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Trust and Distrust in Nigerian Supply Chain Relationships

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Abstract
Purpose- To date, most of the literature on trust and distrust reveal a paucity of studies about Nigerian Supply chain relationships. Specifically, this paper attempts to address this gap by examining how trust is developed and repaired in supply chain relationships.

Design/methodology/approach- Within the scope of this paper, an interpretivist approach was adopted in response to calls for qualitative studies on supply chain relationships. Face to face semi-structured interviews with 12 supplier/customers active in Nigerian trade provided insights into the importance of trust and distrust in enduring supply chain relationships. Data was analysed using iterations from interviews held with the respondents. These iterations demonstrate the key role trust plays in developing and maintaining supply chain relationships whereas distrust deters cooperative relationships.

Findings- Key factors were considered in developing an understanding of how trust and distrust mechanisms affect the coordination of supply chain performance. Three distinct types of trust-calculus based trust (CBT), identification based trust (IBT) and knowledge based trust (KBT) are considered to play an important role in maintaining and developing fruitful relationships. Conversely, the repair of two levels of distrust-calculus based distrust and identification based distrust is crucial to enduring supply chain relationships.

Research limitations/implications- The importance of taking trust and distrust seriously stems from its unique contextual embeddedness. This study fills a gap in the literature by providing insights into how potential customers and suppliers can leverage on trust to improve their supply chain capacities while suggesting remedial actions when trust is violated.

Originality- The paper enriches the view that trust and distrust are crucial in explaining Nigerian supply chain relationships. In a broader context, the complementary relationships between both mechanisms highlight the social advantage of trusting behaviour in overall performance of supply chains.
Introduction
With the advent of globalisation, markets have continued to witness an increase in alternative long term alliances. Most companies have learnt to adapt in the face of growing competition through successful relational exchanges. Prior relationships were characterised by an adversarial atmosphere which encouraged confrontationist relationships. For several years, customers had always dictated the tune by awarding or cancelling supplier relationships (Hacker et al., 1999). Rather than the traditional arm’s length approach, recent customer-supplier dyads are focused on building strong and reliable partnerships (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Zineldin and Jonsson, 2000; Sahay, 2003). Undoubtedly, the trending outcome of these relationships is confirmed in the reduction of cycle time processes (Hanfield and Bechtel, 2002; Hanfield and Nichols, 2002). It turns out that collaborating for mutually beneficial objectives becomes a strategic advantage. As supply chain evolves, customer-supplier collaborations ensure reduced delivery costs and faster to market developments. This suggests that supply chain relationships are enhanced when collaborations become effective. At the same time, the ability of these synergies reveals that sharing partner-specific information improves response times and encourages flexibility. The central propositions shaping this statement is that supply chain agility is derived when partners combine resources and engage in knowledge exchange (Hanfield and Bechtel, 2002; Fedorowicz, 2008). However such collaborative synergies require interactions that foster the building and sustenance of interpersonal trust.

Within the remit of this study, a valuable understanding of the potential challenges unique to developing market economies is important. In light of this uniqueness, customer-supplier dyads are faced with difficult conditions such as poor communication and no recourse to legal measures (Lyon and Porter, 2007). Hence, they respond to these features by rely on trust and social institutions in which it is embedded. In this situation trust becomes rooted in a broader social context (Nuissl, 2005). Trust in the Nigerian context fosters stronger commitments in supply chain relationships while reducing behavioural uncertainty. This particularly true as trust becomes crucial in optimizing cycle processes for effective supply chain performance. In this paper, we acknowledge that trust is a strategic variable which ensures conformities to specifications, and valuable information about others (Lindgreen, 2003; Vieira and Trail, 2008). We make a case for a novel approach to examining the roles of trust and distrust from a developing economy context. Within these sections, we seek understanding of this phenomenon by putting forward the following research questions:

RQ1: What are the types of trust required in supply chain relationships?
RQ2: Can distrust be repaired in supply chain relationships?

To explore trust and distrust in Nigerian supply chain relationships, we adopt a qualitative approach to highlight how customers and suppliers make sense of their relationships; and whether trust can be rebuilt when broken. Our research contributes to the literature on trust by establishing the importance of context in environments where institutions are weak and inefficient. This becomes important as assumptions based on a ‘western model’ of
trust may not be sufficient in explaining perceptions of trust as revealed in Nigerian supply chain relationships (Amoako and Matlay, 2014; Jukka et al., 2017). Secondly, our most salient contribution empirically supports three distinct types of trust; calculus based trust (CBT), identification based trust (IBT) and knowledge based trust (KBT). Our empirical findings support Lewicki and Bunker’s (1995) claim that although these three types of trust are discernibly different, they build on each other as the relationship evolves. Thirdly, our study suggests possible remedial efforts to be adopted in repairing trust. We then proceed to identify a variety of sequential steps to be followed in intractable conflict situations. Against this background, the organisation of this paper is as follows: in the first section, we aim to briefly espouse the concept of trust by providing its preliminary indication in supply chain relationships. In the second section, we examine situations when trust is broken and the extent through which it remedial actions may suffice. Section 3 presents our data collection and analysis. In the final section, we discuss our findings and draw our conclusions.

