).

This section outlines the issues and problems around the development of partnerships for regeneration in Liverpool in terms of bringing agencies together as a forerunner to negotiating a strategy and constructing a vision for regeneration in the city centre. The section will examine the notion of 'partnership' in Liverpool and what this has meant in terms of tackling differences in local institutional political outlooks. The notion of 'orchestrating' partnership points to processes of inter-governmental order and strategic selectivity in establishing feasible, credible and authoritative working organs involved in the task of city centre regeneration. The social and political processes involved in the propagation of partnerships in Liverpool city centre took place in formal and informal settings. The establishment and strategic
direction of partnerships in Liverpool has been structured through avenues of central government funding, local funding initiatives, the outcomes of conferences on the future of the city, as well as local interagency connections formed via more established avenues. With the ending of the Development Corporations and City Challenge programmes in the middle of the 1990s, more localised solutions to the problem of city management and strategic growth had to be found. On the formal level, the Liverpool City Centre Partnership (LCCP, changed to Liverpool Vision in 1999) and the Government Office for Merseyside (changed to the Regional Development Agency in 1998) have been central to the development of initiatives aimed at promoting coherence in regeneration generally and security in particular. The variety of initiatives, funding regimes and partnerships underpinning Liverpool's regeneration necessitated the formation of the Government Office for Merseyside. The Office was established to "provide a single point of contact" for partnerships and to "promote a coherent approach" to competitiveness, quality of life and regeneration (Government Office for Merseyside: A Brief Guide, 1995). More established bodies like the Stores' Committee and Merseyside Police have regular senior level contact through the Officer Partnership Group (established through the Government Office) which was responsible for finding out what bodies exist in the city centre and co-ordinating their efforts towards the marketing and promotion of a secure and orderly city centre. The Group's main partners in the city centre were Merseyside Police, Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, Liverpool City Centre Partnership, the Stores' Committee, Mersey Partnership and Liverpool City Council. The Group aimed to co-ordinate the partners and identify problems for action within the regeneration agenda.
These networks of local governance have had as their strategic nodal point the Government Office which made decisions on funding local projects upon criteria laid down at both central and European government level. Another important point of contact was the Liverpool City Centre Partnership. This body marshalled public and private funding for city centre projects. During the interviews it became apparent that particular partnership agencies did not come together in an unproblematic manner. Interviewees highlighted negative and historically formed perceptions between agencies, perceived threats to institutional authority and issues of leadership.

**Policing and partnership**

A big factor with the cops now is their willingness to talk. It isn’t generally known that they are now talking to people like us [Government Office] at a strategic level because they do influence the process of regeneration. If something is going to adversely impact on the image of Liverpool then we need to know, as do the city fathers (Home Office Advisor [GOM]).

This part of the section examines how particular institutional hurdles were overcome within the process of establishing a partnership between agencies that had previously regarded each other with a measure of institutional closure, even mistrust. These hurdles were managed through the emergent discourses of city ‘renaissance’ and the promise from this of benefits accruing from resource allocation. The processes involved in the instigation of partnerships brought to the surface problems in the negotiation of roles and responsibilities between various agencies that at the same time involved the attempt to reconcile competing interests and perspectives. The partners, therefore, were engaged in constructing a form of official discourse through which a rationale and legitimacy of rule was forged along with the construction of the objects of
partnership power. Importantly, these discourses of partnership “are not neutral” in the sense “that they construct problems, solutions and actions in particular ways that are congruent with existing relations of power, domination and distribution of resources” (Atkinson, 1999: 70). Thus in Liverpool city centre a great deal of ideological work was undertaken by the new primary definers in building coalitions of interest in the name of the wider interest of what was deemed strategically necessary for the ‘city as a whole’. The building of ‘workable’ partnerships in Liverpool needed to be co-ordinated and ‘policed’. Underlying interviewee vernacular of ‘common goals’ and ‘getting a grip’ were changes in the balance of power underpinning the strategic alliances involved in the political decision making process.¹ It was the Government Office that provided a nodal point in the process of creating a perception, if not an actuality, of stability amongst the key players in the regeneration process:

If the police are not talking to the city council and the council are not working with the private sector then we lack credibility in the eyes of everyone else. Regeneration has given this city the impetus to move forward, leave the past behind and challenge some pretty outmoded ways of thinking (Home Office Advisor, [GOM]).

Writers have noted the labour and effort that needs to be carried out to ‘make partnerships work’ with regard to finding common ground and agreed goals (Crawford, 1997). The negotiation of trust and management of conflict between partners in Liverpool was manifest within the discourse of regeneration as

¹ These processes, as Chapter Five discussed, have been characterised as ‘decentred’ in the sense that locally elected governmental structures are becoming but one of many governmental actors involved in promoting a place marketing ethos which sits alongside the fragmentation of centrally funded and administered services. Thus funding regimes such as Objective One and the Single Regeneration Budget, which were ostensibly administered outside of established city politics, led to a shift in power to Government Offices and Regional Agencies. It is in such bodies that decisions are made about the funding of city centre projects and whether applications for funding cohere with strategic thinking about the regeneration of the ‘city as a whole’. 

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signified through the network of interests most centrally involved in the city’s renaissance. The struggle to make partnerships coherent and workable was routinely fought out at the highest strategic level in the attempt to reconcile organisational differences and establish common goals:

Although partnership may be a fairly hackneyed expression, one thing that is coming out of it is a tremendous learning curve as far as partnerships are concerned. There are still people in many organisations who think that partnership means having your name on a list somewhere and saying ‘that’s a good idea, we support you’. It’s not. It’s actually about committing resources to the common goal of the partnership - to the agenda. Problems happen where the goals of the partnership are in tension with the objectives of your organisation. But it’s about commitment; it is about honouring promises and delivering what you agreed to deliver. It is also about negotiating sensible terms of reference when you get involved in a partnership. But this is a growth area with much work to be done (Ibid).

The establishment of terms of reference, common goals and a sense of unity has been most actively fought out and negotiated at the local level. “Responding to the need of the partnership” (Chairman, Stores’ Committee) in Liverpool involved processes that both realigned and reinforced existing local networks of power that impinged directly on the meaning of place and space in the city centre. However, through the discourse of partnership, the ascendancy of the city as a marketable place in tune with modern consumer patterns and investment trends was not a phenomenon orchestrated by the locally powerful alone, but was worked out in conjunction with centrally administered rules and procedures. As Chapter Five discussed, the shift to the so-called ‘entrepreneurial city’ has been encouraged through various central government initiatives around the formation of public and private partnerships and competitive, centrally coordinated bidding regimes. Moreover, the very vagueness with which central government has defined ‘partnerships’ concerned
with regeneration (Atkinson, 1999) has sidelined issues to do with broadening
democratic local decision-making and allowed more established actors to set
agendas. It is these agendas that formed the basis of feedback chains between
local and central decision making agencies with respect to Liverpool. It was the
Government Office that acted as a means of communication between local and
central governmental actors. Thus, one interviewee described partnership in
Liverpool city centre as:

... a method for delivering on a local basis but the policies, the
significant policies, are still set nationally by central government
but it's left to local government and other organisations ... to
actually deliver things on the ground and to feed back to the
central policy making machinery about what works, what
doesn't and why (Chairman, Merseyside Development
Corporation).

As a forerunner to practising and initiating regeneration projects, local
regeneration and state managers organised conferences in an attempt to stabilise
and promote effectivity in the working relations between key players.² It was
felt that only with a measure of stability and coherence among the key players
could regeneration take place. Outside perceptions of local political infighting
and instability "do not bode well for building and sustaining the investment
machinery Liverpool has in place" (Ibid). The process of developing new ways
of thinking across various agencies was forged through appeals to both
particular agencies and the benefits that would be gained in partnership as well
as appeals to the 'city interest' as a whole. This was exemplified by the
position of Merseyside police who re-orientated themselves in relation to other
local agencies at a strategic level through the secondment of senior personnel to

² The researcher, as discussed in Chapter Four, attended two major local conferences indicative of
these attempts to align local key players.
the Government Office. Alongside this, other initiatives were put into place that saw the police working more closely with other city centre regeneration agencies on both formal and informal levels. Firstly, Merseyside Police in the form of the Area Commander for the city centre sat on the monthly meetings of the Stores’ Committee to keep senior store representatives up-to-date on policing in the city and to listen to the concerns of retailers regarding issues around crime and disorder. Secondly, Crime Prevention Officers and undercover police attend a subsidiary of the Stores’ Committee - Crime Alert. These closer working relations at an operational level between police and business came about through pressure from local businesses for the police to take their concerns more seriously around crime and disorder in the city centre and a police recognition of the benefits of being involved in the move to partnership:3

In the past the perception from the business side was ‘what the hell has this got to do with you’ [the police]? Now there is the sudden realisation that the police do have a real role to play. They can be instrumental in initiating the regeneration process and in maintaining it by policing effectively and by consent (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]).

‘Policing effectively and by consent’ became a source of tension between key players regarding what this meant in terms of effective regeneration, and will be discussed in the next chapter. In Liverpool the police and businesses instituted closer working relations under the auspices of regeneration that required the passing of expert information deemed necessary for ‘successful renaissance’. On this point, Ericson (1994: 168) argued that general changes in policing could be analysed under the advent of the ‘risk society’. Here the police role

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3 Both the Stores’ Committee and Crime Alert were central to the establishment of the camera network. This role, and their relationship to Merseyside Police, will be discussed in Chapter Eight.
takes on a “knowledge-risk-security” perspective in providing expertise to other governmental agencies concerned with aspects of “social development”:

I think the cops have become more receptive to the sharing aspect that they were not renowned for before. Since around the time of the Morgan Report in 1991 the perception among police officers was that it was probably within their interests to acknowledge that crime prevention can’t just be left to the cops and by implication opinions spread wider and people wanted to know more. People are much more informed now than they were and the police are a lot more open about the recording of the reality. They recognise that perceptions of safety and un-safety (sic) are factors in the regeneration process (Ibid).

In this sense the police were able to “provide local intelligence and information crucial to the planning stage on all manner of funded projects” (City Centre Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police). In Liverpool, the notion of the police as information brokers extended to meetings of the Confederation of Trade and British Industry (CBI) in the city. It was in this forum that the Assistant Chief Constable addressed investors and potential investors on the merits of setting up commercial ventures in the city:

Our Assistant Chief Constable now carries a stronger message to business. It is now a case of saying ‘look - the CBI needs to know that things in Liverpool are not as bad as they are perceived to be. You need to take this message to your organisations and not miss out on this window of opportunity under Objective One simply because you think Liverpool is not a safe place’ (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]).

Having the police involved at a strategic level in the regeneration process materialised as an outcome of pressure from local businesses and developers. From their perspective, the police needed to be seen as involved in the process to take it forward. In this way partnership with the police would hopefully redress the fallout between the police and the local council after the street disturbances of 1981 and the Militant politics of the 1980s:
In the Liverpool of the 1980s we had the problem of council officers criticising the police and the police refusing to talk to the council. What seems to have happened during the 1990s is that businesses and developers have gained a greater say. They’ve been able to bridge the impasse and point out the futility of wrangling when we should all be working for the renaissance in the city (Marketing Director, Mersey Partnership).

Persuading the police of the benefits of being at the centre of the regeneration process had a two-fold appeal. Firstly, it appealed to the local political position of the police regarding strengthening their involvement in local political decision-making. Secondly, and related to the above, the police’s ideological hegemony on issues of local crime and disorder was also strengthened. In this sense the discourse of regeneration provided the cement with which to reconfigure locally powerful agencies and smooth over old enmities:

The fact that we have senior police officers on board - most crucially in the Government Office - shows Merseyside Police as willing to take a gamble. But the way we sold it to them, and I have been at it for years, is by saying you really ought to be involved in the policy process because there will be policy dividends for you down the track. I mean if we are successful in delivering Objective One and the Single Regeneration Budget and attracting business and people there are operational implications for the police service. As they are involved in the planning stage they will have the edge over other organisations that are not (Home Office Advisor [GOM]).

‘Having the edge over other organisations’ meant the police being involved in the bid approval process through the Government Office. The work of this body has concerned itself with the construction and propagation of a consensus among locally powerful agencies regarding the ‘good governance’ and strategic rule of a particular locality. For the police as well as other institutions this meant experimenting with new cross-agency roles and, at the highest level, engaging the police in constructing discourses and implementing management procedures around local social development strategies:
The police organisation wants to be involved in the regeneration process as partners and we want to see the place as a vibrant region, which is attractive to inward investors and supports a high quality of life for citizens and visitors. Having a police officer in here has been able to make a change in the bid approval process and helps deliver policy objectives around quality of life and freedom from crime. It is actually a good thing for the police as an organisation as well as a good thing for the people of Merseyside. It’s an example of good practice (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]).

Development and business managers were enthusiastic about senior police involvement in the regeneration process in that it helped smooth the process and enhance its credibility in the eyes of potential investors:

To be effective, urban profiling has to have all the key players involved and at the highest levels and we are way ahead of other areas on this. It is not every investor that wants a low down on crime, but a major investor who does, wants to see the sheriff not the deputy. So yes, it’s very good, very good that they [the police] are part of the whole partnership thing - they listen to us and they actually understand that their role is now part of the investment machinery. The Chief Constable has actually been to business receptions with me and explained the picture - they have got totally into that (Chairman, Merseyside Development Corporation, emphasis in original).

Within this process, police symbolic power was a central component in a wider corporate strategy to lever investment and sustain local economic growth. The cementing of local power relations through the discourse of regeneration opened up a space for the police in Merseyside to take forward their own agenda around the issue of police funding. In this sense police involvement in the process bolstered their position in terms of their “symbolic authority” to make “legitimate pronouncements” on crime and disorder (Loader, 1997: 2). Indeed such authority manifested itself in, and was processed through, the authoritative coalitions that have emerged around regeneration. Crime and disorder was articulated in terms of a wider notion of ‘social development’ and
the “quality of life we are trying to promote in this city” (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]):

It seems to me an anathema that in a region in England and Wales that qualifies for Objective One status and where we are trying to do the socio-economic regeneration work with the police on board and through secondment, that the funding for the police is being cut - particularly when crime and safety are the big issues blocking inward investment. It is absolutely crackers and we will be saying so to the Chief Inspector of Constabulary (Ibid)

**Responsible partners and the responsibilisation process**

David Garland’s (1996) notion of a ‘responsibilisation strategy’ highlighted a series of political processes in which state agencies were divesting responsibility for crime control to other public and private agencies at a time when problems of management overload and legitimisation were particularly acute. Indeed, as Garland argued, the responsibilisation strategy has taken place across a range of social policy fields in an attempt to redraw and reconstitute the management of diverse social problems. In the context of regeneration in Liverpool and the reordering of local power relations, the notion of ‘responsibility’ took on a political and ideological significance. The meanings attributed to ‘responsible partner’ and the empowerment of such a partner - through funding and political recognition - pointed to broader processes concerned with the coordination of the local state ensemble in a manner that sought to expand its scope for action and influence. Police expertise was central in these definitional processes and provided leadership in this area. Having the police involved in the bid approval process, with the information and intelligence they can bring, was articulated as a means to enhance the
credibility of local partnerships with respect to those who manage urban funding regimes, such as the Single Regeneration Budget:

All partnerships like to have the police involved - it lends legitimacy to what they do. There is an issue of trust here about who is actually going to be the banker, handle the money and, you know, is it going to get ripped off? This has happened in Liverpool in the past. Some of the government-funded organisations, for example, involved in the regeneration of Toxteth have ripped the government off and there have been a number of fraud investigations. So having the police involved is a step towards making that harder and making partnerships do the right thing rather than what suits their own agenda (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]).

The co-ordination of partnerships has involved ‘policing’ the discursive contours as to the meaning of ‘reliable’ and ‘credible’ partners. More particularly, this has involved the attempt to shape definitions of ‘responsibility’ and ‘responsible partners’ in the regeneration process. Thus partnerships in Liverpool city centre were engaged in a process of determining the ideological parameters of partnership power in terms of who is authorised to speak, on which issues, and at which time. This process can be seen as an attempt to define a localised ‘collective will’ and to promote strategies deemed to serve it. Partnership in Liverpool involved processes towards “the focusing of minds and the negotiation of sensible terms of reference” along with the “commitment of resources to agreed packages” (Home Office Advisor [GOM]) that, at the same time, redrew notions of the public and private interest. In this sense, regulating tensions and mistrust between local collectivities of interest set in motion managerial practices underpinned by ideological agendas around the notion of ‘responsibilisation’. The responsibilisation of agents and agencies took place on a selective discursive terrain that was underpinned by the notion of ‘empowerment’. Key players focused on who was ‘empowered’ to speak for
particular collective interests and, therefore, able to assume a measure of ‘responsibility’ to receive funding:

We need to check with potential partners whether they are empowered to speak for a community. It operates like a checklist: Accountability - to whom? Responsibility - how much of it do you have? Information - how much information is available you and how much do you have to pass to other players? (City Centre Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police).

Accountability, responsibility and information set the discursive and institutional parameters for the process of partnership building and access to centres of power and decision-making. ‘Useful’ information, in particular, was defined within the context of regeneration and, as has been indicated, definitions of what were in the interests of ‘the city as a whole’. Importantly, the building of partnership, therefore, did not represent an open ‘free for all’ that eschewed contemporary and more traditional networks of ideological and institutional power. As one interviewee candidly stated:

One of the biggest problems has been around consultation in Liverpool and the transparency of the process itself. The temptation is when you are setting something up you go and talk to somebody who will respond to your need. You take the easy way round (Home Office Advisor [GOM]).

Thus partnership in Liverpool has operated through a series of constraints to do with the identification and targeting of key players deemed appropriate and necessary for successful regeneration, tempered by definitions of who is responsible and who is not. In this sense, new sets of power relations were reinforced through the building of alliances that at the same time reconfigured the contours of locally powerful networks of rule.
Getting the message across: Re-imaging and the local press

The notions of the ‘entrepreneurial city’ or the city as ‘growth machine’ discussed in Chapter Five each highlighted the development of locally powerful coalitions whose concern to ‘talk up’ a sense of place and instil a growth mentality has led to alliances with local press agencies. The local press “can play an invaluable role in coordinating strategy and selling growth to the public” (Logan and Molotch, 1987: 72). The strategic importance of such agencies in regeneration projects has been grounded in the dissemination of information and images that potentially construct a sense of place favourable to potential investors and geared towards cultivating ‘local pride’ amongst the local population. The construction of an urban aesthetic through local press organs has been an important component in regeneration for businesses, local developers and police. In Liverpool, the local press\(^4\) (consisting of the Liverpool Echo and Daily Post) have been pressed by city centre partners to attune their role and become agents of regeneration. The position of the local press in representing ‘quality of life’ issues was deemed to have a major impact on smoothing the wheels of the investment machinery. This was born from a recognition that the local press can produce negative and positive images of the region and of particular institutions within it, images that will have a direct bearing upon regeneration. Those involved in city centre partnerships were particularly focused upon ‘negative’ reporting around both the City Council and Merseyside Police:

\(^4\) It was the local press as opposed to other media that interviewees highlighted as a concern in the process of building partnerships. In their study Logan and Molotch found that “because newspaper interests are tied to growth, media executives are sympathetic to business complaints that a particular journalistic investigation or angle may be bad for the local business climate” (1987: 72).
We are not trying to have a go at investigative journalism but the presentation of a story does not have to be couched in negativity. Potential investors will want a flavour, a snap shot of things in the city and they will want to see the local press. Sometimes I cringe at some of the stories in there, which only reinforce images we need to overturn - 'Liverpool is politically unstable, the City Council is crap, that Liverpool people are bolshie and thieving'. Some sections of the press have done nothing for this city and Council Officers have a bad taste in their mouths from the past, they’re terrified they might get a bad press and so won’t talk (Marketing Director, Mersey Partnership).

This situation led local partners to form alliances with sympathetic national newspapers in order to promote the city through, for example, national conferences such as Merseyside: The Future, sponsored by The Guardian in 1997. In other areas, agreements with the local press have been inaugurated in order to bridge perceived mistrust. This was exemplified by the negotiation of press-police relations regarding the reporting of policing and levels of crime in the city. One interviewee described these negotiations as “about building trust with the media” after a series of “damaging articles for Liverpool”. These articles:

... were basically along the lines of ‘crime is out of hand and the police are unable to cope with it’. At the end of the day it is as much in the interest of the Echo’s Editor as it is in the interest of Merseyside Police that we repopulate, have prosperity and vibrancy. I mean he’ll sell more newspapers if there are more people living here, working and with money to spend (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]).

The production of news around issues of local crime and disorder were reshaped, in this instance by the building of a collective will around regeneration that helped cement partnerships between key players within which issues of policing assumed paramount importance. Again this involved negotiation and co-operation between locally powerful players at a corporate level:
Now I would like to think we have got our act together here. If something is going to happen that we know about we brief the media first. If things happen that we don’t know about and the media get a story we have negotiated protocols with them so that we can actually say when a story is published it must portray things fairly. We can actually go as far as to contact editors directly via the Chief Constable. ‘This is the Chief Constable of Merseyside on the telephone - if you do not publish a retraction of what you have just said we will issue writs today’. We have done that and they have backed off (Ibid).

Alongside these coercive tactics was a move to cement a political image building process to help shape and reinforce powerful definitions of the ‘public interest’. This kind of coalition building, involving the local press, increasingly endeavoured to link the notions of ‘good business practice’ with the proactive management of images of crime and its incidence:

Merseyside is no worse than other cities - in fact our crime trends are probably better than most. But we seem stuck with an undeserved reputation as a hotbed of criminal activity … To say Merseyside is a safe place to do business requires a sense of proportion. Perhaps nowhere is truly safe in the sense of being completely crime free, but Merseyside is certainly a sensible place to do business … and I am delighted to have the chance to put the record straight (Editor of the Liverpool Echo cited in Merseyside Police Community Strategy Department, 1998: 4).

This closer alignment of the local press to the regeneration process was also in evidence through headlines to do with ‘talking up’ Liverpool and the new entrepreneurial spirit that partnerships wanted to represent. Some examples of this appear in the next section of this chapter. The next part of this section will deal with partnership and the issue of leadership that interviewees identified.

**Trust and leadership**

The trick is; this is never going to be a properly democratic process. We use democratically elected representatives where appropriate and where possible, but there has to be a point where you say, ‘we’ve done as much as we can’ (Marketing Director, Mersey Partnership).
The shift to a more ‘business like’ approach to urban rule and the establishment and inter-linkage of bodies such as the Government Office, LCCP and Mersey Partnership generated initial mistrust between these “catalysts for change” (The City Centre Manager, LCCP) and other local actors, particularly the City Council and Merseyside Police. Initially the latter agencies viewed the former as political outsiders – “parachutists” or “prefects” (Home Office Advisor [GOM]) – who were appropriating and reordering, both discursively and materially, the mechanisms and rationality for urban rule from outside older, established local political frameworks. Mistrust was tempered by the feeling that power was sliding away to other bodies, a perception recognised by the Government Office:

The Government view of regeneration and the Government Office’s view is that it is about arresting the demographic slide, improving infrastructure, improving the quality of life and improving the ability of the local authorities to deliver their services more effectively. The subtext... is about politics and the view rightly or wrongly that central government have an almost pathological dislike of local government – that it wasn’t going anywhere. The Government Office is about striking a balance between local and central. We are here to make the process of change easier (Ibid).

For the Government Office and the LCCP things became easier with changes to Liverpool’s ruling Labour Group in the run up to and after the 1997 General Election. The Group adopted a more cooperative approach to the private sector under the influence of ‘New Labour’. Through this co-operative approach the ‘spirit of regeneration’ became more tangible. These processes of bringing agencies into the ‘spirit’ of the regeneration agenda were at the same time attempting to facilitate trust between agencies. The perceived failure of past forms of urban management under the auspices of an urban welfare strategy
was sharpened for new governmental actors in Liverpool by the spectre of 'hard left' council politics in the shape of Militant in the 1980s:

Something that we are working for and is coming over the horizon is trust, which is growing between organisations like the City Council and the police. You must realise that in Liverpool it was not that long ago since the Fraud Squad were arresting the Deputy Leader, Derek Hatton. Time is a great healer but you need more than time. It’s about building bridges at the highest level in both organisations where you can have a strategic impact in trusting each other with knowledge about each other’s organisations and priorities (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]).

The prospect of gaining funds through competitive bidding and the arrival of Objective One funding “has provided the glue where we have had to sit round the table and thrash out strategies - but it has not in itself solved the leadership issue” (Chairman, Stores Committee). Leadership issues went hand in hand with trust and raised questions for urban managers about who was capable, responsible and ‘charismatic’ to fill the role:

One of the themes that came through is that leadership is required and leadership is something that has been lacking. This lacking is not a reflection of the individuals involved but it points to the problem of Council Officers having to serve the needs of politicians and the politicians in Liverpool, dare I say, are of a widely varied calibre. Some of the more charismatic, who possess qualities of leadership, have actually shot Liverpool in the foot with the rise of Militant and so on. As I’ve indicated this is one of the things in the minds of potential investors (Private Developer [I], affiliated to LCCP).

The perception was that ‘old ways’ of working within established political arenas were at odds with what was deemed necessary for effective regeneration:

Party politics whether left or right is a Stalinist type of approach and can get in the way of real politics. The only thing that gets in the way in Liverpool as in other cities is party politics - that is, who has the right to decide. Until a system is in place that people see as being the right system, not all the people but the few that count, you are always going to have that party politics (Marketing Director, Mersey Partnership).
‘Educating’ elected local representatives to new learning curves regarding the nature of local economic and social development involved moving beyond what was characterised as ‘political infighting’ or ‘turf politics’. In establishing an authoritative context within which partnership for regeneration could operate, a carrot and stick approach was developed as a means to bring agencies into line.

Merseyside Police and the Government Office played a key role here:

Building trust is very, very important. It’s about having the police actually saying to Liverpool City Council here is access to our information, our database that you can use for deciding what you need to do to engineer out crime when rebuilding parts of the city. It’s about focusing minds and getting local politicians to think across the city and not just their own wards and that they might get some of the cake next time (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]).

Thus building strategic ways of thinking in the governance of the city went hand in hand with the allocation of resources through Objective One and the Single Regeneration Budget:

What is bringing people together is the prospect of having some money to spend on what they want to see done. Realistically that is quite fair and legitimate because if you live in a crappy environment you want to do something about it. If something like the Single Regeneration Budget or Objective One is in operation you are told that if you want to spend X million pounds on something, you get yourselves into a partnership, show us that you mean it and have some strategic thought behind it (Home Office Advisor [GOM]).

Within the processes of defining and refining ‘strategic thought’ has been a related process to do with getting agencies to think within an ideological framework that prioritised what was in the interests of ‘the city as a whole’.

