

**PERCEPTIONS, MEANINGS AND
CONSTRUCTIONS OF 'SECURITY'
BEFORE EURO 2020**

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Declaration

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

Abstract

In a post-9/11 world, ‘security’ and ‘security governance’ have become increasingly central to the hosting of sport mega-events (SMEs). Currently, security operations at contemporary SMEs constitute some of the largest security operations in the world. In recent years, one can observe a growing academic engagement with the social and spatial effects of SME securitizations. Still, researchers agree that there is a need for more critical engagement with event-specific security strategies and governance, and examinations of what ‘security’ means in a SME context. This thesis provides an examination of the meanings, perceptions and constructions of ‘security’ before the 2020 The Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) European Football Championship (Euro 2020). This SME was assigned a historical format. For the first time in history, 12 European countries shared the hosting rights for the tournament originally to be staged in June and July 2020. Such novel hosting format raised a series of new questions speaking to mega-event securitizations. Then, in light of the global coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, further questions emerged and intensified as Euro 2020 was provisionally postponed for 12 months, in March 2020, on ‘health’ and ‘safety’ grounds. In global sports, Euro 2020 therefore symbolized an extraordinary and historical SME from a security outlook.

In this thesis, I argue that in a society increasingly preoccupied with ‘security’ and ‘risk’, Euro 2020’s security planning – aiming to protect the geographically unique event – proves an exemplary and powerful empirical site for broader transnational and precautionary practices of security governance in the present-day world. Whilst these driving forces have appeared in existing research on SMEs, the reality is that each SME possesses unique local characteristics and contexts which they are planned and delivered within. Such claim comes particularly true in relation to Euro 2020’s multi-national format. In addition to ensuring ‘safe’ or ‘secure’ events, accounting for the (ever-)changing dynamics in the international system, the thesis also records how these underpinning processes tie firmly into commercial and sanitizing processes that are brought together by security-related policies. To explain the construction of ‘security’, my thesis introduces a new framework – the ‘troika of security’ – through which SME ‘security’ can be understood.

Drawing from qualitative methods, including stakeholder interviews, policy documents and media sources, this thesis provides an in-depth investigation into the ‘security’ pre-planning before Euro 2020. It also captures the unfolding events as COVID-19 resulted in the collapse of European-wide sporting events. The thesis critically unpacks what ‘security’ in a SME context means, can mean, and how it is reconfigured. Overall, this thesis makes sociological sense of the processes through which ‘security’ was to be constructed in Euro 2020’s case. Thereby, it contributes to the field with the most comprehensive study to date, on Euro 2020’s extraordinary pre-event securitization. It also adds to the existing knowledge with one of the first studies that critically interrogates COVID-19 as a ‘security threat’ both in a general sense and as situated in global sports.

Declaration of Published Work

A list of published work using empirical records from this thesis:

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The views, findings, potential errors and conclusions of this thesis are solely those of the author.

Jan André Lee Ludvigsen

Liverpool, UK.

To my family.

Abbreviations

9/11	11 September 2001
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
COE	Council of Europe
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
CSS	Critical Security Studies
EPL	English Premier League
Euro/Euros	European Football Championship
FA	(National) Football Association
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FSE	Football Supporters Europe
IOC	International Olympic Committee
NFIP	National Football Information Point
Olympics	Olympic Games
SME	Sport mega-event
UEFA	Union of European Football Associations
UK	United Kingdom
WHO	World Health Organization

Anecdote

The pictures of the two planes crashing into the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 are amongst the most famous images of the twenty-first century. Since I was only seven years old when these gruesome attacks took place, I would not have had the slightest clue about how this day would shape the world we live in and what immense implications it would have for the contemporary society. To be honest, I think very few people had, even the most merited political or social scientists.

Less than a year after the 9/11 attacks I would, during a family visit to South Korea, join the celebrations of the 2002 FIFA World Cup held in the country. I remember this well. Not only because South Korea did exceptionally well and (surprisingly) reached the semi-finals, but because it was my first experience visiting a sport mega-event. Around me, I would see people from all over the world dressed up in football shirts, scarfs and funny hats. South Korea, which traditionally was best associated with other sports than football, had gone ‘football mad’. Their passionate supporters and the South Korean team’s never-say-die attitude charmed the world of football. Globally, all eyes were on South Korea and co-host Japan – who despite an uneasy past – were joint hosts of the very successful event.

We would stay at my uncle’s apartment on the twentieth-something floor with a view of a busy highway in the outskirts of the dynamic capital, Seoul. Quite early, one morning, I would look out from the balcony and see a large convoy of tanks and other militarized vehicles. This sight was pretty uncommon for an eight-year-old who grew up in Norway, who had only been exposed to such vehicles and armoury through blockbuster movies and videogames. That may be the exact reason why this sight has stuck with me for years, ever since. To this date, I still don’t know if this fascinating sight I witnessed was related to the on-going World Cup, or if it had to do with the perpetual, volatile situation on the Korean peninsula, with the two countries still formally at war.

Interestingly, even to this day, when I look back at my memories of my summer holiday in South Korea in 2002, there are in particular two things I remember, apart from spending valuable time with family members, of course. First, I remember the unique and friendly atmosphere during the month-long event. A feeling of togetherness and being a part of something bigger; even for people who were not particularly

concerned about sports, like my grandparents. Secondly, and *not so* sports-related, I remember the sight of an army flexing its ‘muscles’, perhaps to show the rest of the world that the World Cup’s security was in good hands.

Anyway, one the biggest and most spectacular *sport mega-event* in the world, and *security*. The summer of 2002 surely was a memorable one. I should acknowledge that I did not draw the parallel between these two concepts, nor did I reflect much upon this at the time. Yet, somewhat ironically, the relationship between those two concepts turned out to be the topic for this thesis sixteen years later. To a degree, the same applies to my experiences of living in a post-9/11 world too. Although I had no idea what 9/11 would turn out to *mean* in 2001, I have gradually grown more conscious about many of the effects and the historical marks this day has left. There is zero chance, even today, that I have fully grasped *all* the consequences this day would have. Most definitely, I will never comprehend the full extent of 9/11, and the moments the two planes crashed into the Twin Towers and sent the world into a shock mode.

I have, however, become increasingly aware of the importance of studying the ways in which 9/11 influenced and *still* influences the society we live in today, just like countless of other academics, non-academics, commentators and great thinkers have. 9/11 remains a date which always will haunt us and remind us about how vulnerable we can be – and how our safety can be stolen or undermined in a matter of seconds. Unfortunately, this also applies to today’s sport mega-events.



Figure 1.1: Me at the 2002 World Cup in South Korea. The picture was taken at Suwon World Cup Stadium, 29 June 2002.

Fundamentally arenas for joy, celebrations and defining sporting moments – sport mega-events have become sites where individuals’ physical and perceived security is

now at stake. This inconvenient truth remains central to this thesis and has hopefully been clarified (to some extent) through this anecdote. If not, *don't worry*. The remainder of this thesis will. Finally, I am hopeful this thesis can contribute – if even the slightest bit – to our overall understanding of one aspect of security in a post-9/11 world. As utopian and optimistic –perhaps naïve– as this may sound, I remain hopeful that one day all those visitors of future events can participate whilst feeling as safe and worry-free as the eight-year-old boy in the picture above was during his first meeting with the sport mega-event spectacle.

‘Only the insecure strive for security’

- *Wayne Dyer*

Part I

Chapter 1

Chapter 1: Introduction

Setting the Scene

1.1 Sport Mega-Events and ‘(In)security’

This thesis provides an investigation into the perceptions, meanings, and constructions of ‘security’ in the case of the 2020 *Union of European Football Associations* (UEFA) European Championship in men’s football (Euro 2020). Boasting a historic hosting format, Euro 2020’s hosting rights were shared by 12 co-hosting countries, and the mega-event’s associated security planning and delivery were described by the event owner as ‘one of the largest safety and security operations in the world’ (UEFA, n.d., Sector 6: 2). Moreover, the outbreak of the highly contagious and global *coronavirus disease 2019* (COVID-19) pandemic added to Euro 2020’s securitized nature. Euro 2020’s geographies and ‘networked strength’ became its ‘Achilles heel’ (Parnell et al., 2020: 3) as the mega-event was provisionally postponed for 12 months.¹ Instead of being staged as planned between 12 June and 12 July 2020, the new provisional dates were 11 June to 11 July 2021. Consequently, this meant the security-related efforts and delivery were temporally prolonged, whilst COVID-19 attached another layer to the already unique securitization timeline of Euro 2020, as European-wide sports were temporarily suspended over ‘health’ and ‘safety’ concerns (Tovar, 2020).

By unpacking the concept of ‘security’ in the case of Euro 2020, from a pre-planning stage to the COVID-19 outbreak, this thesis examines Euro 2020’s security governance and the interrelationships between security-related policies and processes of policing, risk-management, commodification, surveillance and knowledge exchange. The thesis’s main argument is that Euro 2020 was not solely an *important* empirical site for present-day ‘security’ constructions and governance, but rather, an *exemplary* site for two distinctive driving forces of security governance and practices apparent in the current world. That includes the transnationalization of security

¹ Despite the postponement, I refer to the event as ‘Euro 2020’ because UEFA confirmed that the event would retain its original name, format and venues *despite* the postponement. Regardless, at the time of writing, some uncertainty still exists around the precise dates of Euro 2020, each host country’s situation and whether fans will be allowed to gather in stadiums and fan zones given the unpredictable COVID-19 situation.

knowledge and the use of precautionary governance. I also argue that the meanings of ‘security’ in a sport mega-event (SME) context are not only subject to change, but that ‘security’ meanings *were* significantly reconfigured following COVID-19. Sociologically, this study is particularly important in a time where the security and policing operations at mega-events have become subject to increased public attention, require enormous financial and human resources and have diverse socio-spatial effects (Cleland, 2019; Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010; Roche, 2017). The importance of the thesis’s argument relates to how it reaffirms mega-event securitizations’ position as end-results *and* expressions of current security dynamics and developments.

The rise of mega-events can, according to Roche (1992, 2000, 2003), be attributed to the late nineteenth century. In modern societies, mega-events represent significant and spectacular occasions that are experienced individually, collectively and culturally. Further, the importance of mega-events for the reading of wider social issues is incontestable (Hall, 2006; Roche, 2000; Doidge et al., 2019). Notwithstanding, as Müller and Gaffney (2018: 254) remind us, mega-events are ‘inherently risky undertakings’. After the tragic events unfolding on 9/11, security issues and risk-management at – or associated with SMEs quickly manifested themselves at the forefront of both media discourses and in relevant academic spheres (Cleland, 2019; Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010, 2011). However, public security concerns related to SMEs can be traced back to the 1960s (Houlihan and Giulianotti, 2012). They were also crystallized following the terrorist attacks targeting the Olympic Village in Munich in 1972 (Roche, 2000; Boyle and Haggerty, 2009) and Centennial Park during the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta (Cleland and Cashmore, 2018).

Following 9/11 and with the subsequent global ‘war on terror’ occurring in a time where transnational terrorism became increasingly dominant on the international security agenda, discourses surrounding the ‘security’ and SME nexus intensified rapidly (Coaffee and Wood, 2006). Broadly, notions of ‘(in)security’ became increasingly globalized and responses to it framed in terms of exceptionalism, leading Bigo (2008: 36) to ask whether it is ‘the norm that defines the exception or the exception that defines the norm?’ in security management. Fundamentally, SME securitizations do not occur in isolation from wider security developments and, increasingly, a strong emphasis is placed by hosts and organizers on maintaining ‘security’ and ‘safety’ before, during and after SMEs (Clavel, 2013).

Kitchen and Rygiel (2014: 202) highlight that because SMEs represent exceptional happenings, it is possible to question their capacity for providing understandings of ‘security’ more generally. Yet, they argue that this is exactly why SMEs are so crucial, since it is through the ‘appeal to exceptionalism’ that SMEs are used as ‘policy windows’ or ‘testing grounds’ for securitization techniques. Hence, the exceptional shifts become routinized in everyday aspects of modern societies, commonly camouflaged as mega-event ‘security legacies’ (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009; Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010). This, again, illustrates how SMEs can accommodate the ‘naturalisation of social inequalities’ (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006: 18). To paraphrase Giulianotti and Robertson (2007), it may be most appropriate to analytically approach a SME as a ‘mirror’ and ‘motor’ of securitization.² A mirror, because it reflects wider security processes and developments that warrant investigation. A motor, because SMEs also advance, accelerate, or can be the drivers for securitization processes or techniques adapted elsewhere in public life.

The rise of security complexes at mega-events is regularly and best illustrated by the continually growing security budgets at post-9/11 SMEs (Sugden, 2012). This is inter-related to the upsurge in the number of active personnel and the introduction of state-of-art security and surveillance measures that are deployed with an overarching aim of keeping events undisrupted from unwanted actors or incidents (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009). Indeed, separate SME’s security operations, involving military troops, armoury and monitoring systems have been described as the ‘largest peacetime security operation in history’ (Yu et al., 2009: 390, describing the 2008 Beijing Olympics). Meanwhile, Ryan (2002, cited in Boyle and Haggerty, 2012) claimed that wars had been planned and executed in less time and with less people than mega-events. Following such powerful descriptions, the sophistication, money and planning invested into ‘safe’ mega-events have increased continually and, like other facets of mega-events, the ‘security’ has become truly ‘spectacular’ (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009).

The expansion of the SME-security pair was also recently demonstrated by the global ‘Sports Against Terrorism’ initiative launched by the United Nations (UN) in the early months of 2020. This programme ‘aimed at safeguarding major sporting events from

² Importantly, this is argued by the authors in the context of ‘globalization’ in sport.

terrorism-related threats’ (UN News, 2020). As the Head of UN Office of Counter-Terrorism declared, ‘[p]rotecting major sporting events entails multilevel cooperation and coordination [and] complex security and policy arrangements’ (ibid.). Thus, mega-event security constitutes a global issue requiring large-scale intergovernmental and universal responses.

For Roche (2017: 133), mega-event securitizations are ‘up to a point [...] normatively defensible in terms of event organisers’ legal and moral responsibilities for basic public safety’. However, mega-event securitizations still provide fertile grounds upon to situate a critical scholarly analysis. Despite representing some of modern societies’ largest, most comprehensive security operations, dealing with a manifold of threats, SME ‘security’ is yet to be fully appreciated academically (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010, Toohey and Taylor, 2008; Cleland, 2019). Still, there is a pressing need for critically examining event-specific risk contexts and ‘security governance’ (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010) with ‘governance’ referring to the intentional activities designed to mould a flow of events (Wood and Shearing, 2007). Further, a central aspect of mega-event securitization has been left under-researched: that is what ‘security’ ultimately *means* or can mean within a SME’s ‘fabricated zones of risk’ (Atkinson and Young, 2012: 289).

Further, the impacts of COVID-19 on elite sport raised a host of questions relevant to the study of mega-event securitizations (Parnell et al., 2020). By addressing these gaps in the literature, this thesis examines perceptions, meanings and constructions of ‘security’ at Euro 2020. However, unlike the traditional style of staging SMEs, the hosting rights for this edition of the ‘Euros’ were not awarded to *one* or *two* host countries. For the first time historically, the spectacular event’s hosting rights were awarded to 12 countries spread across the European continent.³

1.2 ‘A Bridge Between Nations’: Contextualizing Euro 2020

The UEFA Euro 2020, or the 2020 European Football Championship – as it is formally titled – would be the sixteenth edition of the ‘Euros’ and coincided with the tournament’s 60th anniversary. As officially announced in 2012 by then UEFA president, Michel Platini, the event – promoted under the banner a ‘Euro for Europe’

³ Originally, there were 13 host cities, but in December 2017 Brussels lost its hosting rights. Resultantly, London was assigned four additional games, including semi-finals and the final.

– was to be staged across 12 different countries spread around the Europe in a celebration of the tournament’s anniversary (UEFA, 2012). The host cities, however, were not confirmed by UEFA until September 2014. Chappelet and Parent (2015: 11) argue that the decision to employ such spatially diffuse format also was linked to challenges in finding interested hosts with 12 satisfactory stadiums, following the tournament’s expansion from 16 to 24 teams before Euro 2016. Notwithstanding, a stakeholder interviewed in this thesis also insisted that it was partly because ‘when they started the bidding process the only bidder they had was Turkey. And they were not prepared to give a tournament to Turkey’ (Stakeholder 8).

With Euro 2020 approaching, UEFA President Aleksander Čeferin announced that:

There is great pleasure in being able to bring EURO 2020 to so many countries and cities, to see football acting as a bridge between nations, and to carry the competition closer to the fans, who are the essential lifeblood of the game (UEFA, 2017).

The ‘bridge between nations’ analogy was also visible in the event’s branding and official logos. Here, European bridges bridged together cultural landmarks and stadiums in the respective host cities.