Conceptualising Trust
Trust has been defined differently across several disciplines; in management sciences Rousseau et al. (1998) define trust as a psychological state which includes one’s intention to accept vulnerabilities based on the positive expectation of the other party; in economics Gambetta (1988) defines trust to be particular level of subjective probability where an agent expects that another agent performs a particular action; in philosophy Baier (1986) takes trust to be reliance upon the competence and good-will of others, while in sociology Zucker (1986) defines trust as a set of expectations shared by parties involved in a transaction. However, for the purpose of this study, we would draw on the definition of trust spoken in the Eastern Igbo region of Nigeria where trust is understood to be ntụkwásiobi; which loosely translated means a suspended expectation in the reliability of an entity. As trust is a well researched topic, the Igbo translation of trust shares commonal definitions with some of the above definitions. For instance, it relates closely to Möllering’s (2006) definition of trust as the reason, routine and reflexivity whereby all irreducible uncertainties are suspended by maintaining a positive expectation towards another party. Our understanding of these definitions is enhanced if the element of suspension is recognized. Suspension is perceived as the very essence of trust and may also be described as a leap of faith. This becomes an important ingredient as trust is equated as a positive state of expectation from others. Hence, suspension is perceived as a process which enables customer/suppliers deal with uncertainties by maintaining a state of favourable expectation about their actions (Möllering, 2006). Table 1 presents a review of trust definitions across literature.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Definition(s)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anderson <em>et al.</em> (1987)</td>
<td>Trust is the degree to which one perceives that a relationship is based on mutual trust in order to accept short term dislocations with the confidence that this would balance out in the long term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrow (1974)</td>
<td>Trust is defined as a lubricant for all relationships.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baier (1985)</td>
<td>Trust is understood be an accepted vulnerability towards another’s goodwill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barney and Hansen (1994)</td>
<td>Trust is the confidence that a party would avoid exploiting the vulnerabilities of the other party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blomqvist (2002)</td>
<td>Trust is viewed as the expectation of another party’s capability and goodwill involves risks and vulnerabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blois (1999)</td>
<td>Trust is understood to be a situation in which a party makes itself vulnerable to the behaviour of the other party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradach and Eccles (1989)</td>
<td>Trust is a type of expectation which alleviates the fear that the trustee in an exchange would behave in an opportunistic way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bromiley and Harris (2006)</td>
<td>Trust is defined as a non-calculative belief in a trustee’s honesty in negotiations, good-faith efforts and the ability to keep to commitments which are devoid of opportunism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cummings and Bromiley (1996)</td>
<td>Trust is an individual’s belief or common belief among individuals or common groups that they would make good effort to behave well, be honest and not take advantage even when an opportunity to presented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook and Wall, (1980)</td>
<td>Trust is understood to be the extent to which an agent is willing to ascribe good intentions and confidence to the actions of a trustee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dasgupta, P. (1988)</td>
<td>Trust is to a large extent the dispositional capacity, motivation and the extent to which the trustor awards importance to his honesty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsch (1973)</td>
<td>Trust can be defined as the expectation that a party would find what is expected rather than what is feared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doney and Cannon (1997)</td>
<td>Trust is the perceived credibility and benevolence of a trustee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambetta (1988)</td>
<td>Trust is defined as the perception of the subjective probability that an agent assesses that the other agent will perform a certain action before that action can be monitored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govier (1994)</td>
<td>Trust is the expectation of good-will from a person to be trusted rather than ill-will.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardin (1993)</td>
<td>Trust is primarily defined as the dispositional capacity of the trustor towards the trustee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Definition of Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hosmer (1994)</td>
<td>Trust is described as an integral ingredient which facilitates innovation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jones (1996)</td>
<td>Trust is described as not just a set of expectations of beliefs, but rather it involves an affective attitude.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhmann (1988)</td>
<td>Trust refers to the preference of choosing one action over another despite the chances of being disappointed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyon (2005)</td>
<td>Trust is an integral part of social capital. It is emergent from personalized sources embedded in social networks and generalized norms of morality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayer <em>et al.</em> (1995)</td>
<td>Trust is the willingness to be vulnerable to another party based on the trustor’s propensity to trust others and also based on the perception that the trustee can also be trusted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misztal (1996)</td>
<td>Trust means to hold expectations or belief about how someone would perform future actions. This includes the belief that the intended actions would be appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan and Hunt (1994)</td>
<td>Trust exists when one party is confident in the reliability and integrity of the partner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McAllister (1995)</td>
<td>Trust is defined as the belief and willingness to act based on the actions and deeds of the other party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotter (1967)</td>
<td>Trust is the expectation of a statement by a trustee which can be relied upon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shurr and Ozanne (1985)</td>
<td>Trust is the belief that one’s promise is reliable and used towards fulfilling obligations in a relationship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rousseau <em>et al.</em> (1998)</td>
<td>Trust is a psychological state which includes the intention to accept vulnerabilities based on the positive expectation that the other party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weitz (1989)</td>
<td>Trust is defined as one’s belief that it needs would be fulfilled in the nearest future based on the actions of the other party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaheer <em>et al.</em> (1998)</td>
<td>Trust is the belief in another party’s reliability, fairness and predictability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zucker (1986)</td>
<td>Trust can be defined as a set of expectations which is shared by all parties involved in an exchange.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the definitions described above move beyond a set of expectations to highlight the situational risks facing parties in a relationship (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996), as future outcomes are dependent on the expected actions of the trustee (Misztal, 1996). Under these outcomes, one might question what makes the concept of trust attractive in supply chain relationships? From extant discourse, the building of collaborative relationships underpinned by trust enhances competition and growth (Bruton *et al.*, 2010; Amoako and Matlay, 2015). Trust undoubtedly plays a pivotal role in cooperative relationships as contracts may not guarantee absolute certainty that actors in a supply chain relationship will refrain from acting in an opportunistic manner (Svensson, 2000; McEvily *et al.* 2003; Nuissl, 2005). As Ring and Van de Ven (1992) succinctly put it, that trust is a deeply shared value which flows when honesty and integrity exist in a relationship. For instance, trust is instrumental in the facilitation of knowledge exchange (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992) while
diminishing information gathering and processing costs by reducing monitoring (Dyer, 1997; Gargiulo and Ertug, 2006). Therefore, we agree that trust becomes an essential ingredient in building cooperative relationships. In customer-supplier relationships, trust is associated with the reduction of transaction cost as investments and production processes are smoothened through trust (Ghosh and Fedorowicz, 2008). Customers and sellers may minimize the risks inherent by maximizing more opportunities through personal relationships with each other. Consistent with this, trust also reduces the use of formal contracts (Larson, 1992; Amoako and Lyon, 2014), and resolves intractable conflicts (Tomlinson and Lewicki, 2006). Further, Sahay (2003) adopts the stance that customers and suppliers are more interested in long term relationships and its broader benefits. This becomes an important objective in managing supply chain relationships as trust develops when parties acquire more knowledge of each other.