This incorporated the idea of ‘sustainable projects’:

Partnerships will get the money and continue to get it providing they deliver what they said they would deliver. But all of these projects have to identify succession strategies - what are they going to do when the money runs out? Have they thought about budgeting in the future? (Ibid).
In establishing a framework of governance that moved beyond "parochialism" (Ibid), a series of regeneration strategies were initiated to re-orientate the meaning of urban renewal in terms of who would be responsibilised, what kinds of projects took precedence, and where, in geographical terms, funded projects would occur:

People are beginning to get a much better idea about seeing how things can work in strategic blocks. So rather than saying 'I want this in my area', they can actually see that there are over-spill benefits from one area to another. In Merseyside there has always been those who get and those who don’t and there is a perception among residents that the city centre and south Liverpool are getting all the money and the north of the city is not (Chairman, Merseyside Development Corporation).

It was the city centre that provided the hub of regeneration. The assumption was that what would be good for the region of Merseyside would be provided for in promoting the city centre, re-scaling it and re-ordering it within a framework of ‘sensible governance’.

The emphasis, therefore, on partnership between public and private sectors and the shift away from traditional post-war models of urban government threw into sharp focus the issue of leadership. This issue percolated through the local press which provided a forum for local elites to air their views on the subject. For example, in an article entitled ‘Who Runs The City Centre?’ (Liverpool Echo, 15 August, 1997) a series of “key players” expressed the need for leadership that encompassed a range of related issues - including external image, city marketing and street cleanliness. ‘Our City’s Heart: Clean Sweep for the Streets of Shame’ was the title for another article which identified a ‘new confidence’ expressed by city managers in tackling anti-social activities in the city centre.
including litter, graffiti and fly-posting. In the article the City Centre Manager expressed the new confidence thus:

.. if we want to attract the big players to the city then we have to clean up the environment .. I think pride in the city is what we need to have, unless we instil that pride, unless people take ownership of their own city, we are not going to make much of an impact (Liverpool Echo, 9 October, 1998)

The article trumpeted the collaborative efforts towards ‘street cleansing’ between the City Council, City Centre Manager and the Stores’ Committee and mirrored other well received collaborations in the press that sought to manage order in the city centre. Indeed, it was within this context of reordering, re-imaging and establishing responsibility and leadership in the city centre that Liverpool’s CCTV scheme emerged. The scheme was positioned as a flagship development in the regeneration process and was born of similar coalitions of interest. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Eight. Before that, the next section of this chapter discusses the emergence and consolidation of the neoliberal state form and the city centre regenerative visions that emerged within it as expressed by interviewees. It is to these ‘new primary definers’ that the chapter will now turn.

An orderly regeneration: ‘attracting capital and people of the right sort’

Liverpool in the 1990s: Towards the commercially viable city

‘The Perception of Merseyside and the Client Problem’ - a local survey that shows an all too familiar problem. Those surveyed listed crime, poor industrial relations and political unrest as the key major factors in decisions to invest. This is the client pool of our potential inward investment. Those are the perceptions of outside of what’s inside (Marketing Director, Mersey Partnership).
Liverpool and Merseyside are unlikely to succeed if the city centre fails (Ambitions for the City Centre, Liverpool City Council, 1996: 11).

As discussed in Chapter Six, the political, ideological and economic climate of Liverpool in the 1980s meant that the city’s regeneration lagged behind developments that were underway in other cities throughout the United Kingdom. However, the trajectory of the regeneration strategy followed the substantive contours concerning the shifts in urban governance identified in Chapter Five. This section will discuss the key agencies and related strategies underpinning Liverpool’s regeneration in the 1990s as a means of introducing and contextualising the emergent strategies for order in the city that have witnessed shifts in the institutional configuration and responsibility for enacting social control. The creation of an urban aesthetic landscape took both a discursive and material form underpinned by orderly visions for the city centre and, running alongside, perceptions of threats to that aesthetic order. In sharp contrast to the 1980s, and moving more in line with national trends, the contemporary restructuring of Liverpool has focused on the city centre and designated key regeneration sites around retailing and consumption, commerce, leisure and tourism, culture and the arts.

As in other cities, the regeneration of Liverpool was underpinned by a more business like approach to urban management that incorporated City Challenge and the Merseyside Development Corporation. The latter body, established in Liverpool since 1981, was responsible for a series of initiatives (costing £400 million up to 1997) to regenerate the city’s docklands. Stressing a more business like approach to urban governance involved marketing localities in
order to construct a distinctive city image to lure inward investment. The Mersey Partnership has brought together over 300 local partners to invest millions in marketing campaigns through a proliferation of brochures, seminars and conferences and a series of targeted initiatives aimed at national and international media and at potential investors. The work here hinged around promotional strategies towards constructing a local 'quality of life' that publicised information on business services, local infrastructure, labour costs - sold as "lower than the national average for virtually all grades" (The Mersey Partnership, 1997) - culture, arts, education, housing and architecture and scenery. In a climate of global competition, local marketing strategies have attempted to promote a distinctive city image: 'Liverpool - A Maritime City', 'A Pool of Talent' and 'Local and Proud' have been examples. In 1998, a marketing campaign to reverse the negative undertones associated with the regional name 'Merseyside', and to change it to 'Liverpool Bay', was launched with the support of local business with the aim of selling the region to the USA, Canada and Japan where 'Liverpool' was thought to be a "recognised brand name" (Liverpool Echo, 2 July, 1998). In addition, tourism has formed a major plank of the local economy and was estimated to be worth £480 million a year (Ibid). The Merseyside Development Corporation's crowning glory, the Albert Dock shopping, arts and museum complex, received 5 million visitors a year and houses Liverpool's bid at cultural differentiation in the form of the Tate Gallery. In attracting capital and investors local partnerships have been planning and funding improved telecommunications, infrastructural support, tourist attractions and leisure services (notably around the Beatles mythology reported to be worth £50 million in spending alone), café-bar culture and sport.
One of Europe’s biggest city centre developments at Queen’s Square exemplified future visions for the city in incorporating an international hotel within a retail and leisure complex costing over £90 million. Further evidence of private development and investment in the city was evidenced in the creation of a £125 million National Discovery Park incorporating a high-tech media factory linking the waterfront with the retail centre, thus further expanding the city centre in reclaiming derelict buildings and land. The mushrooming of private developments in the city was underpinned by Merseyside’s Objective One funding status whereby £630 million was claimed from the European Union to encourage private investments in technology, exports, marketing and small business (*The Times*, 5 March 1995).5

The attempt to expand the service-based economy through such partnership initiatives was hailed as a success for Liverpool and its people. As noted above, the local press were targeted as key players in getting a positive message about regeneration to the wider public: ‘Partners doing the business’ (*Liverpool Echo*, 20 May, 1998); ‘Mersey fortunes in hands of experts’ (*Liverpool Echo*, 12 September, 1996); ‘Progress - here and now’ (*Liverpool Echo*, 11 September, 1995); ‘21st Century City’ (*Liverpool Echo*, 17 September, 1997) and ‘Mersey is Leading the way’! (*Liverpool Echo*, 1 November, 1996) were examples of positive local coverage.

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5 Objective One funding was granted to Europe’s poorest regions - those whose per capita Gross Domestic Product is less than 75% of the European Union average - and has been instrumental in encouraging partnerships as a prerequisite for funding.
These developments towards instituting sets of power relations in urban governance and regeneration impacted on the city centre as “the driving engine for the whole region” (City Centre Manager, *Liverpool Echo*, 20 May 1998). Drawn up in 1997, the ‘*Ambitions for the City Centre*’ document, involved public and private agencies that included the City Council, the Police, the Development Corporation and the Tourism Bureau. The document took a “hard headed” view of the city’s potential in utilising Objective One funds to become a world class player in insurance, tourism and media, arts and culture (Liverpool City Council, 1997a: 9). The creation of a “safe and secure” 24-hour, ‘European city’ is a central theme in the document. Furthermore, the Council “cannot and should not itself lead in all courses of action” (Ibid: 3). The “success” of the strategy was to be “measured by indicators such as the level of private sector investment, improvements in the appearance of the city centre ... but most importantly by the city centre’s image and level of confidence in its future” (Ibid: 7). Thus the strategic revitalisation of the city centre was prioritised in the drive to economically, socially and culturally regenerate the region as a whole.6

In 1987 the reformed Labour majority on the city council published a major *Economic Review* that highlighted “the need for a strategy” regarding the city centre that would promote its centrality as the hub for regional regeneration.

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6 Indeed during Liverpool’s post war decline, discussed in the previous chapter, the city centre remained the hub of the area’s economic activity. The slow decline of the economic and political power of the merchant class became gradually replaced by the city’s always-strong retail sector (Midwinter, 1971). Out of the 240,000 jobs located in Liverpool in 1981, 101,000 (or 42%) were in the city centre, notably in the commercial, retail and local government service sectors. Despite decline elsewhere in the local economy the city centre during the early 1970s had the highest retail turnover of any shopping centre in England and Wales outside of London (Liverpool City Council, 1987: 3-6).
The Review flagged up a number of "only too well publicised problems" that included the environment, security and pedestrianisation that would need to be tackled if the city centre was to stave off competition and build a "total package" that accommodated shopper's preferences for "an overall leisure experience - the day out in Liverpool" (Liverpool City Council, 1987: 4). The Liverpool City Centre Plan (1993) extended these observations in noting that "competition is intense" and that public and private sectors must work to a common purpose in establishing the "strategies, policies and proposals needed to help create Liverpool as an international city". The instigation of "proper management" through harnessing public and private interests was the prescribed role of the Liverpool City Centre Partnership (LCCP), which was established in 1992 (Ibid: 30). It was part of a patchwork of local bodies loosely connected to elected local government concerned with the promotion and regeneration of Liverpool city centre. The Partnership operated with an annual administration budget of £72,000 to help implement various schemes "working towards maximizing the city centre's potential as a regional centre, and enhancing its attractiveness to all those who use it" (Liverpool City Centre Partnership, 1995: 1). This body acted as a catalyst for public and private partnerships to both fund, and become responsible players, in city centre projects that included transport facilities, area ownership schemes, re-development projects, anti-litter campaigns and, as a central focus, street security. Much of this work took place through an Action Group which comprised of local corporate interests such as Merseytravel, the city's two universities, Liverpool Stores' Committee and the local Chamber of Commerce. From this platform, local and outside interests were to be targeted for potential
investment in local projects that included the provision of security initiatives such as CCTV, discussed fully in the next chapter. The growth of such city centre management agencies extended the neo-liberal drive of the 1980s that implied that lasting economic, social and environmental regeneration could be best secured through giving a key role to the private sector and in making urban places more attractive to business. Hence the LCCP was established as a local initiative comprising of a small administrative team and the (unelected) office of City Centre Manager, which has been filled by seconded senior retail businessmen. This ‘flexible’ and more ‘efficient’ approach to urban management has been described in the following terms:

The City Centre Partnership exists at the behest of the city council but it is not another layer of bureaucracy. It is an open channel of communication, a catalyst and a means of getting things done that need to be done (The City Centre Manager, LCCP).

The impetus behind post of City Centre Manager came from the Stores’ Committee in Liverpool, who saw in the LCCP an opportunity to voice their interests in managing the city centre. The Area Commander from Merseyside Police attended Committee meetings to listen to requests for police action on behalf of the stores and to brief store managers on relevant aspects of policing and criminal activity. Its members accounted for nearly 80% of city centre turnover and its aims were “to assist in provision of a clean, safe city centre environment”, and “to further the interests of all its members who trade in Liverpool city centre” (Liverpool Stores’ Committee, 1992: 1).

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7 The Stores’ Committee in the city has been in existence since the Second World War and holds monthly meetings for its 40 members who pay an annual subscription of £1200.
The Committee has a press officer and formed a sub-group, ‘Crime Alert’, in the early 1980s as a forum for store detectives, private security and police. Indicative of building partnerships towards regeneration, the Stores’ Committee has become a more active player in the city centre:

The Committee was originally formed to look after the interests of retailers, but more recently it has become a body concerned with general issues in the city centre. We see ourselves, because of our voluntary status, as facilitators and a body tuning in to the groups of people who run the city and lobbying them, cajoling them and advising them on what direction the city should take. We now have a strong power base, in that we represent a large number of staff and a large turnover and large purpose for visiting the city centre - but we feel frustrated because the city does not share our vision (Chairman, Stores’ Committee).

With these concerns in mind, the Stores’ Committee actively pushed for the establishment of the LCCP as a more ‘representative’ body of city centre interests that would be able to draw upon the expertise and knowledge of the private sector:

Yes ... we were the founding members ... because our frustration had always been that we have this untapped resource of ideas. We were working on shop floors ... we know what is going on in the city and we know what the demands of the public are as well. We continue to have strong feelings on issues in the city such as street cleansing, security, street trading through to the management of the city centre. There was no representative body to channel this through; it was just a slanging match between the city council and the stores on a regular basis (Ibid).

In general terms, these shifts in the rule of the city centre established new networks and alliances within which the objects of that rule were defined. As part of these developments in the realignment of governance in the city centre, more sophisticated forms of social control evolved through the establishment of partnerships and strategic alliances that precipitated a greater role for the above agencies in the task of securing order in the city through camera surveillance.
The next section will consider, in broad terms, the visions for the city expressed by the new primary definers.

Consolidation and marketing: Visions for the city

Toxteth is not Liverpool; it is not the city centre just like Brixton is not London. The urban problems of the twenty first century are going to the suburban areas. They are moving to the outer city and this brings us back to the necessity of success for the renaissance of the city centre (Chairman, Merseyside Development Corporation).

David Harvey's notion of "attracting capital and people of the right sort" (1990: 295) has been particularly apposite in Liverpool's regeneration strategy. This part of the chapter will overview what can be called the 'politics of attraction' in Liverpool and the general meanings attributed to regeneration in terms of a 'city centre ambience' that key partnership players sought to promote. This will provide a prelude to an exploration of the processes involved in the social control network that defined the 'proper objects of power' within the city centre. The impact of business and development agencies in the local decision making process opened up forms of dialogue around the nature of order in the city centre, and reconfigured locally powerful agencies in realising that order within public space. The regeneration process set in train a series of initiatives in the form of partnerships and local annual conferences bringing together elected representatives, developers, local businesses, churches, educational...
establishments and police. The purposes of such conferences was to create and galvanise a sense of coherence to the work of the various partnerships across the city and to produce progress reports for developers, investors, businesses, elected representatives and "other agencies and groups who contribute to the future of the city centre" (Liverpool City Council, 1997a: 4). Two of the most high profile conferences - *Ambitions for the City Centre* and *Merseyside: The Future* - set themselves the task of identifying a number of themes "as a means of guiding and focusing action" (Liverpool City Council, 1997a: 4). These themes were laid down in the City Centre Strategy up to 2002 and included: building upon retailing, cultural design and media industries; enabling private sector development by improving transport links and providing new buildings, repair and refurbishment; creating a quality environment by improving maintenance and design and security; developing as a leading cultural and tourist centre with an emphasis on business, tourist and short stay products; communicating a positive image to build the confidence of operators, investors, developers and visitors; and, lastly, linking opportunity with need by giving the most needy better access to employment (Ibid: 4).

As part of these strategies for regenerating the city centre, a new ideological terrain was in the process of being constructed which emphasised a re-imaging and marketisation of the urban landscape. Agencies charged with this function can be understood as belonging to what Thrift (2000: 252-253) termed the "capitalist circuit of cultural capital", the use of which has been to accrue and disseminate knowledge used in the construction of place identity. The form of discourse invoked in this task played a role in cultivating belief amongst the
locally powerful regarding the reshaping of place identity. In some respects "it is belief itself, rather than what is believed, that counts as important" (Ibid: 254, emphasis in original). References made by urban managers in 'talking up' Liverpool, 'making the place look better' along with the construction of 'spectacular' urban landscapes through design, played an important governmental role in "lubricating the transition ... to urban entrepreneurialism" (Hubbard, 1996: 1442). This was done, for example, through attempting to foster civic pride and make the city more attractive to external investors. Belief in the regeneration programme for Liverpool was orchestrated through a commercial vernacular that attempted to promote 'confidence in the city', whilst, at the same time, trumpeting a form of locally powerful self promotion, in addressing local and external audiences. General references to the urban landscape with an emphasis on existing and new architecture, as well as the 'look of the place', form an important starting point for understanding the articulation of social order within the city centre. As many writers have recognised, and as the literature produced by regeneration agencies has indicated, there is an increasing emphasis across a range of agencies upon the catch-all category of 'quality of life', within which a number of interlinked programmes for action have arisen for urban managers. Some cities, however, have found it more difficult than others to 'successfully' market a sense of 'place'. Those who took part in the interview process spoke of the difficulty identified in redressing negative perceptions of 'place' regarding Liverpool city centre:

In Liverpool you have got the problem of perception and the actuality - there is a big gap here. If somebody is looking for a place to set up business, which will mean employing people and paying taxes, they will look at it objectively and subjectively.
Objectively - and we are doing very well on this - they ask 'where will we be in commercial terms if we move here'? Subjectively they ask, 'do I really want to be in this place'? Here we are losing at the moment. It is part of the image problem of the city (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM], emphasis in original).

The problem of image set in train a series of objects for action that included: perceptions of political instability; poor labour relations; inadequate leisure, cultural facilities and consumption facilities; a problem of street trading; land litter, crime and disorder. Each issue was seen to contribute to negative perceptions of place. Although these issues were qualitatively quite distinct, they all fell under the remit of The Mersey Partnership as issues to be marketed.

As noted above, the Partnership was established in 1993 and has over 300 members consisting of local businesses, developers, police, tourist agencies, local councils and education establishments all of whom contribute funding to the Partnership. The Partnership evolved from the late 1980s through the efforts of Liverpool Chamber of Commerce and the Stores' Committee who felt frustrated at the City Council in its refusal to give voice to, or work with, the private sector:

The history of The Mersey Partnership starts at the back end of the 1980s. There was a lot of disquiet amongst local companies around the question of who speaks up for Merseyside. Some worthwhile work was being done but not in a co-ordinated manner. It started with the problem of perceptions, out of which stems the problem of inward investment. All city regions in the UK have had to develop new mechanisms, new vehicles to promote and attract investment for all sorts of reasons. More importantly, it is a realisation that this is not just a public sector job, the private sector can probably do it better and can actually physically create and fund an organisation and, critically, use their network to actually make things happen. I think there is always going to be a role for the City Centre Partnership and the Mersey Partnership. They can do publicly what businesses have always done privately - and give people a kick up the backside. So there is always going to be a role for that kind of lobby and if we are going to be an efficient smooth running machine as a
region, the key elements, including the City council will have to be able to run at whatever speed the market wants it to run at (Marketing Director, Mersey Partnership).

The Mersey Partnership orientated its campaigns both at intra-region and inter-region levels and defined ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ marketing issues. The ‘hard’ issues included strikes, productivity and political stability, and campaigns aimed to redress “misconceptions that this is not a sensible place to do business” (Marketing Director, Mersey Partnership). ‘Soft’ issues:

.. are beginning to become more important as regeneration takes hold. Softer issues include crime - that’s the top issue - crime and its perception. Second is the issue of ‘am I going to live here’? That’s the social stuff around education, housing and leisure. These soft issues are about quality of life, which in turn are about security. Security runs like a vein through both hard and soft issues. For our potential inward investors security has political and social dimensions - a secure environment means looking at the political regime, the culture of the workforce and then it runs through into issues of social security and personal safety. We try and deal with all of these things, though different clientele seek information on different aspects of the equation. What we are marketing here, across the board, is stability (Ibid).

Addressing the problem of image provided a focal point for partners in initiating and channelling the regeneration process in the city centre that initially focused upon a generalised ‘look’ and ‘feel’ of the urban fabric:

The regeneration is wonderful because the place was looking very sad and sorry for itself and it has a reputation it doesn’t deserve. We need the place to look significantly better and the city has a lot to offer - there are some beautiful buildings here, the museums and theatres. We need to get people to realise that this is a beautiful city (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]).

The focus on the condition of the urban fabric pulled together themes around ‘pride of place’ and the potential for economic development within a recognition of competition between cities at the national level. The Officer Partnership Group provided a forum where issues under this general theme
could be aired. The articulation of 'place attractiveness' in this forum allowed
the new primary definers to make an impact in the re-configuration of rule in
the city:

One mechanism that is most likely to achieve success is the
Officer Partnership Group. These officials provide an important
guide to policy. But the Group has gained a very powerful
argument to take to the politicians whom it has been left to grasp
the nettle (Chairman, Stores Committee).

The hegemony of 'image' and 'attractiveness' provided a means for focusing
minds across partnerships and played a cementing role in directing urban
governance. As one interviewee stated:

Indeed, if they [local politicians] fail to grasp these arguments
and begin to think holistically they may well lose their seats
because our consultation process has been very wide indeed. For
example, the Stores' Committee, Marks and Spencer, the
Chamber of Commerce, the Mersey Partnership and the
Community Safety Officer in the Council itself, have contributed
to the agenda. The Council are beginning to recognise that, on a
par with unemployment and education, perceptions of un-safety
(sic) are important (Ibid).

In its Action Plan, the Officer Partnership Group related 'image' to "the
development of a safer city" and partners were encouraged to market
proactively Liverpool in a positive light:

The strategic importance of the image of Liverpool cannot be
over-emphasised. The whole regeneration opportunity and
process could be thwarted if people from within and outside
Merseyside do not perceive Liverpool as a safe place and market
its many qualities actively (Liverpool City Council, 1997b: 6).

This marketing must go hand in hand with "situational measures" directed at
the look of the urban fabric such as the "disguise and screening of derelict sites"
and "improving the appearance of the gateways to Liverpool". These measures
were important "to improving the image of Liverpool, not just in terms of
safety, but to stimulate wider regeneration in the city", as "first impressions are
very important” (Ibid: 3). For the locally powerful, the focus on the urban fabric occupied an initial stage on a continuum that sought to re-image and re-order the city centre under a ubiquitous discourse of ‘safety’ within which CCTV was to play a central role.

In broad terms, those at the centre of regeneration in the city centre expressed their enthusiasm for ‘talking up’ Liverpool in terms of its architectural and cultural heritage and as a ‘European city’:

I recently hosted a visit from the Chief Executive of Paramount Parks in the USA. They run theme parks, well controlled and organised, sanitised Disney-like spaces, which are state of the art in terms of security and hospitality. They are a top ten world company and I showed them the Pier Head and walked them through the Albert Dock. They thought it was awesome as it is older than anything they have. They thought it was a fix, you know - like Disneyland done for real. What struck me is that they thought we had it made and that we do not realise what we have got here. Put simply, our job of reclaiming the city centre as an economically viable place will be a lot easier than the American approach, which starts from scratch (Chairman, Merseyside Development Corporation).

The notion of ‘reclaiming’ the city centre as a viable commercial entity was expressed through a variety of strategies aimed at tourists, shoppers and investors. Reclamation underpinned a strategy of re-imaging the city centre that targeted specific audiences. These attempts to revert negative images of the past operated in a manner that played upon and reworked ‘older’ discourses of class and attempted to appeal to a potentially new constituency in Liverpool: an upwardly mobile, prosperous and entrepreneurial citizenry. Reworking images of Liverpool from a ‘working class city’ into a representative ‘European city’ focused not only on how city streets look but also what activities take place in
them. For example, the drive to instigate a café society in the city centre took place alongside campaigns aimed at cultivating a café culture clientele:

Our image campaigns are aimed at addressing local audiences as much as outsiders. The self-perception of Liverpudlians is negative even when they are being funny. The best burglar jokes are about Liverpudlians, but Liverpudlians tell them best! So that is why there are Mersey Partnership campaigns aimed inwardly to address Liverpool people and their relationship to the city. We are saying to Merseysiders - 'you are not just poor or self pitying'. We have to get across that Liverpool people are not all scallies, they have flash and well dressed young people who drink cappuccinos (Ibid).

In this sense, the local population as a whole became a category to be educated in line with ‘quality of life’ and ‘life style’ issues as defined within central regeneration vernacular. These themes ran coterminous with a desire to evoke a notion of self-governing subjects, autonomously choosing aspects of ‘life style’ offered by the regenerated city. Furthermore, and contrasted to these new urban desires, other aspects of city centre business which attracted a rather different citizenry within the network of market stalls, street traders and the “bargain basement sector”, were deemed out of step with the new urban façade and pointed to a perception of a “downgraded economy” (Marketing Director, Mersey Partnership), thereby attracting people of the ‘wrong sort’. As part of this process of re-articulating the urban order, a range of issues were targeted within strategies for responsibilised self-governance. These strategies initiated the instigation of a zero tolerance culture of civility. Intolerance of litter, vandalism and damage to the physical environment, along with “courteous, knowledgeable advice to customers and visitors”, were the desirable qualities of “a town-watch culture where people advocate their own responsibility” (Chairman, Merseyside Development Corporation). North American theme
parks and European cities such as Amsterdam were held as exemplars in this respect:

North American hospitality industries have developed a whole level of management expertise and training - a philosophy of customer relations, which is still to reach our service industries. I mean they are selling a themed product - it’s not just about what is sold but how it is sold. But it does not stop there. If you go to the Magic Kingdom in Orlando you cannot put a fag end out on the ground - a park employee would have picked it up in ten seconds and binned it. It is that kind of quick response we are working towards here. So people won’t stub out a fag or drop a crisp packet because they are totally intimidated by doing it. I ran a similar scheme in London Docklands - if something happens you hit it instantly. I would like to think we did it here as well (Ibid).

As will be discussed in the following chapter, and in recognition of these and other issues, Town Watch was established in Liverpool in 1998. Initiatives such as this have underpinned the material drive towards a service based economy and have taken place alongside a recognition amongst locally powerful partners of the particular need to train the local service based workforce in ‘customer care’:

We want to make people feel inclusive when they come to Liverpool. So what we are doing is about creating jobs within the services but also it’s about creating a town centre culture of responsibility on behalf of those who work here, day to day. It is a way of getting everyone who is working in shops, cafes and bars to know what they are part of - that they get the bigger picture and appreciate what is going on around them (Chairman, Stores Committee).

The LCCP has been at the forefront of a campaign running from July 1997 to establish an Academy (dubbed the “charm school”) to educate service staff in the treatment of customers and visitors to the city (Liverpool Echo, 25 April, 2000). Instilling a culture of civility amongst front line business personnel was recognised as a necessary step in the move to a service economy and as a response to competition in this area from other cities. For example, a more
business like approach in managing the city centre allowed the Government Office and the Stores' Committee to challenge the City Council to take a more proactive stance over its workforce regarding street sweeping. The perception of an 'unclean' urban fabric for these new urban managers was critical to the process of attracting investment, and used as a means to bargain with council officials and change council employment practices that were often described in Liverpool as based on a 'jobs for the boys' agenda:

If we want people to come and shop, go for a meal and to a show, we don't want them to have McDonald's wrappers blowing round their ankles at 7.00pm in the evening - but that's what happens. At a much more cynical level if the City Council adopts and signs up to the regeneration agenda it will give them the leverage they need to challenge some of the inertia and worst customer practice in the Council workforce. This is the case with the street sweepers, who finish at 2.00pm. They should be working shifts. If we are to get a 24 hour city they are going to have to re-negotiate a deal with sweepers so they are cleaning up 24 hours a day (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]).