Whilst it is assumed that this format represents a one-off (*BBC*, 2016), unlikely to become the new normal, it was remarkable that the 2026 FIFA World Cup was awarded to Canada, Mexico and the US, and thereby, will take up a resembling ‘continent-wide’ format. Before 2020, the unusual high number of hosts meant that host nations would not automatically qualify for Euro 2020, which is normal practice. After the qualification rounds, 24 nations would be qualified for the final stages. Here, in the tournament’s group stage, each qualified host were guaranteed two home fixtures (UEFA, 2017). Notwithstanding, Euro 2020 and its owners received criticism due to the related financial costs and logistical obstacles that were imposed on travelling supporters (Stura et al., 2017; *BBC*, 2016; *The Guardian*, 2012; *Daily Mail*, 2012). Host cities were located as far west as Dublin to Baku in the east. Meanwhile, the planned opening game was to be played in Rome, whereas London was assigned the tournament’s concluding matches. Below, *Table 1.1* displays the employed cities and stadiums.

Country	City	Stadium
Azerbaijan	Baku	Olympic Stadium
Denmark	Copenhagen	Parken Stadium
England	London	Wembley
Germany	Munich	Allianz Arena
Hungary	Budapest	Puskás Aréna
Ireland	Dublin	Aviva Stadium
Italy	Rome	Stadio Olimpico
Romania	Bucharest	Arena Națională
Russia	Saint Petersburg	Krestovsky Stadium
Scotland	Glasgow	Hampden Park
Spain	Bilbao	San Mamés
The Netherlands	Amsterdam	Johan Cruyff Arena

Table 1.1: Euro 2020's host countries, cities and stadiums.

In terms of event management and construction projects, Chappelet and Parent (2015: 11) argue that Euro 2020 could be easier to organize since it predominantly employed pre-existing stadiums.⁴ It was also believed that the hosting format would increase the political uniqueness of the 'Euros' (ibid.). Meanwhile, Zimbalist (2016: 111) maintained that 'the good news [...] is that the costs of hosting will be shared by several countries. The bad news is [...] that administrative and security costs will be experienced by several countries'. Indeed, as *Table 1.2* displays, the security planning and delivery at previous 'Euros', since 2000, have come at significant financial costs for the host countries. Indeed, it was announced pre-event that the estimated cost for the policing of the matches and fan zones in London only, for Euro 2020, was estimated at £10.6 million (Mayor of London, 2019). Concerning infrastructural arrangements and construction projects, Euro 2020's format arguably demonstrated a more modest and easier event to 'assemble' than past SMEs, since only one stadium, *Puskás Arena* in Hungary, was a new construction.

⁴ Somewhat paradoxically, Brussels lost the rights to host Euro 2020 since their new stadium, *Eurostadium*, would not be completed in time.

Year	Host	Security Budget
2020	12 countries	To be confirmed
2016	France	€33 million
2012	Ukraine	UAH 491 million
	Poland	N/A
2008	Austria	N/A (No separate security budget, included in overall tournament budget)
	Switzerland	€40.4 million
2004	Portugal	€40 million
2000	Holland and Belgium	USD 35 million (around €28.3 million)

Table 1.2: Security budgets at Euro 2000 – 2020. It is worth mentioning that France, during Euro 2016 was in a state of emergency. As such, distinguishing between SME-related security budgets and general security costs becomes complicated (UEFA, 2005, 2016: 55; Swiss Confederation, 2008: 25).

However, an event taking up such format – like most SMEs – is bound to a complex set of unique ‘security issues’. Indeed, the event’s security operation and management would require transnational and rigorous planning (UEFA, n.d.), from the host cities were confirmed in September 2014 until the event, eventually, took place. For Euro 2020, 12 host cities meant 12 exclusive risk profiles, as all host countries possessed distinctive (geo-)political, social and cultural attributes. In terms of mega-event housing experience, levels would differ vastly between co-hosts (Stura et al., 2017).⁵ And, among the hosts, seven countries were newcomers to staging the ‘Euros’. In spite of this, Klauser (2011a) notes that it is expected pre-bid, and made explicitly clear to all hosts, regardless how (in)experienced, that they must guarantee to UEFA, the ‘highest standards on safety and security issues and capabilities’ (UEFA, n.d., S6: 2). This task became increasingly complicated when, as explained next, Euro 2020’s ‘security’ was severely impacted by the outbreak of COVID-19, which led to its postponement.

Overall, whilst Euro 2020’s format presented opportunities stemming from the event’s spatial diffuseness, it also initiated new questions speaking to the tournament-related security operation which was prolonged because of the postponement. In the realm of mega-events, the hosting format also meant that the case of Euro 2020 is truly novel.

⁵ For example, London, Saint Petersburg, Baku and Glasgow hosted SMEs during the 2010s.

Because SMEs with such a unique format had never been staged previously, existing knowledge on how such format impacts the securitization and relevant security pre-planning remains absent. This speaks to the originality of the case study of this thesis, and upon proceeding, it is the discourses *within* and the organizations and perceptions *of* this very security pre-planning which this thesis critically engages with and captures empirically.

1.3 COVID-19: The Pandemic Crisis and ‘Security Threat’

In 2007, Cheng et al. (2007: 683) described SARS-CoV viruses as ‘timebombs’ and warned of the ‘possibility of the re-emergence of SARS and other novel viruses from animals or laboratories’ which meant that ‘the need for preparedness should not be ignored’. Thirteen years later, in the early months of 2020, the world witnessed the emergence of a new, unprecedented health and safety crisis, which the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a pandemic.⁶ The global pandemic caused by the *coronavirus disease 2019* became extremely central to this thesis, especially towards the latter stages of my research project, in view of the impact the virus had on human life and because the world of sports was not shielded from the pandemic. As of the 6 July 2020, COVID-19 had caused more than 500,000 deaths and there were more than 11 million confirmed cases worldwide (WHO, n.d.).

It is beyond the remit of this section (and thesis) to provide an epidemiological assessment or understanding of COVID-19 in any form. However, the study still examines some of the (in)direct socio-political impacts of COVID-19 on Euro 2020 and the governance of sports and mega-events. It examines how this infectious disease – in addition to posing a ‘health issue’ – presented an existential ‘security threat’ involving securitizing actors, referent objects in need for protection, and extraordinary responses outside the realm of ‘normal politics’ (see Section 1.8.1 for an unpacking of ‘securitization’). It is therefore necessary to establish a basic understanding of what COVID-19 *is* and the pandemic’s position on the security agenda before delving into its impacts in sports.

⁶ WHO is the specialized agency within the UN which has international public health as their main responsibility. Since 1948, it has been the focal international organization in global disease surveillance and control (Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014).

Before proceeding, an important distinction must be drawn. COVID-19 is an *infectious disease*. This disease is caused by the *virus* officially named ‘*severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2*’ (SARS-CoV-2) believed to have zoonotic origins (Rothan and Byrareddy, 2020). Importantly, the main source of spread is human-to-human transmission between people in close proximity to each other, mainly through respiratory droplets. Symptoms include fever, cough, tiredness and shortness of breath (WHO, 2020a). The virus has most severe impacts on elderly and individuals with underlying health conditions. At the time of writing, no vaccine had been developed that could offer immunity to COVID-19.

The virus was first detected in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 and had not previously been identified in human beings. Between December 2019 and February 2020, the disease first spread to Asian regions in geographic proximity, before extending worldwide. COVID-19 was first treated by WHO as an epidemic, but was given pandemic status on 11 March 2020 (WHO, 2020c). A ‘pandemic’ is primarily concerned with a disease’s geographic spread on a global level and a large population lacking immunity to the relevant disease (WHO, 2010). Days after COVID-19 was assigned pandemic status, WHO’s General-Director, Tedros Adhanom, also announced that Europe was the pandemic’s new epicentre ‘with more reported cases and deaths than the rest of the world combined, apart from China’ (BBC, 2020c). In scale, it was argued that COVID-19 represented the most serious public health threat from a respiratory virus since the 1918 H1N1 influenza pandemic (Lodise and Rybak, 2020).

Beyond the epidemiological impacts of COVID-19, the pandemic also generated enormous changes to social, economic and political life. Responses to limit the peak of COVID-19 included the securitization of public spaces, quarantines, social distancing, lockdowns and general restrictions on people’s movements both locally and transnationally (French and Monahan, 2020). However, state responses were not uniform and, as Corsini et al. (2020: 1) write, the ‘seriousness of the situation’ was demonstrated by the ‘extreme uncertainty of the measures taken by the governments of the various countries to stem the pandemic spread’. Responding to COVID-19 became synonymous with extraordinary measures (French and Monahan, 2020) turning countries and continents into *de facto* ‘states of exception’ (Agamben, 2005) where public safety had to be balanced up against risk prevention and where legal

orders were temporarily suspended in the name of ‘national security’. In the US, President Donald Trump declared a national emergency. In Europe, Spain, Portugal and Italy formally declared a state of emergency to combat COVID-19 with extraordinary government powers. Further, given the connections ‘between the mobilities of people and illnesses’ and since ‘places are immensely vulnerable to the movements of illnesses’ (Urry and Larsen, 2011: 219) a number of countries imposed strict restrictions on travelling and mass gatherings. In sum, the emergencies caused by COVID-19 were responded to with extraordinary measures justified under the banner of ‘health’, ‘safety’ and ‘security’.

In a globalized world, the concepts of ‘health’ and ‘security’ have become increasingly inter-connected. Health issues like pandemics, epidemics and infectious diseases are now included on the security agenda as ‘threats’ to individuals’ well-being and states’ stability (Rushton, 2011; Elbe, 2011; Elbe et al., 2014). As Chapter Two unpacks, it is appropriate to analytically and critically approach pandemics as ‘security threats’ characterized their inherently unpredictable dimensions. Evidently, COVID-19 served to reaffirm the ‘health security’ link and the limitations of states’ preparedness and contingency planning (Adey and Anderson, 2012).

Because of the pandemic’s outbreak, merely months before mass crowds would travel to attend the SMEs of the 2020, including Euro 2020 and the Tokyo 2020 Olympics, these events were postponed for 12 months (Parnell et al., 2020). It was therefore *unavoidable* that COVID-19 became a theme of this thesis. Pandemic ‘threats’ to SMEs are, however, mostly mentioned in passing in the growing literature on SME securitizations (Chapter Two), despite Toohey et al.’s (2003) call for taking into account pandemics with global ramifications.

While SMEs in the 2000s and 2010s were threatened by infectious diseases including SARS and the Zika virus, this never caused the postponement or cancellation of the relevant events (Parnell et al., 2020). Ultimately, COVID-19 posed a generational threat to the world of sports. As Tovar (2020) demonstrates, it was even more damaging for sports events than World War II. In the case of football, Tovar argues, the COVID-19 crisis was the first time since the foundation of the sport that it was not merely closed for a number of weeks, but where the ‘lockdown could last longer, maybe even for a year’ (ibid.: 7). Commenting on the unprecedented impacts of

COVID-19 on sports, Mann et al. (2020: 1) argue that pandemics like COVID-19 ‘bring added urgency to examine the impacts of hosting sporting mega-events’. Meanwhile, Parnell et al. (2020: 5) submit that:

The consequences of [COVID-19 related] postponements and cancellations are unknown, yet many commentators and those within sport expect this to fundamentally change the way the industry operates in the future. We urge our colleagues in academia to examine the impact of these changes in elite and community recreational contexts from a socio-cultural, economic and political perspective

Indeed, COVID-19 is already a topic of high sociological relevance. And so, it presents a number of avenues for researchers to explore. As this section shows, the crisis was responded to, in part, as a ‘security threat’. Further, mega-events were *not* exempted from this threat. Hence, concerning the temporal starting point of the outbreak (Winter 2019/Spring 2020) and its effects on my thesis’s case study, this calls for reflecting Parnell et al.’s (2020) call for research. That is done by providing one of the first sociological analyses of COVID-19 as a global ‘security issue’, critically disaggregate the ways in which COVID-19 reconfigured meanings of ‘safety’ and ‘security’ in mega-event settings, and examining its wider impacts on mega-event governance.

1.4 Research Aims and Objectives

Based on the above contextualization and as expanded on in Chapter Two, mega-event securitizations remain academically under-explored and the extant literature is subject to additional growth. Particularly, there is a need for more critical engagement, both theoretically and empirically, with what ‘security’ actually *means* and how ‘security’ is given meaning(s) in a SME context beyond just being ‘undisrupted’ events or the absence of ‘terrorist’ or ‘hooligan’ threats within the mega-event landscapes. Ultimately, ‘security’ is an inherently contested concept with differing and sometimes competing meanings and referent objects (Bain, 2006; Baldwin, 1997; Zedner, 2009).

Therefore, there is still a need for holistic analyses of ‘security’ and for revisiting the distinctive processes that are embedded in, construct and give meaning to mega-event ‘security’. Other scholars have examined processes of ‘policing’ (Armstrong et al., 2017) or ‘surveillance’ (Klauser, 2011a; 2017), which aim to construct or maintain ‘security’ at past SMEs. However, existing knowledge on how these processes collectively play out, and contribute to ‘security’ – when a SME is so geographically and politically unique as Euro 2020 remains minimal. Simply put, Euro 2020’s format

boasted a uniqueness which raised entirely new questions speaking to the construction of mega-event ‘security’.

Anchored in the social realities of an expanding mega-event/security complex and the potential for substantially enriching the existing literature, the overarching research question that I seek to answer in this thesis is:

- *To consider which processes, assessments, activities and policies that may assist the construction of ‘security’ and ‘safety’ in Euro 2020’s context.*

Such question relates predominantly to the pre-planning of ‘security’ at this SME. However, the underlying processes contributing to ‘security’ do not operate in vacuums. They are impacted by the aforementioned assumptions, referents objects or meanings of ‘security’ and what ‘security’ is, can be or how it appears. Accounting for this, there are four objectives that this thesis seeks to accomplish, to assist the sufficient answering of the above question:

- i. *Explore ‘whom’ or ‘what’ ‘security’ was to be provided for in Euro 2020’s context;*
- ii. *Consider ‘whom’ or ‘what’ that constituted a ‘security threat’ in Euro 2020’s context, and,*
- iii. *Critically engage with the meanings of ‘security’ in a SME setting, given the contested conceptual nature of ‘security’*

Furthermore, since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic would severely impact the securitization timeline of Euro 2020, causing a provisional 12-month postponement to the tournament, the pandemic ‘threat’ became an inevitable part of this research and had to be given critical exploration. Thus, my fourth objective reads as follows:

- iv. *Provide an overview of, and examine, sport bodies’ and key stakeholders’ responses to the global COVID-19 pandemic’s impact in the world of SMEs.*

1.5 The ‘Troika of Security’

This thesis empirically develops and presents an original concept that can be applied to contemporary SME securitization processes and explain how ‘security’ is

constructed at SMEs in relation to attending fans. I call this concept the ‘troika of security’, where a ‘troika’ refers to a set of three components that work together in some capacity. Consequently, the troika metaphor is appropriate to the ‘troika of security’ consisting of three inter-linked components that collectively assist the host cities’ and planners’ construction of ‘security’ before SMEs. The ‘troika of security’ refers to the converging processes related to (i) institutional memory, (ii) ‘lesson-drawing’ and (iii) precautionary logics in contemporary SME security governance.

My concept extends existing analyses of post-9/11 security assessments (Mythen and Walklate, 2008) which later have been applied to mega-events as sites of analysis (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009, 2012), and the concept offers a nuanced and holistic alternative for understanding the mega-event security production as a convergence of both retrospective and futuristic components. More broadly, in dealing with the heightened terrorist threat after 2001, security analysts, officials and authorities have increasingly adopted ‘future-oriented risk-based approaches’ (Mythen and Walklate, 2008: 233), driven and oriented not by the question ‘what was?’, but the speculative question; ‘what if?’ (ibid.). Indeed, Boyle and Haggerty (2009, 2012) demonstrate how such logic is embedded into mega-events’ securing processes. After all, ‘terrorism’ poses a threat to SMEs, and event planners and security agencies must indeed attempt to account for the uncontrollable and speculative scenarios by asking ‘*what if?*’ questions. Precautionary logics therefore constitute one of the dynamics in Boyle and Haggerty’s (2009) ‘spectacular security’ concept. As they conclude, a mega-event’s security logic is ‘increasingly oriented to negating the prospects of a vastly expanded range of dangers [and] has undergone a dramatic quantitative expansion’ (ibid.: 271).

Crucially, however, security assessments at mega-events do also rely on retrospective estimations by drawing upon lessons from past SMEs representing either ‘successes’ or ‘failures’ (Klauser, 2011a, 2012). Additionally, the experience and know-how relevant to housing a SME already acquired by local authorities, host cities or law enforcements comprise ‘institutional memory’ – which again – involves looking ‘backward’ rather than into the future. Whilst a precautionary outlook can explain SME planners’ assessments *vis-à-vis* terrorist threats, it has limited explanation power for how ‘hooliganism’, for example, is countered and the roles of fans within mega-event securitizations. For example, the securing against spectator violence is not

necessarily guided by speculative ideas about what *may be*, but instead, by looking back at lessons learnt, past encounters, and ‘*what was*’.