We concur that trust building is predicated on the degree of personal embeddedness between customers and suppliers and also on the context in which they operate. This is especially true as the extent of positive historical cooperation from previous experience fosters trust building relationship (Gulati, 1995; Mollering, 2006). As in most supply chain relationships; trust building also involves reciprocity. For instance, a supplier expects that extended trust is reciprocated without disappointment or malfeasance. In this vein, Van de Ven and Ring (2006) describe violations of ability, integrity and benevolence as determinants of trust violation.

**Types of trust in supply chain relationships**

Our premise towards a conceptualization of trust in this paper leaves us with more reasons to highlight the various types and forms of trust interactions in supply chain relationships. Much has been debated about the topicality of trust; however there exists a dearth of research which examines trust and distrust shaping behaviour in supply chain relationships. Over the past decade, numerous perspectives have shaped a broader movement of trust in socio-economic relationships. First from a micro-level perspective; personal trust is essential to the fabric of many interpersonal relationships especially in situations where formal contracts are not available (Lyon and Porter, 2009; Amoako and Lyon, 2014) or in situations where written contracts may not guarantee absolute certainty of opportunism from parties in the relationship (Sako, 1997; Lyon and Porter, 2009). This form of interaction based trust is usually developed through face-to-face interactions between two or more parties in a supply chain relationship. Secondly, from a macro-level perspective of institutional trusts in which structural arrangements shape the individual and collective actions (Giddens, 1984). Bachmann and Inkpen (2011) point to the fact that institutional trust is a form of collective action embedded in an institutional environment which shapes relationships. This concept of institution may be defined as the rules of the game in the society reducing risks and uncertainties (North, 1990) The growing focus for understanding the role of institutional trust may be premised on the declining level of trust in societies (See Fukuyama, 1995).
From a sociological perspective Lewis and Weigert (1985) designate trust relationships as being shaped by a preponderance of cognitive and emotional trust. Cognitive trust is motivated by ‘good rational reasons’ while a strong positive affection for the object of trust shapes emotional trust. Specifically, the emergence of emotional trust is evident in primary supply chain relationships while cognitive trust is more extensive in trust building across secondary supply chain groups. In this vein, McAllister (1995) supports the view that cognitive trust draws on the cultural similarities, reliable performance, and the credentials of the participant while the emotional based trust is rooted in the likely frequency of the interactions. Therefore, the different types of trust in supply chain relationships may arguably rest on a calculation of the perceived benefits or losses or on an emotional response which is developed as a result of interpersonal attachments.

We also draw from other influential contributions, for example, Rousseau et al., (1998) identify two different types of trust: Deterrence trust which enables the supplier to believe in the trustworthiness of the customer. This is due to the costly sanctions in place for the emergence of opportunism or breach of contracts. For instance, the sanctions for breaching trust far exceed any potential benefits if any of the parties decide to act in an opportunistic manner (Shapiro et al., 1992; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Conversely, deterrence trust may not be a type of trust (Sitkin and Roth, 1993) as it is grounded more in the fear of punishing the erring party for violating trust. The threat which is usually more of an economic calculation is determined by the cost of maintaining or violating trust (Lewicki, 2006). This is contrary to relational trust which stems from repeated interactions between a trustor and a trustee. Reliability and dependability are common elements in this type of trust. For instance, previous interactions between a supplier and a customer provide a clear picture of the positive expectations required in their relationships. This includes the resources exchanged, risk takings and successful fulfilment towards expanding their relationships.

Accordingly, Lewicki and Bunker (1995) identify calculus based trust (CBT), identification based trust (IBT) and knowledge based trust (KBT) as the three distinct types of trusts. They posit that the calculus based trust which is a broader view of the deterrence trust, stems from the rewards of being trustworthy, while available sanctions may include the threat of reputation damage through negative reports and social pressure. Trustworthiness in this case is perceived to be an asset expected in customer-supplier relationships due to its long term benefits and opportunities. Secondly, the identification based trust (IBT) exists because both parties fully understand and acknowledge each other’s wants. This type of trust suggests a mutual understanding of confidence that the interests of both parties should be protected without monitoring. As identification based trust develops, the supplier is able to predict the preferences of the customer and vice versa. A major determinant in the identification based trust is the collective identity where both parties understand what they have to do to sustain trust. The third type of trust is the knowledge based trust (KBT) which is founded on the predictability of the other party (Lewicki and Bunker, 1995). It draws on three key dimensions; (i) The knowledge of information a supplier has about a customer should enhance trust, such that parties can accurately
predict how they will respond (ii). The predictability in these relationships would enhance trust as both parties would take measures to ensure that cheating is prevented. (iii). Lastly, a good understanding of predictability is built on developed interactions which allows for more information about each party. Table 2 below summarises the underlying themes across the three types of trust.