The process of regeneration opened up spaces of manoeuvrability for key players in order to articulate interests, roles and responsibilities both within and between agencies. The cultivation of a 'growth mentality' had at its kernel a drive towards civic pride coupled with educative discourses directed at particular agencies and the population as a whole. These educational aspect of local state rule, along with marketing campaigns, formed the basis of a responsibilisation strategy legitimated though an official discourse that has both constructed and addressed 'self governing subjects'. Campaigns such as 'Your City, Your Choice', launched in October 1998 through the LCCP, was directed at both businesses and individual citizens as responsible categories to be made aware of the benefits of a clean city centre environment and the impact this has on tourism and investment (Liverpool Echo, 9 October, 1998). These discourses
of empowerment were central to strategies of city centre rule and represented techniques that attempted to promote the interests of the new primary definers and the social reproduction of their power to rule. In sum, this discussion has sought to illuminate how the discourses of responsibilisation prioritised a commercialisation of city centre space and the activities within it. In promoting a particular spatialisation strategy, a construction of civility, underpinned by a moral set of meanings, was constructed in a drive to order city centre space.

Conclusion

In light of the theoretical arguments outlined in Chapter Three, it can be argued that the governmental logic that permeated the neo-liberal state in Liverpool hinged around what Zukin (1996a: 45-46) called “a collective belief in the growth of the symbolic economy”, images from and about which circulate through to the wider public and underpin “both a landscape of power and a vernacular”. As representatives of a contradictory and discordant particular social bloc, the agents of the rescaled state have been engaged in local political struggles to forge a “hegemonic project” (Jessop, 1990: 260) across institutional boundaries that has, as discussed in this and the next chapter, thrown up contradictions and tensions between powerful interests. However, ideas of what were deemed to be in the interests of ‘the city as a whole’ were married with a particular meaning of regeneration in order to forge a consensus and legitimacy within and for the mechanisms of rescaling. The meanings and visions outlined in this chapter were central to a hegemonic project that was constructed “through particular spacialized discourses and practices” in a series of attempts to resolve “(albeit temporarily and unevenly) the conflicts between particular
interests within a particular spatially imagined and demarcated space” (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999b: 720). The development of the closed circuit television network in Liverpool, discussed in the next chapter, rendered a visionary and demarcated space both thinkable and practicable for the locally powerful.

Moreover, within these ‘new’ urban spaces, Parenti (1999: 95) argued that, “while the popular press has focused on the economy of play ... few writers have examined the security imperative that lurks on the dark side of ‘culture’ based regeneration strategies”, what he called “policing the theme park city”. The general themes and organising principles discussed above, that brought agencies together, constituted processes toward the creation of normative orders. These orders have permeated the institutions of rule in Liverpool and helped establish inter agency cooperation, but also have been instrumental in setting the parameters of ‘proper’ and ‘orderly’ regeneration. The discourses of empowerment that have addressed the ‘active subject’ are important to recognise and crucial in understanding the establishment of ‘theme park policing’ initiatives. Within the promotional ideologies engaged in the construction of an orderly urban fabric, the context can be identified for understanding the articulation of problems for such orderly regeneration and, in particular, how the objects of power have emerged thematically within the network of city centre rule. The development and promotion of an effective network of surveillance and social control in the city centre emerged out of the procedural alliances and broad city visions discussed in this chapter. An exploration of the development of techniques of control, of which the CCTV
scheme provided a nodal point, will further illuminate an understanding of the processes involved in constructing the normative sense of city centre space articulated by the locally powerful towards the legitimate uses and ordering of that space. The next chapter will examine the particular alliances, techniques and normative frameworks that underpinned the development of the social control network in Liverpool city centre through an exploration of the camera surveillance network.
Chapter Eight

Interpreting the CCTV Network: The Techniques and Norms of Social Control

If Merseyside is to become a hotbed of industrial activity it is essential that we can effectively attract new businesses here. All forms of grant assistance to Merseyside are allowing companies to make considerable improvements to their premises, not only to make them more appealing but much more secure against crime. Most of our major town centres now have comprehensive CCTV systems and many businesses are participating in various schemes that upgrade their security (Community Strategy Department, Merseyside Police, 1998: 1).

Introduction

The previous chapter dealt with the building of coalitions of interests through the discourses of ‘partnership’ and ‘regeneration’ in Liverpool. In particular the focus was on how these interests marshalled support for strategies aimed towards a re-imaging of the city, whilst at the same time establishing broad visions for a ‘renaissance’ in the city centre. This chapter will turn more specifically to the agencies and coalitions that constituted the closed circuit television (CCTV) network, as it emerged conterminous with the political and ideological processes outlined in the previous chapter. The self-styled role of the new primary definers found expression in the development and targeting of the CCTV network, discussed below. Their political and ideological position in the regeneration process provided both an increasingly powerful position for the articulation of problems of crime, deviance and social order, and a focal point for the instigation of social control practices. Therefore, within the context of definitional struggles over the meaning of partnership and regeneration, the “proper objects of power” (Fiske, 1993: 235) emerged as a salient component
of the visions articulated for the city which formed the basis for the engineering of a social ordering strategy.

Following the previous chapter, and the research aims of the thesis laid out in Chapters Three and Four, the development of the local CCTV network will be situated within the political, ideological and material imperatives that informed the strategies of powerful coalitions and partnerships involved in the regeneration of the city centre. In this sense, the thesis extends and challenges previous research around CCTV. This chapter will, firstly, overview the previous research in order to outline the issues it has raised and its limitations. Secondly, and in contrast to many of the previous studies, this chapter will examine more closely the ideological underpinnings of the techniques of social control in Liverpool city centre. In particular, the focus will be on the role of CCTV in the promotion of a social ordering strategy that was filtered and organised through the regeneration process. This will illuminate the cross-agency alliances involved in the management and targeting of the CCTV network, and indicate how that targeting was rationalised and refined through the normative orders of power (introduced in the previous chapter). The role of CCTV in Liverpool was pivotal in that it was identified as a ‘flagship’ development in the promotion and maintenance of an orderly city, though, as this chapter will explore, this development sat alongside and linked in with other policing initiatives in the city centre. Lastly, the chapter identifies and explores the tensions and contradictions within the networks of the locally powerful as the social ordering strategy unfolded.
The research process and CCTV

In Chapter Four a number of issues were raised regarding the relationship between powerful interests in the state and private sector, and the research process in and around contemporary crime prevention. This relationship helped marginalise political questions and processes that could be included in a research agenda and placed theoretical and methodological limits on understanding contemporary crime prevention practices such as CCTV. What follows in this section is a discussion of previous research around CCTV before presenting further research findings that develop the arguments in this thesis.

The centrality of surveillance camera technology in the field of crime prevention is borne out by the existence of its own research and practitioner journal, *CCTV Today*. Like all criminological research, the research process around CCTV has taken place within a politicised environment. Encouraged through a cocktail of government grants, private funding and superlative rhetoric, CCTV has been eagerly taken up by public and private partnerships at the local level.¹ Through the early 1990s, in a context of rising crime and public fear about crime, the rapid proliferation of CCTV was described by several commentators as an expedient, ‘technical-fix’ solution to a range of crime related urban problems (Groombridge and Murji, 1994; Graham et al, 1996). According to Groombridge and Murji (1996: 283), CCTV is viewed in government circles as unproblematic and has also become big business so that it “now seems set to achieve the status of an article of faith in popular crime

¹ These developments have been discussed in the Introduction and will be highlighted again in Chapter Five. Chapter Eight will discuss extensively the establishment of partnership approached to CCTV in Liverpool.
prevention discourse”. At times the debate around CCTV has been sharply polarised among researchers and practitioners. Some writers have argued ‘for’ CCTV as a necessary and straightforward policy response to increasing crime and incivilities (Horne, 1996), whilst others have noted the problematic nature of research in this area in that “critics of CCTV are often portrayed as enemies of the public interest” (Davies, 1996a: 328).

The next section will examine the research carried out on CCTV. The research will be broadly grouped under the two headings of evaluative and normative research. Following a discussion of the literature in this area, it will be possible to locate and elaborate upon the research questions and methodology of this thesis.

i. Evaluation of CCTV

Evaluative research into CCTV has exemplified many of the limitations discussed in the previous section regarding the narrow parameters of investigative questions posed and methodological approaches adopted. The proliferation of CCTV through Home Office and private sector funding has brought with it various attempts within and outside criminology to evaluate its effectiveness as a crime prevention tool. According to Tilley (1998: 145), “we have probably reached the point where the potential for CCTV to reduce crime has been established”. However, Tilley also pointed to a number of problems that can be identified for evaluative researchers in investigating CCTV. In particular he pointed to the relationship between the researcher and commissioners of research:
It is not always clear exactly what is wanted from an evaluation of a CCTV system. Whether an evaluation is worth undertaking at all and what needs to be done in any study depends on the purpose of the work. The evaluator and the commissioner of the evaluation need, thus, to agree reasonable purposes, and the research design of the study must be devised to achieve them. Evaluators should not underestimate the need and opportunity they have to educate those asking for evaluations as to questions it is possible to answer and desirable to answer. Similarly, those orchestrating evaluations should not underestimate their need to spell out, negotiate and oversee the evaluations undertaken on their behalf to generate credible and useful findings (Tilley, 1998: 139-140; emphasis added).

Tilley highlighted a variety of purposes that may exist for evaluating CCTV schemes, and that these purposes vary widely in their ability to generate credible findings and practical applications. He implied that the search for ‘credible’ and ‘useful’ findings continues to be a source of heated debate amongst evaluators. Thus, the first and most common kind of evaluation has asked ‘Does CCTV work?’ This approach has variously focused upon the impact of CCTV on levels of recorded and reported crime. Such statistical indices have been most commonly used as evidence for the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of CCTV. However, as Tilley (Ibid: 141) observed, such research has produced “mixed and arbitrary findings”. This approach has most often been constructed and applied by the proponents of CCTV that include policing agencies, local managers and developers. Short and Ditton (1995: 10), in their review of this work, noted that research with claims for ‘success’ in cutting crime, improving detection rates or in being unanimously popular amongst ‘the public’ has generated “post hoc shoestring efforts by the untrained and self-interested practitioner”. From this observation, the authors challenged the lack of ‘professionalism’ within this type of evaluation study:

This is not to claim that the evaluations are intentionally deceitful (or that CCTV doesn’t work): just that the evaluations
havent been conducted by independent professional analysts, and thus, in no case that we are aware of, do they satisfy the standard criteria of a credible evaluation (Short and Ditton, 1995: 10).

In view of these problems a more ‘robust’ evaluation procedure has been developed that asks ‘Can CCTV work?’ This has been tied to, though not exclusively, the so-called “realistic evaluation” approach (Tilley, 1998: 145). Such work has stressed the need to address a wider and more complex set of questions pertaining to the effectiveness of CCTV that are sensitive to ‘context, ‘mechanisms’ and ‘outcome patterns’ (Ibid). According to Tilley, three related questions ‘have always to be asked’ in order to produce realistic and credible results:

- **Mechanism** - What is it about CCTV which may lead it to have a particular outcome pattern in a particular context?
- **Context** - What conditions are needed for CCTV to trigger mechanisms to produce particular outcome patterns?
- **Outcome pattern** - What are the practical effects produced by causal mechanisms being triggered by CCTV in a given context? (Tilley, 1998: 145-146).

This approach recognised that CCTV can produce a number of effects (both positive and negative), for example, reductions in particular offences, displacement of particular offences, and impacts on the use of public space by women and young people. Realistic research has sought to evaluate CCTV alongside other crime prevention measures operating within a locality. From this angle, CCTV may reduce some crimes while others remain fairly constant (Brown, 1995). In his findings from a research evaluation in three town centres Brown noted the complexity of factors that have to be taken into account to make a CCTV scheme more effective:
The implications of these findings are that in order for a camera system to be effective within a town centre, there needs to be a high degree of coverage ... If a town centre area has many side streets and other premises such as car parks, it will require many cameras and several operators to make such a system effective ... CCTV seems to work best when it is part of a package of measures ... What is important is the way CCTV is used as part of an overall strategy for policing town centres. In order to sustain an effect, the cameras must also play a part in the apprehension of offenders ... Camera successes can then be published, reinforcing the message for offenders that there is an increased risk of being caught (Brown, 1995: 65).

Other studies in this vein have attempted to assess what the managers of CCTV schemes profess as the aims of a system (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) and the impact of CCTV upon the behavioural patterns of criminals in a given locality (Short and Ditton, 1998). Short and Ditton’s research evaluated the sharply debated issue of whether CCTV led to reductions in crime:

There are two key concerns relating to the effectiveness of open street surveillance CCTV schemes as crime prevention measures. One, do they reduce crime? Two, if so, is this at the cost of displacing it elsewhere? (Ibid: 404).

The research challenged previous findings that used police-recorded crime data as the sole reliable indicator to test for significant falls in crime after the introduction of CCTV.\(^2\) In their pilot study, thirty offenders were interviewed to ascertain their attitudes to CCTV and whether they considered re-offending in an area with camera coverage. Using a qualitative approach to evaluating CCTV, they found that camera surveillance impacted differently upon different types of offence - some criminal behaviours being displaced others remaining fairly constant (Ibid: 426-427). Thus within evaluation research the issue of displacement has been crucial:

\(^2\) For these researchers, CCTV “cannot be counted as a success until it has been demonstrated that these apparently saved crimes have not simply been displaced elsewhere”. Furthermore, earlier statistical based studies “did not permit a check for temporal, tactical or target displacement” (Short and Ditton, 1998: 405).
... because the simplistic demonstrations of crime rate decreases that typically accompany the installation of open street CCTV systems are usually used to justify the ongoing system expenditure. If offending can be shown to be merely displaced elsewhere, then these demonstrations of apparent effectiveness would be revealed as worthless (Short and Ditton, 1998: 426).

Following Tilley's 'realistic' agenda this kind of research has stressed that CCTV may produce specific and beneficial outcomes in particular contexts that depend upon a range of factors including offence type, offender behaviour, camera location and the stated aims of a CCTV scheme. For Tilley this kind of evaluative research has a clear role in the policy process:

This type of approach is also needed to develop individual schemes ... Those commissioning and conducting evaluations have an important role to play in arranging, undertaking, writing up and disseminating CCTV evaluation findings in a responsible way likely to help us achieving objectives cost-effectively whilst being aware of, taking account of, and where possible avoiding unwanted side-effects (Tilley, 1998: 151).

In moving away from findings that report an unqualified 'success' for CCTV such research - at least potentially - has applications in the policy arena of crime prevention, for example: in reminding practitioners of the dangers in assuming high levels of public support for CCTV (Honess and Charman, 1992; Ditton, 1998); in the need to carefully plan a camera network suited for specific localities and to place CCTV alongside other crime prevention and policing initiatives (Squires and Measor, 1996); and in moves to develop a CCTV scheme in such a way that recognises the perceptions and behaviour patterns of actual and potential offenders. In broad terms this research has remained supportive of CCTV as a potential crime and disorder reducing technology - albeit one that needs considerable fine-tuning and constant monitoring. In confining itself to the pragmatic, this research has not concerned itself with
problematising or questioning those definitions of crime and criminality that have underpinned the development of CCTV networks.

ii. Investigating the normative: questions of power and CCTV

Technical questions have set the evaluation research agenda on CCTV and, in doing so, not allowed for theoretical and normative questions that concern the conditions of its emergence, consolidation and uses of CCTV that take that agenda outside of a narrow crime prevention discourse. Graham et al (1996: 25) called for “a more critical debate about CCTV” among researchers and policy makers, arguing that research in this area needs to be broadened. They argued that what is “urgently required” are investigations into the effects of CCTV on the perceptions of diverse socio-economic groups and the development of CCTV within processes towards the “commercialisation” of urban centres. In their theorisation of CCTV, Norris and Armstrong (1998a: 8) noted that surveillance could be seen as “a form of power with a number of dimensions which all raise important questions which move beyond the narrow confines of criminological concerns with effectiveness”. In making this observation, the authors introduce broader theoretical concerns within which to flag up a number of research questions that move beyond evaluative methodological frameworks. In order “to develop a sociologically informed analysis and critique of the exponential growth of CCTV surveillance” (Ibid: 10), they encourage research into the relationship between CCTV and power. This would allow a broader range of questions to be asked such as: who is targeted by surveillance cameras and why? They raised further questions such as whose interests underpin CCTV schemes; how public support for CCTV has served
particular political interests; how do those targeted by CCTV experience and resist surveillance; and, what of the relationship between CCTV and structures of accountability and the impact of advanced surveillance systems “in increasing the scope of power?” (Ibid: 10). A number of researchers have developed research agendas that have built upon these broad questions. As will be shown, these agendas vary in the level and focus of analysis. Nevertheless, normative research is less preoccupied with whether CCTV ‘works’ and, instead, is expressive of a wider set of concerns that converge around the question of whose interests CCTV benefits and its relationship to social order. Those working within a normative framework have critically investigated, firstly, the targeting of CCTV and, secondly, the relationship between CCTV and the reconstitution of contemporary urban space.

Questions of power1: targeting, CCTV and civil liberties

The growth of CCTV has not gone completely unchallenged, as research asking questions into the civil liberty implications and regulation of this growth has demonstrated (Davies, 1996b; Fyfe, 1995; Kitchen; 1996; Bulos, 1997; Fay, 1998). The lack of statutory regulation pertaining to the uses and operational procedures regarding CCTV schemes - what Fyfe and Bannister (1996: 44) termed the ‘democratic deficit’ - has led some researchers to examine the discretionary perceptions of operators and managers of CCTV in order to ascertain who and what is targeted using camera systems. In this vein Bulos (1995: 5) asked a series of research questions omitted from previous research in this area. These questions included: the impact of the cameras on non-criminal patterns of behaviour; the nature of the criteria of selectivity used by operators;
and the processes of resisting the gaze of CCTV. Bulos interviewed the
operators of one CCTV scheme and concluded that young men in relation to
other social groups "were regarded with greater suspicion". Her findings raised
issues to do with the 'enclosure' of public space, whose interests this serves and
the impact of this upon uses of public space by young people. In noting the
expansive body of research on the effectiveness of CCTV in reducing crime,
Norris and Armstrong (1998b: 10) pointed out that very little attention has been
paid to the "working rules" of CCTV operators and how the investigation of
these rules may help us understand "the social construction of suspicion". In
their extensive observational study covering the operation of three CCTV
control rooms which generated 600 hours of data, the authors identified eight
working rules that guided the targeting of surveillance. These rules included a
prior knowledge of a person's criminal record, stereotypical assumptions
regarding the distribution of criminality (particularly towards young black
men), and normative conceptions of time and place. This research strongly
challenged assumptions that a straightforward relationship between CCTV and
'crime prevention' exists:

Although these working rules produced nearly nine hundred
targeted surveillances, they only led to forty five deployments,
predominantly for crime and order related incidents. The
deployments produced an arrest for one or more persons in
twelve incidents (Ibid: 11).

For these authors the findings pointed to a systematic discriminatory use of
CCTV against particular categories, which for them raised further questions
relating to the possibilities for the emergence of a collective culture of
resistance on behalf of those under systematic and targeted surveillance.
CCTV has often been legitimated on the basis of women’s safety and studies are divided in suggesting, on the one hand, that women are more likely to support camera schemes than men (Squires and Mearor, 1996: 38) and, on the other hand, that although women express support they do not necessarily believe CCTV will greatly impact upon crimes of sexual assault and physical attack (Honess and Charman, 1992: 11). More broadly, Brown (1998: 218) observed “the gendering of subjectivities of security and insecurity is hardly considered within debates over electronic surveillance”. Using observation and interview data gathered from a cross section of women and men who use the CCTV monitored town centre under study, Brown concluded that CCTV only bolsters an already masculine regulation of public space and women within it.3 In terms of the policy implications of these findings Brown argued that research findings that stress gender differentiation regarding safety have not been given priority in policy formation around CCTV.

Questions of power 2: CCTV, private interests and the constitution of urban space

As will be highlighted in more detail in Chapter Five, a discerning feature of contemporary developments in the organisation of crime prevention strategies has been the role of the private sector in initiating and managing such strategies (Bottoms and Wiles, 1996: 5). This is certainly the case with CCTV schemes whose capital and maintenance funding has in part come from the private sector

3 Brown pointed to the differential meaning and experience of social control that feminist writers highlighted in Chapter Two. She stated, “CCTV, which is essentially a tool of surveillance, is likely to be of limited benefit to women. They are already subjected to policing by attitudes and behaviour; they already police themselves by avoidance behaviour … It is not so much a question of whether CCTV can improve women’s safety, as one of whether CCTV relates to the ways in which women are made to feel insecure” (Brown, 1998: 217).
(Home Office, 1995). Investigating private involvement in the initiation of CCTV schemes and the consequences this has for the uses of surveillance and its impact upon the ordering of public space has been highlighted by a number of researchers in the field (Bulos, 1995; Fyfe and Bannister, 1996; Reeve, 1998; Coleman and Sim, 1998).

Research conducted by Reeve (1998: 70) aimed to place CCTV “vis a vis other elements in the stage set of consumption”. For him, CCTV could be understood along with those processes that seek to create “predictable environments”; that cohere with attempts to enhance the economic viability of urban centres (Ibid). Within these broader shifts in urban management Reeve argued that questions around CCTV and its impact on crime and criminal activity was “a side issue” (Ibid: 70). Central to this process of urban economic enhancement has been the role of privately sponsored Town Centre Management (TCM) from where Reeve gathered data using questionnaires. TCM has been essentially “commercially driven” (Ibid: 76) and CCTV has been pivotal in consolidating “a particular view of a town centre as a safe environment for those staying within the standards determined by the agencies controlling its use” (Ibid: 81). The research by Reeve raised questions about the proliferation and use of CCTV as an element within the broader strategy of urban “commercialisation”

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4 The increasingly active involvement of the private sector in the implementation of social control has, as Chapter Two discussed, been documented and theorised by several writers concerned to theorise changes in contemporary control strategies (Cohen, 1985; Shearing and Stenning, 1985; Fyfe, 1995; Garland, 1996).

5 TCM will be discussed in Chapter Five as it has emerged within the so-called ‘entrepreneurial city’ and in Chapter Seven as it has related to developments in Liverpool’s regeneration partnerships. In Liverpool TCM will be understood as one component in a patchwork of neo-liberal institutions that constitute the contemporary local state.
and the private interests this has promoted. For Reeve, these processes have denied "the traditional view of the town centre as a democratic space, capable of being appropriated by different groups for autonomous ends" (Ibid: 84).

Taking a similar line of enquiry, Fyfe and Bannister (1996: 44-45) argued that the diffusion of CCTV needs to be understood not through "operational questions about effectiveness" but in situating CCTV "in its political context". The authors placed their research into CCTV within an historical and theoretical context within which a number of research questions were generated. In applying Foucault's panoptic schema they argued that CCTV can be seen as "a general expansion of power" and as a "political technology for producing obedient individuals in public spaces" (Ibid: 39). These power relations have to be researched in recognition of the alliances between the local state and local private capital (Ibid: 40). Importantly, "city centre CCTV systems are not simply a piece of crime prevention technology" (Fyfe and Bannister, 1996: 40). In making such observations, a wider set of research questions have been generated that place CCTV within the economic, political and ideological processes that constitute urban governance. Bannister, Fyfe and Kearns (1998: 22) argued that research into urban CCTV systems must be informed by broader theoretical frameworks that forge an understanding of "the nature of contemporary urbanism" and the "economic and political imperatives" that shape the urban form, its differentiated uses and identity (Ibid: 35). For these authors therefore, research into CCTV should be approached less for its crime reducing potential but "rather as a symbol, of the current urban
Assessment and further questions

For the purposes of cogency and organisation, the above section reviewed CCTV research and categorised this work into evaluative and normative research. The section sought not to present an exhaustive review of research findings around CCTV but to establish and highlight the sorts of questions that have been asked in approaching the phenomenon and the relationship between research findings and policy. Evaluative research has been concerned to investigate, through the refinement of methodological approaches, the effectiveness of CCTV as a crime prevention tool and to address its impact upon categories of ‘crime’. However, this type of research has promoted a narrow focus of investigation. Important as this latter work is - for it may indeed challenge the legitimating discourses of CCTV managers and practitioners - it needs to be placed alongside critical qualitative investigations concerned with deconstructing prevailing definitions of risk within the public/private CCTV networks.

Research concerned with normative questions has begun to raise more critical questions arising from both theoretical and empirical work focused on the uses of CCTV and the interests and forces that shape such uses. Thus a number of researchers have raised issues connecting CCTV to processes related to an intensification in the exclusionary potential of contemporary social control (Norris, Moran and Armstrong, 1998), the privatisation of public space (Fyfe
and Bannister, 1996), and as indicative of an emerging ‘new penology’ (McCahill, 1998). From this literature a number of research questions can be developed and new questions introduced into an analysis of the camera network in Liverpool, which sustain a critical focus upon political economy in understanding the techniques and social meanings of social control. Thus, following the methodological discussion presented in Chapter Four, the remainder of this chapter will develop the arguments central to this thesis, namely; that the rationale for CCTV can be understood as part of a locally powerful social ordering strategy within a neo-liberal state form.

Liverpool, CCTV and ‘renaissance’

During the 1990s, what was conspicuous about public and private policing initiatives in the city centre was the development of an underlying rationalisation for such initiatives that mobilised around the notions of ‘regeneration’ and ‘quality of life’. As discussed in Chapter Six, public order policing in and around the city centre was, throughout the 1990s, increasingly articulated through a discourse of urban ‘renewal’ and ‘regeneration’. These discursive themes played a significant role for the new primary definers in rationalising the policing initiatives discussed in this chapter. The discourse of regeneration provided a platform for the locally powerful to promote their visions for the city out of which a variety of strategies for rule in the city centre were articulated. For example, the establishment of CCTV in the city symbolised a new-found confidence for the new urban managers central to the regeneration process, and consolidated their belief in the process. As one interviewee stated:
CCTV is a fantastic thing. Liverpool was one of the first major cities to establish a comprehensive surveillance system and it has helped produce dividends across the board. We had been arguing for it for years, and finally we pulled it off. It is marketed here so people know it is there. We had one of the biggest launches in the UK and as the Home Office minister said at the time people have nothing to fear from this technology and it will prove a tremendous asset to the city of Liverpool. Why? Because it can help induce confidence; a confidence in this city for all manner of people. And confidence in this city is something that has been lacking (Chairman, Stores’ Committee).