Overall, these retrospective meanings and estimations remain integral in a SME’s security preparations (Klauser, 2011a, 2012; Boyle, 2011). And as this thesis argues and presents in an original context, knowledge recirculation operates in tandem with ‘outside of the box’ and unforeseeable scenario thinking. This subsequently extends the view that mega-events are ‘secured’ primarily through precautionary means and ‘outlook based on futurity’ (Mythen and Walklate, 2008: 221; see Boyle and Haggerty, 2012). Thus, the three components constituting the ‘troika’ work in concert – and share the common aim of providing ‘safety’ and ‘security’ for fans and other attendees. And, those in charge of, or providing ‘security’, combine retrospective *and* futuristic assessments, as the ‘troika’ conceptualizes the suggestion that learning and imagination sit alongside each other in mega-event security (Molnar et al., 2019).

Besides, it is vital to highlight the role of football fans as central actors in the ‘troika’. The security planning and delivery of any SME encompass a number of actors (Fussey, 2015), and involve various hierarchies of power in positions to define or determine what ‘security’ is; how it should be exercised; and what constitute a ‘security threat’ or ‘issue’. As such, security services, event owners and organizers have been dedicated most attention in existing research (Klauser, 2011a; Armstrong et al., 2017). And indeed, this thesis captures how, for example, the event owner’s policy-documents consisted of discursive framings of ‘security threats’, even before Euro 2020 host cities were confirmed (Chapter Four). Moreover, law enforcements and security agencies possess distinct roles of power within a mega-event’s securitization (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009; Taylor and Toohey, 2015; Aitken, 2020). Despite this, it remains crucial to locate the social group and important stakeholder group of football fans within the ‘troika of security’. Although fans do not compose a socially homogenous group (Numerato and Giulianotti, 2018), situating fans as powerful actors within the ‘troika’ remains consistent with the following observation:

There has been a number of surveillance studies in contemporary society but very little have concentrated on sport, in particular, the changing notion of security, surveillance, and terrorism since 9/11 and *its impact on one of sport’s key stakeholders: the fans* (Cleland and Cashmore, 2018: 456, emphasis added)

Hence, whilst law enforcements, international organizations, stewards and sporting bodies possess powerful and highly visible roles within the ‘troika of security’, as mega-event security providers, fans also perform an important yet somewhat conflicting role in the ‘troika’ as subjects to be provided with ‘security’ and actors to potentially be ‘secured against’. Fans also occupy a position within the ‘troika’ as consumers of securitized event spaces and as politically mobilized advocates for social change (Doidge et al., 2019). This is empirically captured in Chapters Four and Five, over which the ‘troika’ is laid out.

This means that fans may ultimately be what the ‘troika’s’ aforementioned merging futuristic and retrospective elements seek to ‘secure against’, such as fans labelled ‘hooligans’ or ‘risk fans’ (Pearson and Stott, 2016) supposedly posing a threat to other fans (Tsoukala, 2009). Further, rival fixtures that may transpire in a tournament, might call for a precautionary and speculative approach. Notwithstanding, fans – in form of organized fan networks – also assist the processes of the ‘troika’, such as the lesson-drawing component by, for example, participating on tournament-specific working groups or consultative visits before the event, with powerful actors like UEFA and the Council of Europe (Chapter Five).

As Chapter Five documents, fan representatives can potentially engage in information-exchange and in the transfer of best practices speaking to football policing, fan zones or match-day experiences. During football mega-events, fans’ (non-)compliance with policing actors may also impact the overall ‘security’ (Stott et al., 2011) and thereby inform how future events are planned in relation to the planning actors’ institutional memory. Then, as Chapter Four finds, football fans, as the main consumers of the mega-event, also represent a population to be provided with ‘security’ and protection as referent objects. Both in an objective sense, but also subjectively, as the cleansed spaces and spheres, that are ‘harmonized by “fun”’ (Lauss and Szigetvari, 2010: 745), are facilitated through lesson-drawing and precautionary processes for fans and event visitors in their roles as consumers of the event’s spaces, products and official sponsors.

Therefore, whereas the ‘troika of security’ explains host cities’ and organizers’ construction of ‘security’ before Euro 2020, it is also imperative that the multiple roles of football fans within the ‘troika’ are accounted for, and that the ‘troika’ is not

conflated with the position, power or actions of security agencies or the event owner. Ultimately, in this hierarchy of power present within a mega-event's securitized landscapes, the thesis shows how fans – as situated in the 'troika of security' – remain both *influenced* and *influencers* vis-à-vis the 'troikas' three security-related components, and how fans possess significant, overlapping and occasionally paradoxical roles as a multiplex population that assist the securing efforts and pre-planning, are secured against as a potential 'security threat', and are facilitated for as the primary consumers and users of the blended securitized and commodified event spaces.

Whilst contributing to debates around preparedness and anticipation (Zedner, 2009), the 'troika' can essentially explain the production and reproductions of 'security' before Euro 2020. Further, the concept feeds into my thesis's main argument that Euro 2020 was an exemplary site for two distinctive practices of security governance in the current world. It possesses sociological value because it offers an understanding of security and its management in a post-9/11 world, and locates the roles and experiences of contemporary football fandom (Numerato, 2018; Cleland et al., 2018) within such security constructions. Further, it may be applied to other social contexts by researchers investigating 'security' and 'risk' management in other social contexts or securitized climates. That may include forthcoming SMEs, protests, political summits, cultural festivals or urban events where 'security' is planned, implemented, exercised and contested by supporters and other attendees.

1.6 Justification for the Research

It is not merely post-9/11 societies' preoccupation with 'security', 'safety' and 'risk' (Bauman, 2005; Beck, 1992; Mythen, 2014; Zedner, 2009), nor how such security-related fixation is embedded in the domain of SMEs (Coaffee et al., 2011; Yu et al., 2009), which justify this research. Though these are the underlying social realities that my study is firmly anchored in. By drawing from the existing literature, it is possible to detect calls for a continued examination of SME securitizations and how 'security' is constructed and/or given meaning(s) in a sporting context. Against this background, it was also recently argued that spectators attending mega-events are 'likely to face even greater security and surveillance measures as new threats emerge' (Cleland and Cashmore, 2018: 466). Firstly, this implies a continually expanding area of study in

line with ‘new threats’. Secondly, this reinforces Euro 2020’s position as a key site of analysis and data collection. Collectively, this enhances my justification.

Giulianotti and Klauser (2010, 2011, 2012) advanced the study of SME security governance as a field requiring increased interdisciplinary research. They argue that, ‘for social scientists [...] SMEs promise new fields for critical investigation’ (2010: 51). Their research agenda forwards tentative, emerging issues in SME-security research, and highlights potential theoretical and analytical frameworks for future scholarship. Researchers are also urged to commit to a transnational and critical investigation of the various effects originating from SME securitization and event-specific risks and security strategies. Finally, the authors emphasize the vitality of assembling case studies of particular events, so to generate ‘sustained, comparative studies of security issues, and processes at different events within varying contexts’ (ibid.: 58). More recently, the continued importance of this area was demonstrated by Cleland (2019) and Cleland and Cashmore (2018). By connecting my research to this evolving research agenda, a study of Euro 2020 is arguably in full harmony with the forwarded recommendations speaking to assembling new mega-event case studies. Adding to this, of course, Euro 2020’s context was truly exceptional and boasted a one-off continental format, which initiated questions regarding cross-country differences related to the securitization of the event. Ultimately, Euro 2020 presented transnational cases under the umbrella of one larger, overarching case study.

Furthermore, the importance of studying the securitization of the *European Championships* in football must not be downplayed, as oft-considered the world’s third largest SME (Klauser, 2013; Horne, 2010). Indeed, Horne (2010) demonstrates the ‘Euros’ sociological significance, as a recurring tournament, both in terms of material and representational legacies. Only the Olympics and the *Fédération Internationale de Football Association* (FIFA) men’s World Cup are bigger in size and popularity. It is unsurprising that researchers allocate most attention for the two biggest SMEs. However, Müller (2015: 639) argues that existing knowledge about the Olympics is well-established, whilst we know slightly less about the World Cup. Concerning those other events – whose size are not too distant from the Olympics or the World Cup – we know ‘hardly anything’, Müller claims (ibid.). Undeniably, the ‘Euros’ can be pinpointed as one of those events hinted towards.

Although some scholars utilize the ‘Euros’ as a case study to examine ‘policing’ or ‘security’ (Lauss and Szigetvari, 2010; Klauser, 2011a; 2012; Hagemann, 2010, Stott, 2003) this body of work remains limited. What is known about the ‘Euros’ undoubtedly lags behind what is known about the Olympics and World Cup. Ultimately, the ‘Euros’ – as an internationally and sociologically important mega-event – require more research from researchers seeking to extend the knowledge base on SME security governance, as called for (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010, 2011, 2012). As existing studies (Klauser, 2011a, 2012; Hagemann, 2010) and UEFA’s (n.d.) requirements for the Euro 2020 hosts underline; the scale of the ‘Euros’ security delivery is of enormous significance in localized and globalized settings. The event is, however, insufficiently researched when juxtaposed to the two other mentioned SMEs that receive the majority of scholarly attention.

Finally, I justify this research through a series of recent events and global developments. A number of Euro 2020 host countries (i.e. Germany and Spain) and cities (i.e. London and St. Petersburg) were struck by terrorist attacks throughout the 2010s. Whilst France was not a Euro 2020 host, the attack outside *Stade de France* in Paris, in November 2015, meant Euro 2016 was played under a state of emergency (Goldblatt, 2019). It also demonstrated that sports events are targets for terrorist attacks (Cleland and Cashmore, 2018). So was the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013. Despite this, attacks at SMEs are rare and relatively low in numbers (Spaaij, 2016). Indeed, Atkinson and Young (2012) align SME-related terrorism with Baudrillardian *non-events*. Yet, attacks *do* occasionally happen, whereas security operations take place regardless. These operations have long-lasting socio-spatial legacies (Boykoff and Fussey, 2014), and the eventuality of an event passing on ‘undisrupted’ must not distract us from that.

Other recent events also add to the importance of studying the securitization of Euro 2020. That includes the large-scale outbreaks of ‘hooliganism’ at Euro 2016 (Wong and Chadwick, 2017) and the mentioned pandemic which disrupted SMEs in unprecedented ways (Parnell et al., 2020). Overall, developments in the international system and security fields in the years leading up to Euro 2020, both *in sports, through sports* and more externally, contributed to the event’s extraordinary securitization and the subsequent circulation of security-related discourses, knowledge, meanings attached to this particular SME.

And so, this research may first be justified and anchored in the existing research agendas and gaps in the pre-existing literature (Chapter Two). Second, it is increasingly necessary to empirically capture those SMEs whose size, popularity and symbolism are not too distanced from the Olympics or the men's World Cup (Müller, 2015). In themselves, editions of the 'Euros' present sociologically illuminating and recurring mega-events that represent global occasions (Horne, 2010). Finally, I justify and rationalize the research through recent events and developments in the 2010s and 2020s that are both internally and externally positioned in relation to sports, and extremely important in the fields of 'security', including 'terrorism' trends and the COVID-19 pandemic. As I argue, Euro 2020 serves as an important opportunity to explore the SME-security *nexus* further. And ultimately, this research is justified based on the significant, timely and potentially unique scholarly contributions it can make by *acting upon* calls for research, capturing recent developments and exploring unexplored territories in the context of an under-researched and novel case study: Euro 2020.

1.7 Original Contributions to Knowledge

At the turn of the millennium, Roche (2000: 5) wrote that 'mega-events have attracted relatively little research attention'. A decade later, in a review of Andrews and Carrington's (2013) *A Companion to Sport*, Bairner (2014) suggested that 'the coverage of mega-events has surely reached saturation point'. Concerning mega-events, Bairner questioned if there still was 'anything more to be said'. Responding to Bairner, Rowe (2019: 4) acknowledges that the academic literature on mega-events can be both predictable and repetitive, but stresses that 'there is still wide scope and a pressing need to speak of any recurrent sociocultural phenomenon'. In his recent book, Roche (2017) also acknowledges the occasionally predictable nature of certain aspects of mega-event research. However, Roche's book convincingly underpins his introductory statement holding that 'mega-events always have the capacity to surprise us and show us something new about our social world' (ibid.: 4). In this thesis, and especially here, where I present my thesis's original contributions to knowledge, I unsurprisingly endorse Rowe's and Roche's viewpoints. Arguably, 'security' and mega-events as continentally extraordinary as Euro 2020 represent just two areas where there *is* more to be said and where knowledge still needs to be developed.

Through an examination of Euro 2020's securitization, this thesis argues that Euro 2020 was an *exemplary* and *powerful* site for two key practices of security governance in the present-day world. These practices reflect (i) the transnationalization of security and (ii) the exercise of precaution and future-oriented security outlooks. In the study of SME security governance, this thesis therefore connects with existing mega-event cases (Klauser, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Armstrong et al., 2017; Fussey, 2015; Fussey et al., 2011). However, I build on this work by locating retrospective and futuristic processes that assist the normative aim of 'security' in the completely novel event-setting of Euro 2020 – as a SME with 12 extraordinary national security contexts, which had to be postponed in the name of 'health' and 'safety' in the face of the global COVID-19 crisis (UEFA, 2020b). To date, this thesis is the most comprehensive examination of Euro 2020's securitization.

Whilst I contribute to the academic repository of SME case studies, what my research offers, more distinctively and uniquely, is an original contribution to the field in the form of a conceptualization of existing insights in tandem with empirical data which, collectively through the 'troika of security', can explain the pre-planning of 'security' and 'safety' before SMEs. I display this in relation to the most geographically distinctive SME planned in recent history. Further and ambitious at heart, it is hoped that, by using a SME as a portal for analysing wider security trends, the framework and this thesis as a whole, can capture or assist the understanding of mechanisms through which security governance occurs in post-9/11 societies, with a specific reference to urban, securitized contexts like SMEs and other cultural events.

Another contribution to knowledge offered by this thesis is the critical interrogation of what the concepts of 'security' and 'safety' *mean* in a SME setting. It is clear that mega-events are securitized. Yet an under-researched dimension is what 'security' actually means. By drawing from and bridging theoretical perspectives borrowed from critical security studies (Buzan et al., 1998; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010), which seldom have been applied in a sporting context, this thesis offers an account of the fluid and contextual meanings of 'security' at Euro 2020 and the practical implications of this. This again speaks to broader debates on the linkages between securitization and the political economy of professional sports (Giulianotti, 2011; Andrews and Silk, 2012). Ultimately, my thesis underpins how event spaces that are 'tamed, sanitized [and] guaranteed to come free of dangerous ingredients' (Bauman,

2000: 99) were desired and facilitated through security-related discourses, policies and requirements hosts must meet. In my extension of knowledge concerning what ‘security’ means in the SME context, I evidence how this refers not merely to the subjective and objective ‘security’ conditions of spectators or a host nation. It also refers to the conditions where consumption patterns and commercial attractiveness are comforted. In this sense, my thesis offers an original contribution to knowledge on ‘security’s social meanings and roles’ (Jarvis and Lister, 2012: 162).

Additionally, my thesis contributes with one of the first sociological analyses of ‘security’ and ‘safety’ meanings as elite sport was faced by the generational pandemic threat of COVID-19. Considering the recent nature of COVID-19, knowledge on how this pandemic event impacted SMEs is still limited and under-developed. Even pre-COVID-19, very few studies examine the exceptional threat to SMEs posed by pandemics. In this thesis, I offer a rich account of how the meanings of ‘security’ and ‘safety’ were reconfigured following COVID-19. I capture the shift in security management from *endemic* to *epidemic* threats and I show how sports bodies represented a microcosm for the regulatory mechanisms through which the pandemic was responded to, as apparent in political and health circles.

In terms of contributions to knowledge, I offer a sociological and security-focused analysis of COVID-19 as a novel ‘threat’. This contribution becomes increasingly layered since it can work as preliminary foundation for future work in the area. Finally, the new knowledge and original findings in this thesis can offer directions and lessons on how SMEs and the distinctive spaces within them should – or should not – be policed, operated and managed. Thus, the thesis contributes with lessons to the evidence-base speaking to football policing and SME security management.

1.8 Key Concepts and Terms

Before proceeding, it is useful and necessary to engage with and clarify a series of key concepts and definitions this thesis consistently follows and refers to. First, what constitutes a ‘mega-event’ should be made explicitly clear, since the literature works with different indicators and arrives at unique definitions (Roche, 2000; Müller, 2015; Gold and Gold, 2011). Indeed, Müller (2015: 627) notes that “‘mega-events’ are much discussed, but seldom defined”. He continues by arguing that the question of ‘what a mega-event is’, remains ‘definitional bickering’. Müller then dismantles previously

employed definitions and his point becomes visible; a universally agreed-upon definition is absent.