Table 2. Types of Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calculus-based trust (CBT)</th>
<th>Identification-based trust (IBT)</th>
<th>Knowledge-based trust (KBT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A calculation of the outcomes resulting from creating and sustaining a relationship relative to the costs of maintaining or severing it.</td>
<td>Identification with the other's desires and intentions; mutual understanding so that one can act for the other.</td>
<td>Knowing the other sufficiently well so that the other's behaviour is predictable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Lewicki, 2006

Through a careful analysis of the above discourse, it becomes apparent that trust implies a relationship between two or more people i.e. between the trustor and trustee. This suggests the existence of a dyadic relationship, where supply chain members have information about the capabilities, competencies and intentions of parties involved (Laeequddin et al., 2010). It also suggests that threat of the consequences of trust violation would ensure parties behave in a trustworthy manner (Shapiro et al. 1992). Although trust is indispensable in business relationships such as supply chain, it involves elements of uncertainties (Lewis and Weigert, 1985) but is also a special solution to problems of risk (Luhmann, 2000). We argue that although trust reduces complexity of uncertainties to considerable proportions and remains important to the functionality of supply chain relationships, distrust may also emerge in ways which may be problematic.

Distrust in supply chain relationships

As earlier stated, trust is often defined as the belief of confidence about one’s characteristics which increases the willingness to take risks (Ferrin et al., 2007). Trust assumes a very delicate nature, difficult to build but very easy to violate. However, in supply chain relationships, uncertainties and complexities may be further worsened when trust is violated. As previous held expectations are not met; distrust may emerge as a direct challenge to the held expectations of the relationship. Distrust, which is a product of trust violation, automatically increases with the severity of the violation. Within the trust literature, Lewis and Weigert (1985) point to evidence that when trust declines, the probability of terminating existing relationships and calculating attitudes become evident. The focal role played by trust in supply chain relationships emphasizes the recognition for a definition of distrust. Conversely, distrust which is perceived as the opposite of trust ignores the confidence, intentions and motives which support the disposition to trust
As a result, the essential norms of behaviour expected in supply chain relationships must not be taken for granted. In the context of this study, we define distrust as a negative set of expectations, which negates the confidence, benevolence, reciprocity and integrity desired from participants in a supply chain relationship. As trust is predicated on the positive expectations of benevolence, distrust on the other hand allows for the expectation of injurious actions in a supply chain relationship. Consistent with our definition, Luhmann (1979) accurately refers to distrust as the positive expectation of an injurious action by a given party. In our view, we contend with Lewicki (2006) that distrust implies a tendency to assign sinister intentions to the other party and thereby protection from another party.

Accordingly, Tomlinson and Lewicki (2006) point out that when distrust sets-in, good faith efforts to restore trust are usually met with suspicion. In supplier/customer relationships, when distrust occurs at the early stages of supply chain relationships, it casts a foreboding picture that damages the partnership. This violation of trust at an early stage becomes more harmful to the future of the relationship than when it occurs at a later stage (Long et al., 2008; Lewicki, 2010). Furthermore, the emergence of distrust also creates difficult conditions which limit cooperation between supply chain participants. As noted, unmet expectations or social obligations lead to a deterioration of the relationship as longevity in relationships lead to longer benefits (Gronroos, 1994). Hence, without trust, relationships may not stimulate the supportive activities required in situations of risk and uncertainty (Luhmann, 2000). In order to attain more insights into the nature of distrust; we would examine conceptual clarifications of the types of distrust.

**Types and levels of distrust in supply chain relationships**

The crux of the above stream of concepts, made in respect to supply chain relations, reveals that distrust reduces the objective credibility, benevolence and expectations required in a supply chain relationship. Interestingly, trust and distrust are viewed as dimensionally distinct constructs as both are envisioned as being independent of each other (Lewicki et al. 2006). In this perspective, trust is a continuum which ranges from low trust to high trust; while distrust is a continuum ranges from low distrust to high distrust. Tomlinson and Lewicki (2006) identify two types of distrust; functional distrust exists when a supplier sets boundaries which limits the freedom of the customer but allows interactions. For instance, let us assume a relationship exists between a supplier and a customer, where the former decides to put control mechanisms such as monitoring or formal contracts to buffer themselves from perceived sinister intentions of the other party. On the other hand, dysfunctional trust fosters hostile behaviour and retribution. For instance, if a supplier believes that trust has been implicitly or explicitly violated, the response may result in hostilities, litigation or damage to reputation (Bies and Tripp, 1996). This may lead to a severance of the relationship as a result of an increase in negative exchanges.
Accordingly, two distinct levels of distrust may also exist in supply chain relationships: these are the calculus based distrust (CBD) and identification based distrust (IBD) (Lewicki and Wiethoff, 2000; Lewicki, 2006). The calculus based distrust (CBD) which is the opposite of the calculus based trust (CBT) refers to the negative expectation regarding the conduct of the other party. Here, the overall costs of maintaining trust in the relationships outweighs the benefits to be achieved. While the identification based distrust (IBD) is negative expectation of a party’s conduct drawn from and unproductive interdependence or competing goals.