The expression of ‘confidence’ through CCTV pointed particularly to the increased power and influence of the private sector in local decision-making and the process of urban management generally. It was these new primary definers who, as will become clear, provided a central ideological and material base for the introduction of CCTV in the city. The development of CCTV in the city centre took place within a wider set of debates concerning the city’s regeneration, outlined in Chapter Seven, and therefore can be situated materially within the network of alliances and strategies of rule that have shaped the meaning and direction of regeneration. Within these processes the surveillance system was developed and managed in order to appeal to a range of audiences - namely, consumers, local businesses and potential investors. In this sense, CCTV provided a focal point for the Liverpool City Centre Partnership and its members to carefully re-image the negative reputation of the city:

We can reassure already existing businesses, which may have felt isolated - let down even by crime being unchecked in the city centre - that we are keeping an eye on their frontage day and night. We can also reassure the consumer, and tourists, that this is a safe place to enjoy and spend some time. And of course, we can show potential investors into the city that we have our act together with efficient and open partnership forums, which care about business in this city and are prepared to provide the necessary safeguards (The City Centre Manager, LCCP).
It is important, then, initially to contextualise city centre CCTV as a key policing development implicated in a series of regeneration strategies on a number of fronts. Following on from this, the next section examines the establishment of CCTV through the various networks of partners that were introduced in the previous chapter and will illustrate how these partners cultivated a rationale and management structure for the surveillance network.

**Establishing the camera network in Liverpool**

*Roots and consolidation*

CCTV has been the flagship in promoting a secure city centre in Liverpool and has provided the vehicle for initiating partnership policing in the city. Thus, tracing the trajectory of Liverpool’s CCTV scheme can further illuminate the shifts in urban rule together with changes in responsibility for the provision of social control in the city.

In 1989, a report drawn up by the Liverpool City Centre Crime Prevention Panel looked into the feasibility of establishing a CCTV system in the city centre in terms of mobilising cross-agency support and securing funding. The report signalled the start of a responsibilisation strategy, discussed in Chapter Three and the previous chapter, concerned with the governance of crime and disorder in the city centre. Early in the report it was stated that:

> It is recognised that the prevention of crime is not just a matter for the police. If we are to succeed we must all accept responsibility. The support and co-operation of all in the community is essential. Local authority departments, business and commercial interests and the individual citizen all have a part to play. It is equally recognised that solutions to crime need to be based on sound knowledge of local problems and needs. To
this end the Crime Prevention Panel is a non-political organisation representing the public (Crime Concern, 1989: 2).

"All sectors of the city community" were represented on the Panel that consisted of the City Council, Crime Concern, Merseyside Tourism Board, the Stores’ Committee and Merseyside Police. In creating a "safer city for all", the Report contextualised the need for CCTV within:

The changing face of the city centre [which] has received wide media coverage following press releases from the Leader of the City Council. Private sector investment in the city has also gathered momentum through the development of new shopping precincts and large scale refurbishment. Installing CCTV as an initiative for crime prevention will register support for all. It will prevent and reduce crime and disorder. It will reduce the ‘fear of crime’, restore confidence and encourage greater city centre use. It will be helpful to business in that they would not have to present a siege image (Ibid: 9).

Initially, the Report proposed an initial six camera network to be located in the main retail area and hoped that funding would be shared across a range of agencies, notably central government, the City Council, Merseyside Development Corporation, the police and large corporate bodies. It was proposed that the system would be maintained by yearly subscriptions from commercial and business enterprises and that it would act “as an additional aid to the police”:

At the end of the day it was concluded that to obtain the most effective and beneficial use of the system, the only body capable of monitoring is the police. The value to be gained, it was felt, would be derived from the speed of communication with, and operational response from, police officers on the ground. The police have the training, skill and experience unique in this field and the statutory power to take the necessary action. We are cognisant to the fact that we would be adding to the burden already carried by the police, but feel that the benefit to be derived would outweigh the costs and resource implications (Ibid: 7).
As noted above, the original intention was to seek funding from the City Council, Merseyside Police, central government and large corporate bodies. In effect no money was forthcoming from the Council (whose budget deficit was the largest in the country throughout the 1990s), nor Merseyside Police. Insurmountable problems around funding and responsibility for the system meant that CCTV in the city as envisaged by the Liverpool City Centre Crime Prevention Panel was abandoned. As one of those involved in the process explained:

Part of the debate we were having at the time was setting up CCTV which many of the people felt was an essential element in trying to improve the product of Liverpool city centre - primarily as a shopping base but also as a safer place for people to walk around ...[and] drawing upon the experience of other cities who have pushed ahead - particularly Newcastle. We put forward this proposal for CCTV through the Urban Crime Fund but we could not sort out the management of it and it was eventually abandoned at that stage. One of the reasons I was unwilling to push forward with it was I and others felt very strongly that Merseyside Police should have accepted long term liabilities for the maintenance and management of the system. Okay, it’s an expensive system - high quality fibre optics - but unless someone took ownership of it, whether it be the City Council or Merseyside Police - who did not have much money, but realistically it was a policing tool ... (Private Developer [2], affiliated to LCCP).

CCTV did not arrive in the city for another five years, with the configuration of relations and responsibilities between key partners considerably changed from the initial plan. The conflict between the partners flagged up the difficulties over responsibilities for the funding, monitoring and location of the system. It was not until July 1994 that Liverpool’s camera network was established with a total capital funding of £396,000. Central government, through the Urban Programme, provided £100,000, the European Regional Development Fund contributed £158,000 with the private sector inputting £138,000. Initially, 20
high-resolution pan, tilt and zoom cameras with full night-time capability were installed within a two-square mile area, covering the central shopping and office districts. The system was monitored by a private security company in a secretly located control room in one of Liverpool’s shopping malls. Monitor and audio links were installed in Merseyside Police Headquarters and in the Police Shop on Church Street (the city’s central shopping street). The system formed part of an extensive surveillance network which linked the police, private security and in-house store security via a radio link “early warning” system which made possible the monitoring of persons through both open public space and private shop space. The cameras were located on police advice in “recognised trouble spots and escape routes” (LCCP, 1994: 3).

**Rationalising CCTV in Liverpool**

CCTV did not come about just because retailers were bleating. But it is a fact that they were in the best position to bring all of this about (Chairman, Stores’ Committee).

At the high profile launch of the system, David MacLean, the then Home Office Minister for Crime Prevention, invoked the infamous murder of local two year old James Bulger to illustrate the need for, and advantages of, CCTV. His rationale for the system was picked up in the national press.\(^6\) National coverage of the launch was also underpinned by assumptions about the preventative capacity of the cameras regarding the safety of women and children in public spaces (LCCP, op. cit: 1), along with the much-publicised claim that the

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\(^6\) Such coverage included: ‘Liverpool’s bid to prevent new James Bulger horror’ (*Today*, 7 July, 1994); ‘Jamie Bulger city unveils spy cameras’ (*Daily Express*, 6 July, 1994). As *The Guardian* reported “the system is also expected to cut the risk of toddlers being lost, or abducted like James Bulger, led away to his death 18 months ago by two boys at a shopping centre in Bootle, three miles north of the of the area covered by the Liverpool scheme” (*The Guardian*, 6 July, 1994).
cameras would reduce crime in the city centre by 20% (Daily Post, 7 July, 1994). A “more secure environment” was thus promised, “particularly in a city like Liverpool where the fear of crime is not borne out by the statistics” (City Centre Manager, Liverpool Echo, 6 July, 1994). At the launch, MacLean praised the “excellent common sense” of the people of Liverpool in positively responding to the system, adding that formal regulation of CCTV was unnecessary:

The controls are that if people are behaving themselves, not committing crime on the streets, then nothing actually happens. It is rather fanciful to suggest that we need special controls just because we are using the latest high technology which actually stops crime … and that’s what the public want (Liverpool Echo, 5 July, 1994).

The various strands of official rhetoric around the launch of CCTV belied deeper motivations for the introduction of the system that were identified during the interview process. The impetus behind the establishment of the network involved a series of complex inter-related processes including: the desire to reconstruct the city’s deviant image; the bolstering of consumer and business confidence; the counteracting of certain forms of crime; and the perception - particularly on behalf of the business community - that the police could not or would not police the city centre ‘effectively’. As one urban manager put it:

The Bulger case served to focus attention but was not the prime cause in establishing CCTV - it’s a much longer-term thing than that (Research Interview, 8).

For this interviewee, involved in the management of CCTV, the system emerged to tackle the city’s negative image and its perceived impact on city centre business:
Perception is the biggest single burden Liverpool has got in terms of regeneration. There is a lot of information and disinformation, which can feed back in locally. The core trading area can be seen by some as a dangerous place (Ibid).\(^7\)

According to one key player, the network had:

... been evolving for the last 10 years. My experience of towns and cities is that it [CCTV] came out of horrendous store losses ... up to 3% straight loss. We have long been particularly concerned about security with regard to stores but also external security of the environment in which we operate (Chairman, Stores’ Committee).

As active lobbyists in establishing the Liverpool City Centre Partnership (LCCP), the Stores’ Committee was able to articulate more powerfully the need for a CCTV scheme:

We were the leading advocates of CCTV. We had been pursuing the issue for 4 or 5 years before the establishment of the LCCP in 1992, but when the Partnership was formed the number one priority of the City Centre Manager was to establish a CCTV system, which he did successfully ... housed in the city centre and run predominantly by the private sector (Ibid).

The major retailers in the city felt that the policing and prosecution of offenders in the city centre had become ineffective. The main problems they identified were summarised by one interviewee as the “lack of resources to patrol the streets; the lack of communication on criminal movement from one area to another and the lack of the courts to give meaningful sentences given to the convicted offender, which can have a knock-on effect on the morale of the police and Crime Alert members” (Private Communication from the Stores’ Committee, August 1996). The Stores’ Committee were concerned about cut-

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\(^7\) The notion of ‘dangerous place’ was not constructed on the basis of local crime statistics alone. On the basis of crime statistics Liverpool city centre would have to be seen as ‘less dangerous’ than the immediately surrounding areas during this period. A total of 5,954 criminal offences were reported in the first 5 months of 1994 in the police division which includes the city centre compared with 7,131 in the division covering north Liverpool. Within this period the city centre showed a higher crime rate than north Liverpool in the categories of street muggings and other thefts from the person, but these only accounted for 2.9% of all city centre crime. The statistics show that shoplifting accounted for 13% of all city centre crime (The Independent, 6 July, 1994).
backs in police foot patrols in the city centre from two sergeants and fifteen officers from the Shop Theft Squad to one sergeant and six officers based at the Police Shop on Church Street. This lengthened the police’s back-up response time from 90 seconds to 5 minutes. Within the context of dwindling public resources for the police, the pressure on the private sector to carve out a political space to responsibilise themselves in matters of managing local crime became acute:

My biggest concern for the police is that their power base has been undermined, their authority undermined, the conviction rate has fallen. The simple fact is that the criminal seems to be winning the war (Chairman, Stores’ Committee).

Within this context a “siege mentality” (Ibid) emerged within the Stores’ Committee who felt, at best, let down by public authorities in the city:

Our organisation has security bills of £270,000. That suddenly becomes an acceptable cost and do I feel comfortable with that? Well I can control it and become master of my own territory instead of relying on a public service body. This came about because of a deterioration in the quality of the police force - under-resourcing and motivational problems. We decided to take control of our own situation and because our insurance companies demand it - you don’t get cover unless security is sorted out (Ibid).

**Funding the CCTV Network**

Funds to establish the CCTV network from central government and European sources were made available on the proviso that private sector funding would also be forthcoming. Thus the role of the LCCP from 1992 was to lobby various businesses in the city to generate capital funding. This was done without any long term planning regarding the maintenance of the system:

At the beginning the primary goal was to get the system up and running while the capital funds were available through European and government money, with no plan for operating costs. The
initial funding was capital not revenue (The City Centre Manager, LCCP).

Lack of planning regarding future funding towards maintenance costs contributed to tensions within the security network; these are discussed in the final section of this chapter. For one CCTV manager, the rise of CCTV in Liverpool was a process of “metamorphosis” and the raising of private capital involved targeting the larger traders in the city:

All the people that were approached were pretty sold on the idea. I’m not saying they parted with cash easily but the issues were well known. They all had the same problems as previously outlined and there was a general move towards this (Ibid). 8

The ongoing maintenance costs of the system were secured through lobbying activities directed by the LCCP and aimed at local businesses. As pointed out earlier, the surveillance system in Liverpool linked the control room with private security via a radio link, which was monitored by police along with camera pictures. The combat radios - of which there were 60 on the network - cost £350 each and were acquired through the Urban Crime Fund and owned by the Stores’ Committee who issued them to members on payment of an annual subscription.

The Management of CCTV

Management of the system involved the City Centre Manager at the LCCP, the managers of a major shopping mall (where the system is housed) and Merseyside Police. The police controlled access to taped information for reviewing, evidential and publicity purposes as laid down in the local Codes of

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8 In Liverpool, businesses that operated within the CCTV coverage area received insurance discounts of up to 40% through a scheme entitled ‘Watchguard’ brokered between the LCCP and a local firm of major insurers.
Practice (Liverpool City Council, 1994). The handbook also stated that the police may request cameras to be directed to specific locations and that such requests must be complied with unless the operator deems otherwise, in which case the police must be given an explanation (Ibid: para. 6.9). The objectives of the system included: deterring crime; enhancing detection; reducing the fear of crime; making the city centre more attractive to business, shoppers and tourists; improving communication and response times of police patrols; and creating a safer city for all (Ibid: para. 1.3). Para. 1.5 of the Codes of Practice stated that private operators of the system must discharge their duties in line with the objectives “to keep wrong-doers off the streets”. Thus the local controls surrounding the system cohered around an informal triangle or chain involving the City Centre Manager, security management of the shopping mall and the City Centre Commander for Merseyside Police:

Although everything we do has to be closely worked out with the police - they don’t control it, only over evidence. This is all part of maintaining the system’s integrity and confidence with the public. So there is not a lot of need for detailed control … I’m not saying it’s not there because there is a management chain (Chairman, Stores’ Committee).

The day-to-day operation of the system was directed through Crime Alert, the sub-group of the Liverpool Stores’ Committee. This group performed functions in the front line of targeting surveillance in the city centre and will be discussed in more detail below.

The ‘effectiveness’ of CCTV as a finely targeted mechanism of public surveillance needed to be communicated to the wider public. Home Office

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9 Codes of Practice for CCTV schemes were drawn up on a local discretionary basis amongst the immediate interested parties (The Observer, 10 March, 1995).
Guidelines urged scheme managers “to get the local press on your side from the start” to “ensure they realise what your objectives are” in focusing “them on the safer shopping/walking element” (Home Office, 1994: 32). Thus, from the outset, a key component in the management of CCTV in Liverpool was its reception in the local media and therefore its credibility and legitimacy among the wider populace. As one CCTV manager stressed; “there is no need for detailed controls; as long as we’ve got Mr and Mrs Bloggs on board - great” (The City Centre Manager, LCCP). Another interviewee stressed the need to “constantly sell the benefits of CCTV; though this must be done carefully” (Private Developer [1], affiliated to LCCP). These issues will be returned in the final section of the chapter.

The location of the cameras in Liverpool was decided on the basis of “police crime patterns and knowledge of incidents” along with the “hands on experience” of store security so that “escape routes and access points” would be covered (The City Centre Manager, LCCP). Crime Alert, along with the City Centre Manager, defined the role and use of CCTV in the city:

That is what is most effective about CCTV ... It is effective when you know who you are looking for (Chairman, Stores’ Committee, emphasis in original)

Furthermore:

You need somebody to monitor the system, somebody available to react and to be seen to react - then it has got credibility (Ibid).

This involved triggering an “appropriate police response” using picture relays and the two-way radio. This acted as an “early warning deterrence”:

The criminal element is not stupid. They have a pretty good idea about what’s covered, where and how ... and they can tell that by testing it ... but once they’ve been picked up on the radio and
then on camera - it cramps their style - there is virtually no escape (Ibid).

Importantly, a message “must go out” to those targeted by the system so that “known shoplifters and people who are banned cannot walk around the city centre with impunity” (Ibid). This message was also relayed replete with video stills through local and national media to promote claims of the system’s success in deterring and apprehending potential and actual offenders. The police Area Commander, in a much publicised comment, maintained that:

The system is like having 20 more officers on duty 24 hours a day who make a note of everything, never take a holiday and are very rarely off sick (The Times, 6 July, 1994).

The police position on CCTV in Liverpool will be returned to below, as it took a more ambiguous line than such official pronouncements suggested. In summary, for the City Centre Manager CCTV provided a broader vehicle for social ordering in the city centre: “Hopefully the cameras will deter criminals. But we also hope the cameras will reassure potential investors” (Liverpool Echo, 13 June, 1996).

After the launch and establishment of the CCTV system it was integrated along with two other initiatives in the city centre with a security function. Firstly, Crime Alert had been in operation some years before the CCTV scheme came on line and, as noted above, took a key role in targeting the system. Secondly, the Town Watch initiative arrived after the CCTV scheme became operational and was envisaged as a visible street level accompaniment to the effectiveness

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10 One urban manager passed on examples to the researcher of ‘successful’ media coverage: ‘Tapped by CCTV’ (Liverpool Echo, 10 November, 1995); ‘This man has just knifed a stranger to death’ (Daily Mirror, 2 December, 1995); ‘Camera Trap’ (Liverpool Echo, 5 February, 1996).
of public camera surveillance. It is to a consideration of the development and role of these organisations that the chapter will now turn.

**The Role of Crime Alert**

The work of Crime Alert has been briefly alluded to, above, in this chapter. What follows will detail the work of the organisation, its rationale and position within the overall security network. As Chapter Four noted, eight meetings of the group were attended during the course of the research within a year long period. This section will utilise field notes and interview material accrued from the group. The group initially used to consist of store detectives only, but with the proliferation of in-house security guards, security managers and in-store CCTV the meetings of the group became operationalised on a monthly basis with 30 to 40 attendees. These meetings provided a central focus for local businesses, police and private security in defining risks and gaps in the network as well as prioritising policing objectives for the city centre. In bringing together private and public interests this closed forum represented, to borrow Brogden and Shearing’s (1993) term, the development of a local ‘security network’. In Liverpool, the network consisted of initiatives spearheaded through the Stores’ Committee and its larger offshoot, the Liverpool City Centre Partnership. From these bodies was developed the city centre CCTV system, Crime Alert and Town Watch that collectively formed the pillars of the network. The work of Crime Alert was described as “letting the criminal element know that we know they are there … it is about making it harder for them”. This body acted as a catalyst for store security and attempted to “get people into the spirit” (Chairman, Crime Alert). The Chair of Crime Alert
reported back to the Stores’ Committee, which, as mentioned earlier, the Area Commander from Merseyside Police attended. Crime Alert existed as part of the Stores’ Committee and is one of several inter-related subgroups with responsibility for promoting retail interests and working with interested parties in the city centre:

The Stores’ Committee is like a brotherhood organisation and from that we have set up Crime Alert. There are groups responsible for tourism, street lighting and street cleansing. But we all work as a team and each cultivate working relations with the likes of the City Council and Merseyside Police (Ibid).

Within Crime Alert, Merseyside Police Crime Prevention Officers and operational support, private security and store security met to discuss intelligence and the targeting of activities in the city centre.

Crime Alert had its roots in the early 1980s and was launched as ‘Commercial Crime Watch’ at the behest of Liverpool Stores’ Committee. To be a member of the group the annual fee of £1200 had to be paid to the Stores’ Committee whereby access to the radio link and monthly meetings was granted:

Crime Alert, in conjunction with the Liverpool Stores’ Committee, has an aim to make Liverpool a safe and clean city for visitors and shoppers alike and to this end works closely with many organisations, including the city council, Liverpool City Centre Partnership and the Chamber of Commerce (Private Communication from the Stores’ Committee, 11 August, 1996).

Crime Alert identified problems in the city centre very broadly, but these problems were subsumed under a key concern with that which was detrimental to trade. The main problems were defined in the following manner:

We have problems with terrorist threats - the Animal Liberation people for example. Of course we have shoplifting, damage to property day and night. From a personal point of view and from the Stores’ Committee point of view we also believe the street traders do not enhance the city centre. They force people in
certain directions so you have not got any freedom to move through Church Street at will. Street beggars, street musicians and collectors give the same problems. We seem to have people collecting for all sorts all the time. We don’t believe there should be so many and that licensing should be tightened up and inspected (Chairman, Stores’ Committee).

Initially the group was organised through the larger stores “to get information passed amongst retailers of who was operating in the city centre to the detriment of trade and with a view to working with police to curtail the problem” (Chairman, Crime Alert). From this fairly ad hoc and informal communication channel, “the idea progressed to an organised monthly meeting with a full sixty radio communication system connected to the city camera room and ‘Cop Shop’ along with meetings with the Police Intelligence Unit, Crime Prevention, Shop Lifting Squad with regular attendance of the Crime Prosecution Service” (Ibid). The larger numbers of attendees at Crime Alert were private security. Most of the security staff was hired on an individual basis by particular stores, while others belonged to national security firms contracted to particular retailers (Ibid).

The aim of working more closely with the police was initiated by the larger retailers who had been advocating such a move on a national scale. In this sense, the cultivation of both formal and informal national feedback chains helped to plan and initiate action at the local level. For example, in Liverpool, Marks and Spencer, who spearheaded the move to install a City Centre Manager and who took a leading role in the Stores’ Committee, developed senior and Board level links with Home Office Ministers concerned with crime prevention. In this context, meetings occurred around issues to do with the role of retailers in “contributing to the local environment in which we operate”
(Representative of Stores' Committee). The aim of such contacts was to encourage and galvanise local co-operation between business, local government and police on matters of crime prevention and to "improve the environmental quality of life within which business operatives work" (Ibid). In forging these links, Marks and Spencer were central in that they had been able to utilise their national security provision which consisted of six Divisional Security Co-ordinators and extensive data bases of known and potential shop lifters including a regularly updated and distributed "national top ten". The utilisation of this provision to aid local policing was encouraged by the Home Office and supported by major retailers themselves who, in Liverpool, wanted to see more done in terms of policing crime as perceived from the retail perspective:

Other stores are very interested in what we are doing because we tend to be the high street leaders in these things - probably because of the size of our operation and the high levels of loss we incur, we have invested a lot in security. So we tend to know if and when there is something going down somewhere. So if we have got a pattern of something happening we can get the Regional Crime Squads involved (Ibid).

From the perspective of Merseyside Police the pressure to become involved with local retailers took place in a context of criticism from the latter over the perceived decline in police presence in the city centre and lack of understanding regarding retail issues. For the police, the more effective targeting of their resources provided a rationale for the existence of Crime Alert and their working with them. However, Crime Prevention Officers initially expressed their concern about engaging with such bodies in that 'normal' policing issues, resources and time may be diluted in having to engage with the business community. These tensions between players will be introduced at this point in
the chapter but will be returned to in more detail below. One Crime Prevention Officer stated:

Some years ago when the police were invited to attend local traders’ meetings I would sit for hours listening to people talk about the state of the pound and what a Labour Government would or would not do for the local economy. This can’t be justified - it is a waste of police time and so, yes, we encourage sub-groups that focus on the issues the police can be useful in. These partnerships with local traders come out of the fact that the police cannot do it on their own. So we, and others had to get on board with this. Crime Alert is a classic example of how we cannot police the city centre as we once did - because of resource issues and the like. So we rely on those others to be our eyes and ears and bring things to our attention, so if we do have an incident we can allocate resources accordingly (City Centre Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police).

The police role in the city centre, as discussed in the previous chapter, changed from a situation of relative isolation from other agencies to one of closer co-operation and liaison. In this context, information became a prime commodity and negotiating tool in inter-partner relations:

Fifteen or twenty years ago we would not have even entertained the idea of engaging with the likes of the Stores’ Committee. I mean, two separate organisations, right? The level of information exchange and formalised meetings that we have today was unimaginable then. For example, as a Crime Prevention Officer I would have to seek higher approval for releasing crime figures and even if they were released there was the worry of how they would be used - how would they reflect on the police? With the arrangements we have now this is not necessary and we can be a bit more honest. We have nothing to hide and if people say those figures are terrible, we say yes they are, and that is why we are doing this-and-that to rectify the situation. The more information we release the more we can explain ourselves and influence people (Ibid).

Information gathering and sharing was also a key function of Crime Alert. The information gathered through CCTV footage and intelligence from the radio link was channelled through the Chair of Crime Alert to be used in helping to guide police action. This information channelling through the private sector was
necessary in order to get the police to act - "they'll only proceed if there's intelligence, not because we want them to" (Chairman, Crime Alert). From the police point of view, this was crucial for them to get involved in criminal or potentially criminal activities and to target resources accordingly. For Crime Alert, a process of learning to gather information and collate it in accordance with police criteria of 'usefulness' was set in motion:

We have day-to-day contact and monitoring procedures aimed at street beggars, Big Issue vendors, acts of criminal damage, fly posting - anything of that nature. We know when it has become a problem. The more information they [the police] get, the more that is fed to them, the more they can decide upon what resources they need to put in. If we can get our act together information wise, they are quite willing to receive the information, estimate it and act upon it (Ibid).

Within Crime Alert all security managers were regularly encouraged to write to the Area Commander within Merseyside Police informing him of all incidents in order to "keep piling on the pressure for increased police manpower in the city centre" (Field Notes). Again, lower level Crime Prevention Officers were initially reluctant to become involved with Crime Alert in that a sense of an 'independent' policing rationale for particular policing operations was being taken away:

As the business partners became more organised through things like Crime Alert and CCTV they were obviously able to command a certain amount of information about crime in the city - at least crime in the way they see it. These associations tend to evolve with a crime component in their day-to-day activities and there are always victims amongst them and so we get dragged in. Dragged sounds terrible, but you know we tend to get pulled in their direction (City Centre Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police, emphasis in original).

The police response at a more senior level was to establish specialist units to work more closely with local businesses in the city centre. Thus the Police Intelligence Unit, a Crime Prevention Officer for the city centre and the Shop
Lifting Squad regularly attended Crime Alert and supplied information and operational support when appropriate.