Unless stated otherwise, I follow Roche's classical definition of mega-events as 'large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance' (Roche, 2000: 1). However, as Müller exhibits, this definition – like the other definitions – has its pitfalls. For instance, it does not take into account the fact that mega-events commonly are associated with large costs and hosted in order to be a catalyst for urban change and positive impact in the host area (Müller, 2015). Still, Roche's definition corresponds with the mega-events this thesis focuses on. That includes the 'Euros', whereas most of the utilized literature are from Olympic or World Cup-based case studies.

The 'Euros' is the main competition for European men's national teams. Only European national teams geographically located in Europe, with the exception of Israel, can qualify for the 'Euros' (Klauser, 2013). The 'Euros' are organized by the UEFA quadrennially (normally the same year as the Summer Olympics). The competition, founded in 1958, has progressively expanded in terms of size, competing teams and thus competitiveness. Between 1980 and 1992, the 'Euros' had only eight competing teams. This number was doubled in the competitions taking place between 1996 and 2012 with 16 participating teams. Euro 2016, hosted in France, was the first edition with the current model of 24 teams. As aforementioned, the size and popularity of the 'Euros' is well-documented and corresponds with the indicators of Roche's (2000) mega-event definition.

Using the recent Euro 2016 as an example, this event generated around \$42 million in revenue per game in broadcasting money (*Forbes*, 2016). This demonstrates the event's global reach and the interest for the tournament for which 51 games were played across 10 host cities. As UEFA's (2016: 7) post-event report maintained, the event attracted 2.5 million spectators to the stadiums and generated around €484 million in sponsorship revenue. The 'Euros' are truly global in scope and with regards to tourism and media interest. As Mittag and Legrand (2010) argue, the 'Euros' even attract nearly as much attention as the World Cup globally. Despite being the third largest recurrent SME, it has been subject to limited academic examination. However, existing sociological issues that have appeared in relation to the 'Euros', focus on

expressions of national identity (Giulianotti, 1995b; Maguire and Poulton, 1999; Horne, 2010), brand protection (Pearson, 2012b), ‘cosmopolitanism’ (Millward, 2010), ‘hooligan’ behaviour (Weed, 2001; Poulton, 2005), the relationships between UEFA and the state (Włoch, 2013) and most recently, ‘security’ (Lauss and Szigetvari, 2010; Klauser, 2013, 2017).

Further, there are other concepts that have been loosely defined in social or political sciences that this thesis refers to continuously. For example, ‘terrorism’ and ‘hooliganism’ both lack universal definitions (Schmid, 2004; Rookwood and Pearson, 2010). Again, long discussions could have been engaged in, but it is not the intention of this thesis to resolve such perpetual, definitional questions. For the sake of clarity, the employed definitions this thesis follows and other key terms are summarized in *Table 1.3*.

Concept/Term	Definition
Mega-event	Large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance (Roche, 2000: 1).
Hooligan	[A]n individual who attended matches with the intention of becoming involved in violence with rival supporters (whether or not s/he achieved that aim) or a fan who became involved in physical violence (but not other disorder or criminal activity) even if this was not his/her initial aim (Rookwood and Pearson, 2010: 151)
Terrorism	The use of violence against civilians by nonstate actors to attain political goals (Kydd and Walter, 2006: 52)
Stakeholder	Individuals, groups or organizations that has a direct or indirect interest or stake in the activities of a particular organization (Freeman, 1984)

Table 1.3: Key definitions.

1.8.1 The Securitization Framework

This thesis already has, and will throughout refer to ‘securitization’ or ‘securitized’ events, objects or places. A breakdown regarding what this theory and conception of ‘security’ involves, as originating from International Relations and Security Studies, is thus required. When referring to ‘securitization’, this thesis follows the Copenhagen School’s social constructivist theorization of the process (Buzan et al., 1998). In this view, an ‘*issue*’ becomes a ‘*security issue*’ when it is securitized through a discursive speech act. Securitization theory was quickly viewed as a pioneering and critical alternative to the realist and state-centric understandings of ‘security’, which emphasized military force and ‘power’ in an anarchical international system which, up to the 1990s, dominated Security Studies (Aradau, 2004).

Essentially, ‘securitization’ can be understood as a more extreme version of ‘politicization’. The process means that a political issue is taken beyond the established rules and process of ‘normal politics’. In this process, an issue is framed or constructed as a ‘security threat’ to a specific reference object whose survival is at stake. Although what exactly makes ‘normal politics’ remains undefined, this discursive practice allows for extreme measures (Buzan et al., 1998). Ultimately, such view of ‘security’ is pessimistic since the ‘danger of “security” as understood by the Copenhagen School is that it allows governments to suspend legal constraints and democratic principles in the name of security’ (Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014: 333).

Securitizations occur primarily through a discursive speech act from ‘appropriately positioned actors’ (Jarvis and Lister, 2012: 161). Often, but not exclusively, these actors are leaders, elites and politicians.⁷ The shift from ‘normal politics’ to ‘security’ is fundamental, since this shift facilitates the conditions that ultimately allows for extraordinary measures. This may involve secrecy, tax levies or limitation of rights illustrating the abandonment from ‘normal politics’. Yet, it is also subject to an audience’s *acceptance* (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-25). Floyd (2007) delineates three steps of a successful securitization. This involves the identification of existential threats (a securitizing move), emergency action and convincing the audience.⁸ Following this, ‘security’ can be understood as a ‘social and intersubjective construction’ (ibid.: 329) and a self-referential procedure that invite exceptional measures to ensure survival.

Despite the emphasis on ‘security’ as a linguistic speech act, this does not imply that ‘to speak “security” means simply to talk in a higher-pitched voice’ (Wæver, 1995: 75) or is enacted by ‘uttering the word *security*’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 27, original emphasis). Securitization remains of greater complexity than this, and is rooted in the exceptionalism found within Schmittian politics (Aradau, 2004). Further, Huysmans (2011) emphasizes the importance of the ‘act’ dimension of ‘speech acts’. Importantly, Huysmans argues that securitization processes are also shaped by the more banal activities, meetings and regulations: the ‘little security nothings’. He suggests that it is these, and not always the exceptional speech act, that enact the securitization

⁷ However, it has been argued that Bourdieu’s (1991[1982]) concept of ‘cultural capital’ is essential in order to perform a speech act. That is because a speech act is not merely a question of linguistics. It also depends on the ‘social position of the enunciator’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 46).

⁸ The latter Buzan et al. (1998: 26) originally refer to as ‘effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules’.

processes, whilst encouraging re-engagement with the ‘act’ in the study of securitizations.

Finally, there are two important dimensions to securitizations that must be addressed. First, securitizations are not irreversible. ‘Desecuritization’ refers to the processes through which a securitization is reversed and no longer framed in terms of threat-defence or survival, and therefore dealt with through ‘normal politics’ again (Wæver, 1995). This could be through ‘reassuring discourses’ or new modes of protection (Case Collective, 2006). Yet, desecuritizations also require a degree of acceptance from an audience. Desecuritization is nonetheless left largely under-theorized and subject to interpretation (Floyd, 2007) within this constructivist reading of ‘security’ (Aradau, 2004).

Secondly, Buzan and Wæver (2009: 257) also introduced the new concept called ‘macro-securitization’, which ‘bundle other securitizations together without necessarily outranking them’. Macro-securitizations are ‘defined by the same rules that apply to other securitisations’ (ibid.). But crucially, the concept allows the ‘possibility of multiple audiences across many units’ (ibid.: 275). The concept also acknowledges that securitizations can be hierarchically ranked and bundled, whilst being of high analytical value to SME securitizations. As Van Blerk et al. (2019) maintain, this concept can be applied to SME contexts wherein securitizations of different ‘security threats’, such as ‘terrorism’ and drug crime (ibid.), or ‘terrorism’ and ‘hooliganism’ (Divišová, 2019) are bundled together and collectively addressed pre-event. Despite the conceptual applicability, it is striking that the consultation of the securitization framework is rare in the study of SMEs, despite the common reference to *securitized* mega-events.

1.9 Thesis Structure

This thesis is divided into seven chapters that collectively assist the fulfilment of the study’s aims and objectives. *Chapter Two* is a literature review divided into two parts. The chapter unpacks the complex relationship between SMEs and ‘security’. The first part reviews the existing literature on SME ‘security’ and revisits the relevant concepts of ‘security legacies’ and ‘security networks’. The second part, rooted in the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of critical security studies, explores the meanings of the contested concepts of ‘security’ and ‘safety’. Then, the securitization of health, with a

specific reference to COVID-19, is discussed. Finally, the chapter highlights the relevant gaps in knowledge that this study aims to fill against the backdrop of changes to ‘security’ and football fandom.

Chapter Three describes, explains and justifies the thesis’s methodology and research design. To gather the data for the empirical part of this thesis, I employed a number of qualitative approaches, including documentary analysis, semi-structured stakeholder interviews and an analysis of a large volume of media sources. Originally, I had planned to conduct a participant observation in a Euro 2020 host city (London) in June and July 2020. Notwithstanding, these plans had to be abandoned due to Euro 2020’s COVID-19 related postponement. My reflections on the impacts of COVID-19 on my research project and, generally, on being a social researcher in a period of ‘social distancing’ compose a crucial part of this chapter. Overall, the chapter discusses this study’s methodological underpinnings, data collection, analysis strategies and ethical considerations.

The second part of the thesis presents my empirical data and findings. Two chapters are dedicated to the ‘security’ pre-planning before Euro 2020 and one chapter examines the unexpected pandemic ‘threat’ that saw sports collapse in 2020. In *Chapter Four*, Euro 2020’s securitization is examined through a critical analysis of relevant policy documents deemed central to the event’s ‘security’ planning and organization. Further, the chapter examines the theme of ‘responsibility’ and ‘whom’ or ‘what’ that were ‘secured’ ahead of Euro 2020. Ultimately, it gives an insight into the multiple meanings of ‘security’ and ‘threats’ in Euro 2020’s context.

Chapter Five builds substantially on the documentary research and presents new findings from a series of stakeholder interviews prior to Euro 2020. In order to explain perceptions and the construction of ‘security’ prior to Euro 2020, this chapter introduces an empirically-informed, but theoretically elaborated on conceptual framework which extends the current literature. I call this the ‘troika of security’. Whilst tentatively developed in Chapter Four, Chapter Five solidifies the ‘troika’ which consists of precautionary logics, lesson-drawing processes and institutional memory. The ‘troika’ merges retrospective and futuristic security assessments and locates these very processes in Euro 2020’s novel and extraordinary context. Insight

into the event's policing outlooks and omnipresence of uncertainties are also provided here.

Chapter Six unpacks the meanings of threat in light of the COVID-19 outbreak. It documents the shift from endemic threats to an epidemic threat and, as argued, COVID-19 represented *the* key event on the securitization timeline prior to Euro 2020. Based on an analysis of interview statements given in the media and official announcements, it is argued here that COVID-19 reconfigured what 'security' and 'safety' could mean in a SME context. I also argue that sports bodies' governance of the pandemic operated as a microcosm for the broader regulatory mechanisms through which COVID-19 was responded to in political and health circles. Overall, this strengthens the idea sustaining that analysing global issues in sports (like a pandemic or security) can strengthen a more general analysis of those same global issues.

The concluding chapter, *Chapter Seven*, sums up the main arguments, answers the research question and explains how this thesis, with its original contributions, realizes its objectives. The chapter concludes by delving into the practical implications of my findings, highlighting my study's limitations and providing avenues for future research.

Chapter 2

Chapter 2: The Show Must Go On

Unpacking the Sport Mega-Event and ‘Security’ nexus

2.1 Introduction

In 2006, two central scholars in the sociology of SMEs forecasted that ‘security issues are likely to come more to the fore in production of sports mega-events’ (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006: 19). The accuracy of this prediction is noteworthy. Although it can be argued that such claim was a relatively ‘safe bet’, being articulated in a post-9/11 era, the quote forecasted what now is a manifested social reality. Undoubtedly, security issues and their management find themselves at the ‘fore in production’ of SMEs, with the immense amounts of capital, resources and organization associated with the staging of undisrupted events (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011; Cleland, 2019). This chapter examines the socio-historical roots and the increased significance of the mega-event–security *nexus*. It goes deeper into questions of why SMEs progressively have become militarized, securitized and costly affairs. It highlights how contemporary SME securitizations can be observed, and which aspects of mega-event ‘security’ that existing literature succeeds in and fails to sufficiently address or examine empirically. As argued, substantial gaps exist in the current literature, whereas a series of critical questions are left unanswered.

Structurally, this chapter is divided into two halves. First, a sociological introduction to SMEs and research that have dominated the field is provided. Then, the existing and relevant literature on SME ‘security’ is contextualized and reviewed. Two concepts directly linked to mega-event securitization: ‘security legacies’ and ‘security networks’, are then discussed in detail. The second half of the chapter critically and theoretically unpacks what the contested concepts of ‘security’ and ‘safety’ can mean in a SME context. Following this, the threats to SMEs posed by pandemics and infectious diseases are revisited in COVID-19’s context, before the chapter’s conclusions are offered.

2.2 The Sociology of Sport Mega-Events

‘Globalization’ processes and the economic restructuring of cities in Western societies during the twentieth century were crucial in increasing the attractiveness of mega-

events as vessels for urban economic regeneration (Roche, 1992). Now, hosting a SME is considered extremely prestigious because such events possess high levels of economic, cultural and political significance (Horne, 2007; Doidge et al., 2019; Preuss, 2007; Roche, 2000). SMEs are true spectacles, broadcasted worldwide and assigned with extensive media coverage. Given the enormous symbolic, political and social values attached to mega-events, Roche (1992, 2000, 2003, 2017) – a pioneer in the field – quickly recognized the importance of an academic study dedicated to mega-events. For Roche (2000: 1) mega-events constitute ‘some of the modern society’s “parades” and “shows”’. Prior to, but predominantly after Roche’s work, academics from a wide array of backgrounds have recognized the significance of mega-events. This has given life to a body of research examining various social, cultural, political and financial aspects of mega-events. Considering mega-events’ undisputed local, national and international importance, the social study of mega-events has steadily progressed and turned towards new pathways.

A complete list of those aspects of mega-events that have been approached academically cannot be provided here. However, scholarly research in the social sciences has been largely legacy-centred (Garcia, 2010; Kowalski, 2017; Preuss, 2007; Cashman, 2005). Prior to this widespread interest in mega-events’ socio-economic legacies, Roche (1992: 565) observed that the field was dominated by narrow economic approaches concerned with economic impact studies. Indeed, mega-events are normally hosted for wider and ‘positive’ post-event impacts. Hence, much appreciated academically are certain mega-events and their (in)ability to act as catalysts for urban regeneration (Gold and Gold, 2011; Watt, 2013; Essex and Chalkley, 1998) and impacts on tourism during and post-event (Weed, 2006). Mega-events’ impact on local residents and communities in host cities, regions or countries are also oft-examined (Weed et al., 2015; Lin, 2013). Other scholars examine SME’s political economy (Boykoff, 2014, 2020; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006) or states’ strategic employment of SMEs to acquire ‘soft power’ (Grix and Houlihan, 2014; Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2015).

As Yu et al. (2009: 391) argue, these strands of research are invaluable and provide insight ‘into the roles of SMEs as catalysts for promoting socio-economic, urban, political or cultural outputs’. However, they also highlight that there is one important element of SMEs which has been allocated relatively scant critical attention. That is

the manifold of security issues. Upon an extensive reading of the existing literature, such claim is frequently articulated and becomes visible. The SME-security *nexus*, although given somewhat more appreciation in recent years, undoubtedly represents an under-researched area, where the assigned academic attention does little justice to the *de facto* importance and extent of this relationship globally, in socio-political and economic fields.

2.3 The Sport Mega-Event and ‘Security’ Nexus

This section draws predominantly upon existing research addressing ‘security’ at the Olympics, the FIFA men’s World Cup⁹ and the ‘Euros’. Notwithstanding, the existing literature focusing on the latter lags behind the former two (Müller, 2015). Drawing from this corpus of work can be explained and justified by a series of reasons, such as the fact that conditions of risks and uncertainties are shared between these three mega-events, whilst risk-management and security operations have tended to resemble one another across events over time (Jennings and Lodge, 2011). Therefore, there are pronounced similarities both in the risk-profile and risk-management between the events. Naturally, this is because the mentioned mega-events generally share exposure to the same ‘threats’ (Jennings, 2012b). Simultaneously, the intention here is not to downplay that these three are distinctive SMEs in terms of size and popularity. Yet the actual differences are hard to measure and may not be as significant as oft-imagined.