**Table 3. Types and levels of distrust**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of distrust</th>
<th>Functional distrust</th>
<th>Dysfunctional distrust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An important mechanism which prevents supplier chain participants from having a naive view of the untrustworthy actions of another. It is an approach that ensures that parties are on guard against potential violation.</td>
<td>Dysfunctional distrust promotes suspicion which fosters hostile activities and retribution. Here conflicts become intractable as retaliatory actions automatically sets in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels of distrust</td>
<td>Calculus based distrust</td>
<td>Identification based distrust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is an arm’s length approach where the entire costs of maintaining trust outweighs the entire benefit to be achieved from the relationship. It usually occurs in the initial stages of the relationship.</td>
<td>It tends to occur as a result of differences in values, goals and unproductive synergies. It usually leads to intractable conflicts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Tomlinson and Lewicki (2006)

Based on the above insights, the following section examines how trust is repaired in supply chain relationships?

**Repairing Trust in supply chain relationships**

A commonal perspective shared across literature suggests that trust reduces transaction costs in relationships (Bromiley and Cummings, 1996). This includes the optimal cost of controlling and monitoring involved in supply chain relationships. However, when trust is violated as a result of actions detrimental to the continued existence of such engagements (Gambetta, 1988), it leads to subsequent decline in trust and cooperation (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Kramer, 1996). Hence, it becomes interesting to explore the possibilities of reconciliation through trust repair. Extant studies on trust repair have explored the dynamics between distrust and the remedial approaches used in repairing trust; Tomlison et al (2004) recommend reconciliation and rebuilding trust as two fundamental but sequential steps to repairing trust. Bies and Tripp (1995) identified a variety of responses to trust violations, which they organised into seven categories. They include (1) revenge
fantasies by the victim (2) doing nothing (3) private confrontation with the violator (4) identity restoration (5) social withdrawal (6) feuding and (7) forgiveness. Similarly, Gillespie and Dietz (2009) propose a four stage process towards repairing trust. The first stage includes a verbal acknowledgement of the incident and an expression of regret. The second stage involves identifying the cause of failure and how to prevent its reoccurrence in the nearest future. Stage three includes making reparations and implementations derived from stage two. The final stage assesses the progress and effectiveness of the interventions against future violations. Although the recursive element in the above discourse reveals that violated trust can be repaired, nevertheless this is dependent on the violator’s response and the victim’s willingness to reconcile (Hershey and Bradley, 2006). To advance our understanding of trust repair in supply chain relationships, we hereby integrate Tomlinson and Lewicki’s (2006) salient strategies of reducing distrust to our study.

Reducing dysfunctional distrust
The first step in managing dysfunctional distrust is by creating an awareness of the existence of distrust in a customer-supplier relationship. Early signs of distrust may be counter intuitive as parties become increasingly unwilling to engage in further collaborative exchanges. These misconstrued perceptions would have an indirect effect on the relationship as suspicion becomes a psychological barrier which blinds trust (Kramer, 1999). As supply chain relationships thrive on longer term relationships (Zineldin and Johnson, 2000), managing distrust requires the need to address the root cause of the problem. For instance a supplier may fail to deliver good at the stipulated dates, time or location. This may have been as a result of unforeseen circumstances such as accidents. In this context, the supplier owes it a duty to overcome this perception by communication. A second step may include examining the implication of the roles and responsibilities of both parties as this may pose a window for breeding distrust. This suggests that the supplier understands implications and responsibilities of their given roles and vice versa.

Consequently, the Graduated and Reciprocated Initiative in Tension reduction (GRIT) model proposed by Osgood (1962) may also be another strategy adopted to reduce dysfunctional distrust (Lewicki, 2006; Tomlinson and Lewicki, 2006). This model proposes steps that antagonising parties in a supply chain relationship may adopt in order to reduce existing tension. The strategy includes making statements by the initiating party to reduce the heightened conflict towards trust rebuilding. These statements by the violating party would signal concerted efforts to correct distorted perceptions and must be able to convey the willingness to emphasize a more collaborative relationship. On the other hand victim (e.g the customer) may show reciprocity to those actions as a sign to rekindle the relationship. However, this may be predicated on the consistency and evident benevolence in the subsequent actions of the former. It is expected that these efforts would ensure that trust emerges through an interpretation of the other party’s conciliatory motives.
Managing levels of distrust

In managing calculus based distrust (CBD), Tomlinson and Lewicki (2006) proposed the following strategies:

1. The existence of sufficient deterrents or punishment when trust is violated. We contend with this strategy as customers and suppliers value their reputation. Hence, they would be sensitive to the risks of negative information on their reputation. This information may be transmitted through links to other networks which would deter future partners.

2. The existence of valid and clear expectations: In structuring expectations, the customer-supplier relationship must include clear cut requirements and a detailed set of objectives. By this, there should be an understanding of the capacity and performance limitations of the supplier or customer. In this context, misconstrued perceptions should be addressed while expectations are made clearer, with fewer ambiguities. Parties should show an understanding of the required roles and manage the expectations of the other party.

3. The existence of attractive alternatives to satisfy interests: One way of reducing CBD distrust is by having an alternative plan to reduce the risks in a conflict situation. For instance a customer who is a victim of distrust would have a fall back plan or explore other alternatives in intractable situations. Other efforts may include the practice of keeping multiple suppliers as basis for the continuation of the business activities.

4. The existence of boundaries limiting vulnerability in relationships: This denotes that boundaries are put in place to reduce the degree of interdependence or the extent to which the victim may be vulnerable. The benefit from setting boundaries in dyadic relationships, would lead to lesser conflicts while improving the willingness to manage the resolution process.

In managing identification based distrust (IBD) which often results to intractable conflicts, the following strategies may be applied in a supply chain relationship:

1. Explore the veracity of identity based differences: This ensures that the supply chain participants conform to the accuracy of the differences associated with the conflict. For instance, customers and suppliers should endeavour to address the existing conflicts by ensuring a clear communication of their differences. Both parties may also resolve to introduce a mediator where necessary. The benefit of communicating differences may reveal underlying benign motives as against sinister intentions.