Although tensions arose on technical matters between police and private security (these will be discussed in more detail below), members of Crime Alert developed an organisational bonding through the cultivation of a normative sense of purpose that engendered loyalty and cohesion around the aims of the group. This normative underpinning aided the various agents within Crime Alert to define their work as well as cement relations between agency representatives. These normative processes were manifest in the discursive exchanges between group members and represented an integral part of the low level social ordering activities the group were engaged in. Such exchanges constructed and demarcated the users of city centre space: the 'respectable' and 'non-respectable'. Members of Crime Alert characterised the objects of their power as "dross", "scallies", "knobs", "hawkers" and "fake homeless" (Field Notes). These constructions complimented and reinforced, albeit in less sophisticated tones, the broader visions for order in the city centre discussed earlier in the chapter and in the last chapter.

In the process of constructing the proper of objects of power, the members of Crime Alert collectively compounded a process of negation and othering directed at known and potential shop lifters, street traders, homeless people and young people who were regularly the subject of ridicule, contempt and objects
of fascination and frustration. These aspects of Crime Alert will be discussed more fully below.

The Role of Town Watch

Alongside the city centre CCTV initiative and Crime Alert, another interrelated scheme was developed. Town Watch (also known as the City Representatives) stemmed from discussions between the Government Office and the Stores' Committee and was described as "a reassuring, visible presence that is uniformed but recognisable... to stand in public places with no special powers" (Home Office Advisor, [GOM]). Town Watch became operational in January 1998 and recruited 20 persons from the long term unemployed. The problems in establishing Town Watch were considerable and involved negotiating relations with the police and city centre funding regimes. The issues with the police were down to operational matters:

The possibility was they [the City Rep's] would be perceived by the regular police as the thin end of the wedge to a two tier police service .. They [the police] told us what they would not be prepared to tolerate that and we had to construct a path through it. So we had to avoid things like using the word 'security' and the word 'control'. You have to avoid words like 'residential areas' (Ibid)

The Government Office took on the role of selling the idea to the Association of Chief Police Officers through Merseyside's Chief Constable. For the police, the idea became realistic when it became clear that Town Watch personnel would not be a policing substitute. Furthermore, from the police point of view, Town

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11 At one meeting of Crime Alert the group spent fifteen minutes watching CCTV footage of a woman pushing a wheelchair with three small children in tow. The woman appeared to be pregnant. The group were keen to identify her because she was “too dirty to be your ma”. Several minutes were taken up with the question of whether she was “really pregnant” and whether the children belonged to her. She had been “seen around town” and several group members and the chair requested information on the woman (Field Notes).
Watch would be an independent policing aid, with specified links with the policing apparatus and untainted by links with the private security industry:

They would have to be employed through or by the Local Authority and would have a communication network that was independent of the police. We [the police] might help in their training and so on. The deal is that they [Town Watch] will have service level agreements with a broad spectrum of agencies. So for example, if they found uneven paving stones and asked the Highways Department to come and sort them, they would sort them in an agreed number of days. If they find crime, vandalism or anti-social behaviour and they report them to the police, the police will respond within agreed time periods. The key thing is they would have no special powers. They would not be expected to use their civil powers of arrest unless it was in circumstances were they would do it anyway as citizens. On that basis we are happy to go with it because it is very much not-for-profit like the private security industry and will employ people responsibly (City Centre Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police).

The role of Town Watch emanated from concerns within the Stores’ Committee regarding the declining police presence in the city centre, alongside the separate issue of the competition wrought by the rise of ‘out of town shopping’ areas. These latter domains were seen to be one step ahead of the city centre regarding street security and cleanliness. Town Watch was envisaged as a response to these issues as well as a facilitator to the tourist industry:

Town Watch is a group of people from the long term unemployed who are trained in knowledge of the city. They have maps and car park information. They are also trained in non-aggressive communication skills with the general public. The training is extensive in making sure Town Watch is non-confrontational. They can move on street traders unlawfully trading and move on beggars. They can check the validity of Big Issue sellers and they can even challenge people who drop litter on the streets. They are radio linked to the CCTV control room so that if they see something untoward they would be able to call the police very quickly. They are literally a presence; they are not another police force. They are not vigilantes (Representative of Stores’ Committee).

Town Watch emerged from negotiations between key players at local and national level and fitted in with the regeneration strategy, giving the personnel
of the Watch a broad remit. As well as “protecting the City Council’s assets and the streets” (Ibid), Town Watch was established to give visitors “a sense that they feel comfortable and not fearful from crime” (Ibid). The managers of Town Watch were concerned to counter negative perceptions of the group as “yet another layer of surveillance and policing in the city centre” (Home Office Advisor, [GOM]). Town Watch represented one component in the network of order maintenance in the city centre. As one interviewee expressed it:

What you have to realise is it [Town Watch] is only part of the solution. Town Watch feeds in with an agreed strategy between city centre occupiers; it involves linking in with CCTV; it involves linking in with the police. It also involves a significant publicity campaign so people know why they are there. It’s got to be marketed right (Ibid).

Thus far the chapter has discussed the interrelationship between CCTV, Crime Alert and Town Watch, and the problems identified by urban managers pertaining to the dynamics of this interrelationship and the promotion or marketing of these aspects of social control. The next section of the chapter will outline the role of the security network as a vehicle understood not just in terms of the techniques implicated in contemporary governance but understood also for the moral and normative dynamics that underpinned these techniques of control in shaping a social ordering strategy for the city centre. Moreover, the position of CCTV, Crime Alert and Town Watch within these processes was tactically important in that these techniques of order formed the basis for future ordering strategies:

The long-term vision for a structure that would include CCTV and Town Watch is having a system that is in a position to make qualitative interventions, positive interventions in the cyclical process of offending. It is actually resourcing that system and then getting the players in that system to recognise problems and then intervene (Chairman, Stores’ Committee, emphasis added).
Targeting the camera network: The proper objects of power

As indicated earlier, the CCTV surveillance system developed within a wider set of debates taking place within the various partnerships concerned with the management of the regeneration process. The purposes of CCTV in the city centre, and thus how it was used and targeted, were articulated within the formal and informal networks of the neo-liberal state - by those responsible for engineering the regeneration process. As noted in the previous chapter, the Stores’ Committee, Liverpool City Centre Partnership, the Office of Partnership Group and Merseyside Police played a key role in this process. These same partners also played a determining role in establishing the bodies and mechanisms aimed at consolidating and extending CCTV, and (from their point of view) rendering it more effective, within a wider security network which tied in with the operations of Crime Alert, Town Watch and public policing in the city centre. Thus the responsibility and management of CCTV and its attendant organs lay within the network of these partners. It was the Stores’ Committee and the LCCP who initially pushed and developed all the links in the network and gained a greater hands-on control and responsibility for the targeting of the network. The issue of leadership and responsibility regarding the CCTV network was not a clear cut one and existed as a source of tension for the partners themselves (as will be discussed later in the chapter). However, understanding the objects of city centre surveillance must require both a recognition of the trajectory of neo-liberal urban management and the social relations out of which this trajectory was borne and, indeed, constructed. In other words, as the previous chapter argued, understanding the day-to-day operation of the surveillance system must be placed within the underlying
features of the emerging social order. The taken for granted assumptions of those operating the CCTV network that pertained to what constituted ‘suspicious’ and ‘incongruous’ activity were reliant on, and took their cues from, the broader ideologies of constructing a sense of place.

The partnerships involved in regeneration set about defining problems perceived to hinder the regeneration process through defining categories of negative and identifiable risk. In constructing the objects of their power the agencies involved in the network were engaged in a process of defining categories of ‘responsibility’ concerning the uses of city centre space and the ‘appropriateness’ of certain practices and behaviours against the backdrop of urban revitalisation. The historical material in Chapter Six highlighted the concerns of Liverpool’s governing classes directed at particular groups and activities in the city centre. These activities were defined as disorderly thus undermining the city’s sense of civic propriety. The governing classes were not only involved in defining disorder but also took a role in shaping the police response to it. The following discussion will draw attention to historical continuity regarding these processes, focusing on the targeting of problematic activities in the city centre by the city’s governing fractions involved in the regeneration process. This historical narrative of the practice of social control will strengthen criticisms made earlier regarding the a-historical theorisations of risk and social control put forward by, for example, Feeley and Simon.

In 1997, a move to bring coherence to the process of securing the streets of Liverpool was developed through the Officer Partnership Group which
developed a strategy document, which derived from meetings between the key players and was circulated to them. This document, introduced in the previous chapter, was entitled *Action Plan - Regeneration Agenda for Liverpool: To Develop a Safer City*. The document placed ‘safety’ as central to the regeneration process:

Experience and perceptions of safety in Liverpool fundamentally affect quality of life across the whole of Merseyside and impact on inward investment and wider economic regeneration of the city. Developing a Safer City is an essential element of the holistic approach to promoting Liverpool as a safe, vibrant, regenerating city, which is attractive to inward investors and supports a high quality of life for residents and visitors (Liverpool City Council, 1997b: 1).

The document identified “key elements” defined as “situational measures” to “make Liverpool city centre more attractive for work, commerce, leisure, shopping and tourism” (Ibid: 6). The document consolidated the role of the partners discussed so far in this chapter in placing CCTV in a pivotal position regarding street management. The key elements were stated as “raising a visible, uniformed presence in the city centre; improving litter and graffiti removal services; encouraging leisure and healthy life style opportunities; a focused media campaign; controlling street traders”; and, as a key element in orchestrating responses to issues of “street management and cleanliness”, “extending closed circuit television” (Ibid). Against this backdrop the chapter will now turn to the themes and issues to emerge from the interview process regarding the objects of partnership power and the targeting of the camera surveillance network.
Purification of the streets

The pavements here are a disgrace. They do not encourage investment (Field Notes: senior business executive addressing local conference, Merseyside: The Future, 4 July, 1997).

The streets of the city centre formed a focus for the attention of the locally powerful in general and the security network in particular. The concern with ‘the look of the streets’ and the ‘ambience of city centre life’ was central to the architects of regeneration discussed in the previous chapter. The focus on the streets as an object of power has conflated a range of problems for an orderly regeneration. Threats to the local urban aesthetic were identified as: the problem of litter; individual and travelling groups of shoplifters; the prevalence of litter and graffiti; sellers of the homeless magazine (The Big Issue); young people; licensed and unlicensed street trading; and busking. As problems hindering the process of regeneration, these categories were positioned in opposition to a more orderly vision of street life that has been constructed around culturally defined notions of ‘carnival’ and ‘fun’, but which were at the same time highly circumscribed. The streets became a locus for the new primary definers to instil ‘spontaneity’ and ‘playfulness’ as well as to advertise, through the use of banners on special posts, officially sanctioned cultural and other events in the city centre. Alongside the CCTV system, the LCCP established various campaigns to promote a city of civic propriety:

It all stems from our ‘Local and Proud’ initiative, which sparked off a number of other projects. The city centre was obviously in a bad state, a free for all, if you like; buskers, fly posting, litter and all manner of collectors – none of it controlled and some of it down right offensive to visitors, tourists and shoppers. It gave the impression of wider dereliction and impoverishment. We needed to counter these kinds of things and salvage the architectural and cultural heritage of this city; if you like - marketing the city’s heritage splendours, and building a more
family friendly environment. We’re giving the city centre back to the people (Chairman, Stores’ Committee).

Reclaiming the city centre as a managed and controlled environment formed a key regeneration strategy concerned with levering inward investment. ‘Street cleanliness’ became the eclectic buzzword through which a series of initiatives concerned with street order were enacted:

I am not spouting a prejudice here but as any one who cares about the future of this city will tell you the people of this city are so untidy. The streets are always filthy and that just gives us a bad name. Just how many more letters to the [Liverpool] Echo do we have to read slagging us off for the state of our streets? It’s a big put off for shoppers and tourists (Economic Development Officer, Liverpool City Council).

Through the LCCP, street cleansing took root in an initiative entitled Gold Zone, launched in 1998. The initiative relied chiefly on private sector backing and had the support of key players that included the Stores’ Committee and Mersey Partnership. In attempting to make businesses and citizens responsible for their own environment, Gold Zone marked a step in the direction of responsibilised self governance. At the same time, the LCCP along with Merseyside Police and the City Council invoked a by-law to extend “alcohol free zones” in the city centre. This “important weapon in the war against street crime” applied to the drinking of alcohol on all main streets. Street signs were erected warning people that drinking in the streets would entail the risk of being fined up to £500 and the possibility of police arrest. The exceptions to the by-law were the new designated pavement cafes (Daily Post, 24 March, 2000). The

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12 Gold Zone was concerned with “the protection of central pedestrian areas” from litter, fly posting and graffiti alongside the promotion of “brightening up” events such as street decoration, entertainments and events (Gold Zone, March 2000). Gold Zone was initiated in the more prestigious shopping areas of the city centre and developed a “fault finding service” in which local members reported unwanted or untoward activities which infringed the Gold Zone initiative. Along with the Gold Zone Crew, funded by Liverpool City Council, three police officers also patrol the Gold Zone areas (Liverpool Echo, 22 November, 1999).
by-law was suspended during officially sponsored festivals and events. The instigation of a café bar culture brought with it contradictions for urban managers. With the proliferation of bars the fear of a city centre blighted by drunken disorder was seen as a threat to the desired urban ambience, outlined in the previous chapter, and must, therefore, be countered with the measures above. In this sense a careful management of street order was enacted in an effort not to offset the trajectory of regeneration but to reorder the nature, timing and location of activities in the streets.

The mushrooming of street management schemes tied discourses of image and safety to the logic of investment, whether through tourism, shopping or attracting new businesses. Within this, the role of the CCTV network was to oversee a ubiquitous construction of 'street cleanliness'. This role was articulated in a manner that referred to 'the people'. As one CCTV manager put it:

The city centre is a people’s place first and foremost and CCTV is a people’s system. It’s got to be other-wise it could not be successful in terms of what we are trying to do (The City Centre Manager, LCCP).

For this interviewee, CCTV was described as one of "the vehicles" through which the LCCP and its partners operated. As mentioned earlier, CCTV was described by one its managers as important in the process of "sustaining the pedestrian flow of traffic" (Ibid). In sustaining this flow, a number of obstacles to street order were identified by those who managed the camera network. These obstacles will be discussed below.
Homelessness became an important factor for those partnerships concerned with image management and the creation of favourable business climates. In September 1995, Liverpool City Council’s Social Services Committee considered a motion in the name of a Conservative Councillor. The motion read as follows:

That the City Council, in conjunction with Merseyside Police, initiate a programme to remove from the streets of Liverpool all professional beggars in order to prevent residents of the city and visitors being harassed and accosted (Liverpool City Council, 1996: 2).

The Sub-Committee approved the motion. The motion formalised random police ‘checks’, using the Operational Support Division, on those found begging and selling *The Big Issue* magazine in the city centre. The problem was articulated as one of rooting out and ridding the city of “aggressive beggars” as distinguished from the “genuinely homeless”. During this time, one councillor was reported as saying that “some of these people are earning up to £500 a week. It doesn’t improve the city’s image” (*Liverpool Echo*, 11 September, 1995).

In joining the Office of Partnership Group, the Stores’ Committee was able to articulate the problem of the homeless in Liverpool that dovetailed with its, and others’, concerns about street cleanliness and the quality of the environment.

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13 The issue of homelessness and its increased visibility on the streets of Britain through the 1980s and into the 1990s received growing national attention from media commentators and policy makers. The notion of ‘professional begging’ and what the then Shadow Home Secretary Jack Straw referred to as ‘aggressive begging’ (*The Guardian*, 9 September, 1995) helped to move the debate around homelessness into the domain of street disorder and public safety.

14 The motion also condemned the Conservative Government of the time “for creating a situation in which people are driven to beg because of lack of work and lack of proper benefits” (Liverpool City Council, 1996).
Hostility towards the homeless was not uncommon and underpinned their hostility towards the presence of this group for seemingly contradicting the re-imaginining of the city centre:

Oh yes, there is a 'big issue' [laughter]. When people come out of Lime Street to do some shopping they've already passed seven or eight Big Issue sellers and it really pisses them off. You then think this city is seedy and full of beggars and homeless people; like something you stand on (Research Interview 1).

The problem of homeless persons in the city centre was articulated most forcibly through the Stores' Committee and the LCCP:

Well you see we have this problem with Big Issue vendors. They stand right outside the more popular stores in a manner intrusive to those entering and leaving. Some of them even go into a store causing mayhem. Some of them we’ve banned because it has been in our customers’ interests (Chairman, Crime Alert).

Initiatives from the partners aimed at the problem of the homeless varied from covert surveillance to ‘educational’ approaches which brought together police and Stores’ representatives to meet with The Big Issue vendors in order to discuss “sensible selling strategies” (Home Office Advisor, [GOM]):

It is not politically acceptable to say to the Big Issue sellers ‘get lost’. All we can do is negotiate with them and say ‘do you realise the impact this is having on people’? I know some of them have taken this on board and try to sell their paper in a manner that is non-threatening or overtly intrusive. But some of them just look wrong. They do not look like someone who has fallen on hard times and are trying to do something for themselves but [look] like they are getting money for the next fix. Perhaps The Big Issue should consider who they accept as a vendor and where they are placed (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM], emphasis in original).

These educative strategies included discussions among key players as to the possibility of responsibilising The Big Issue vendors with tasks deemed more appropriate in a regenerating city centre. These tasks included recruiting and training the vendors as tourist guides along side Town Watch (Liverpool Echo,
8 January, 1997). At the same time, other initiatives included the undercover surveillance of the homeless in the city centre undertaken by Merseyside Police. The Stores’ Committee pressured the police for the increased targeting of homeless groups. Crime Alert provided the forum for the conduct of such operations. These involved police officers posing as homeless people in order to ascertain intelligence on their movements, involvement in criminal activity, and whether or not they were “genuinely homeless” (Chairman, Crime Alert). Intelligence was then passed around private security staff regarding the identification of ‘problem’ homeless persons, which was then used for targeting them in the city centre. As indicated earlier in the chapter, Crime Alert provided a forum within which a normative bonding was nourished between private security and police personnel. This bonding, underpinned by open hostility towards identified groups, was particularly visible regarding the homeless. During one Crime Alert meeting, two police officers engaged in undercover operations led a debate about the homeless problem in Liverpool:

Chair: It is just annoying when you read in The Sun about the Big Issue vendor who moans if he makes £800 a week.
Police Officer 1: Yeh, but as we know 99.9% of them are known criminals.
Police Officer 2: Only 1 in 50 that we spoke to are actually homeless.
Police Officer 1: We’ve nailed the original aggressive beggar now. He can’t come into the city because we know him. He can’t move outside his front door.
Chair: The problem is there are just too many of them. They are always aggressive, threatening and selling at our doors… shoplifters, drunks, dirty sods, wandering in and out of stores.
Private Security Guard 1: They shouldn’t be allowed in stores. We should always check their identification.
Private Security Guard 2: She’s awful (pointing to photo). You can smell her before she comes round the corner.

(Field Notes, Crime Alert).
The ‘concerns’ raised in the conversation were recorded by the Crime Prevention Officer who promised the Chair of Crime Alert he would report them to the Area Commander. Crime Alert focused its own surveillance measures using the radio link and CCTV to monitor the movement of Big Issue vendors around the city centre. This was felt necessary, as vendors in particular were, it was thought, trying to avoid surveillance and becoming known to security staff. This concern was placed alongside the futility of the ‘educative’ measures mentioned above:

We had meetings between the Stores’ Committee and The Big Issue office, where they put their side of the story and we put ours. But the situation gets no better; they just seem to be an uncontrollable group. They swap and change their identity badges amongst themselves and change pitches – it can be difficult to keep tabs on them. They probably have a good knowledge of security in the city centre but we are on to them (Ibid).

The positioning of Big Issue vendors outside of store entrances was also deemed problematic in that they could over-hear information passed over the radio link:

It has been known for them to pass on this information and even tip off shoplifters, some of whom have managed to get away (Security Manager [1], Crime Alert).

The monitoring was felt necessary as “they are a potentially criminal group – we have examples of them stealing and dealing in drugs – and they intimidate the public in entering our stores” (Research Interview, 15). In summary, homeless people were the subject of intense surveillance underpinned by hostility towards this group for its perceived attitude in either attempting to avoid surveillance or in merely ‘looking wrong’.
Street trading

As Chapter Six highlighted, Liverpool city centre has a long tradition of independent street trading which dates back to the early nineteenth century and which has been the subject of concern and regulation by the locally powerful and the police.\textsuperscript{15} Licensing, along with the requirement of traders to pay for the square footage of their pitch and parking and refuse fees, had the impact of cutting the number of traders as well as forcing others unwilling or unable to pay the licence fee off the streets and into local pubs to sell. During the 1990s, a number of issues emerged that underpinned a concerted effort by city centre partners to remove the street traders from the main city centre consumption zone of Church Street. Based as they are on the door step of the big city centre retailers, the Stores’ Committee along with the Government Office and LCCP, vocalised a number of concerns that provided a focal point on which partners have agreed as to the ‘unsightliness’ of the traders, the rubbish they leave behind, the minimal licence and pitch fees compared to the business rates of mainstream retailers and insinuations that traders are involved in criminal activity. As one senior security manager put it:

\begin{quote}
They are taking trade away from respectable retailers and we also feel that it is having an effect on people feeling safe within the city centre. Why be crowded out by people like that? (Chairman, Crime Alert).
\end{quote}

The problem of street trading was expressed in terms of the negative image for the city centre. These discourses emanated from established retailers organised through the Stores’ Committee and those concerned with strategic re-imaging at

\textsuperscript{15} Street trading derived from the secondary economy that flourished in this period and provided local people with income and shoppers with relatively cheap merchandise. Historically the street traders, as part of the secondary economy, became subject to the ‘moving on’ policing described by Brogden (1982) tied to a licensing system in the early twentieth century administered through the City Council.
the Government Office. The problem of street traders condensed around the issue of licensing and violations of pitch size allowable under the license. For those involved in the security network the battery of powers available to regulate traders was felt to be inept at addressing the problem:

The regulation of pitch sizes needs to be enforced, as does the vetting of traders by the police. No trader should be allowed to operate with a criminal record. Enforcement orders against these people should be used without fear of a backlash. This laxity has led to our belief that there is a mafia out there (Representative of LCCP).

This “mafia” seemed particularly well organised, with one local Labour Councillor among the fifty one licensed traders. The traders fought and won a High Court battle against having them removed from the city centre, despite much pressure from the Stores’ Committee and the Government Office. The victory was seen as “creating a crisis of confidence in the way our city is run” (Liverpool Echo, 24 May, 2000). The issue of street trading has figured prominently in local press articles and became a central feature in debates around the ‘proper’ governance of the city alongside an alternative representation of the ‘public interest’. In defiance of those seeking to create a new urban aesthetic, the traders articulated a sense of tradition clearly at odds with the position of the new primary definers:

What people should realise is that the traders survive because people shop at our stalls. People want the barrow boys and flower sellers to stay. We are part of the furniture in the city. Not every one in the city can afford to shop at Marks and Spencer (Street Trader in Liverpool Echo, 20 July, 1999).

In challenging the power of the new urban aesthetic, the traders argued that “if traders were removed [from the city centre]... it would become a soulless and sterile place much like high streets in other cities, but Liverpool, the ‘pool of life’. is no other city and we do not wish it to be” (Leaflet, Street Trading: The
Facts, 1998). The local press, however, was a key vehicle in orchestrating a campaign against street trading. In one particular editorial, street traders in the city centre were derided as nineteenth century throwbacks belonging to a “monstrous era”. Street traders were characterised as a “species” and a “pox on our city”, who, because they represented “a curse” on the city, should be located “somewhere more appropriate ... like the Mersey, perhaps” (Daily Post, 19 May, 1998). In the local press traders have, at best, been described as an ‘eyesore’ and at worst as ‘swagmen’.

For the traders a process of criminalisation was underway as a perquisite to their removal; “we would suggest that words used to describe us would normally be reserved for Nazis, rapists and child molesters and not people who after all, are only trying to earn a living” (Leaflet: Street Trading: The Facts, op. cit).

From the point of view of the Stores’ Committee and the LCCP, the longevity of street trading in Liverpool has been tempered by successive City Council administrations granting trading licences:

These issues go back to when Adam was a lad. Rightly or wrongly the licensing has given the traders certain rights, which has bounced back on us. I know as a city we have had to set up this situation properly and responsibly but the other side of it is that a lot of them have not paid any rent for some time. There are not many people in this city getting anything for nothing. These guys are out there giving us straight competition and paying nothing (Representative [2] of Stores’ Committee).

Other partners outside of retailing expressed similar sentiments and spoke of being “educated” about the issue by other partners. The move at bringing

16 Other press headlines have included ‘War on Street Traders’ (Daily Post, 19 May, 1998); ‘That’s your lot’ (Liverpool Echo, 21 May, 1998).
partners together has allowed the Stores’ Committee to place street trading
higher on the agenda of city centre regeneration at Government Office level. As
one urban manager in the Government Office put it:

What they [Stores’ Committee] were doing and saying about
street cleanliness was relevant and that’s how they got involved. They were able to tell us about some of their problems like the
number of street traders outside their doors. I personally find it
difficult picking my way around them but I hadn’t thought about
how they were taking trade away from stores. Also a lot of stuff
that gets nicked from the stores is sold out there as well, which is
really galling (Home Office Advisor, [GOM]).

The problematisation of street trading played a central discursive role in linking
issues around ‘quality of environment’, street cleanliness and the ambience of
the city centre in the eyes of potential inward investors:

We bring businesses to look around Liverpool and it’s worrying
you know - by the time we get to the core trading area we are
faced with the chaos of the traders. Shabby stalls, cheap
merchandise and litter that says Liverpool is a low grade
economy (Research interview 17).

As well as the hindrance deemed to be placed against investment the problem
of street trading (as intimated above), has also been expressed in terms of
criminality:

The stalls are a menace, take up space and undermine the
business of established retail. They generate litter and provide an
opportunity for the disposal of stolen goods and the practice of
benefit fraud, that kind of thing. There is very little to say that’s
positive about them; they are in the wrong place (Security
Manager [I], Crime Alert).

Furthermore:

This problem has been with us a long time and maybe now we
are going to sort it. It’s common knowledge that merchandise
moves from high street chains to the stalls and into the pubs …
but the police, well they don’t want to know (Chairman, Crime
Alert).
Other partners highlighted what they thought was the ‘real crime’ in the policing of the city centre which raised issues of what should be policed at any particular time:

The police will harass someone selling the Big Issue who is not doing much harm really other than making £20 a day more than he should. Yet, every one of those street traders is on invalidity or unemployment benefit. Now who is the thief there? (Security Manager, non-member of Crime Alert).

The use of Liverpool’s CCTV system to monitor street trading was undertaken at the request of some of the major retailers, as one security manager sympathetic to the traders stated:

I know people out there who work hard for a living and I also know that some of the stores, including this one, have wanted more to be done about the traders. But yes, we can, and do, use the CCTV system to see what’s happening. One store was convinced a particular line of shirts that they sold was lifted and being sold back outside for half the price! So the system can be used to monitor deliveries to traders to see what they’re selling (Research interview 11).