As Müller (2015: 639) argues, the World Cup and ‘Euros’ are ‘not much smaller in size’ than the Olympic Games, which the majority of relevant literature addresses. Moreover, the three events share other important attributes being highly symbolic occasions, attracting millions of television viewers (hence, broadcasting revenues) and visitors gathering in large crowds. They all possess extensive real-time media and social media coverage (Wong and Chadwick, 2017) which ultimately contributes to making such events vulnerable, attractive and symbolic targets (Sugden, 2012).¹⁰ As Coaffee and Wood (2006: 513) remind us, ‘spectacular events are also spectacular targets’.

⁹ Unless stated otherwise, referred to as the ‘World Cup’.

¹⁰ Increasingly, this is also depicted in popular culture and cinematic representations. For example, *The Dark Knight Rises* (2012), *The Brothers Grimsby* (2016) and *Manhunt: Deadly Games* (2020).

Public concerns related to security issues and risk-management at modern SMEs can be traced back to the 1960s (Houlihan and Giulianotti, 2012: 701; Fussey et al., 2011). However, the consensus is that the terrorist attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics, perpetrated by Palestinian terrorists against Israeli athletes in the Olympic Village, causing 17 deaths, was the landmark moment. This attack contributed vastly to the elevation of ‘security’ and ‘safety’ anxieties associated with large-scale sporting events (Hassan, 2016; Fussey and Coaffee, 2011; Galily et al., 2015; Giulianotti and Klauser, 2012; Whelan, 2014).¹¹ Rapidly, throughout the 1970s, security planning manifested itself as a vital component of SMEs (Coaffee et al., 2011). Meanwhile, stadium disasters, including Heysel and Hillsborough in the 1980s, reaffirmed the relationship between sport and security.

Beyond the sporting sphere, the 9/11 attacks, the increased threat posed from transnational terrorism and subsequent preoccupation with ‘safety’ and ‘risk’ (Bauman, 2005; Mythen, 2014), assisted the processes that brought ‘security’ to the forefront of SME housing (Atkinson and Young, 2012; Clavel, 2013). More recent events have merely added to this. This includes the 7/7 bombings in London, less than 24 hours after the city won the rights to host the 2012 Olympics, the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing and the attacks outside *Stade de France* in 2015 (Coaffee and Wood, 2006; Spaaij, 2016; Cleland and Cashmore, 2018).¹² Importantly, Giulianotti and Klauser (2010) suggest that, as a consequence of 9/11 and the subsequent global and US-led ‘war on terror’, the most dominant area of SME expansion with regards to costs and personnel has been the area related to security and risk-management. Predominantly, this argument may be observed through the ballooning of security budgets for post-9/11 SMEs as compared to SMEs in a pre-9/11 world.

This also reaffirms the social significance of the SME-security nexus. Generally, after 9/11, security policies became increasingly precautionary and pre-emptive of nature (Coaffee and Wood, 2006). The terrorism threat posed to SMEs, and the need to respond to this threat efficiently, sufficiently and appropriately meant that the involved costs and personnel of SME security operations increased drastically (Coaffee et al.,

¹¹ For an all-inclusive table of Olympic-related threats and responses (1972-2016), consult Fussey et al. (2011: 70-76).

¹² This attack took place outside the stadium while France played Germany in a friendly game, 13 November 2015, as a part of a series of coordinated attacks in the French capital that day.

2011). To reiterate an oft-employed example of this, the security budget for ‘Sydney 2000’, the last Summer Olympics before 9/11, was in the region of US\$179 million (Sugden, 2012: 419). Four years later, US\$1.5 billion was allocated security expenditures for the 2004 Athens Summer Olympics. Meanwhile, the 2012 London Olympics’ expenditures reportedly reached US\$1.9 billion (Giulianotti, 2013). Then, to contextualize the expansion of involved personnel, the number of security staff in Munich 1972 was 2,130, whereas in Athens (2004) 41,000 people were involved in maintaining security (Toohey and Taylor, 2008: 463).

These numbers reinforce the significance of mega-event security operations and, straightforwardly, Giulianotti (2013: 96) submits that ‘such enormous expenditure is in itself worthy of close examination’. Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, security budgets continuously increased apace and available figures hold that the 2018 Russia World Cup, which was the last men’s football mega-event to take place before Euro 2020, had an estimated 31 billion RUB allocated security (Müller, 2017: 1117). Now, security practices and measures at post-9/11 SMEs have become standardized (Galily et al., 2015; Coaffee and Fussey, 2010; Yu et al., 2009). The heightened security focus – and extraordinary measures taken – are not only event-specific, although the objective levels of risk vary from event to event due to host nations’ (or cities’) distinctive geopolitical, social or cultural attributes and dynamics (Wong and Chadwick, 2017; Cornelissen, 2011). With such enhanced ‘security’ focus, a prerequisite for being awarded mega-event hosting rights is therefore to be capable of guaranteeing and ensuring maximum ‘safety’ for all event participants (Clavel, 2013; see Chapter Four).

In scale, security operations related to SMEs have been described as warfare like undertakings. Yu et al. (2009) argue that the 2008 Olympics in Beijing was the largest peacetime security operation in history. Four years prior, a similar phrase was employed to describe ‘security’ at the Athens Olympics (Wilson, 2004, cited in Toohey and Taylor, 2008). Anecdotally, it has been maintained that wars have been waged with less planning and coordination than some mega-events (Ryan, 2002, cited in Boyle and Haggerty, 2012). Such descriptions are important and illuminate SME security operations’ immensity in contemporary societies. Every mega-event now reveals a total security effort (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011) where the planning and deployment resemble of modern warfare with new security strategies, infrastructures,

surveillance technologies and policing efforts (Armstrong et al., 2017; Cleland, 2019; Whelan, 2014; Sugden, 2012; Lauss and Szigetvari, 2010; Coaffee et al., 2011). The assemblages of security ultimately demonstrate the increasingly blurry distinctions between civilian-military, war-law enforcement and internal-external security relations (Klauser, 2017). Somewhat paradoxically, all this occurs amid local residents' everyday lives, within public spaces and urban areas (Klauser, 2012) that are converted into concealed lockdown zones and 'surveillant assemblages' (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) centred on social and crowd control.

Boyle and Haggerty (2009) argue that every host city attempts to, and is expected to emulate and/or excel its predecessors by creating 'spectacular security' and creating a subjective sense of 'security' that, simultaneously, facilitates fertile conditions for consumption. Further, organizers, authorities and security agencies must make precautionary efforts to account for the most 'unthinkable' scenarios. This feeds into a '*security spectacle*' which exhibits spectacular images of preparedness (ibid.). However, despite this emphasis on an exhibition of 'spectacular' or 'total security', it is also crucial that increased securitization of SMEs, ideally, does not obstruct the spirit of the sporting events and actions (Coaffee et al., 2011; Boyle and Haggerty, 2009). Fundamentally, 'the show' must be allowed to *go on*.

Hence, organizers conveying spectacular images of 'security' also have incentive to keep 'security' as invisible and discreet as possible, to avoid that extensive perceptions of fear and insecurity are created through overt and powerful displays of 'security' or deployed militarized tools (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009; Clavel, 2013; Coaffee et al., 2009). More broadly, this connects with one of Zedner's (2003a: 163) security paradoxes, namely that '[s]ecurity promises reassurance but increases anxieties'. Zedner notes that, ironically, by providing visible reminders of the risks that have been secured against, insecurity levels may actually be exacerbated. Buzan (1991: 37) describes this as self-destructive efforts to achieve security. A recent example of this involves the security operation before the 2016 Olympics in Rio, Brazil, which relied heavily upon military forces to counter insecurities and contributed to increased violence in the securitized urban areas (Azzi, 2017). As such, SME 'security' should both ideally and, somewhat idyllically, be appropriately balanced between being spectacular, and simultaneously, not *too* spectacular (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009).

Having observed the expansion of security governance at SMEs, Giulianotti and Klauser (2010) set out a research agenda with emerging issues and potential social scientific theoretical approaches compatible with the study of SME security.¹³ In addition, three types of risk categories are broken down. These, by no means an all-encompassing list of the potential risks and hazards present at SMEs, are (i) terrorism, (ii) spectator and political violence, and lastly (iii) poverty, social division and urban crime (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010). Historically, these represent the most prominent mega-event threats. Yet, as South Korea's Pyongyang Winter Olympics in 2018 served as a reminder of, state or cyber conflict can also threaten an event's 'security' (Rowe, 2019).

Besides, threats to SMEs must be viewed in context of the mass crowds they attract. Crowds may be targeted by terrorists (Coaffee et al., 2009), criminals, affected by supporter violence or fan and law enforcement clashes (Millward, 2009a). Contemporary SMEs attract thousands of fans, with and without stadium tickets. Commonly, fans without match tickets congregate to watch matches, consume and socialize in erected fan zones (Millward, 2009a; Kolyperas and Sparks, 2018; Hageman, 2010).¹⁴ Fan zones, again, may be site for chaos or clashes (Millward, 2009a) and have become important entrance points for the empirical examinations of 'security' at contemporary mega-events (Klauser, 2011a) since they represent one joint in the wider SME security strategy. In fan zones, attendees are 'governed by fun' through activities, consumption and monitoring that collectively allow for containment and choreographed crowd control (Lauss and Szigetvari, 2010).

This, again, illuminates the important links between 'security', control and consumption. As Giulianotti and Klauser (2010) argue, there is a need for examinations of how 'security' and its related policies inter-connect with mega-events' commodification processes. This relates to how consumption hubs like fan zones are 'secured' (Klauser, 2017) and how 'security' practices and policies serve to assist the construction of conditions where consumption practices can thrive (McGillivray et al., 2019). The political economy and neoliberal rationalities inherent to SMEs emphasize creation of spectacles and aesthetic environments (Silk, 2014),

¹³ The outlined theories include (i) *security field* – inspired by from Bourdieusian theory, (ii) *critical urban geographical theory* and (iii) a Beck inspired *risk theory*.

¹⁴ Studies occasionally refer to fan zones as public viewing areas, fan parks or fan fests.

and scholars find reinforcing links between security practices and event owners' or commercial partners' aspirations to maximise profits from events (Eick, 2011a, 2011b; Eisenhauer et al., 2014; Klauser, 2008).

The need to 'secure' is ostensible and bound to aesthetic desires. Yet, essentially, the ways through which SMEs are 'secured' reflect trends in the wider society. Drawing from Debord's (1977) *Society of Spectacle*, Boyle and Haggerty (2009) argue that SME's spectacular security practices are shaped by external security and surveillance dynamics. Hence, a mega-event represents an *entrée* or a window for contemporary analyses of 'security', 'security governance' and analyses of mega-event securitization 'offer important lessons about local and global processes' (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009: 271). Reinforcing this perspective, Tsoukala (2016) holds that security practices at SMEs cannot be disassociated from the broader security contexts in modern risk societies.

More broadly, one pronounced way through which these arguments can be demonstrated is the shifting modes of security assessments to counter transnational terrorism threats. These are identifiable in a post-9/11 world (Mythen and Walklate, 2008) and embedded in mega-event securitizations (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012; Cleland, 2019). Accordingly, risk assessments taken under conditions of uncertainty are guided by the question 'what if?', instead of 'what was?', or 'what is?' (Mythen and Walklate, 2008). Drawing upon Beck (1992), Mythen and Walklate (2008: 234, emphasis added) write that:

This climate of not knowing enough – and, moreover, knowing about not knowing enough – has had a visible impact on the authority of security institutions. So far as regulating terrorism is concerned, there has been a palpable shift towards futurity in practices of risk analysis and the language of governance [...] The new calculus [of risk] does not assess the future by focusing on the past [...] *Instead, security assessments are direct by the question: 'What if?'*

This again 'translates into policies that *actively* seek to prevent situations from becoming catastrophic at some indefinite point in the future' (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 105, original emphasis). Transferred into the realm of SMEs, this means that SME security assessments are increasingly moulded by such precautionary thinking which influences the ways mega-event planners and security agencies 'secure' (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009). A result of this is the 'continuous reiteration in official circles

that security planners must “think outside the box” (ibid.: 260) when dealing with a number of unknowns. This, again, reinforces how ‘security’ at SMEs operates in tandem with – and not in isolation from wider ‘security’ contexts, assessments and fields.

This analytical relation remains vital to this thesis, which not only anchors itself in these perspectives but, similarly, utilizes a SME as a portal to enhance the understanding of ‘security’ more broadly. The fact that security operations and assemblages at modern SMEs are being frequently portrayed as ‘quasi-war’ operations (paradoxically) occurring in peacetime and involving clusters of international agencies and actors (Boyle, 2011), underpins the logic and strengths of employing a SME as a site of analysis for conceptually or empirically exploring security practices, meanings and ‘security’ more generally in the present-day world.

To be clear, the importance of a continued study of the mega-event and ‘security’ relationship is unequivocally agreed-upon. Though, for years it was a neglected relationship. In 2008, Toohey and Taylor (2008: 453) described that the lack of conducted and published research on ‘terrorism’ and SMEs as ‘surprising’. Following some pioneering scholarship, the field grew (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010, 2011, 2012; Boyle and Haggerty, 2009; Cleland, 2019; Cleland and Cashmore, 2018). Predominantly, however, ‘security governance’ in relation to ‘terrorism’ has been in focus. Moreover, case studies are mainly related to the Olympics and to a lesser extent the World Cup or ‘Euros’. To be sure, it should still be clear that ‘Olympic security’ has received less academic examination compared to other elements of the Olympics (Spaaij, 2016). Regardless, the study of mega-event securitization still presents new avenues for critical examination (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010).

Not uncommonly, research often addresses Olympic-related (counter-)terrorism and this relationship is often studied from ‘afar’ and/or media-focused (Spaaij, 2016; Spaaij and Hamm, 2015). Whilst representing important studies, these also illuminate the manifold of largely untouched avenues that exist, which researchers could examine to – as called for – broaden and widen the scope of the critical mega-event securitization project (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010, 2011, 2012; Hassan, 2014, 2016). For example, by referring back to Giulianotti and Klauser’s (2010) risk

categories, there is undoubtedly scope for an enhanced focus on spectator violence,¹⁵ poverty, crime and social division and how these are instrumental in an event's securitization.

With the Olympic-terrorism pair largely covered, it has been argued that 'critical social scientific analysis needs to move beyond common-sense reporting of such [terrorism] incidents' (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2012: 312). In that sense, it is argued here that more holistic analyses of SME 'security' are needed; especially as new threats emerge (Cleland and Cashmore, 2018; Parnell et al., 2020). Concurrently, this feeds into the argument for examining SMEs not confined solely to the Olympics or the World Cup (Müller, 2015) and Giulianotti and Klauser's (2010) more general research agenda in which social researchers were urged to critically unpack and investigate the diverse effects of SME securitization. SMEs are not securitized solely to account for or preempt 'real' or 'perceived' terrorism threats, because the securing of SME spaces and the associated social ramifications relate to a series of 'security threats' and aims.

This should be seen in light of mega-events 'macro-securitized' nature, wherein different securitizations are bundled together (Buzan and Wæver, 2009) and collectively addressed in the name of 'security' (Divišová, 2019). For example, 'hooligans' or a host city's crime rates can contribute vastly to a SME's macro-securitized milieu (Wong and Chadwick, 2017). However, studies approaching 'crime' and 'hooliganism' as 'security threats' are limited compared to those studies focused on 'Olympic terrorism'. The preoccupation with 'terrorism' in relevant scholarship is unsurprising. Arguably, 'terrorism' is a threat that can cause largest emotional and physical harm, and 'terrorism' concerns are usually fuelled by the media's catastrophe forecasting coverage of potential 'terrorism' (Atkinson and Young, 2012). According to Galily et al.'s (2015) outlook, it remains inevitable that the 'terrorism' risks at SMEs will continue and perhaps increase as the world's interconnectedness grows.¹⁶ Notwithstanding, the preoccupation with 'terrorism' in

¹⁵ Indeed, studies on 'hooliganism' exist in large numbers. It is even argued that 'hooliganism' has been 'over-researched' (Marsh et al., 1996: 1). What I argue, is that there is more scope for exploring how 'hooliganism' impacts mega-event securitizations. Existing studies on 'hooliganism' predominantly pursue a theoretical explanation of 'hooliganism', describe 'hooligan culture' from 'inside' or the policing of 'hooligans' in domestic leagues or international tournaments. For studies on 'hooliganism', see Giulianotti (1995a), Armstrong (1998), Dunning (2000), Spaaij (2006) and Stott and Pearson (2007).

¹⁶ Importantly, based on number of attacks, SMEs are still relatively safe with regards to terrorism (Spaaij, 2016; Taylor and Toohey, 2015). Spaaij (2016) employs the Global Terrorism Database and

existing scholarship translates into substantial research gaps to fill concerning other ‘security threats’.