2. Acknowledge areas of contention: In the customer-supplier dyad, on-going distrust resolutions would include avoiding areas or topics which may result to disagreements. This would include shifting from perceived ideological discussions to alternative conversation in order to reduce the existing tension.

3. Develop a mutually acceptable process: As stable relationships would definitely translate to longer term relationships, the third strategy involves developing an acceptable constructive process based on shared values. Although this may not reduce distrust completely, nevertheless it would lead to the advancement of future interactions between the customer and supplier.
Methodology
In addressing the key research questions shaping this study, this paper draws on a qualitative study in examining trust and distrust in supply chain relationships. The empirical component of this study is rooted in the interpretivist perspective (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hammersley, 1992) towards understanding the differences between people as social actors (Saunders et al., 2012). Owing to the part that interpretivism is centred on the reality of the subjective experience and uniqueness of human inquiry (Schwandt, 1994), the research adopts a case study approach to investigate the contemporary phenomenon which exists between suppliers and customers within its real life context (Yin, 2009). The comparison of different cases provides for clearer conclusions in explaining issues of trust (Lyon, 2005). The point being that it becomes expedient to uncover how suppliers and customers make sense of their relationships from a particular vantage point (King and Horrocks, 2012).

Twelve cases were selected through a purposive and theoretical sampling in line with the research questions to explore the processes which shape trust and distrust in customer-supplier relationship (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). Our choice of 12 respondents was aimed at comparing perceptions and experiences as it relates to their particular environment. The unit of analysis for this study focused on the dyadic relationship between the supplier and the customer in their capacity as owner/managers since they are tasked with the key decision making choices. Data was collected in the summer of 2017 using semi-structured interviews to examine why a set of trust decisions were taken, why they were implemented and what results were achieved (Schramm, 1971; Yin, 2009). The interviews were conducted at the workplaces of the respondents, as these proved convenient for the purpose of the interviews.

The consideration for limiting bias was minimised through ensuring a considerable amount of observing their market transactions, documentary analysis and informal discussions (Lyon and Porter, 2009). In addition, patterns were identified, analysed and reported within data using thematic analysis. This becomes important as it aided the description of data in rich detail while interpreting various aspects of the research questions (Boyatzis, 1998). Nigeria was chosen for this study as its domestic supply chain presents an interesting case for examining the dynamics between trust and distrust. Currently, supply chain relationships play an important role in enhancing the availability of commodities in West African and international markets. Hence, by considering the difficulties associated with doing business in Nigeria, for instance the existence of an inefficient regulatory system, no recourse to legal systems and poor transport infrastructure, we contend that little attention has been paid to issues of trust and distrust in facilitating supply chain relationships. The below table highlights the profiles of the supply chain participants involved in this study.
Table 4. Supply Chain participant profiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Employee Numbers</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fertilizer Company</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Maize Company</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Rivers State</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Potatoes Company</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Plateau State</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Elementary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Green Pepper Ltd</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Ogun State</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Elementary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Agro Allied Ltd</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Plateau State</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Plastic Ltd</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Lagos State</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tin Enterprises Ltd</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Abuja State</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Cocoa Ltd</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Ogun State</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Beverage Ltd</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Accra, Ghana</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Elementary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Textile Ltd</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Lagos State</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Beads Ltd</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Coal Ltd</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Results and discussion

In presenting our findings, we highlight the types of trust and distrust discussed in our literature, the remedial efforts adopted in repairing distrust. The empirical findings reflect the importance of interpersonal trust in sustaining the relationship effectiveness between suppliers and the customers. This was evidenced by a psychological perspective emphasizing cognitive and affective dispositions to their partners (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). The cognitive disposition was grounded on the firm belief that a party expects the other party to be dependable and reliable while the affective disposition was grounded in the reciprocated concerns and care of the partner (McAllister, 1995). Aspects of the cognitive based trust was highlighted by a respondent who supplies textiles to various local and international markets narrated how she chooses whom to trust and the circumstances allow which allows for this. She relied on the expectation that her customer would be dependable through evidence from previous interactions which has shaped the development of trust (Zucker, 1986):

'It is not an easy thing oh, because it’s a mindset but I hardly make mistakes. This is because the choice of people I give my goods on credit to, is based on evidence of good behaviour. Some of my customers were recommended by friends and other contacts, and they have vouched that they can be relied upon to perform. They have been in business for long and are dependable. Our relationship continues to grow because they show that they can be relied upon’. (Case 10)

The affective foundation of trust which highlights emotional bonds and genuine care as a basis for the manifestation of trust was also evident (Lewis and Weigert, 1985, McAllister, 1995). In this vein, a plastic supplier operating in West African markets highlighted the affective aspects of trust development with his partner. This was established as he drew on the emotional bonds and genuine concerns which he has for his customer. As this was noted in his response:

'I do business with him because I know he has children and parents who are depending on him. His wife is even pregnant and would deliver soon. You know he is from my side (community) and we care for our business. He knows I am family man too so we know we have to care of our business and not disappoint each other. So far our business has been growing’.(Case 6)

This choice to trust affirms a particular leaning to sentiments and emotional ties with expectations of reciprocity as a basis for trust. The show of care and genuine interest by the respondent has been critical to the development of affect based trust as he offers most of his goods on to his partner based on emotional ties. Interestingly, when other respondents were probed, we realised responses which established the existence of other
forms of trust. As illustrated by a customer who enjoys receiving goods on credit from his suppliers explained how trust develops:

‘No no, it is a gradual process, although it takes time but at the end we have grown to understand ourselves as we do our business. My partner now understands that I am a confirmed guy and won’t disappoint him, so he gives me the required goods and when I sell I remit immediately without him reminding me. We don’t even have any agreements because we now know our families and also where we stay.’ (Case 3)

As illustrated above, the expression ‘grown to know ourselves’ refers to stage like development of trust. In particular, the respondent affirms the developmental process of trust in the supply chain process. First, the parties commence their relationship by establishing CBT, which is an arms-length encounter where party’s risks and vulnerability are evident (Lewicki et al., 2006; Tomlinson and Lewicki, 2006). Nevertheless, as a result of repeated interactions, the reputation and degree of interdependence strengthens the CBT. In addition, the movement then extends from CBT to KBT as the parties grow to know each other better and learn to trust themselves. The response ‘my partner now understands that I am a confirmed guy and won’t disappoint him’ provides evidence that knowledge and predictability enhance trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1995). Furthermore, the movement from KBT to IBT occurs when the parties employ knowledge to develop identification with the other party. A respondent who buys coal from her suppliers, shares her experience on the emergence of identification based trust:

‘Our relationships are very strong because we respect and like each other. It is no longer about my business succeeding but it is about us doing well. I want my supplier to do well and they also want me to do well. So we have to support each other’s businesses because if the business thrives mine would thrive too. Hence we are like family now oh!’ (Case 12)

The expressed perspective which signals a shift from KBT to IBT emphasizes the strengthening of common identities with a focus on maximizing joint outcomes (Lewicki et al., 2006). Hence, the movement form CBT to KBT highlights changes from differences of possible trust violations to knowledge as they grow to understand themselves. While the movement from KBT to IBT signals the need to ensures strengthening commonalities.

In view of further findings revealed by the respondents, they highlighted the existence of distrust in their trading relationships. The nature of these findings establishes a valence between the positivity associated with trust as against the negative aspects of distrust. Accordingly, the respondents all established that negative perceptions were formed when partners fail to honour agreements. For instance, a respondent who supplies agro-allied inputs described the relationship with one of her West African partners:
‘When I supply him goods, he always fails to payback as promised. Sometimes I would call to remind him and he would promise to pay. But he would delay oh till I become frustrated and sad. You know this is business and we can’t tie down money like this. I might not be able to give him goods on credit again’. (Case 5)

The above description highlights that non-cooperative behaviour influences distrust; as parties must feel bound by reciprocity which induces cooperation (Koeszegi, 2004). We established that this level of distrust which occurred as a result of negative expectation was evident in the early stage of the relationship. This level of distrust is consistent with the calculus based distrust (Lewicki and Wiethoff, 2000). As we noted earlier, the second level of distrust i.e. the IBD, is grounded on the premise of unproductive interdependence and competing goals (Tomlinson and Lewicki, 2006). In these situations, the relationships are characterised by intractable conflicts and as such sanctions may be put in place to encourage cooperation (Ferrin et al., 2007). Specifically, two of the respondents highlighted that sometimes they use threats of reputational damage to deter the possible violations as surmised below:

‘Me, I don’t like problem but the good thing is that people know that I am honest and they believe me and you know that I was the former chairman of our association. So I tell my customers that as soon as you disappoint me, I would tell everybody about you and they will run from doing business with you. So if you want us to be correct business contacts, you have to promise to behave well’. (Case 1)

The above response establishes the desired expectations required from respective parties while ensuring that partners commit to abiding by them. Similarly, when conflicts arise, misconstrued perceptions may be a factor that fuels distrust in supply chain relationships (Kramer, 1999). This may be resolved by identifying the origin or source of the distrust. For instance, we established that the customer couldn’t meet up with his payment at the stipulated date because he lost his father. In situations like this, the customer owes it a duty to overcome this perception by communicating in order to overcome any distorted perceptions:

‘My supplier was very angry that he had not heard from me for a month. He even threatened to report me to the association or even seize some of my belongings and cancel our business. He was unaware of my father’s death. But when he was informed, he felt very sad and even told me to pay him anytime I like. He even sent me some money for the burial.’ (Case 2)

Nevertheless, in situations where distrust may have escalated, suppliers may invite third parties to resolve disputes between themselves and their customers. The responses revealed that they invite mutual friends to help diffuse existing tension (Amoako and Lyon, 2014). The below, sums up the views of respondent sums up his experience as follows:
'When my partner has disappointed me for too long, I would report him to our association. Our association would now send two much respected people who would come to look into our wahala (situation) and see how to settle it. This always works and at the end we all drink and become friends again.' (Case 8)

Our analysis of the above evidence proceeds from the role interventions play in establishing trust within customer-supplier relationships. It is expected that in addition to resolving existing conflicts, interventions also serve as a deterrents to distrust as the violating party would be critical about a second intervening process. Within dyadic relationships, supply chain interactions are characterised by varying degrees of CBT, IBT and KBT and varying degrees of CBD and IBD when trust is violated. The interviewees established that suppliers took considerable risks to provide credit to their customers; where CBT, IBT and KBT were used to reduce risks and uncertainties. Although trust violation emerges when evidence disconfirms the expectations of the other party, the willingness to reconcile is hinged on the nature of apology, timeliness of reparative actions and sincerity (Tomlison et al., 2004). We contend that calculating the outcomes of sustaining the relationship, ensuring a mutual understanding and knowledge of the other party play an important role in shaping trust relationships. As distrust threatens existing relationships, considerations suggest distrust must be repaired before it is rebuilt. It also seems natural to point that intractable conflicts may lead to a termination of relationship. This includes the possibility of having future interactions with the offender (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). Hence, in relating our findings, we have illustrated a model of trust relationship building and rebuilding below.
Figure 1. A model of trust building and rebuilding