The monitoring and recording of violations of pitch space was also undertaken and passed on to licence enforcers at the City Council. The role of Crime Alert in this respect was to minutely scrutinise the activities of trades in order to cajole relevant authorities to take action against them:

We do believe that the stuff that is stolen from the shops ends up on the stalls. All the information we get is passed on to the Police Intelligence Unit. The proof is that street stalls have been raided and closed down for handling stolen goods. We also get members of the public complaining about them. They aren’t controlled in any way. The way they take the mickey by infringing their pitch allocation is just a laugh. We record any extensions - how they extend their pitch, by the use of bars and verandas and boxes jutting out over the ground (Chairman, Crime Alert).

Surveillance was also directed at unlicensed sellers who kept mobile around the city centre, selling out of suitcases and back packs. This group, was believed to
consist of about 30 “known traders”, posed a particularly difficult problem in that “they don’t just work the streets but inside pubs and clubs” (Ibid).

The use of the camera network to monitor street traders was justified neither in a deterrent nor preventative capacity. Hostility to street trading was intense, and the solution to the ‘problem’ was, in the final analysis, seen as political. As long as the traders were there the camera network would perform a disciplinary function regardless of whether strictly criminal suspicion was present; and, in that sense, the camera network contributed to the wider political pressure brought to bear on traders, adding to the message that their presence was ‘unwelcome’. Street trading, like homelessness though not illegal ‘activities’, have never-the-less fitted into categories of suspicion defined by normative conceptions of place and their associated categories of ‘appropriateness’ and ‘responsibility’. The camera network was mobilised in a disciplinary sense so that it communicated and aided ‘the rules of the game’ in the regenerating city centre under prevailing definitions of ‘responsibility’. Moral abjection towards these groups cut across the institutions for regeneration and underpinned the use and targeting of CCTV. The message CCTV could communicate was summed up thus, “they know we are watching” 17 (The City Centre Manager, LCCP).

17 Discretionary surveillance of the homeless and traders has not been subject to any formal debate in Liverpool regarding the use of the camera network. In the absence of general statutory control over the use of CCTV systems, operations here lie to a large extent outside of the law. The Data Protection Act (1998) has provided some regulation in terms of the requirement to register information kept, the purpose of its use, and access to data subjects of their files. However, breaches of the Act depend on individual citizens making complaints but, as in the case of visual surveillance “most people [do] not know what data is kept on them by whom” (Maguire, 1998: 232. Furthermore, the Act made general exemptions for the purposes of data defined as relevant to the ‘detection of crime and its prevention’.
Youth

Any child or group of children without a parent with them is bound to arouse suspicion. Just think of the Bulger case. In a sense the kids are the easiest to dissuade. They know they are being watched and it seems like a game to them but once they know we aren’t playing they get bored and go elsewhere (Security Manager, Mersey Travel Rapid Response Unit).

Other researchers have noted the contemporary targeting of young people by policing agencies in urban centres, albeit with particular reference to targeting black youth (Norris and Armstrong, 1998b). This has taken place within the process of interpretive construction that has highlighted constructions as to the proper and legitimate use of time and space. The visibility of youth in public urban spaces has become linked to perceptions of disorder amongst other groups in the population, particularly in the context of urban revitalisation and the creation of safe shopping zones (Beck and Willis, 1995; Oc & Tiesdell, 1997). Young people of school age constituted a particular concern for security managers in Liverpool, who perceived their presence in the city centre as incongruous with the ‘family friendly’ environment they espoused:

There’s a tradition in Liverpool of kids bunking school. They roam in and around the city centre on buses and hang out. The city centre has an appeal to the kids; they treat it as a playground but it isn’t. They harass shoppers and staff alike. The fact that they aren’t doing anything intimidates people, and, it seems almost pointless to ask where are their parents in all of this? But there is a time and a place for children to be in the city centre (Chairman, Stores’ Committee).

In dealing with these kinds of problems, a number of initiatives focusing in the city centre were established. In attracting custom from outside the city centre, public transport, and its image, was deemed a key attribute in regeneration. Mersey Travel and Merseyside Police, with support from the Stores’ Committee, set about cleaning up the image of public transport in Liverpool. In
particular, the aim was “to rid the system of ticket touts”. This group consists largely of children of school age who “use the Away Day ticket scheme to move aimlessly around the city, leaving litter and graffiti and intimidating drivers and customers” (Security Manager, Mersey Travel Rapid Response Unit). Mersey Travel developed their own Rapid Response Unit (RRU), a twenty strong security unit who were trained and to work with the police:

On of the reasons the RRU was set up was to deal with kids who actually are becoming more violent. This tends to be a daytime problem; bored kids using the buses as a play ground. But since the 24-hour city initiative our buses have taken on more passengers in and out of the city of a weekend. Rowdiness, drunkenness, physical damage and even urination on the buses have all increased (Ibid).

For Mersey Travel, a senior player in the regeneration process, the problem of youth led them to argue for linking up the city centre surveillance system with their own camera network covering bus stations and some buses.\textsuperscript{18} Within Crime Alert, a special Juvenile Group was established to deal with young people to initiate Truancy Watch. This scheme was initiated to “deal with the scallies”. The CCTV system became a key tool to help police “round up pupils in the city centre” who presented “a nuisance to people going about their daily business”\textsuperscript{19} (City Centre Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police).

\textit{Race}

In his Report, Lord Gifford had noted the “strikingly noticeable” (Gifford, 1988: 70) lack of black faces as either workers or visitors in the centre of

\textsuperscript{18} This came one step closer to fruition with the extension of Liverpool’s CCTV scheme announced in October 2001.

\textsuperscript{19} The scheme was extended in 1998 under a £315,000 government funded initiative that involved police and other agencies in stopping and questioning suspect truants. 1,000 school children were stopped in 1999 and a third of these “gave a good reason for being out of classes” (\textit{Liverpool Echo}, 19 June, 2000).
Liverpool. Both local policing and public and private sector employment practices were held responsible for this visible social demarcation in the city.\textsuperscript{20} Interestingly the issue of ‘race’ rarely came up during the interview process. This relative silence was not overtly picked up by nor prompted by the interviewer during the interview process. However, when race was articulated it pointed to continuity from those observations made in the 1980s and further back, in that:

A colleague of mine works in Bristol they have problems with young black kids. We don’t have as many ‘darkies’ as other towns and cities. They’re just not here. They stick with their own kind, don’t they? (Research Interview, 19).

Another manager, when asked what groups particularly caught his attention, stated simply “blacks stick out”. When asked what he meant by this, he stated “if troublesome black kids are in town they don’t stand a chance - we know about it” (Ibid). Notwithstanding these comments, the relative silence on race can be attributed to the findings of local reports that have questioned Liverpool’s cosmopolitan image, the role of public agencies, and patterns of local racial violence that have promoted “a devastating lack of mobility” for Liverpool’s black population and “confined” them to their places of residence outside of the city centre (Gifford, 1989: 83). Race as a relative non-issue for security managers can be understood against the peculiar and historically formed politics of exclusion that has operated in Liverpool and been noted elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{20} Thirteen years later, little has changed. Liverpool 8 Law Centre described the city centre as a “no-go area” for black people in terms of work and leisure. Only 2\% of city jobs were being filled by black people, which amounted to a 1\% improvement since 1988 (\textit{Liverpool Echo}, 3 July, 2001).
In summary, this discussion around the targeting of the camera network has raised issues that challenge the common sense assumption that 'those who have nothing to hide have nothing to fear from CCTV'. The routine targeting of the network, and the discretion within that targeting, have been informed by local ideologies of place and social order that have displayed a particular historical trajectory that has been rearticulated and reasserted within contemporary partnerships for regeneration. These wider contemporary discourses pertaining to the legitimate uses of the revitalised city centre have therefore reinforced some older historical sentiments and normative judgements around what constitutes an 'orderly' city. The proper objects of power were identified not in any straightforward sense of crimes committed or on the basis of identifying known offenders but, rather, through the operation of a set of normative judgements within which legal suspicion may only play a small, if any, part. Thus the ideology of regeneration located within the neo-liberal state set the context for groups and categories that were defined as outside of city centre renaissance; as a threat and visual anomaly to regeneration. Thus, for example, surveillance of street traders was deemed legitimate in this context. Indeed, the surveillance of those groups and individuals described above was based on an implicit message to those targeted by the system, which was one of 'they will know we are watching'. The message itself reinforced the wider discourses constructed around these 'unwelcome' groups and activities as entirely negative – even pathological - and problematic in hindering the construction of a positive image for the city centre. In this sense, the CCTV network formed a key role in a neo-liberal state strategy geared towards the surveillance over, and collation
of information about, a given territory. The camera network ran conterminous to the ideological and material power to define and shape that territory.

**Tensions within the network**

The practices of social ordering in the city centre were not without their tensions and contradictions. Tensions between agencies engaged in social ordering in Liverpool city centre were identifiable at two main levels: firstly, at the highest strategic level within the regeneration process; secondly among agencies working on the ground in and around Crime Alert. It is to a consideration of these tensions that the chapter will now turn.

i. Locally powerful tensions

There is total agreement among players about the problems that need to be addressed but there are significant differences of priority - about actually doing things to address the problems and what those things should be. The city's renaissance is a very delicate thing and has to be carefully managed. Each player needs to think carefully about what they are doing and why (Representative [2] of Stores' Committee).

As a number of writers have noted, and as Chapter Seven discussed, the practice of 'making partnerships work' has not been without problems. Bringing together different agencies with different organisational aims, philosophies and working practices may compound tensions between partners around inter-agency perceptions, designated roles and issues in leadership (Crawford, 1997; Loveday, 1999). Regarding these issues, Crawford (Ibid: 133) pointed to what he called the "creative management of conflict" between multi-agency actors which often took place 'behind the scenes' in informal settings:

> The creativity of practice, more often than not, takes a pragmatic and managerial form. It tends to be about 'getting through the
day's business' and meeting managerial objectives, *rather than pursuing any moral or political mission* (Crawford, 1997: 135, emphasis added).

In Liverpool, contrary to Crawford's argument, the context of establishing effective strategies and structures of city centre rule did not lead to a strict separation between managerial and moral discourses and practices. The public and private interests engaged in the regeneration process forged a strategy of rule that coupled a hardheaded pragmatism along-side deeper moralising visions that underpinned a set of social ordering practices. This is not to suggest that tensions did not arise among strategists in the regeneration process. In broad terms tensions between the new primary definers arose not in the meanings attributed to regeneration and order but through the strategic actions pursued to achieve these ends. What was deemed as 'good' and 'bad' for the city's image represented benchmark questions that guided senior managerial approaches and their ideological positioning to order maintenance practices. Other tensions arose not out of opposition to particular crime prevention practices but in their management and funding. In short, the problems for order were not deemed problematic, but the means to achieving order were.

As others have noted, tensions between the goals of partnership decision-making processes and sections of the public have been evident (Crawford, 1997; Audit Commission, 1999). Writers have noted the importance of 'appeals to community' in crime prevention strategies (Crawford, 1997). Appeals to 'community' in the city centre were highly circumscribed. The idea of 'community' in the city centre was constructed assertively rather than demonstrably. If 'community' was invoked at all it was as an after thought;
'people have nothing to fear from CCTV', 'it's a peoples system'. These assertions were made without any detailed assessment of what 'people' were being referred to, or what 'the people' thought of practices such as CCTV. Marketing and carefully constructed image campaigns were prioritised as part of these processes underpinned by the politics of persuasion rather than by any open channels of debate. Within the locally powerful discourses explored in the previous chapter, 'the public' were selectively characterised and addressed in a particular fashion – as themselves entrepreneurial in spirit and in tune with the 'playfulness' of the new urban order. This fitted with the construction of the city centre as a commercial entity where the 'people' (or public) are regarded as an important potential client base (i.e., a commercial category), but are also absent ('outsiders' to regeneration machinations) - a transitory category to be kept at a distance from the processes of city centre rule. Indeed, and as noted elsewhere, forms of partnership rule in the urban centre “do not need to exert total power over the city's population to act effectively (i.e., whether through the ballot box or other means), but rather they merely need the power to act” (Hall and Hubbard, 1996: 156, emphasis in original). As discussed in the previous chapter, the ideological basis and scope for this power to act inoculated the workings of local power from outside scrutiny. In this sense, tensions between components of the security network and 'the public' in the enactment of social ordering in the city were marginalized as non-issues. Instead, however, tensions arose in the networks of rule themselves. in particular, between and within different class fractions within the networks and the structures of political power. It was in this arena that the 'public interest' itself was constructed and made meaningful in relation to the processes of urban
renaissance and social ordering. These tensions will now be looked at in more detail.

**Militarisation, safe shopping and CCTV**

Contemporary writing around social control, documented in Chapter Two, have emphasised the management of risk that relies upon actuarial techniques. It has been argued that these techniques are outmoding ‘older’ forms of control characterised as state centred, repressive or authoritarian. Davis (1990) pointedly drew attention to important omissions that can be found in urban studies and in criminology regarding the inter-linkage between techniques of policing and control found within urban centres. As the discussion earlier in this chapter indicated, writings around the impact, effects and uses of CCTV in Britain have treated this technology as a discreet entity in policing urban space. In other words, CCTV has not been placed alongside other policing and security initiatives deployed in conjunction with camera surveillance systems and how these dialectically inter-relate within a strategy of social ordering.

The characterisation offered by Davis focused on the range of practices initiated towards “the architectural policing of social boundaries” (1990: 223) and pointed to a continued interrelationship between ‘old’ and ‘new’ order maintenance strategies.

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21 Davis argued that: “... contemporary urban theory, whether debating the role of electronic technologies in precipitating ‘postmodern space’, or discussing the dispersion of urban functions across poly-centered metropolitan ‘galaxies’, has been strangely silent about the militarization of city life so grimly visible at street level” (Davis, 1990: 223).

22 This point has been reinforced by Parenti (1994: 47) in his examination of “urban militarism”, understood as a “creeping fortress culture” concerned with “managing social inequality”.
As discussed in Chapter Six, public order policing in Liverpool intensified under the banner of ‘Citysafe’. The enactment of zero tolerance measures alongside militarised forms of policing was underpinned by discourses of ‘regeneration’ that point to the kinds of authoritarian measures outlined by Davis. In Liverpool, the network of CCTV cameras was reinforced by a heavily militarised police force. However, militarisation has not been universally welcomed among all factions within the regeneration networks in Liverpool. Thus coherence and uniformity of purpose regarding various policing initiatives in the city should not be taken as given or inevitable. As will be noted below, the intensification of proactive policing, - the use of highly visible and armed police officers on the streets of the city centre - became a source of tension among key players. For the police, however, the issue of armed patrols was represented to other players as ‘necessary’ to the regeneration process. As one police officer stated:

We had no anticipation [that] the subversive drug trafficking in the seedy side of Liverpool life was going to manifest itself into gunfire on the streets. That was a real kick in the bollocks to Liverpool and the regeneration process. [The shootings] in some respects helped push the issue up the agenda and get something done about it (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]).

One local councillor backed putting armed patrols on the streets and called for the use of the Prevention of Terrorism Act to arrest city gun suspects (Merseyart, 16 May, 1996). The armed operation in the city centre was commenced during Christmas in 1996 and received high profile coverage in the local and national press up to a year after its inception, much to the alarm of the

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23 This included armed patrols and the use of the Operational Support Division. The latter received record complaints in 1998. The use of CS gas received more complaints in Liverpool than anywhere else in England and Wales for 1998 (Liverpool Echo, 5 March 1999).
Stores' Committee, the LCCP and Mersey Partnership. The issue highlighted differences in institutional logics and power, produced fractures within the channels of communication between key players, and undermined the stability of the unifying potential found within the discourse of regeneration. The role of highly visible and proactive public order policing became subject to scrutiny amongst the new primary definers, some of whom felt uncomfortable with certain policing practices against the backdrop of city centre re-imaging and regeneration. The police were put in a situation where they felt on the back-foot in defending certain policing practices to their partners. This problematised the meaning of partnership in the city centre, as one police officer commented:

There is liaison, yes. At the level more of informing them what we are going to do and why we are going to do it rather how would you feel if we go and do this. There is a statutory obligation on the police to protect life and we couldn’t possibly fail to deliver on that. If somebody was uncomfortable with the sight of a police officer carrying a gun in a public place then they need to see that this is what we have to do operationally. This fact is often much more clear than how we are going to sell that in a positive way (Ibid).

As identified in the previous chapter, the police's 'willingness to talk' was a factor in building partnerships. Within the debates that followed police gun patrols, this meant informing key players of intended police operations because this was recognised as a factor in 'regeneration' and as something that all partners had signed up to. Although other key players welcomed the police providing such informal briefings, they also questioned and expressed frustration around a sense of exclusivity concerning police operational matters. Alongside this concern was the feeling that this kind of policing was an aspect of order maintenance that, unlike CCTV, was out of formal and informal partnership control. These concerns developed into a cynicism about police
intentions towards their commitment to the city’s renaissance. As discussed in Chapter Six, police justifications for placing armed patrols on the streets of the city varied. This was not welcomed by local businesses, developers and members of the city council who were working, as they saw it, for a more coherent approach across regeneration agencies. As one developer put it:

When the police put armed patrols on the city streets it was interesting in that they were saying it was for armed raids and violent crime and this was picked up in the national press. Then after a couple of weeks they said it was because of an IRA threat. There is a bloody big difference between the two! I mean having an armed patrol walking down Church Street is bad PR for the city. Okay, they say it is a deterrent but some of us think it is a bit of egoism, bravado by the police to say ‘take us seriously’. But in reality, and the way the press used it, it makes Liverpool look like a shooting range (Private Developer [1], affiliated to LCCP, emphasis in original).

In other words, coherence regarding re-imaging was being undermined. Others expressed a frustration with the role of the police in the regeneration process, in that this role was not only being misplaced but also contributed to a misunderstanding of the fundamentals of regeneration partnerships. It was felt that the police were not altogether concerned about the more mundane aspects of policing, as perceived within a regeneration agenda:

They are [the police] so important to a lot of things that the city needs to happen around enforcement – traffic congestion, illegal parking – as well as aspects of safety like putting normal bobbies on the street. A problem has been getting them on side and committed; because they will practically say ‘we’ve got more important things to do like chase robbers’. We have to make them understand this is all well and good but we can only do that by working in partnership (Representative of LCCP).

Frustration mounted around the view that certain aspects of policing - seen as central to successful regeneration - were outside of partnership control. The police were widely perceived as working to their own agenda. As one marketing strategist put it:
I have to talk professionally now in terms of me being an investor walking through the streets. No doubt an investor wants to see the bobby with his sleeves rolled up and talking to the granny on the corner. There is no doubt in my mind that the gangland issue has been exaggerated, fuelled as much by the national as local press. The locals [partnerships] have tried to handle it carefully but the police always need to show they mean business, and are back and in control. So they tend to present things artificially to the media. Like those photographs that they released in 1996 showing the police in flak jackets and carrying submachine guns. As far as the rest of the world was concerned, every policeman in Liverpool was dressed like that. They [the police] did it for very political reasons. They, as always, were saying 'we need more money' but it backfired on the region economically in terms of image (Private Developer [1], affiliated to LCCP).

The channels of partnership at senior level provided the avenue to pressure the police and debate the merits or otherwise of armed patrols underpinned by police characterisations of ‘rampant’ armed criminality:

Senior police contact is, I think, the biggest interrelationship between the investment agencies. So we could say to the Chief Constable that he was going on a bit – with high profile, gun toting policemen. We said you will kill the industry and that is really awful. He listened to us and put out a reverse script, which said murders are less in his city than elsewhere. I mean we were crying with the amount of adverse publicity the police were putting out to defend their own budget. We know that was what it was all about and there is some sympathy around here on this (Chairman, Merseyside Development Corporation).

As the previous chapter highlighted, the police were able to reposition themselves through senior secondment to the Government Office as an example of ‘best practice’. This also provided the means of testing new avenues to argue for increased funding. Within this forum, the issue of armed response led to fine-tuning and the harmonising of relations across partnerships. Here, a partial resolution was constructed that established a campaign aimed to counter media stories about Liverpool as ‘gun city’ whilst at the same time recognising that policing operations are left to the police as the statutory authority, who by now
realised the need to inform partners of key policing developments. The issue of 
armed patrols also sat alongside concerns regarding public policing in the city 
centre. The channels of strategic communication forged in the regeneration of 
Liverpool aided a process whereby Merseyside Police could be challenged 
regarding certain practices and operations through the discourse of urban 
renaissance. ‘Image’ was the key in this kind of criticism, set against the 
backdrop of an image of a ‘family friendly city’ alongside increasing tourism, 
development activity and investment. The regeneration strategy that CCTV was 
central in promoting was, it was thought, being undermined by other, ‘less 
credible’ policing initiatives.24 As key actors in the regeneration process, 
Merseyside Police were not immune to these governmental strategies and, as a 
means of massaging dissent from its partners, provided information and ‘greater 
openness’.

Politics, funding and CCTV: central - local tensions

As discussed above, the establishment of the camera network in Liverpool was 
part funded from monies available through the Crime Prevention Agency 
established under John Major’s Conservative administration (changed to the 
Crime Reduction Unit under New Labour). The process of application for funds

24 The militarisation of city life and public places may bring its own contradictions and generate 
its own insecurities, which undercut and undermine any perceptions and feelings of security 
thought to be generated by CCTV. The essence of this contradiction was captured by the 
comments of a visitor to Liverpool: “As a visitor to your city, I read with interest the article about 
media bias and the way Liverpool is presented as being a gun capital... I saw two men carrying 
automatic weapons in the shopping precinct and went along to the police station to complain... 
But these two men carrying the automatic weapons were your policemen! They were driving 
slowly through the crowded centre on a peaceful, sunny afternoon with their guns resting like 
babies on their laps. I don’t know who they were trying to impress but they frightened the life of 
me. What an image! Would those guardians of our safety really think of using those weapons in a 
crowded centre of ordinary innocent people? But I’m only a tourist” (Merseymart, 20 June, 1996).
both to establish and extend CCTV set out various criteria for eligibility in the CCTV Challenge Competition. These criteria included the establishment of partnerships, police involvement, parallel private sector funding and the identification of a local crime problem. Through these processes limitations and constrains were placed on Liverpool’s security network. For theorists of social control, these ‘real world’ constraints are important to recognise for they challenge those characterisations of seamless webs of surveillance found in some aspects of the ‘dispersal of discipline’ thesis discussed in Chapter Two.

A great deal of local effort in establishing multi-agency links and accruing local knowledge was a prerequisite in the bidding process. Within Liverpool city centre the effort of the partners was strategically directed in line with plans for regeneration. As already made clear, from the perspective of key players at the local level the establishment and extension of CCTV in Liverpool fitted in with an agreed agenda for the city’s renaissance and underpinned both the uses of CCTV and where it was to be located. Those involved in drawing up and submitting applications to central government expressed frustration at what they perceived as the politicking that governed central policies on crime and law and order. National priorities therefore sometimes appeared to conflict with local agendas in terms of support funding for CCTV, and in particular where it could be geographically placed. The ‘fickleness’ of central government actors was a target of frustration:

Around CCTV, as with other central government initiatives, if you have a Minister who is enthusiastic about a particular course of action then that particular course of action will find funding. If a Minister says it is a good idea, then it is a good idea (Home Office Advisor, [GOM]).
It was felt by key players that their local strategies for the uses of CCTV were not always listened to or appreciated within the arena of central government decision-making. It was perceived that the Home Office and central government generally were subject to ideological constraints and short-term political expediency regarding the allocation of funds for CCTV projects. Frustration expressed by key players in Liverpool was aimed at the personal complexions of senior ministerial personnel, but these personal idiosyncrasies were placed within a wider context in that “every government I’ve seen has beaten the law and order drum and there doesn’t seem to be any substantial change in that respect” (Ibid). The changing sentiments underpinning central government law and order policy were seen as obstacles for the ‘less ideological’ task of establishing CCTV in Liverpool city centre. Tensions were apparent within the process of submitting funding applications for cameras, as when key players in Liverpool were looking to extend the city centre system in 1996:

The process is, unfortunately, transparently political. Last year in CCTV Challenge we were expecting an indicative allocation in the region of £600,000 to £800,000. We got £34,000 worth of projects funded. I was given the opportunity to comment on the bids before decisions were announced. The only two projects we got funding for, one was in a school, I had commented on as ‘not strategically important and should be funded from mainstream Education Authority funding’. But they [the Home Office] funded it! Like it was a knee jerk reaction - to Dunblane perhaps? These are some of the problems we deal with. Frankly, the bids from Merseyside this year – the temptation has been to throw them in the bin. Why waste time and effort reading them and making recommendations because on previous showings it was working for nothing (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]).

It was the Government Office and the seconded police officer within the Office that collated and passed comment on bids throughout the Merseyside region.
before sending them to the Home Office. The Government Office had a key role in shaping and submitting ‘responsible’ bids. The Office’s desire to prioritise bids of ‘strategic importance’ was, it was felt, compromised by central government tendencies to use grants for CCTV to further their own political advantage.25

The strategic vision for Liverpool developed through the Office was, it was felt, impeded by ‘beating the law and order drum’ at the national level alongside allocating funds to marginal constituencies in electoral terms. It was felt that competitive bidding for CCTV, although potentially useful particularly in setting up the system in Liverpool, was ideologically driven and could not be relied upon in the long term. Competitive bidding was seen as:

... partly public relations and an expensive PR job at that. There have been many millions spent on CCTV through the bid process and this has levered significant sums of money from other sources. So there is an element of added value to it. It is just that the location of some of the funding could be questioned at a later stage (Home Office Advisor, [GOM] ).

Local state managers often saw themselves as positive instigators of a ‘politics of change’ at the local level. However, this ‘progressive’ self-image was cynically contrasted to ‘a politics of chance and opportunism’ at the national level. However, the ‘politics of change’ was not always in conflict with ‘national opportunism’. The two were married when CCTV was established in Liverpool in 1994, when local and national authorities were able to work

25 As one interviewee stated: “We have to draw a distinction between a government strategy and manifesto commitments. These distinctions are unsubtle. The CCTV Challenge Competition has been patchy in its application. You have places like Bakewell, Kendall and Wigton getting fairly substantive chunks of funding for CCTV and no one on Merseyside getting anything. But these are Tory marginal seats” (Research Interview 1).
together to fund Liverpool's camera network and, as discussed earlier in this chapter, legitimate it with reference to the murder of a local child.

Central government competitive funds for CCTV, when granted, were viewed as a kick start in establishing strategies for local order and encouraging local players to add funds for such purposes. The funding of CCTV in Liverpool city centre and by implication its extension had, therefore, not been without its problems. The levering of local investment to maintain and extend CCTV is the subject of the next part of the chapter.