Jennings and Lodge (2011: 199) point out that international football mega-events are more associated with issues of public disorder, violence and ‘hooliganism’. More so than terrorism, which remains a larger threat at Olympic Games (ibid.). Potential and actual transgressive behaviour by fans, historically and presently, is constructed as a social threat requiring extra punishments, wide-reaching surveillance and expansion of legal powers (Spaaij, 2013: 167). In other words, it is securitized (Buzan et al., 1998). However, limited research deals with how, exactly, this contributes to or impacts event’s (macro-)securitized, although ‘hooliganism’ is often anticipated before SMEs (Wong and Chadwick, 2017).¹⁷

Essentially, mega-event securitization is a multifaceted phenomenon. And, as this chapter argues based on the existing research, there is scope for a more inclusive and holistic analysis of the components that are ‘bundled together’. This is compatible with mentioned directions for researchers (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010, 2012; Yu et al., 2009; Cleland and Cashmore, 2018) and would allow for progressively understanding the wider social implications of SME securitization in both contemporary societies and sporting contexts. As Yu et al. (2009: 392) argued:

Despite the growing importance of security issues at SMEs, very few academic works have provided critical accounts of the wider social implications of the massive security efforts surrounding SMEs (ibid.: 392).

Arguably, to fully understand these ‘wider social implications’, it is necessary to engage with the wider spectrum of expected and unexpected ‘security threats’. Subsequently, this permits even more holistic and diverse analyses of SME ‘security’.

Consequently, this argument and the reviewed literature illuminate the observable research gaps. These undeniably serve to reinforce the argument sustaining that mega-events presents new fields for a critical study of ‘security’ (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010). First, it becomes evident that researchers should commit to holistic analyses of

finds 22 cases of Olympic-related terrorism. This paradox is elaborated when ‘security’ is unpacked later.

¹⁷ Episodes of ‘hooliganism’ were for instance apparent at Euro 2000, 2012 and 2016, the 2006 World Cup. They were highly anticipated before the 2018 World Cup (Lee Ludvigsen, 2018). Ahead of the South Africa (2010) and Brazil (2014) World Cups, concerns over urban crime were predominantly articulated pre-event.

event-specific ‘security’ and seek to empirically examine the processes that assist the construction of ‘security’ and the far-reaching and (in)direct effects caused by the securitization of multiple threats, populations and behaviours. This involves ‘terrorism’, but also ‘crime’, ‘violence’ and diseases, which represent ‘threats’ in the mega-event landscapes and fundamentally require (or are used as justification for) the large volumes of planning, resources and capital invested into security efforts. Secondly – and inter-connectedly – in order to fill lacunas in the literature, it is required to increasingly examine the *social implications* of the enormous security operations that take place in the name of a mega-event. As will be returned to, this relates to the social meanings of ‘security’ and ‘whom’ (or ‘what’) ‘security’ practices or policies includes or excludes. Moreover, some of the impacts of SME security operations include what is commonly referred to as ‘security legacies’ and ‘security networks’. These concepts must be seen in context of the globalization of security and security-related knowledge (Bauman, 2005; Bigo, 2008; Tsoukala, 2009) and presently represent integral components in the bidding and housing phases of mega-events. Hence, they are necessary to give some examination.

2.3.1 Security Legacies

Historically and presently, mega-events have been staged (and pursued) for their anticipated, significant socio-economic impacts, and for leaving a ‘positive legacy’ on their host countries/cities after the event’s duration (Roche, 2017; Hall, 2006). ‘Sport mega-events are never only about sports’, Kowalska (2017: 81) rightfully highlights. Early, ‘narrowly economic and functionalist’ (Roche, 1992: 564) mega-event research was typically evaluations or measurements of ‘impacts’ and ‘legacies’ in post-event local economies and tourism (ibid.). This has continued however not limited to functionalist approaches, whereas researchers increasingly has started to embrace ‘legacies’ associated with brand image, health and sport participation (Gold and Gold, 2011; Weed et al., 2015).

Mega-event legacies’ common denominator is that they are intended to (in)directly benefit host cities/regions and citizens beyond a mega-event’s transient lifespan (Eisenhauer et al., 2014). ‘Legacies’ are planned, unplanned, diverse and operate on several scales simultaneously (Preuss, 2007). They can be economic, infrastructural, symbolic or related to ‘security’ (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011). Indeed, security practices have both immediate and long-term implications (Crawford and Hutchinson,

2016) and ‘security legacies’ have recently surfaced as a key concept. It refers to those *lasting* impacts of SME security strategies, technologies and practices beyond a mega-event’s duration (Giulianotti, 2013; Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010).

Pre-event discourses emphasizing ‘positive legacies’ commonly contribute greatly to the justification of security investments at events (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011; Cashman, 2005). Given security concerns’ central role in the bidding and housing phases of SMEs, promises of leaving a significant, positive ‘security legacy’ have become oft-emphasized and a key commitment from hosts and local authorities (Giulianotti, 2013; Coaffee et al., 2011). After 9/11, global and provincial cities have increasingly attempted to build resilience against terrorist threats (Coaffee and Wood, 2006). Mirroring this, SMEs are also expected to exhibit considerable anti-terror resilience before global audiences’ watchful eyes (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009). SME hosts invest significant amounts of capital in order to transmit images of ‘order’ and ‘security’. Yet, hosts are well aware that SMEs in themselves are short-term spectacles. Thus, long-term ‘advantages’ in form of ‘security legacies’ are pursued by event planners and local authorities, as SMEs become catalysts for upgrading elements of cities’ security and surveillance infrastructures or systems (ibid.).

Usually, this relates to the introduction of new, utilitarian and long-lasting technologies (Clavel, 2013; Coaffee et al., 2011; Toohey and Taylor, 2012) or the piloting of certain technologies or systems throughout the event, before they (potentially) are installed elsewhere in the public domain (Giulianotti, 2013). Historically, traces of such practices can be observed inside English football stadia which, during the 1980s, were used as testing grounds for Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) and other surveillance systems (Giulianotti, 1999). Now, SMEs facilitate, accelerate or involve the implementation or increased deployment of monitoring tools (Fussey et al., 2011; Samatas, 2007). Samatas (2007) critically observes this in light of the 2004 Athens Olympics, which involved a rapid increase of CCTV in public space. Like Coleman and Sim (2000) and Norris and Armstrong (1999), who consider CCTV to make public space increasingly exclusionary, Samatas conclusions are

pessimistic concerning this event's surveillance technologies, as he optimistically argues for a purified and surveillance-free Olympics.¹⁸

However, 'security legacies' must not be conflated with surveillance or technology hardware. 'Security legacies' represent one way through which the exceptionalism of SME securitization is carved into the 'routine' and 'everyday life of cities' (Kitchen and Rygiel, 2014: 202). In terms of typologies, Fussey et al. (2012) highlight that 'security legacies' can be conceptual, technological or physical. Meanwhile, Giulianotti and Klauser (2010) identify six 'security legacies' that regularly remain post-event. These 'types' are (i) security technologies, (ii) new security practices, (iii) governmental policies and new legislations, (iv) externally imposed social transformations, (v) generalized changes in social and trans-societal relationships and finally, (vi) urban redevelopment with connections or consequences for SME securitizations (i.e. slum clearance) (ibid.: 54). Nonetheless, it is argued that the first type, technologies, has been the most obvious post-event 'security legacy', whilst demonstrating a tool *during* events and a legacy (ibid.).

Building upon his previous work (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010), Giulianotti (2013) revisited 'security legacies'. This time, he again outlined six characteristic security legacies reminiscing those from his past work. Here, however, breaks them down in more detail. The designated 'legacies' are: (i) new technologies, (ii) strategic partnerships, (iii) knowledge and expertise, (iv) economic aspects, (v) legislation and policing and lastly (vi) public effects. With the exception of strategic partnerships and knowledge and expertise, two legacies that will be discussed further in the next section, the other 'legacies' are now unpacked.

Giulianotti (2013) first notices how *new technologies*, as mentioned, often are introduced and implemented at SMEs. Technologies also tend to remain intact and operational after the event. As an example of new technologies, it is remarked how Dehli, ahead of the Commonwealth Games in 2010, installed 2,000 new CCTV cameras in the city. Further, Germany's 2006 World Cup demonstrates the first time the country deployed CCTV cameras with face-recognition software (ibid.: 96). In terms of *economic aspects*, Giulianotti identifies SME security's potential economic

¹⁸ Though, as Samatas (2007: 235) acknowledges, the primitive Olympic model he envisages: free for surveillance, doping, commercialization, professional athletes and corruption – based on the ancient Greek model – is an idealist utopian model.

benefits. Here, it is pointed out how security legacies can mean sustainment – or even expansion – of local and national security businesses, combined with a boost in security-related employment (ibid.: 98).

‘Security legacies’ speaking to *policing* and *legislation* include new policing strategies and legislation that may prolong beyond the event. This involves additional legal restrictions addressing individual activities – that under normal circumstances would not be criminalized – as well as the protection of event sponsors (ibid.: 99). In the longer-term, such measures may actually be counter-productive and generate insecurities.¹⁹ Further, tensions between ‘security legacies’ and democratic principles and human rights may surface (Samatas, 2007; Spaaij, 2016). Giulianotti (2013) recounts one episode from the 2006 World Cup in Germany where more than 1,000 Dutch fans were told to remove their trousers upon arrival at the stadium, simply because their trousers featured the logo of the Dutch brewery, Bavaria, which was not an official World Cup sponsor.²⁰ The episode represents a practical example of how SME ‘security’, either through precautionary policies, or ‘legacies’ are intertwined with processes of commodification (Giulianotti, 2011). Thus, commercially and aesthetically pleasing spaces, or conditions facilitating this, are assisted by security-related policies and/or practices like the prohibition of items, products or services similar to those of official sponsor/partners (Hagemann, 2010).

Finally, the *public effects* Giulianotti (2013) highlights relate to the public’s understanding of ‘security issues’. He argues that since the public experience a period of heightened ‘security’, this impacts their ‘understanding of security issues and provisions’ (ibid.: 101). These experiences may not only generate acceptance for future security measures exceeding the ‘norm’, but can have a deterrent effect on urban crime, Giulianotti writes, employing South Africa’s reduction in urban crime following the 2010 World Cup as an example (ibid.). Another example of this is also Australians’ general acceptance of increased surveillance and security measures in

¹⁹ Security *measures* and *policies* can influence spectators’ satisfaction and enjoyment of the game. Supporters seek ‘authentic’ experiences when attending live-games (Millward, 2011; Petersen-Wagner, 2015). These can be disrupted when – as Taylor and Toohey (2015) write – innocent practices (such as drums, Mexican waves, flags and banners) are forbidden in the name of ‘security’ or ‘safety’. An example of this is UEFA’s decision to ban ‘vuvuzelas’ at European games.

²⁰ For a longer account of this, see Eisenhauer et al. (2014). Writing on brand and sponsor protection in the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, they outline the securitization of sponsors as one ‘FIFA-ization’ strategy.

relation to the 2000 Olympics in Sydney (Toohey and Taylor, 2012). Further, the limited research on fan perceptions of ‘security’ in sports settings also suggests that security measures and presence is an accepted part of the event experience (see Cleland and Cashmore, 2018; Cleland, 2019; Lee Ludvigsen and Millward, 2020). However, some fan cultures resist securitization and heavy-handed policing in football (Numerato, 2018). Thus, SMEs can impact the public’s general understanding of ‘security’. Having unpacked the above ‘legacies’, it is clear that the six ‘security legacies’ have been under-explored in the sociology of SMEs.

Adding substantially to the study of ‘security legacies’, Coaffee et al. (2011) examine the ‘lamination’ of security practices and infrastructures ahead of London 2012. They argue that London’s Olympic security design was to be conserved post-event for legacy purposes, but also aimed to deter mundane criminal activities, including drug dealing, prostitution, joyriding and anti-social behaviour more broadly (see also Armstrong et al., 2017). The study also illuminates how the unique security measures for London 2012 and its security technologies added another layer to, and thereby *laminated* London’s already exceptional pre-existing security infrastructures. Even pre-2012, London had the status as the ‘most surveilled democratic city in the world’ (Fussey et al., 2011: 185). However, this did not prevent London 2012 from being a catalyst in regards to new surveillance technologies (Fussey et al., 2011; Armstrong et al., 2017). Yet, even before 9/11, the Olympics generated ‘security legacies’. Concerning Sydney’s 2000 Olympics, Toohey and Taylor (2012) argue the Games produced ‘security legacies’ related to new legislation and surveillance. Both were implemented low-key and justified through public discourses assisting the manufacturing of consent (Herman and Chomsky, 1998).

Not exclusively a post-9/11 concept, a ‘security legacy’ can be understood as an ‘innovative element of securitization’ (Coaffee et al., 2011: 3323) that has become increasingly relevant in line with the solidification of post-9/11 SME security concerns. Yet, limited academic debates have taken place around ‘security legacies’ (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010). Indeed, post-event legacies generally are inherently difficult to measure and deem (in-)effective (Preuss, 2007; Langen and Garcia, 2009). Not merely because there is no consensus with regards to what a ‘legacy’ involves, nor how it should be defined (Preuss, 2007). But importantly, the term ‘legacy’ is often ‘elusive, problematic and even a dangerous word’, given the automatic assumptions

holding that ‘legacies’ are always positive when promoted by organizing committees (Cashman, 2005: 15). Furthermore, the term’s positive connotations have preserved despite critical voices highlighting various negative ‘legacies’ (Talbot, 2019)

In most post-event evaluations ‘security legacies’ tend to ‘fly under the radar’ (Giulianotti, 2013: 101), and arguably, this represents an ‘area where there is a need for rigorous sociological research’ (Giulianotti and Brownwell, 2012: 212). Unquestionably, other mega-event ‘legacies’ have been dedicated more scholarly attention and, upon proceeding, ‘security legacies’ will work as an important conceptual relation. Essentially, ‘security legacies’ can assist the understanding of relationships between new technologies, security policies and social environments. The concept is also useful in order to better understand if the social costs of SME securitizations and surveillance – like the Dutch fans’ ‘ambush marketing’ episode – are ‘worth it’ (Fussey et al., 2011: 209), or if this rather amplifies insecurities. ‘Security legacies’, as a domain requiring more examination, is underscored by existing studies (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009; Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010). Particularly concerning how exactly ‘legacies’ intertwine with commercial desires and, moreover, how ‘legacies’ feed into strategic partnerships and notions of ‘knowledge’ and ‘expertise’ as discussed next.

2.3.2 Security Networks, Knowledge and Lesson-Drawing

The concept of ‘security networks’ revolves around relationships and nodes based on expertise, knowledge and the use of networks of security actors/agencies for the securing of spaces or objects. ‘Security networks’ can therefore be analytically approached as closely related to Bigo’s (2000, 2006) ideas of the globalization of ‘(in)security’ and policing networks, and the public policy concepts of ‘lesson-drawing’ and ‘policy transfer’ (Rose, 1991; Boyle, 2011; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). These explain or are concerned with how *past* knowledge and policies are drawn upon in *new* temporal and spatial settings.

Dupont (2006) observes an increased use of the concept of ‘networks’ in the social sciences. In a mega-event context, ‘security networks’ have now become increasingly prominent and conceptually utilized (Whelan, 2014, 2016). Ultimately, these are networks devised to establish or strengthen ties and nodes between security agencies

involved in mega-event security governance. Importantly, these represent transnational networks which ‘transcend borders, time, and space’ (Zedner, 2009: 62).

Boyle (2011: 170) employs the term ‘security *knowledge* networks’, and defines these as the:

[D]ense but shifting linkages between these various actors collectively [...] which not only facilitate the movement of event-specific security expertise between geographically and temporally distant locales, but also serve as key channels through which contemporary security rationalities and technologies are consolidated and disseminated globally

Reflecting the involvement of multiple agencies in security management more broadly (Zedner, 2009; Bigo, 2000), the actors involved in the planning and delivering ‘security’ at SMEs now include law enforcement bodies at state and local level, public safety and intelligence agencies, international sports federations and bodies, international governance organizations, security consultants, think tanks, technology firms and logistic firms (Boyle, 2011). Additionally, on a European level, independent supporter networks have increasingly become involved in pre-event security and policing matters and the general event organization (FSE, 2019; Cleland et al., 2018; Numerato, 2018).

The rise of ‘security networks’ in the mega-event field can be seen in light of Munich (1972) and 9/11. These watershed moments resulted in SME’s organizational complexity increasing in scale and sophistication (Toohey and Taylor, 2008). Learning from past failures and successes, whilst enacting and enhancing transnational collaboration between security agencies have since become central to SME security operations and ‘one-off’ football matches (Spaij, 2013; Tsoukala, 2009). Consequently, SMEs represent platforms where relationships are established on local, national and international levels (Giulianotti, 2013) and where intelligence, security information and know-how increasingly are shared between security stakeholders (Taylor and Toohey, 2015). Demonstrating this, the London Olympics had up to 40,000 security actors representing a range of agencies (Whelan, 2014: 397).