Findings
This case study investigates trust and distrust processes from an African perspective. The evidence from this study establishes the role trust plays in fostering relationships and how distrust deters cooperative relationships. We explored various types of trust useful in supply chain relationships; ranging from cognitive and emotional trust (Lewis and Weigert, 1985; McAllister, 1995) to Lewicki and Bunker’s (1995) identification of calculus based trust (CBT), identification based trust (IBT) and knowledge based trust (KBT). Our empirical results suggest that parties relied on evidence from previous interactions in building trust. In particular the customer-supplier relationships emphasized an affective disposition to trust; which is manifested through sentiments, emotional bonds and genuine care. Further, it was found that interventions appear to be the solution to reducing conflicts in situations where intractable conflicts arises (Tomlinson and Lewicki, 2006; Amoako and Lyon, 2014). Such strategies would encourage continued cooperation and more productive opportunities in supply chain relationships. We also provide evidence which suggests that a supplier’s favourable perception of a customer’s reputation leads to increased cooperation and credibility (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Sahay, 2003; Tomlinson and Lewicki, 2006); while the propensity for distrust reduces when the victim understands the reason for violation. In this setting, personalised commitments and benevolence reflect a relationship which in respect and reciprocity (Jukka et al., 2017).
A primary contribution of this paper was to draw attention to managing levels of distrust. We point to the existence of sanctions as deterrents since parties are sensitive to the risks of negative reputation. In situations like this, negative information may be transmitted to other networks in deterring future partners. We have also noted that misconstrued perceptions should be addressed with expectations made clearer. Such expectations must include an understanding of the capacity of the other party and a detailed set of objectives. Indeed, a termination of future interactions with the offender may occur when the magnitude of trust violation is very high (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). Parties may then decide to develop mutually acceptable constructive process based on shared values. Mediators can be introduced to resolve the underlying conflicts as this would reveal underlying benign motives or sinister intentions. Although this may not reduce distrust completely, nevertheless it would lead to the advancement of future interactions between both parties. Another important contribution of this research was highlighting the nature of network ties in supply chain relationships.

Due to the paucity of formal institutions in developing economies, the role of networks takes an increasing importance. The economic benefits of networks are evident in supply chain relationships as they provide access to information and social status for financial support. Our findings further draw attention to the fact that obstacles are overcome through strong embedded networks drawn on kinship, family and associations (Drakopoulou-Dodd, 2011); while networks fill the void of formal institutions. From a practitioner standpoint, this study establishes how trust and distrust may impact customer-seller relationships. While trust serves as a lubricant to foster supply chain relationships, the remedial efforts adopted in repairing distrust will help partners to improve their business relationships.

Our empirical findings further reflect the importance of interpersonal trust in sustaining the relationship effectiveness between suppliers and the customers. From a research angle, our study stems from a psychological perspective which emphasizes the cognitive and affective dispositions of supply chain partners. The model established in this study provides a foundation for further research on trust and distrust in supply chain relationships. In addition, our results support the findings of previous research that have examined trust from an African perspective (Amoako and Matlay, 2015; Lyon and Porter, 2009). These findings reveal the importance of social capital such as trust in promoting regional faster to market developments.

Regarding policy implications, this paper suggests that more attention should be focused on the potentials of local customers and sellers who draw on complimentary relationships for survival. Within the context of this paper, government policies should be directed towards complementing social relationships for instance through the development of communication network and access to finance. However, the evidence conveyed in this paper also has its limitations. Our selected cases have been assessed by drawing on
CBT, IBT and KBT forms of trust but limited in sample size. Hence in order to overcome this limitation, future research may attempt to provide a more exhaustive dimension by increasing the number of cases. This should provide a richer account of this phenomenon while exposing more complex realities that may have been overlooked. With respect to the focus of our analysis; we also note that future studies should distinguish between institutional and personal trust (Williamson, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995) and how they shape supply chain relationships. This may include examining the norms, values and codes (North, 1990) or the socially non-calculated values (Nooteboom, 2007) which govern supply chain relationships. In addition to the suggestions above, providing an in-depth understanding of trust repair and the use reparations as compensations in situations of distrust would undoubtedly contribute to useful knowledge. The suggestions we provide in resolving distrust may not be entirely sufficient in supply chain relationships, we hope that future research may raise insights that can contribute to more responsive processes of managing distrust in supply chain relationships.

Conclusion
This paper contributes to studies on trust and distrust in supply chain relationships in contexts of institutional void. Within the remit of this study, our participants have responded to the deficiencies of this void by developing ties through trust relationships. In this vein, we draw attention to perceptions of trust and distrust from the lens of Nigerian traders. Accordingly, we proceed to address the two research questions shaping this study. In the first research question we make an attempt to espouse the types of trust found required in supply chain relations; while examining the repair of distrust in these relationships.

Our most salient contributions are twofold: firstly in answering these questions, we contend that supply chain relationships are characterised by the distinctiveness of CBT, IBT and KBT and alternate degrees of CBD and IBD when trust is violated. These distinct forms of trust reduce considerable risks which enable credit advances and trust propensities. Another detailed contribution worth mentioning is the role interventions as remedial approaches to trust repair. Although we contend that trust can be repaired, distrust would create dissonance which fosters negative feelings. Simultaneously, this would lead to the subsequent decline in trust and cooperation (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Kramer, 1996). In particular, our findings have revealed that interventions may also serve as a deterrent to non-benevolent intentions. Due to the nature of the phenomenon being studied, we advocate for more studies built on our findings.
References