**Funding and levering local revenue**

There is a lot of good-will in terms of contributions for the cameras, but this is no way to run a business (The City Centre Manager, LCCP).

The tensions discussed in the previous part of this chapter compounded issues of funding, specifically at the local level. As has already been stated earlier in the chapter, the key players in Liverpool grasped the opportunity of establishing a CCTV system without outside funding assistance in the absence of any long term funding plan. This had implications for the management and control of the system, to be discussed below. The LCCP was charged with the function of generating funds from local interests to secure long-term maintenance costs for CCTV in order to extend further installation. However, dipping into the local capital purse was not without its problems in terms of funding the camera network. Although widespread ideological support for the camera network existed among local businesses, this did not necessarily extend to financial support. Thus, although "the Liverpool City Centre Partnership proved that organisations would be prepared to divert funding towards establishing CCTV."
it could not easily sustain it” (Ibid). As the City Centre Manager stated, this was a source of frustration between sections of the business community and the LCCP:

Part of the problem of funding for the City Centre Manager is having to go cap in hand and this is not good enough. You know, local businesses who pay rates ask ‘why don’t local government do it’? I call it the ‘they syndrome’ – ‘they should do, they should do it’. That's not very helpful at all (Ibid).

The battle to maintain local funding was centred on membership of the Stores’ Committee. The £12,000 annual fee allowing access to the radio link was only available to those who could afford it, i.e., the larger retail outlets and businesses. These differentials in financial clout also extended to the ability to contribute to CCTV. The installation of each camera was costed at £15,000 and the LCCP approached businesses to fund a camera. The funding process was made problematic by contradictions between local and national business interests. As one local business manager expressed it:

I think there is a benefit to the city in having CCTV. If it is good for the city it is good for me as a businessman. If more people are coming into the city we all get a share of their custom. I took this point to my head office outside of Liverpool. We had already contributed to the capital funding of the system but, as far as revenue was concerned, I had to tell the LCCP ‘sorry mate my boss said no’. I’m not saying this as a general point but my superiors will not go overboard in putting money into Liverpool when we pay high rates and they think the city has a history of mal-administration (Representative [2] of Stores’ Committee).

Others players, however, justified funding the cameras as it was a necessary feature of what they deemed to be good business practice:

We can fund cameras in our domain. Being involved in the pavement café culture means we want to be able to have tight control over anyone who gets up to mischief. So it will be very useful to us. It is a legitimate extension of our business interests and quite correctly we should pay for it and make contributions towards it (Private Developer [2], affiliated to LCCP).
The fractures within local capital led to intense debates regarding responsibilities for funding. As one interviewee stated, “it seems inequitable that other people who benefit may not necessarily be paying for it” (Representative of LCCP). Such comments were directed at businesses and police:

If you think about what the CCTV system costs, the total revenue costs and you think, well, how many policemen is that? It is just a joke. The relative cost for CCTV is a lot, but it is just a drop in the ocean compared to a police car and they [the police] get more benefit from CCTV (Chairman, Stores’ Committee).

The LCCP also scorned the lack of financial input into the camera network because, as previously mentioned, “realistically it is a policing tool” (Ibid) – a tool owned by the private sector but from which, as other key players observed, the police derived ideological and practical benefits. These issues impinged upon related debates concerning the management and control of CCTV.

Management and control

We make the point, and I think it is a very healthy one, that this is a separate and independent body. I think the worse thing is if the police had control of the system. I’m not saying anything improper would happen... but I think public perception and credibility is everything. Whilst we’ve got Mr and Mrs Bloggs on board, great (The City Centre Manager, LCCP).

Whilst the ‘independence’ of the CCTV network was stressed by the LCCP, this masked deeper ambivalences around the management of CCTV both as a policing tool and as a marketable product, which needed to be sold ‘properly’. For others in the network the positive notion of ‘independence’ was challenged by a concern that control of the system was unnecessarily ubiquitous and vague. The lack of ‘detailed control’ pointed to problems of ownership of the system:
At the moment responsibility for the system lies between the City Centre Manager and the private sector; the police and the City Council. Nobody owns it and everybody owns it. Everyone wants to promote it and nobody is actually promoting it. Nobody really seems to be championing the cause of CCTV in a clear and consistent way (Economic Development Officer, Liverpool City Council).

‘Championing the cause of CCTV’ pointed to a concern that its effectiveness – though apparent and agreed by all – needed to be marketed more aggressively. Such marketing needed to be directed at potential contributors to the system:

CCTV is doing its work. The private interests behind it are quite progressive and, on the whole, very supportive because we have a long-term interest. Many others need to be convinced that they need to invest in this, year in year out. Funding can tend to dry up because people can’t see the impact that CCTV is having on promoting the product of the city centre. It’s a selling job. CCTV needs to be sold (Private Developer [1], affiliated to LCCP).

Another player complained that CCTV had assumed “a hidden element” in the management of the city centre and that “this hybrid arrangement” regarding its oversight only contributed to downplaying its benefits (Ibid). The process of marketing CCTV and providing information as to its effectiveness was seen as a legitimate return for those contributing to the system:

We would not expect full accountability for every camera in every street but we would legitimately expect something in relation to an investment. If the city is to make further inroads into private sector sponsorship they [LCCP] have got to show that the system is apprehending villains. We have to show what happens with CCTV, not just images of people before or after a misdemeanour have occurred (Private Developer [2], affiliated to LCCP).

Trumpeting the benefits of CCTV, though, was not without its detractors, particularly if this form of selling its benefits took a more sensationalist twist in terms of publicity at national and international levels. The release and use of CCTV footage in press and broadcast media was not necessarily seen as a good thing regarding Liverpool:
The one thing about CCTV, which is a bad thing, is the crop of TV programmes using footage. It is interesting in talking to people who are involved in that because I think they miss the point. Sometime ago there was a programme with footage from Liverpool and someone said ‘wasn’t it good it was on TV’. It showed a man with a knife. Some of us think this is the last thing we want – portraying the image of what Liverpool is perceived to be. This kind of thing does more damage than any good that was done by CCTV. But peoples’ egos get involved and they say; ‘Oh aren’t I clever I spotted this or I spotted that’. CCTV should never be used publicly, because it does more damage to the city (Private Developer [1], affiliated to LCCP).

These tensions were managerial in nature and pointed to problems in presenting the CCTV network to important audiences. CCTV had to be managed in such a way so that each audience received the desired message. For the public, the system must be seen as ‘credible’; for local capital, it must be perceived as ‘cost effective’; and for potential outside investors, it must be seen as both of these things while also reinforcing the more general perception that Liverpool city centre as a whole was being managed effectively. The difficulties thrown up in managing the camera network highlighted a key problem for its supporters regarding how much visibility the system should have, and in what circumstances does high or low visibility become problematic? This was illustrated with the system’s launch, when it was announced that the monitoring room was housed in a secret location in the city centre. The only people to know of the location were the private security monitors, the City Centre Manager and senior police officers. Security personnel could only contact the monitoring room by radio. Secrecy was thought necessary “in order to prevent sabotage and protect personnel” (The City Centre Manager, LCCP). For others inside the security network the idea of secrecy was counterproductive:

When the system was launched nobody was supposed to know where it was. All this ‘we’ve got to keep it a secret’ nonsense – the secret bunker! It is silly and over protective when you think
of the potential for these things to be misconceived. It’s not big brother and we don’t want people to think we are in a war zone here. We need a certain level of transparency about it and proper regulation, control and monitoring, none of which we really have. It’s a situation where no one really knows what’s going on (Economic Development Officer, Liverpool City Council).

**Embracing the system**

Although CCTV managers stressed the independence of the camera network, this was contradicted by concerns that the police were not as supportive as would have been liked. Thus, although “the credibility of the system is their [police] credibility – they take as much applause as we do”, the police were again seen to be working to their own institutional agenda, which was seen to undercut the process of partnership:

> When we set the system up there were political issues around the police and their attitude to CCTV, which meant they could not pick up the initiative, nor would local government. Now that it has become accepted and proved itself – it is now the time. In fact it is long overdue for the police to actually embrace the system – adopt it, manage it and fund it alongside the LCCP (Chairman, Stores’ Committee).

For the police however, the CCTV system – though formally acknowledged and accepted – represented a shift away from one of their key institutional goals: an increase in funding and manpower. As one police officer commented:

> I will say there is the will in the police force. The police have a problem with the question of ‘will the cameras replace people?’ They cannot win because when we get more cameras they will be asked to save money through loss of manpower. The police on occasion have used the ‘Big Brother’ argument but really it’s about the politics of funding. The bottom line is the police believe they may become less visible with CCTV; they will become more of a prevention force (Home Office Advisor, [GOM]).

For these reasons, the police in Liverpool were described as being “at arms length with the system” (The City Centre Manager, LCCP). Although the police
were involved in the bidding stage and the location of the cameras they also expressed an ambivalence directed at the central policy making process:

In my experience of 22 years in the police you can do a far better job by being in a place than by looking at it through a camera. The deterrent effect by a physical presence is greater than that of CCTV. I'm not overtly enthusiastic about CCTV. I see it as a tool in the armoury but not the be all and end all. This is not a view shared by some ministers, unfortunately (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]).

This contradiction fed directly into tensions mentioned earlier. Fears of police downsizing were purported to be at the nub of the police 'over playing' 'serious crime' and public order problems in Liverpool. On the other hand, giving a higher profile to these policing issues undermined the regeneration process in constructing Liverpool as a 'dangerous place' and one that was under-policed. For the police therefore, conflict also rose between the idea of the café culture and order in the streets. On the one hand, this culture was thought to bring economic benefits to those investors in the service sector while, on the other hand, simultaneously generating disorder in the form of, for example, drunkenness. Thus the extension of legitimate business interests central to the regeneration process was also seen to promote sites of potential street disorder. This factor was highlighted most forcefully by the police for whom 'regeneration' brought with it potentially negative scenarios. As one interviewee put it:

"We've got to manage it [...]. We recognise that we might actually see a rise in levels of recorded crime if the renaissance is successful [...]. It is part of a trade off. The benefits of the vibrant twenty-four hour economy on the one hand balanced against the downside of more crime, more drug abuse and drunkenness" (Ibid).
Leadership

The tensions among the key players in the regeneration process highlighted the salience of image and the promotion of a positive reputation for Liverpool. These concerns took in a wide variety of issues that dovetailed with the problem of responsibility for city centre rule. In this sense, businesses and developers readily articulated a frustration aimed at the City Council who were perceived as being not as enthusiastic about economic development as the private sector and as failing to take a leading role:

We have to look at the negative images of this city and ask why people do not come here and why do the big investors not come here. There are issues about what happens in this city - how it is run. There are simple things like the state of the streets, the state of the pavements. We pay the highest business rates in the country and we seem to get some of the worst services. I was in York yesterday and Leeds two days before. They pay less rates than us but have masses of investment going into the cities and most importantly these places are spotless (Regeneration Coordinator, Liverpool City Council).

Difficulties were also expressed regarding attracting particular retailers to the city centre who felt that doing business in Liverpool would be bad for their image. The negative sense of place was not only attributed to potential retailers but also to potential theatre patrons, shoppers and tourists. The identification of a leadership vacuum set in motion intense debates towards achieving greater clarity in managing the city centre and imbuing it with strategic direction. For the LCCP, financial maintenance of CCTV was tied in with broader issues to do with general street management:

We need a powerful body. The LCCP can remain along with the City Centre Manager but they need a more powerful body with a powerful figurehead with responsibilities for: one, raising funds for the long term along with: two, the city council, who need think more long term than that. I know we've already got a problem with high council tax and rates, but a service charge needs to be set up where we could establish a pool in the region.
of £1 million per annum. This would ensure the marketing of this city is backed, by ensuring total street management – clean streets, empty bins and secure the tenure for CCTV (Representative of LCCP).

Another interviewee, who expressed the need to harness more effectively senior contact points and inter-institutional funding differences, echoed this:

It is like the City Centre Partnership. It needs to be bigger and raise its profile with someone powerful to bring that about. We all talk about under resourcing but all these agencies have got budgets of some description but they all seem to tail off at some unknown point. It is like the spokes and the hub, only there is not really a hub in Liverpool (Chairman, Stores’ Committee).

The tensions that arose from aspects of policing and sustaining revenue funding plugged directly into debates about management of the city centre. In this sense, the establishment of the City Centre Manager was perceived as a stepping-stone by which the private sector could consolidate its power in the city centre along the lines of American style Business Improvement Districts (BIDS).

ii. Tensions on the ground

*Police and Crime Alert*

Tensions between personnel directly involved in managing and staffing the security network were also expressed. As with the issues identified above, these tensions provided potentially insoluble problems as much as created opportunities for the development and creative extension of the work of partnership networks. The manifestation of these tensions was found in three main areas; police and private security relations; the problem of discipline among security personnel; and, finally, crime displacement.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, a key function of Crime Alert was to act as a pressure group upon the police to encourage them to act against problems identified by retailers. Shoplifting, Big Issue vendors and street traders represented the major problems in this respect. On the latter two issues, the police felt limited in what they could do and expressed concern at having to listen to ‘gripping’ about issues that they felt were outside their remit:

We understand the stores point of view but they tend to confuse what is actionable in a criminal sense and what is, from their view, a pain in the backside. Street trading used to be a police matter before it was licensed - okay in the old days we could move them on - make it difficult for them to operate. What it boils down to is the Stores' Committee do not like street traders in the middle of Church Street, selling products cheaper than they are. We can do very little about that because they are licensed other than argue they may cause an obstruction. This is more a public image matter rather than a police or criminal matter (City Centre Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police).

The police acted as an organ of discipline upon Crime Alert. This involved processes towards structuring police involvement based "not on people moaning to the police but hard, transferable information" (Ibid). The police role in Crime Alert had run along educational lines. Aspects of policing carried out by Crime Alert members have to be underpinned by training and advice from the police:

If Crime Alert highlights particular problems then part of my function is to go in there and say ‘look do you want to discuss this, do you want a training session on the law, do you want a training session on people with aggression?’ That is part of our function although some stores provide their own training. The main problem we find with Crime Alert is the paperwork side of it. Some of the statements we get are not up to what we require in court. Often we have to go down and re-interview witnesses. The evidence is there but they have not quite got the literal skills to deal with that side of it, to put it together in a statement that is acceptable in court (Ibid).
The police role in providing advice on aspects of law and training to handle aggressive situations was often seen as a frustrating task, but was also seen as to be in the interests of the police as it is they who are responsible for putting files together for the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS): "we don’t want to look as though we don’t know how to put a case together" (Chairman, Crime Alert). For the police, the encouragement of greater ‘professionalism’ within the security network provided some frustration.

For members of Crime Alert, the evidential process caused difficulties but underlined their greater sense of frustration aimed at police and courts for not taking a tougher stance against categories of shoplifters. These fell into three main types: the professional, the opportunist and the drug addict.

Any person on a second offence caught shoplifting is then banned from a store. This is where we get into problems with the CPS because in theory a person who has been banned from a store and who comes back in to the store is trespassing. If he is trespassing and then steals he is actually committing an act of burglary, but the police or the CPS will not bring a charge of burglary because they say that tends to prove previous bad character which cannot be brought out until he is found guilty of the offence for which he is charged. It's a Catch 22 (Security Manager [1], Crime Alert).

The process of working in Crime Alert was described as a “cat and mouse game” where “we tiresomely see the same old faces” (op. cit.). The group had been campaigning for stronger sentences against shoplifters in order for them to be banned from the city centre or all stores within the centre as part of their bail condition or sentencing. For one interviewee, the failure of the courts to give "meaningful sentences" and "the dismal showing of police manpower on the streets, has a knock-on effect on the morale of Crime Alert members” (Security Manager [2], Crime Alert). However, the group has not been totally inactive in
combating its problems. Of particular concern was the identification of people who were banned from shops or had been issued Trespass Notices. Stills from in-store CCTV and external footage were distributed to help private security identify potential and known shoplifters thought to be in the area. In this way, Crime Alert was able to “make it difficult for them to move, keep them twitching over their shoulders so they think ‘sod this I’m not staying round here’” (Security Manager [3], Crime Alert).

Police scepticism toward working with some elements within the private security industry was also in evidence:

They do have a fairly mixed bunch here in terms of experience and practice in the security field. But that’s the situation - some are ex-army or with no authoritative experience at all. Others are from established security firms, vetted and trained. But you know you are not talking to a uniform bunch - some are probably in it for the wrong reasons, looking like street fighters. Some are claiming benefits and working... others are more professional. The problem is a lack of regulation in this industry - they are badly paid and some have dodgy backgrounds (City Centre Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police).

This extended to worries expressed by police officers over the handling of intelligence by private security:

There is one thing that has always been a contentious issue in this grey area. That is giving photographs to non-police personnel. We are the legal authority and they have more limited powers so we are working towards Crime Alert taking on the responsibility of collating and distributing photo files which we can have access to. I don’t think the police should be handing out photos to God knows who. It’s also like we are saying ‘do our job’. Which they can’t. we have to be more careful with our intelligence (Ibid, emphasis added).
Network discipline

The process of handling, swapping and collating intelligence within Crime Alert was, as part of its function, a means to engender discipline upon private security personnel regarding what their work entailed on any particular day. However, keeping members of Crime Alert ‘alert’ as to what and whom they were meant to be targeting was not without its problems and caused frustration for security managers. For managers, this pointed to gaps in the system due to “human error” which manifested itself on the airwaves of the radio link. Radios therefore were often used “inappropriately” (Security Manager [1], Crime Alert). At a Crime Alert meeting, the chair relayed a story to those assembled to illustrate his frustration regarding the need to maintain radio discipline:

The other day one of our number alerted the CCTV control room to a group of youths roaming in town, clearly up to no good and doing some swiping. When it was decided to call the police in we lost visual contact because of radio interference. We can’t tolerate this and use of radios for personal use has to stop. It wastes police time and the time of the boys in the control room. Anyone caught blocking radio messages gets their fingers chopped off! (Field Notes).

‘Blocking’ referred to security personnel chatting over the network. This meant using the radio in a distracting manner to talk about, and track, women through the city centre, football, and up-and-coming leisure activities. Allied to this problem was the fact that subscriptions for the 60 radios were not always paid up and some of them would go missing. Threats to confiscate radios and barring deviants from the network were not uncommon at Crime Alert meetings. Lack of professionalism was also a criticism from outside Crime Alert. There were some store security personnel who were linked to the radio network who would not attend Crime Alert meetings because of what they perceived to be its unprofessional nature. Although in agreement with the necessity of information
swapping and the role of Crime Alert as a useful early warning system, the meetings themselves were criticised as being “an open forum for people to get shot of frustrations”.

To work in the city you should need qualifications rather than just walk in off the street, be given a radio - which is voiced across the city – and start talking rubbish on it. Some have had no formal training; they’ve been thrust into it. What they do only drags us all down (Research Interview, 18).

Not all security managers wanted to associate with Crime Alert because of “off-putting uniforms” and “untidy guards” (Ibid). Perceptions of different standards of professionalism divided those on the network.

Displacement of crime and expansion of the CCTV security network

The acceptance and utilisation of CCTV within processes of order maintenance has within itself produced a form of logic for its own expansion. Concerns about the displacement of crime and disorder also produced a source of tension amongst key players involved in establishing CCTV schemes in the city centre.26 Tensions were apparent among the wider business community within two years of the establishment of CCTV in Liverpool city centre. The cameras were seen to be having a displacement effect in Allerton, an affluent suburb lying 3 miles south of the city centre. The Allerton Traders’ Association identified the city centre camera network as the reason for increases in thefts, and argued that retailers in the area faced mounting problems in terms of finding and funding more advanced forms of security to combat these issues.

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26 The problem of the displacement of crime to areas that lie outside of camera coverage has been officially recognised as a potential negative impact of CCTV schemes (Home Office, 1994: 9). Among critical commentators, displacement of crime to relatively ‘unprotected’ areas will reinforce existing social polarisation in that CCTV is “likely to displace crime from rich to poorer parts of cities” (Graham, 1998: 100).
(Merseymart, 7 March, 1996). While displacement has become a concern for many of those who comment on CCTV, there has been less analysis conducted on the contradictions and tensions within and between local business coalitions in managing ‘insecurity’. Also, any implications arising from the displacement of crime for expanding surveillance and security networks has received little attention. In Liverpool the issue of displacement in the form of ‘travelling shoplifters’ illustrated this issue and pointed to how public and private policing agencies across the urban centre are increasingly having to find ways of coordinating their efforts against what one interviewee described as “flying wrongdoers” (Chairman, Crime Alert). Thus local partnerships began to coordinate their work, which was taking on an extra-local dimension:

At a recent meting I spoke to a security manager in Birkenhead who happened to mention that a lot of Liverpool scallies were getting picked up in Birkenhead. That got us thinking and we made inquiries in North Wales and other towns and cities. It became apparent that shoplifters and even beggars were moving around – out of Liverpool – because of our CCTV and the work of Crime Alert. We helped Birkenhead set up something similar to our system because it was becoming blatantly obvious our thieves were travelling. So if our thieves were travelling to the likes of Sheffield, Leeds and Wrexham then their thieves must be going somewhere. We realised they were coming to us because our operatives and security didn’t recognise them. That’s how it stared. We now have regular meetings of up to 50 or 60 people from all over the region; police, private security and CCTV operators. It’s a way of swapping information on who is travelling, where and with whom and finding out how we can target them. It is a way of us getting to know who is coming to our area and who we are exporting to other areas (Security Manager [2], Crime Alert).

Sharing information across networks included passing names, addresses and photographs of known and potential criminals. This information could then be used to monitor and restrict movement between places. For example, such information on travelling groups and individuals had been passed to British
Transport Police in Liverpool so they can feed back to Crime Alert regarding who was entering or leaving the city. Although initially a source of tension, the issue of displacement helped to extend and intensify the work of security networks within different locations. The success of these initiatives was measured in terms of the greater power conferred by collaboration in information exchange and surveillance, so that those targeted “get tired of trying to dodge us; they feel harassed and go elsewhere” (Chairman, Crime Alert). The obvious tensions between inter-local collaboration and, at the same time, the displacement of ‘troublemakers’ to other locations formed a central contradiction in the operation of the security network. This was a contradiction that fed itself:

We are working towards an attitude of ‘not on our patch’ and information exchange helps in deterring troublemakers coming in to the city. But if we are successful they only go to other similar patches for our colleagues to have to deal with. So we send them more information to help get rid of them and eventually they may end up back with us (City Centre Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police).

Such arguments and frustrations expressed by Liverpool security managers fed into the more general desire for more security and surveillance in the city centre. The ‘success’ of the system and the continual discovery of ‘blind spots’ or gaps in the network fed calls for extensions, fine-tuning and greater sophistication of the overall network. These calls from Crime Alert personnel for extending and refining the network came together with the aspirations of senior regeneration personnel for the same end. These desires for the future

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27 This has taken place alongside concerted efforts by local business-led networks to intensify surveillance and the evidence gathering process in order to pressure local magistrates to increase fines and sentences for those who have broken exclusion orders (The Guardian, 19 November, 1997). More recently, ‘Exclusion Notice Schemes’ have been developed for the greater collation of intelligence that can keep targets on file indefinitely and be used in gaining stiffer sentences in the case of thieves (Dobie, 2000: 25).
expansion of CCTV can be qualitatively distinguished: the former emerged from a ‘hands on’ experience of working the system, whilst the new primary definers took their cues for network expansion from wider political and economic considerations that underpinned their ideas of a proper and orderly regeneration. In this sense, the development of the CCTV network generated further perceptions of insecurity (‘blind spots’, ‘escape routes’), which, in turn, fuelled calls for more security that would cover more areas of city centre and outlying space.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the empirical material gathered during the course of the research in order to examine the aims of this thesis in tracing the development of social control within a neo-liberal state form. Building on a theoretical understanding of this state form (discussed in Chapter Three), its role in building the ‘entrepreneurial city’ (explored in Chapter Five), and its development in Liverpool (discussed in Chapter Seven), this chapter has traced the development of the camera network in Liverpool and understood it as part of these wider processes that have defined and articulated underlying features of local social order. In so doing, the CCTV network has been placed within a wider set of social relations and frameworks of political power that have been understood as processes that the camera network has both reflected and reinforced. This, it has been noted, has not been an unproblematic process for senior managers in the neo-liberal state. Tensions regarding the instigation of social control practices have been subject to negotiation and compromise. However, the formation of the camera network in Liverpool and the negotiation
of a social ordering strategy have been characteristic of and given direction to, 
the circuits of power in a neo-liberal strategy of rule. In building upon 
arguments in the previous chapter, this chapter has focused upon the degree of 
ideological unity in these processes that gave the camera network a social 
meaning. It was also argued that identifying, in ideological terms, the problems 
for order was far less problematic than establishing, in a managerial sense, the 
means to achieve it. The next, and final, chapter will conclude the thesis in 
drawing together the central themes and issues raised within it in order to 
discuss the interpretation of contemporary social control practices.
Iain Bundred’s whole life is a movie. Every step he takes is captured on unseen cameras as secret watchers see his life unfold. It may seem like a plot for Jim Careys’s Hollywood hit The Truman Show. But this is the reality in Liverpool today, not just for Iain but for all of us. [...] The watchers do not care how we live our lives, as long as we stay within the law. But the pickpocket, the mugger, the armed robber, or the drunken driver knows that those hidden eyes are out there. Today the Echo takes you behind the scenes to show you a day in the life of an ordinary Merseyside citizen, through the eyes of the CCTV cameras (Liverpool Echo, 1 September, 2000).

The ‘story’ above which covers “a day in the life of an ordinary Merseyside citizen” was told using closed circuit television (CCTV) stills which showed Ian Bundred, smartly dressed in suit and tie, as he went about his normal daily routine. Iain, in his car, was captured: going to work; entering the office; at work at his desk; doing a spot of shopping on his lunch break; buying a paper in a newsagents; driving out of the city on his way home; going back into the city by train for the evening; buying a ticket at a theatre; having a drink in a café-bar; and, finally, on his way home by train at 11.15pm. The story of Iain as told in the local newspaper evoked the ‘responsibilised citizen’ for its readers, as someone who has “nothing to fear” from visual surveillance and cares not for outmoded arguments concerned with “invasions of privacy” (Ibid). Iain, a “volunteer” for this Echo “investigation”, like the central character in The Truman Show was “astounded” to learn that his every move was caught on camera. Unlike Jim Carey’s incarnation, however, he more optimistically retorted, “it does make you feel safe” (Ibid). In Liverpool the press have played a central role in “representing order” understood as a “morality.
procedural form and social hierarchy” that is both symbolically and visually persuasive (Ericson et al, 1991: 1). The ‘responsible citizen’ presented in the article mirrored the idealised consumer-worker befitting of a ‘new’ urban sensibility as articulated by the city renaissance managers discussed in Chapter Seven. The mundane and seemingly disinterested discourses of responsibility have underpinned the wider social ordering strategy, of which CCTV has played a key role and that this thesis has explored.