‘Security networks’ can be pinpointed as one of the mentioned ‘security legacies’ speaking to strategic partnerships, knowledge and expertise (Giulianotti, 2013), because the practices, habits and networks which SMEs foster are not time or space specific (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009). Essentially, these networks are likely to remain

post-event, and to be re-activated for future SMEs for the consultation and briefing of future hosts and organizers (Klauser, 2011a; Boyle et al., 2015). This validates the understanding of ‘knowledge’ and ‘networks’ as distinctive and long-term legacies.

‘Security networks’ must also be understood in light of broader trends, and the ‘ways in which national police systems are structured in differentiated networks’ (Bigo, 2008: 19). Further, the increasingly multiplex nature of SME’s security operations means that the state’s monopoly with regards to providing ‘security’ has diminished. Security expertise is now globalized (Boyle, 2011), and as evident in other domains of present-day societies (Zedner, 2009; Petersohn, 2018), private security actors at SMEs are given greater responsibilities (Houlihan and Giulianotti, 2012) around ‘the authorization and delivery of security’ (Dupont, 2006: 168).

In order to fully understand ideas of transnational networks based on security knowledge, the conceptual tools provided by Bigo (2000, 2006) and Tsoukala (2007, 2009) are useful. Both the scholars are associated with the strand of critical studies of ‘security’ referred to as the Paris School. Drawing upon Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘habitus’ and ‘field’, Bigo draws attention to the discourses and constructions of security as evident through security practices (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Bigo (2002) is concerned with the social relations between security professionals and observes that globalized ‘(in)security’ has led to the rise of experts in the security fields: the ‘managers of unease’. These are positioned to classify threats and determine what ‘security’ *is* (Bigo, 2008). Crucially, Bigo highlights how the traditional distinctions between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security have become increasingly blurred and hard to detect following the Cold War. This was amplified by 9/11 and changes meant that in the creation of ‘security’, *external* security agencies (the army, intelligence agencies) and *internal* security agencies (police, customs) became preoccupied with the same threats and increasingly entangled in the similar ‘security fields’ with a set of deterritorialized tasks. Therefore, the ‘field of the professionals of (in)security functions like a Möbius strip’ since the actors’ outside-inside positions are flexible (Case Collective, 2006: 459).

Bigo (2000) also highlights how the transfer of security-focused knowledge occurs between the ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’ with ‘security knowledge’ developed in one place being applied to elsewhere in the world. In this era of transnational threats, Tsoukala

(2009) employs some of Bigo's ideas of blurred 'internal' and 'external' security to the European efforts to 'secure' football from 'terrorists' and particularly 'hooligans'. The broader 'convergence of the internal and external security realms', she writes, 'has found itself a regular field of application in major sporting events' that not only require national militaries, but also transnational forces, like NATO (Tsoukala, 2009: 123). In part, this verifies the functionality of the ideas around 'external' and 'internal' security in the study of SMEs.

Given the manifold of active actors around SME spaces, Clavel (2013: 76) argues that mega-events have become 'laboratories' for the testing of transnational collaborations:

To combat major security threats, new partnerships must be developed between security forces, and so the management of safety during major sports events is an expression of the growing cooperation between the police (national and international), the armed forces, intelligence services and all other stakeholders, public or private. Indeed, SMEs have become a laboratory for testing these new collaborations

Although it is important emphasize that teaching, learning and emulating are not unique to policing, security or mega-events (Boyle, 2011), such description mirrors the arguments sustaining that sports have served as a socio-spatial laboratory for the piloting of new security systems (Armstrong and Giulianotti, 1998, Giulianotti, 1999). Furthermore, the employment of knowledge and experiences from previous mega-events can be seen in context of the two aforementioned, but related concepts: 'lesson-drawing' (Rose, 1991) and 'policy-transfer' (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).

As Klauser (2012) highlights, the networks of expertise active within SME planning underpin how 'policy-transfer' and 'lesson-drawing' processes occur in order to reproduce or re-circulate security practices and policies between SMEs. Central to both 'policy-transfer' and 'lesson-drawing' processes are the 'intention to learn from others' experience' (James and Lodge, 2003: 183). For Rose (1991), there are five alternative ways of drawing upon 'lessons'. These include 'copying'; which refers to 'using practice elsewhere literally as blueprint', 'emulation'; which is adopts a particular programme, but also 'adapt for national circumstances' (p. 21). Moreover, 'hybridization' combines elements from two different places; 'synthesis' 'combines familiar events from programmes in effect in three or more places', and finally, 'inspiration' is used to refer to the deployment of other programs as an 'intellectual stimulus for developing a novel programme' (p. 22).

Lesson-drawing, knowledge exchange and information-sharing are now expected and formally required at contemporary SMEs for the purposes of ‘security’ and ‘safety’ (see Chapters Four and Five). This suggests the movement of expertise through networks. Though, as pre-existing research maintains, the coordination of ‘security networks’ can pose considerable challenges. Whilst coordinating ‘networks’ in routine operations *per se*, is highlighted as demanding (Whelan, 2014; Whelan and Molnar, 2017; Whelan, 2016), this becomes increasingly tricky in a SME setting, where hosts’ security performances are scrutinized by the public (Whelan, 2014). Inter-organizational tensions (Whelan and Molnar, 2017, 2018; Taylor and Toohey, 2015; Boyle et al., 2015), ‘struggle for space’ (Klauser, 2015) and actors’ aspirations to maximize their interest and position inside the network (Fussey, 2015) can add to this. Additionally, the forces present in mega-event landscapes occasionally hold different views and follow separate rules of engagements to suspicious behaviours (Fussey, 2015; Whelan and Molnar, 2018).

Concerning the question of how ‘networks’ work internally, some studies produce insight to this. Boyle (2011) examines networking activities before the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver and identifies three hierarchical and institutional networks including state institutional networks, transnational networks and non-state institutional networks (ibid.: 170-174). Crucially, Boyle notes how ‘organizational templates’ at state level were articulated, in addition to how ‘transnational networking activities’ took place occasionally prior to the 2010 Winter Olympics (ibid.). Meanwhile, Klauser (2011a) explores the transfer of ‘best practices’ of the fan zone exemplar from the Germany World Cup in 2006 to Euro 2008 in Switzerland/Austria.

Examining the transfer of security-focused knowledge and policies, Klauser finds that this involved exchanges that set up connections between security stakeholders from previous and forthcoming events. Activities, for the purpose knowledge exchange and for ensuring a high degree of internal cooperation, took place in form of conferences, workshops and gatherings (Klauser, 2011a) which formulated a ‘dynamic assemblage of individuals, ideas and things (handbooks, guidelines, legal documents, plans, etc.)’ (ibid.: 3216). However, while these studies provide invaluable insight, Whelan (2014) argues that limited empirical work examines the dynamics, organization and interplay within ‘security networks’.

Still, recent scholarship successfully produces accounts of how preparations and decision-making across ‘security networks’ play out (Boyle, 2011; Klauser, 2011a, 2017; Armstrong et al., 2017). Though, research gaps still exist, but an important point here is the access to necessary data and participants, which can surface as an obstacle due to the (often) clandestine nature of such networks; especially so, pre-event.²¹ This of course serves as a reminder that anyone researching ‘security’ will encounter a number of unusual methodological obstacles (Molotch, 2012; Eski, 2012).

The importance of studying ‘security networks’ and collaborative efforts to provide ‘security’, however, remains undisputed. As historically has been the case more broadly with so-called ‘intelligence failures’ (Dahl, 2005),²² Fussey and Coaffee (2012: 282) argue that:

[W]hen security problems have occurred at sporting mega-events, it is the coordination and communication components that have proved to be both crucial [and] the most common points of failure

Consequently, ‘security networks’ and knowledge exchanges must be understood as crucial components in the ‘success’ of any event’s security delivery. In this vein, it is plausible to argue that ‘networks’, similarly to and inter-connected with ‘security legacies’, warrant further inter-disciplinary examination. Indeed, there is still a pressing need to answer ‘the questions of how security policies circulate between mega-events [that] have been widely ignored so far’ (Klauser, 2011a: 3305). Importantly, answers to such questions can still be produced with limited or no ‘inside’ access to ‘security networks’ and their inner-workings (see Chapters Three and Four).

In this thesis’s context, the geographically and culturally extraordinary Euro 2020 raised a host of important questions around the frequency of networking events, knowledge exchange conferences, the role of policy handbooks and guidelines, and the impact of cultural differences on how ‘security’ was approached. Interestingly, concerning the collaborations between German, Swiss and Austrian security officials (between 2006 and 2008), it was argued that links and communication were particularly strong because of the countries’ closeness geographically, culturally and

²¹ For example, evaluations or accounts of intelligence performances are inherently difficult for people outside the intelligence community. Details may be concealed behind thick curtains of secrecy (Kerr, 2008).

²² Admittedly, such term is contested. Though, ‘intelligence failure’ can refer to a ‘mismatch between estimates and what later information reveals to have been true’ (Jervis, 2006: 10)

linguistically (Klauser, 2011a: 3211). Klauser argues future research should investigate how ‘different cultural and linguistic contexts’ relate to and interact with each other (ibid.). Meanwhile, Taylor and Toohey (2015: 393) encourage researchers to examine ‘how different cultures may impact the expectations and approaches to managing security and safety issues’.

Indeed, ‘security’ and ‘safety’ represent two contested concepts (Bain, 2006). Within the transnational, fluid and diverse ‘security networks’, different nodes will possess different understandings, definitions and perceptions of security as derived from socio-cultural and occupational backgrounds. It may therefore be argued that a geographically and culturally exceptional SME like Euro 2020 – with its 12-country format – posed a unique case for the understanding of cultural influences on ‘security’ and, essentially, how processes of lesson-drawing and knowledge exchange contributed to ‘security’, as a concept that is critically unpacked next.

2.4 Critical Security Studies and Sports: Critically Unpacking

‘Security’ and ‘Safety’ Meanings

The sharpened focus on ‘security’ and ‘safety’ at SMEs is evident. Nonetheless, it remains important – and necessary – to ask what mega-events, their athletes, officials and attendees, are ‘secured’ from. And then, what ‘security’ and ‘safety’, more precisely, *mean* in this context. In unpacking this, this section takes a critical approach. In the existing literature, the underlying logic and rationales behind securitizing moves associated with SMEs are tackled. However, ‘very few have actually addressed [...] what to secure from’ (Whelan, 2014: 396). Attempts and efforts to secure spaces automatically instigate questions about what is being secured, and for which reasons (Barnard-Wills et al., 2012). Yet, these questions – and the meanings of ‘security’ are rarely asked nor critically examined in existing research. It is therefore timely and required to investigate closer whom or what SMEs are ‘secured from’ and ‘secured for’ in order to disaggregate the meanings of ‘security’ in a SME context.

Zedner (2009: 10) submits that ‘security is too big an idea to be constrained by the strictures of any single discipline’. Preoccupied with ‘security’, this thesis employs insights from theoretical perspectives in Security Studies that are rarely employed in

the study of global sports. It argues that adopting Critical Security Studies' (CSS)²³ approach to 'security' is compatible with the exploration of the above questions. Crucially, this allows for a deepened understanding of 'security'.²⁴ Broadly, critical security studies' (lower case) epistemological position is shared with that of critical criminology. It sees the state and economy as forces shaping social relations, and assembled security measures are *one* way of concretizing power (Loader and Walker, 2007).

Within this field, CSS (upper case) work within the tradition of Frankfurt School's Critical Theory and adopt a normative approach to the study of 'security' which equates 'security' with 'emancipation' (Floyd, 2007). This centrality of 'emancipation' borrows from the Frankfurt School's intellectual premises and its traditions speaking to 'social change' and 'resistance' (Aradau, 2004). CSS challenge and criticize the dominant ontological assumption in traditional, objectivist International Relations and Security Studies theories (i.e. classical or neo-realism), where the state figures as the referent object for 'security' (Browning and McDonald, 2011). CCS's critiques, however, are not simply voiced by pointing towards new or emerging threats to human survival because, by doing so, critical security studies will not 'in itself move security studies away from its traditional concerns' (Krause and Williams, 1997: 35).

Critical security studies, with its conceptualizations of 'security', have emerged as a distinctive alternative to orthodox, state-centric theories, and the lens maintaining that security studies should focus on the 'the threat, use and control of military force' (Walt, 1991: 212). Fundamentally, CSS are concerned with broadening, deepening and focusing security studies beyond this (Wyn Jones, 1999). By *broadening*, CSS seeks to go beyond the traditional view preoccupied with threat and military power as the only means to provide security. *Focusing*, refers to CSS's aspirations to promote emancipatory politics through theory and practices of security studies (Williams, 2005). *Deepening* shall be returned to. Moreover, CSS's agenda has revolved around four key tasks: (i) critique of traditional theories, (ii) exploring meanings and

²³ Sometimes referred to as the Welsh School or Aberystwyth School.

²⁴ It is crucial not to confuse CSS with 'css' (lower cases), which is the broader, critical subfield of Security Studies called 'critical security studies'. These share some similarities but do not equate. CSS (the 'Welsh School') fits within 'css', but the approaches of 'css' do not necessarily fit within CSS (Williams, 2005).

implications of critical theories, (iii) critically investigation of security issues, and (iv) to revise security in specific places (ibid.: 137).

Unlike the state-centric theories which CSS challenge, ‘security’ is observed through a lens where the individual is the referent object for ‘security’. Consequently, the state is a mean – rather than an end – to ‘security’ (Burke, 2007). Normatively, individuals (or groups of individuals) should be emancipated from their constraints to ensure ‘security’, as CSS define security *as* emancipation and maintain that the more ‘security’, the better (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010; Booth, 1991).²⁵ Such security-embracing view contrasts Copenhagen’s School’s negative view of ‘security’ (Buzan et al., 1998) and there are issues *vis-à-vis* where security ‘stops’ (Floyd, 2007: 333). Further, Booth provides no answers on what emancipation ‘looks like, apart from its meaning to particular people at particular times’ (Booth, 1997: 110, cited in Aradau, 2004). According to Zedner (2007: 272), CCS’s idea of ‘emancipation’ is loosely defined and generates new questions. However, she also argues that ‘it is a provocative idea’ that ‘invites consideration of the means by which people may seek their own security rather than having order foist upon them’ (ibid.). Burke (2007: 8) also questions the clarity around how ‘security’ is made possible yet characterizes CSS’s ambitions as ‘immense’.

Accordingly, it is only with reference to ‘real people’ security has any meaning (Williams, 2005: 141). Positioning the individual as *the* object of security, ‘provides the conceptual shift that allows these perspectives to take their place as central elements of any comprehensive understanding of security’ (Krause and Williams, 1997: 46). Such understanding of ‘security’, naturally, is consistent with how security studies, post-9/11, increasingly have ‘embraced notions of human security that place people, rather than the state, at the centre of security policy’ (Coaffee et al., 2009: 491).

Upon proceeding, it is a vital point, as Jarvis and Lister (2012) maintain, that CSS’s approach *can be* combined with more constructivist approaches to ‘security’, concerned with the social construction of ‘security’, which CSS indeed have criticised (Booth, 2007). This includes the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework (Chapter One). Accordingly, ‘it is both possible and desirable to combine these two

²⁵ This broadening of ‘security’s’ definition, however, has been criticised for making the concept ‘so elastic as to render it useless as an analytical tool’ (Ayoob, 1997: 121).

insights' (Jarvis and Lister, 2012: 162) which offer critical and alternative theories or conceptions of 'security', which this thesis ultimately seeks to explore. Conceptually synthesizing the two frameworks is also consistent with this study's purposes, concerning the micro-experiences, production and meanings of 'security'.

Hence, whilst securitization theory has been criticized for not sufficiently accounting for 'different levels of risk perception and fear among different type of audiences' (Meyer, 2009: 650), CSS's individual-centric reading of 'security' not only becomes complimentary, but underpins the strengths using the frameworks collectively. Although this thesis seeks to examine the wider meanings of 'security' as articulated by stakeholders and key organizations, the 'security' of the state cannot be completely eschewed nor downplayed. For example, an attack targeting a mega-event would represent an attack against attendees and stakeholders, but also the relevant state. Indeed, the state, within 'non-traditional' security theories 'still matters but is not privileged over other sectors of security' (Floyd, 2007: 334). Consequently, the frameworks of CSS and the Copenhagen School offer useful insights collectively, despite seldom being combined (*ibid.*).