This responsibilisation strategy has been reinforced as Chapters Two and Three illustrated by the contested relationship between three key domains: social control, the nature of power and social order. This thesis has argued that the relations between these three domains remain critical. In this sense, the thesis has sought to understand the materiality of Liverpool’s surveillance network as part of a project of regeneration and social ordering within a city that has rescaled its institutional power to act. The thesis has therefore sought to explore the surveillance network not for its effectiveness in reducing categories of crime, but in terms of how it has been located and utilised within wider social relations. In other words, CCTV has been analysed for its qualitative dimensions as a vehicle of social ordering. As a local case study the thesis has made no claims towards generalisation, although, as the discussion in Chapter Four indicated, it has presented a set of empirical data that has sought to contribute to wider theoretical arguments concerning the nature of power, social order and social control in contemporary cities.
In light of the literature on social control, and in critical response to it, this thesis has argued its case within a series of analytical concerns outlined in Chapters Four and Five, and illustrated in Chapters Eight and Nine.

Firstly, CCTV has been understood as a contemporary form of social control, which has been located within an understanding of state institutions discussed in Chapter Three. Therefore, CCTV has been analysed as a tool in the reordering of power through the local neo-liberal state. Power in Liverpool was not analysed in isolated segments, as either 'private' or 'public', but as the outcome of term setting alliances between and across these shifting domains. The ideological and material terms established through these alliances underpinned strategies for sovereign control over city centre space. Thus CCTV played an important part in excavating a form of sovereign territorial control.

Secondly, CCTV has been explored as a normative strategy of social control. In other words, it has been understood as a practice of contemporary social ordering geared toward an ideologically motivated cleansing of the streets of Liverpool city centre. In doing this, the thesis has thus offered a correction to neo-Foucauldian approaches, which have prioritised the technical over the normative in this field.

Thirdly, and related to the above, CCTV has been explored within the material and ideological context of its emergence – namely within the ‘entrepreneurial’ forms of rule identified in Chapter Five. Within the research process this involved ‘studying
up' in order to identify the locally powerful, to assess the meanings they attribute to the objects of their power, and to understand how they initiated a responsibilisation process in order to coordinate partnerships.

Fourthly, in light of the historical material pertaining to Liverpool in Chapter Six, CCTV in the city has been understood as marking historical continuities in the power to consolidate social divisions and define and target problem groups thought to hinder projects for socially ordered space. CCTV has not been understood as denoting a wholesale shift in the strategies of social control. In other words, the normative demarcation of social space found in the nineteenth century city has a contemporary correspondence with the processes of articulating the proper objects of partnership power discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine.

In concluding the thesis this chapter will reflect upon and draw together the central arguments made in the preceding chapters. Thus what follows will consider the research and its contribution to the academic debates in the interpretation of contemporary social control.

The research process focused upon the locally powerful within a neo-liberal state form and the attendant ideologies that informed the meanings attributed to urban space and form. A central claim has been made for the understanding of social ordering practices as both technical and moral-ideological in character. Thus CCTV and associated ordering initiatives have been situated within the discourses
of renaissance and censure articulated by the locally powerful. In arguing against a
strict separation between these two - the technical and the ideological - aspects of
social control in contemporary societies the thesis returned to an understanding of
social control, identified in Chapter Two, as "a metaphor for pragmatic thinking
about morality and social solidarity in times of acute social tension" (Sumner,
1997b: 6-7). Also discussed in that chapter was Durkheim's notion that construed
social control as unproblematically reflective of popular sentiment. As the opening
quote to this chapter illustrated, the Durkheimian view of social control would be
acknowledged, and made welcome, within the official discourses that have sought
to present technologies of rule, such as CCTV, as expressive of the public interest
and demonstrative of 'community empowerment'. However, legal, technical or
state forms of control, as later theorists suggested, "do not simply 'express' such
sentiments - they also seek to transform and shape them in accordance with a
particular vision of society" (Garland, 1990: 54). Similarly, studies directed at
contemporary 'governmentalities' or so-called risk orientated management
strategies have been indicative of a view of social control without 'the social'
element; in their depictions of 'post-disciplinary' control techniques and/or
individually manifest 'mentalities' of 'freedom'. Earlier derivatives of the neo-
Foucauldian approach strongly suggested the impossibility of holistic,
universalising or, what this work would prefer to call, 'totalising' theoretical
understandings of contemporary "control societies" (Rose, 2000: 325). This
detachment of control strategies from centres of power and ideological frameworks
was thought useful for the avoidance of crude 'functionalism' and 'reductionism'.
but as this thesis has illustrated any such detachment fails to account for the normative aspects of power, control and their location. Indeed, it was these normative and ideological aspects of power that guided the 'diffusion' of tasks and responsibilities to 'responsible' partners in the regeneration process. Moreover, there has been "a tendency among risk theorists to overstate the importance of cold, actuarial calculus as the determining form of responding to system breakdown" (Rigakos, 1999: 145) within what this thesis has identified as social ordering strategies. In thinking about the normative nature of order alongside, and not as an alternative to, techniques involved in the regulation of social space, CCTV, it was argued, has to be analysed as more than just a piece of crime prevention technology and instead situated as a vehicle for reproducing and sustaining a particular social order, one that embodied a complex nexus of commercial as well as ideological and moral imperatives. In the construction of a local "regime of truth" (to borrow Foucault's phrase, 1985: 93) or 'a politics of truth', the locally powerful were engaged in a process of defining problems, of a normative and technical nature, that hindered a particular governmental programme. Thus the reinforcement of particular and established definitions of crime; the privileging of 'public' discourses of risk over 'private' and the marginalisation of other dangers in the urban environment (including sexual and racial harassment, insecurities generated by homelessness, pollution in the urban realm and white collar crime), were part of

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1 The term 'diffusion' suggests a pluralisation of power, though, as this thesis has argued, the 'diffusion' of power in Liverpool has been strategically coordinated in a manner that has reflected and reinforced established power relations. Thus changes, instigated through partnerships, in the structure and objects of city centre rule, have inaugurated a refinement and not a transformation in the ideological and political centres of power.
this process and can be understood as having operationalised, in the 'public interest', a local truth-claiming strategy. The articulation of these discourses was illustrated in Chapters Eight and Nine, through an examination of the ideological outlooks of the locally powerful and the attendant security network. The powerful linkages between various local 'expert' domains within the neo-liberal state were able, albeit not without internal conflict, to articulate a vision for the city that encompassed an idealised citizenry and a desired urban utility. Chapter Seven explored how, in general terms, threats deemed to hinder the renaissance project were constructed and articulated. In 'studying up' and casting a gaze upon the locally powerful, the thesis challenged notions of the 'risk society' that have dematerialised processes involved in the power to define risk and 'public safety'. These definitional processes were bound up with attempts to align strategically the players in the partnership programme itself.

This thesis has argued that the quest for a form of 'joined up' social ordering within Liverpool was itself a dilemma and predicament of strategic importance that focused the minds of regeneration managers who, faced with scarce funds, fractured budgets and a feeling of being let down by local and central governments, defined and rescaled their own power to act within the process of urban restructuring. They strove for and inaugurated 'joined up' governmental programmes as a means of overcoming peculiar tensions and perceptions of mistrust between agencies at the local level. In this sense, the quest for 'joined up' governing was integral to the process of responsibilisation – of defining who and
what were to be included as relevant to the social ordering strategy. Furthermore, these processes can be understood as integral to state rescaling which illustrate shifts in authority over physical space.

Both the responsibilisation strategy and targeted, ‘hot-spot’ policing fall under the remit of the Crime and Disorder Act, discussed in Chapter Five, with its emphasis on partnership building, auditing and more ‘effective’, pinpointed policing. What this thesis has argued is that the trajectory and meaning of responsibilisation has been developed within the networks of the new primary definers. In setting the parameters of urban rule, the locally powerful have generated particular images and categories of dangerousness which target the economically marginalized as a group who appeared “unable to learn the lesson that neo-liberalism now expects of its subjects” (Pratt, 1997: 181). Such lessons in ‘civility’ and ‘responsibility’ were discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine. A self-defined remit of those directing the responsibilisation process, as Chapters Eight and Nine illustrated, was to identify, manage and contain ‘the locally dangerous’ under the gaze of the city centre security network.²

In sum, the quest for ‘making partnerships work’ can be thought through as highlighting issues in the agency and manoeuvrability of the local state which has been less diminished and more redirected through novel institutional and

² ‘Responsibilisation’ was understood in Chapter Three as a political process conducted through neo-liberal networks engaged in assigning authority to accredited bodies as a forerunner to implementing agreed social ordering measures. This process was seen to prescribe a public interest through forging a discourse that promoted a particular vision for ‘the city as a whole’.
ideological networks towards the creation and management of social and physical spaces. The exponential growth and development of CCTV provision and the discourses that have accompanied it have provided evidence of the endurance of sovereign forms of state power over territory.

Furthermore, as argued in Chapter Three, and contrary to some aspects of neo-Foucauldian approaches, claims over sovereignty have been reconfigured within the rescaled state. Chapter Seven provided empirical material to show how a range of locally powerful actors articulated their visions for the city centre of Liverpool. The public-private partnerships that have underpinned CCTV have, as this thesis has argued, been engaged in setting the ideological and material limits and possibilities for social sovereignty. As argued in Chapter Four, social control practices need to be analysed for the normative prescriptions that underpin them. It is these normative frameworks that lead into an exploration of sovereignty. In other words, issues arose between partners over 'who runs the city' and of how articulations for an ordered urban realm could serve as a rationale for rule over territory. Exploring these issues challenged the governmentality literature for its descriptive and overly technical focus and its reluctance to move beyond what some have referred to as neutral observation (Rigakos, 1999; Garland, 1997). This has been the result of a failure to examine the normative dimensions of contemporary social control – a failure to materialise and place control discourses and practices within particular social relations, and therefore explore as central the

3 Such spaces have been constructed with concerns of 'civility' and a certain 'quality of life' at their core.
normative claims to sovereignty over a physical and symbolic space. Indeed, others have framed this in terms of a de-politicisation process that has enshrined the contemporary 'managerial state' (Clarke and Newman, 1997). The technicist and managerial discourses emanating from this state have, in many instances, been incorporated into theorisations of risk.

The construction and targeting of the historical and contemporary 'proper objects of power', identified in Chapters Six and Seven, have demonstrated continuity through processes of 'social defence' within the urban centre. Allied to this targeting process has been the intensification in repressive and coercive state practices, explicitly rejected in some governmentality studies as unnecessary for managing social order (Barry et al, 1996). This thesis has located CCTV not as an alternative to 'state control', but as interrelated with other practices of social ordering – including the intensification of military forms of policing which have proliferated during the late 1990s in Liverpool particularly, and more generally in cities in both the UK and the USA. The visibility of public order policing – particularly in its more acute paramilitary guises – does not, as Chapter Seven demonstrated, always sit easily with the more broadly conceived project of urban renaissance as envisaged by key partnership players. The thesis has therefore

4 As Rigakos stated, cannot these processes of constructing enemies “be necessary and routine”? He cautioned scholars “not to misread risk systems as operating on a separate or detached logic from 'unscientific' impulses such as racism, heterosexism, classicism …” (Rigakos, 1999: 146).

5 Others have commented on this interrelationship such as Coleman and Sim, (1998), Parenti, (1999) and Herbert, (1999).

6 Coercive displays of rule, however, have sat alongside a local and national language of 'war on crime' that constructs 'yob cultures' and un-aesthetical urban wastelands in both the UK and USA (Parenti, 1999; Garland, 1996). In Liverpool, the targeted deployment of militaristic policing to
highlighted continuities in social control practices which belie any 'clean break' with an 'older penology' in terms of both those groups targeted and the ideological basis of that targeting. For the purposes of neo-liberal state rule the reclamation of city centre space was underpinned by discourses of moral abjection and corrective severity.  

On balance, contemporary risk theorists have operated within an implicit demarcation between institutional forms and their supposed polar mentalities. Thus, the state has been depicted as the pole of retribution/coercion and non-state agencies as the pole of instrumentalism/risk (Shearing, 2001). As this thesis has argued, there can be no easy separation here in terms of exclusivity of institutional forms or 'mentalities'. As discussed in Chapter Seven, private agencies have not been solely directed by a risk mentality and have utilised a language of moral condemnation in order to pressure formal criminal justice agencies to 'get tough' on problems relevant for them. Furthermore, another assumption can also be questioned regarding whether “the mechanisms of coercion within criminal justice [will] come to be seen less as a device for inflicting pain and more as set of resources to be considered in reducing risk” (Shearing, 2001: 217). On the contrary, the components of spatial reordering need to be analysed in dialectical

defined 'hot spots', along with the racialised use of stop and search and the development of 'yob maps', have maintained a central role in local social ordering (Coleman, Sim and Whyte, 2002).

7 As argued elsewhere, “modern penal severity” has been, and continues to be, central to “modern states’ development”. Furthermore, “as tools of governance … measures of repression, containment, reclamation or exclusion reappear in remarkably similar forms, remarkably intact in both justification and procedure, when social and political change creates a space for their application” (Brown, 2002: 32).
interrelation and as belonging to a strategy of social ordering, not always uniform and coherent. This thesis has explored those processes that have constructed the legitimate and ‘safe’ uses of public space and of how the proper objects of partnership power came to identify social categories as ‘deserving’ of exclusionary, sometimes oppressive, monitoring. These processes of social censure, along with definitions of responsibility, have, it was argued, been framed within the rescaled state form in Liverpool, and as such point to the necessity of retaining a focus on shifts in state form and power. For one writer the state remains central for thinking about the operation of power and challenges to it:

... it is exactly through the state (at what ever scale) that the position and role of the citizen and his/her relationship with society is defined, institutionalised and, on occasion, contested and challenged [...]. If we are concerned with formulating emancipatory policies and strategies, the state and other forms of governance remain key areas for challenging processes of exclusion and disempowerment (Sywngedouw, 1996, 1502, emphasis added)

The shifts identified in Chapter Five towards partnership rule in the urban setting have linked urban renaissance, ‘quality of life’, and crime and disorder. These linkages can be understood as situated within, and characteristic of, state rescaling. Maintaining a theoretical focus on the state has enabled this thesis, firstly, to identify the condensation of power and strategies of coordination and formalisation involved in state formation and, secondly, to identify the fractures and contradictions within these processes. Issues of coordination and strategic direction in the process of orchestrating partnerships were analysed in Chapter Seven as attributes of state rescaling itself. Understanding these processes has necessitated a contingent analysis that has stressed the heterogeneity of state structures and
action, which, in terms of the analysis presented in this thesis, has included an exploration of the tensions and contradictions between state institutions and actors. Within the governmentality literature explored in Chapter Two, CCTV can be understood as helping to create public spaces for 'free', 'responsible' consumer orientated citizens who independently choose their autonomous role in the life of the city. Such analyses have run conterminous with official discourses that have provided legitimacy for CCTV as an empowering technology that has enabled consumers to have the “freedom and safety to shop” (Home Office, 1994: 9). As the thesis has argued this discourse has ignored the material context within which these developments have taken place. The power to promote and redefine a ‘responsible citizenry’ can be seen as indicators of a new politics of legitimacy processed within, and aiding the reproduction of, a rescaled state. Keeping ‘Mr and Mrs Bloggs on board’ with local entrepreneurial initiatives was a key concern of the interviewees in this thesis, and underlined the importance they attached to a re-channelled decision-making process that has set a course beyond democratic structures as conceived for local government in the post war period.8

Within Liverpool, the process of promoting business and consumer confidence was set alongside ideas pertaining to the legitimate use of the city centre and the desired moral order which underpinned it. In representing CCTV as ‘a people’s system’, a larger orchestration was enacted to construct a consensualised ideal of a benign

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8 As Chapter Seven indicated, the development of partnerships attempted to forge a new consensus around an entrepreneurial and local promotional spirit that at the same time attacked ‘older’ avenues of political action as redundant and not in the interests of the ‘city as a whole’. In this sense, the locally powerful were engaged in political struggle towards reformulating the ‘public interest’ conterminous with the strategic direction of partnership power.
authoritative power over territory. Thus, as Chapter Seven illustrated, partnerships have been engaged in a constant battle in formulating and marketing ‘entrepreneurial strategies’ of rule. Their power to act channelled large sums of money into campaign strategies that have driven a powerful promotionalism through place marketing aimed at local and national audiences.\textsuperscript{11} It has been argued that CCTV cannot be understood in isolation from these wider strategies, and instead has formed a vehicle for their potential realisation.

The conclusions and findings from this thesis have raised further questions for future research. A study of the locally powerful does not preclude a complimentary study of the experiences of those targeted by urban surveillance networks. In this thesis the voices of the homeless, young people and street traders, as subjects of a powerful and detrimental labelling process, have remained relatively silent. Their perception of ‘city life’ and the world of meaning they hold represent an untapped reservoir of knowledge that, if studied, could yield a fuller and more enriched understanding of the processes described in this thesis, namely: the unfolding of entrepreneurial forms of rule and their impact upon ‘the urban experience’. More broadly, and as the thesis has argued, the hegemony of neo-liberal rule cannot be taken as given and will therefore be incomplete and open to contestation. Thus, resistance to local state projects from local publics and bodies needs to be

\textsuperscript{11} Such a locally powerful promotional vernacular included discourses around particular images of street crime as harmful to citywide regeneration and in need of policing. The process of coalition building endeavoured to link discourses of Liverpool as a ‘safe place to do business’ with a rhetoric of partnership, identified in Chapter Five, that claimed an apolitical stance in shaping a orderly regeneration of city spaces.
researched, particularly - as Chapters Seven and Eight demonstrated - these projects themselves often assume rather than demonstrate local community participation. Research into the meaning and practice of contemporary local democracy – including processes of communal exclusion and oppositional appropriation by locally powerful networks – would itself further enhance our appreciation of the trajectory of neo-liberal rule. Taken together, these are important silences that have been marginalized in both criminological and geographical literature and need to be incorporated into a wider understanding of neo-liberal cities. These kinds of questions can also find application between urban locations to explore similarities and differences of practice and experience regarding partnerships for crime prevention (Edwards and Hughes, 2002; Stenson, 2002) and entrepreneurial rule more generally (Hall and Hubbard, 1996). Such studies would contribute to debates concerned with the tensions between theoretical generalisation and empirical findings from particular politico-cultural locations. As stated elsewhere, and reinforced in this thesis, “the best of the literature on the entrepreneurial city seeks to demonstrate that the political economy of place and the cultural politics of place are intimately intermeshed” (Ibid: 170).

Not with standing these areas of theoretical dispute, this thesis has sought to make a contribution to these debates in arguing for a sociological understanding of contemporary social control mechanisms that takes into account how the interests of the locally powerful are organised institutionally, along with their normative
representations of city centre space. In placing CCTV within a broader appreciation of prevailing social relations this thesis has argued that the camera network has constituted more than a technology for the prevention of crime. Alternatively, this technology can be understood as part of a wider social ordering strategy that has a material and ideological basis within the neo-liberal state. It is out of these processes that the realisation of particular and tendentious visions of socially ordered space, its ‘proper’ and ‘responsible’ uses, has been developed and reproduced by the locally powerful.
Appendix One

List of interviewees identified by either occupational title and/or institution.

Research Interviewee by Occupational title and institution

Superintendent, Merseyside Police, Government Office for Merseyside [GOM]

Chairman, Stores’ Committee

Home Office Advisor, Government Office for Merseyside

Marketing Director, Mersey Partnership

Liverpool City Council, Economic Development Officer

Chairman, Merseyside Development Corporation

City Centre Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police

The City Centre Manager, Liverpool City Centre Partnership (LCCP)

Private Developer [1], affiliated to LCCP

Regeneration Co-ordinator, Liverpool City Council,

Representative [1] of Stores’ Committee

Private Developer [2], affiliated to LCCP

Chairman, Crime Alert

Security Manager [1], Crime Alert

Security Manager [2], Crime Alert

Representative of LCCP

Representative [2] of Stores Committee

Security manager, non-member of Crime Alert

Security Manager [3], Crime Alert

Security Manager, Mersey Travel Rapid Response Unit

Total of twenty
Appendix Two
Specimen letter to interviewees

Ref: RC/AD/1-30

23 March 1997

Marketing Manager
The Mersey Partnership
Cunard Building
Pier Head
Liverpool
L3 1ET

Dear

I am a researcher at Liverpool John Moores University, School of Social Science and am conducting research coordinated by Professor Joe Sim. I am undertaking a major study into the perceptions and definitions of security and insecurity in Liverpool city centre. Initially, the investigation seeks to ascertain the views of a range of city centre agencies at senior management level who are involved in the process of defining and responding to security problems. I am therefore writing to ask if you would agree to participate in this research as a senior agency representative by taking part in a semi-structured interview. The interview would last a maximum of two hours and covers the following areas:

i) The nature of the organisation/employment duties.

ii) Organisational perceptions of insecurity and security in the city.

iii) Involvement through partnership with other city centre agencies for purposes of security (e.g. CCTV, Stores Committee, Image management, etc.)

iv) General views of security/insecurity within the current regeneration of Liverpool city centre.

I would like to stress at the outset that organisational and individual confidentiality are guaranteed and information used in the research will not be identified with any one agency or individual. As one of its outcomes the research findings will be made available to interested parties providing a collation of security initiatives and their effectiveness.

Initially then I wish to interview corporate managers but in order to ensure the full range of views in this area, and with your permission, we would like to interview
those within your organisation responsible for security management 'on the
ground' (for example, and if appropriate, the nature of their work with Crime
Alert etc). I should like to conduct interviews in the corporate sector from the
beginning of May 1997, subject to the time schedules and availability of an
appropriate manager. If you have any queries regarding this project, do not
hesitate to get in contact with myself on 0151 231 4072 or 0151 231 4043
(Secretary). I appreciate your time and assistance in responding to this matter and
look forward to hearing from you.

Yours faithfully

Roy Coleman
Liverpool John Moores University
Appendix Three

Interview Schedule

Prompt: Explain research, aims, outcomes, and confidentiality (i.e., points in the letter).

Name:

Location:

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<tr>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
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<td>Home Area/Residence</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Education</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

To what level are you qualified? (Prompt: ‘O’/’A’ levels, Degree etc.)

Where were you educated?

7       Previous Employment:

Title: Duties/Responsibilities: Dates:

8       Present Employment:

i) Job title

ii) How long have you been at this post?
iii) Duties/responsibilities:

**Part B:**

Prompt: I would now like to move on and ask about how security is managed within your organization.

9 How do you define security within your organization/institution?

10 What are the main security threats to your business?

11 What do you identify as your main vulnerabilities?

12 What ‘in-house’ measures do you operate to combat security problems and create a secure environment? Do you use any of the following?

a) External Advisors? Yes No

If yes, who are these advisors? (Prompt: Police, private consultants, others?)

b) Do you have ‘in-house’ security managers? Yes No

If yes, how long have you had a security manager and what are the duties and responsibilities of this position?

c) Do you undertake staff training for security purposes? Yes No

If yes, what does this training involve? (Literature for staff, courses?)

d) How often is staff training undertaken?
Do you have on-site uniformed security guards? Yes No

If yes, how many do you have and who are they?

How do you define their role in your organization?

e) Do you have on-site CCTV? Yes No (go to (i) page 12)

If yes, how do you define its role?

f) Who monitors your CCTV system?

What happens to the material collected from CCTV?

Who has access to this material? (e.g. Police, Crime Alert etc.)

g) Is your CCTV system overt and publicly visible? Yes No

h) Do you use a covert system? Yes No

If you use covert CCTV how do you view its role?

i) How important is the design and layout of your premises in terms of security measures?

(Prompt: to control access, movement (pedestrian flow), staff and security)
j) Are there any other security measures that you use that have not been mentioned?
   (e.g. Aural surveillance)

13 What prompted you to adopt your security measures?
   (Prompt: level of crime, loss of stock, police advice, competitor practices?)

14 In terms of dealing with incidents of crime involving the public during business hours (e.g. shoplifting) what are the procedures you adopt?
   (Prompt: Formal or informal, and what is involved in these different procedures?)

15 Overall, what is the role of the security measures you have adopted?

16 How do you measure the effectiveness and level of success of your security measures?
   (Prompt: How do you know they work?)

17 How have concerns with security changes since you first joined the organization?

18 More generally, what is your view about how concerns with security have changed over the last 20 years? Have things become worse or better and what do you think are the reasons for any change?

19 What are the main constraints that your organization faces in adopting security measures?
   (Prompt: Fiscal, putting the public off....)

20 How do you see future of your in-house security provision and its development?
   (Prompt: Increasing in complexity/sophistication and relationship to other organizations?)

Part C:

Prompt: Having discussed your in-house security process we would like to move on to the relationship between your organization and security initiatives in Liverpool City Centre.
21 What local initiatives and collective programmes are you involved in to promote insecurity?
(e.g. Stores Committee, Crime Alert, Crime Stoppers, others)

22 How did you hear about these initiatives and how did you become involved?

23 What is the purpose of your involvement in these initiatives?

24 What do you regard as the benefits that such involvement brings to your organisation?

25 Are you involved in the Liverpool City Centre CCTV initiative?
Yes
No (no, go to question 30)

25 If yes, how did you hear about this and how did you become involved?

27 What is the nature and level of your involvement?
(Prompt: funding, meetings, intelligence-targeting?)

28 What are the benefits of being involved in Liverpool’s CCTV scheme?
(Prompt: is it value for money? Crime prevention?)

29 Are there any disadvantages or problems with your involvement in the CCTV scheme?

30 For what reasons are you not involved in the CCTV scheme? Would you like to be?

Part D:
(Prompt: I would like to ask some questions about your views on security within the regeneration of Liverpool city centre)

31 Are you involved with any partnerships concerned with regeneration?
What does regeneration mean to you and your organization?

What does partnership mean to you and your organization?

32 What are your views on the current regeneration of Liverpool city centre? What does it mean for your organization / business?

33 What, if any, do you perceive as the obstacles that hinder this regeneration?

Prompt: Political / administrative / inter-agency dealings?

Security / policing / order-disorder / groups / categories?

34 In your view have the security measures you have described helped in the regeneration of Liverpool? What are the reasons for your views?

35 More generally, how important is security in the current regeneration drive?

Finally regarding your organizational role are there any other points that you wish to make regarding security and insecurity in Liverpool city centre?

Thank you for your time and assistance in this interview.

Finish time:
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