Convincingly, Floyd (2007) argues for a bridge building between the two critical and potentially complimentary theories. However, not on ontological, but pragmatic grounds – as a challenge to traditional state centric security theories. Floyd highlights general commonalities between the two Schools. These include (i) reflection on the concept of security, (ii) concern with the issues with potential widening as contradictory and political, (iii) security as a practice and (iv) self-reflection (*ibid.*: 335). Remarkably, Copenhagen School's Buzan et al. (1998) in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, contend that their securitization theory, unlike CSS, has no 'emancipatory ideal' (p. 35). Nonetheless, the following claim suggests that CSS *is* complementary to their approach:

Such an approach [CSS] is therefore complementary to ours; it can do what we voluntarily abstain from, and we can do what it is unable to do: understand the mechanisms of securitization whilst keeping a distance from security (*ibid.*)

According to Floyd (2007) combining the two insights is not just desirable, but advantageous. Crucially, one key advantage that Floyd proposes includes 'that the more unified the critical schools of security are, the stronger an alternative they can

offer to the mainstream of security studies’ (p. 336). Whilst ‘security’ for CSS is regarded positive, Copenhagen School considers it negative – as a failure to deal with an issue with ‘normal politics’. Offering a more nuanced view, Floyd argues that securitization is issue-dependent and advocates a ‘consequentialist evaluation of security’ that focus on evaluating securitizations ‘in terms of their consequences’ (p. 349). There are also similarities between securitization theories and CSS within conversations on ‘politics’ as an act ‘privileging the marginalized [and] certain predefined identities (Gad and Petersen, 2011: 322). It is therefore evident that there are not only shared motivations, but compatibility between the two perspectives. Most importantly, in how they challenge traditional assumptions and meanings of ‘security’, as a term that is now unpacked further.

As a concept, ‘security’ remains highly contested and lacks one universally agreed-upon definition (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Famously, Baldwin (1997: 5) noted that ‘redefining “security” has recently become something of a cottage industry’. In existing literature, scholars define it as ‘the relative freedom from harmful threats’ (Mroz, 1980: 105). Others, as the ‘assurance of future well being’ (Martin, 1983: 12). As explained, ‘security’ can also be defined in terms of speech acts (Buzan et al., 1998) or as ‘emancipation’ (Booth, 1991). This encapsulates the concept’s contested nature. Yet, it also underpins that questions such as ‘security for whom?’ and ‘from what threats?’ are fundamental for an understanding of ‘security’ (Baldwin, 1997). And perhaps, ‘it is probably more accurate to describe the concept of security as insufficiently explicated than as essentially contested’ (ibid.: 24). As one example above demonstrates, and as Booth (2005: 21) notes, a typical dictionary definition of ‘security’ is ‘the absence of threats’. Transferring this to the realm of SMEs, ‘security’ can, for example, be the absence of ‘terrorists’, ‘hooligans’ or ‘criminals’. Not only is this unrealistic; it is unachievable.

For instance, a ‘terrorist’ threat can never be completely controlled, due to human behaviour’s unpredictability and inherent limitations of intelligence and counterterror strategies (Tsoukala, 2006; Betts, 1978).²⁶ Hence, *if* ‘security’ is the absence of ‘terrorist threats’, then true ‘security’ at a SME cannot be achieved. As Booth (1991)

²⁶ As famously argued by intelligence scholar Betts (1978: 88) concerning ‘intelligence failures’; ‘intelligence failures are not only inevitable, they are natural’. Partly because of human cognitive limitations and limits to intelligence estimates.

and other critical security scholars would agree, such vague definition of ‘security’ facilitates a plethora of follow-up questions. These questions are central for a critical approach of ‘security’. Further, such vague definition of ‘security’ is incompatible with CSS’s reading of ‘security’ as a ‘derivative concept’. In treating ‘security’ as a derivative concept, CSS scholars maintain that our view of ‘security’ is derived from:

Ways in which we see the world and the way we think politics work: what we think of the most important features of the world politics will influence what we think of as threats, what needs to be protected, and hence how we define security (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 22).

As a derivative concept, ‘security’s’ meanings vary. The concept’s meaning is subject to individuals’ deep-seated assumptions about political life. How one conceptualizes ‘security’ cannot be neutral. Moreover, to ‘be free’ or ‘feel free’ from threat depend on an individual’s understanding of world politics. Important distinctions should also be drawn between feeling and being ‘safe’. Hence, one may see that ‘security’ – as the ‘absence of threats’ – can reach no final meaning (Booth, 2005: 21). For CSS, aspiring to deepening the security agenda, imprecise definitions of ‘security’ generate questions that should be asked and answered.

Not too dissimilarly from Baldwin (1997), such questions include what threats one is seeking freedom from, and whom – or what – that threatens us (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010). In other words, one should ask (i) ‘whom’/‘what’ is being secured (ii) from ‘what’/‘which’ threat. From asking the first question, security’s referent object will be clear (McSweeney, 1999). And also, exactly ‘whom’ or ‘what’ that is being securitized as a threat to the referent object’s ‘safety’ must be engaged with, if aiming to critically unpack ‘security’ at contemporary SMEs. Here, it becomes apparent why, despite their differences, there is promise in combining the critical theories of CSS and the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework (Floyd, 2007). The former enables us to understand ‘security’ deeper with individuals as referent objects. The latter can give more accurate answers on exactly *who* securitizes; which issues and for whom (Buzan et al., 1998: 32) and ultimately, how.

Commonly, ‘hooligans’ or ‘terrorists’ are outlined as threats which SMEs require freedom from (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010). When critically approaching these labels by asking ‘what is a hooligan?’ or ‘terrorist’, obstacles are immediately encountered. Fundamentally, both concepts lack universally accepted definitions.

'Hooliganism' lacks a legal definition and a 'precise demarcation of membership', and is used as an umbrella-term to cover 'a variety of actions which take place in more or less directly football-related contexts' (Spaaij, 2007: 412). Likewise, Schmid (2004) outlines the difficulties reaching an adequate definition of 'terrorism'. He argues that 'terrorism' definitions 'generally tend to reflect the interests of those who do the defining' (Schmid, 2004: 384).

What this means, is that those actors SMEs ideally are to be 'freed' or 'secured' from can have a multitude of meanings. 'Terrorists' and 'hooligans' undeniably represent two actors that will generate public fear and be constructed as threats to public and social order (Poulton, 2005; Tsoukala, 2008) and spectators' 'safety' at SMEs. Indeed, Baudrillard (1993: 79) likens the two, arguing that 'hooligans' are 'no different from terrorists' in that their acts are instantly mediated to global audiences. Following the commitment to a deeper investigation into what we 'secure from' - it *is not* denied that 'hooligan' or 'terrorist' actions both exist and occur. What is crucial, however, is that questions are not solely confined to *what* the threats *are*. Critical attention should be devoted the wider socio-political contexts of the threats. Resultantly, such critical interrogation can assist the understanding of what 'security' ultimately is or means, whom 'security' is *for* or *against*, and the 'securing' efforts' effects.

2.4.1 Going Deeper: Dimensions of 'Security' and the Media's Role

The two adjectives, 'security' and 'safety', are related concepts but not identical (Bain, 2006).²⁷ While 'security' may induce measures that ultimately lead to public 'safety' and protection from dangers, 'safety' refers more to a condition where one is free from harms (ibid.). However, since the concepts are related, 'security' can also be used to indicate the objective state of being without or protected from threats. It can also be utilized to describe the subjective condition of freedom from anxiety, whilst it can refer to the means of or pursuit between these 'end states' (Zedner, 2003b: 154-158).

Notwithstanding, more 'security' does not automatically translate into more 'safety' (Buzan, 1991: 36). And as stated, 'security' can have a wide array of meanings and referent objects (Zedner, 2009). Moreover, actual and perceived 'safety' and 'security'

²⁷ For example, Hedley Bull, a central scholar in the English School of International Relations, used the terms 'security' and 'safety' interchangeably in his seminal *The Anarchical Society* (1977). Bull wrote that security is 'no more than safety: either objective safety, safety which actually exists, or subjective safety, that which is felt or experienced' (p. 18).

do not always correspond. For example, the extent to which one feels ‘secure’ or ‘at risk’ is ‘not precise, actuarial calculations premised on reliable data, but social and cognitive constructs assembled from a mix of experience’ (Loader, 1997: 381). By taking a critical approach to ‘security’, it must be accepted that individuals’ subjective and objective ‘safety’ and ‘security’ are shaped by a spectrum of factors.

Additionally, ‘security’ and ‘safety’ and perceptions of these, should be seen as occurring on different levels. For example, on an individual/personal level, if a spectator travels on their own, or on a collective level, if an attendee travels with others (Toohey and Taylor, 2008). Stevens and Vaughan-Williams (2017) employ mixed-methods and find that individuals prioritize ‘personal safety’ as the referent object for ‘security’. Yet, it can also be perceived at global, national and communal levels (Stevens and Vaughan-Williams, 2014) and it is not only the difference in *how* threatened an individual is, that matters, but ‘the level at which they perceive those threats’ (ibid.: 170). Moreover, threats or risks to one’s ‘safety’ or ‘security’ can be constructed (Tsoukala, 2009). This underpins the crucial demarcation between actual (objective) and perceived (subjective) ‘security’.

Both subjective and objective ‘security’ and ‘safety’ remain central here. Risks to our ‘safety’ must always be seen as risks within a knowledge relation that makes it impossible to separate the risk *per se* and the public perception of it (Beck, 1992). Beck (1992) discusses risks in relation to the management of insecurity and fears, and as Durdodie (2007: 9) argues, ‘perceptions of risks are as important– if not more so – than the actuality of risks we face, as perceptions often determine behaviour’. Thus, the degree to which mega-event stakeholders or attendees feel subjectively ‘safe’ and ‘secure’ has a regulating effect on their behaviour and decisions to attend, which is not solely related to the degree to which they objectively are ‘safe’.

In this vein, the mediation of ‘security threats’ should be viewed as important because it reinforces the need to ‘secure’ and the subjective perceptions of ‘(in)security’ before SMEs. Generally, the media plays a prominent role in framing social problems (Tsoukala, 2008; Stevens and Vaughan-Williams, 2014; Loader, 1997). And, when unpacking ‘security’ at SMEs, it is clear that media discourses are of high centrality. The media has the capacity to mould public perceptions of ‘safety’ and ‘security’ to a degree where they stop corresponding with social realities (Atkinson and Young,

2012) or ‘security’ on an objective level.²⁸ Occasionally, this enables contexts where ‘the perception of threat is a greater problem than the threat itself’ (Zedner, 2009: 23). The construction of a social problem *per se* may be as important as its ‘reality’. Especially, when the ‘power to construct lies [...] with one side’ (Pearson and Sale, 2011: 161). If seeking to critically understand ‘security’ at mega-events, the ways in which media framing and public discourses construct perceptions of ‘(in)security’ and risk associated with SMEs must be considered a key determiner behind perceptions and meanings of ‘security’ and preliminary efforts to ‘secure’.

However, mega-event threats are occasionally ‘real’. Objectively, attendees may very well be unsafe. Incidents of ‘terrorism’, ‘hooliganism’ and ‘crime’ have undoubtedly taken place at past SMEs (Cleland, 2019; Spaaij, 2013). Though, Spaaij (2016) tracks incidents of Olympic-terrorism and concludes that SMEs are ‘quite safe with regard to terrorism’ (p. 456). Similarly, Taylor and Toohey (2015: 379) underline that ‘there is a low risk of an actual terrorism incident occurring during an event’. Threats to SMEs, like elsewhere in societies, are characterized by a dual nature. They are sometimes real, since they materialize (illustrated by Munich, 1972 and *Stade de France*, 2015). They are also occasionally constructed or imagined, rather than ‘real’ (Atkinson and Young, 2012). Dangers arising from ‘hooligans’ or ‘terrorists’, as stated, are never completely non-existent. However, they must be placed in context. Although mega-events’ hyper-securitized climates perhaps suggest otherwise, ‘hooliganism’ mostly takes place as isolated incidents, whereas ‘terrorism’, fortunately, seldom materialize at SMEs (Spaaij, 2016).

Atkinson and Young (2012) extend Baudrillard’s ‘non-event’ concept to SME-related ‘terrorism’. Based on the mediation of ‘terrorism’ before the Olympic Games in Salt Lake City (2002), Athens (2004) and Turin (2006), they argue these SMEs constitute ‘non-events’; where something does not live up to its ‘projected definition nor assigned status in the media’ (ibid.: 289). It is argued that SMEs represent ‘fabricated zones of risk’, as the media is acting ‘catastrophe-forecasting’ and ‘fear brokering’ before mega-events (ibid.). This relates to what Beck (2009) characterize as ‘staging’, and others yield similar findings (Tsoukala, 2008; Schimmel, 2011; Yarchi et al., 2015)

²⁸ Reinforcing this, Nacos et al. (2011) find that, in the US, increased threat levels will be provided more media attention than decreasing threat levels.

and maintain that international media outlets tend to endorse authorities' responses to terrorist threats (Yarchi et al., 2015).

Such media attention can legitimize security measures implemented for SMEs (Taylor and Toohey, 2015) and may fuel insecurities, as the literature crystallizes the media's role in constructing threats and shaping the public perceptions of 'safety' (Gillespie and O'Loughlin, 2009). There are, however, caveats involved with the application of Baudrillard's 'non-event' to mega-event 'terrorism' (Atkinson and Young, 2012). Especially because of occurrences *after* the mentioned study.²⁹ Thus, 'terrorism threats' at SMEs should not merely be seen as 'hyper-real' 'non-events', despite their relatively low frequency against the backdrop of a disproportionately high media coverage.

In the critical reading of 'security', those threatening individuals' 'safety' should be critically investigated. Bauman (2005) observes that displays of those threatening our 'personal safety' have become *the* major asset of the mass media. However, whilst media discourses contribute to the social construction of threats and fears, and to an extent, help us understand who we, allegedly, 'secure from'; media discourses rarely facilitate an understanding of those we are 'secured from'. Media discourses mentioning 'hooligans' or 'terrorists' evoke fear and insecurities, but rarely provide much socio-political context of these threats (Tsoukala, 2008, 2009). For example, apart from the case of 9/11, 'acts of [...] terrorism are committed by a tiny number of individuals and result in between a few hundred and few thousand casualties *per year over the entire world*' (Smyth et al., 2008: 1, original emphasis). Similarly, it is argued that 'hooliganism' issues have been overstated for decades and academically over-researched (Marsh et al., 1996). Media versions of violent supporters commonly paint a picture of 'mindless animals', but fail to give any 'in-depth analysis into the root of football-related disorder' (Poulton, 2005: 41). Undeniably, 'hooligans' may well pose a threat to social and public order. However, the lack of critical context provided is incompatible with a critical and deepened understanding of 'security'. Thus, whilst media discourses can exacerbate subjective insecurities, they do not necessarily aid a deepened understanding of security realities.

²⁹ For example, the Boston Marathon bombing and the attack outside *Stade de France*. However, there is definitely plausibility to the argument that the media are guilty in being catastrophe forecasting.

‘Security’ at SMEs should not be viewed as the absence of real threats, constructed threats or threats that ‘never’ materialize. Although hard to empirically document, threats may *not* materialize or be thwarted *because* of the high levels of ‘security’.³⁰ Understanding what ‘security’ means at SMEs requires a deeper engagement. Questions that must be asked around securitizing acts and moves include ‘for which exact purposes?’; ‘whom that are secured for and against?’ and ‘what are the effects?’. And, what the existing, attached or potential advantages or disadvantages are. Overall, very few studies examine these dimensions of ‘security’ before or throughout SMEs. Such gaps in knowledge, however, do also exist more generally, although a shift can be observed within security studies literature since 2010, involving a turn away from an elitist focus towards ‘micro’, ‘vernacular’ or ‘everyday security’ in critical scholarship (Croft and Vaughan-Williams, 2017; Solomon and Steele, 2017; Jarvis and Lister, 2012).

Against this background, it remains crucial to continually subscribe to bottom-up approaches, and ask questions about for exactly whom or which populations ‘security’ is created for (Kennelly, 2015; Barnard-Wills et al., 2012), and how this is experienced at micro-level (Gillespie and O’Loughlin, 2009). Beck (1992) was alive to the fact that individuals perceive and react differently to risks and, after all, security ‘means different things to different people in different places and at different times’ (Croft and Vaughan-Williams, 2017: 22). With ‘security’ viewed here as a derivative concept, meaning one’s world-view determines what ‘security’ ultimately is, ‘being’ and ‘feeling safe’ are non-uniform concepts (Booth, 2005). They depend on whom the relevant security issues – whether ‘real’ or ‘constructed’ – are considered by (ibid.).

This section argues that a dictionary-adhesive definition, equating ‘security’ with an absence of threats falls fundamentally short when unpacking ‘security’ at SMEs. Empirical research suggests that the public ‘experience and perceive (in)security in a plurality of ways and contexts’ (Jarvis and Lister, 2012: 172). This is also the case in the securitized spheres of SMEs, where ‘security’ means different things to organizers, security actors, spectators and host city residents. By borrowing from, and working within the key premises of critical security studies, this may assist the unpacking of

³⁰ Exemplifying this, the *Stade de France* bomber’s intention was to enter the stadium. Notwithstanding, the bomber did not manage to get through the security check point. Therefore, the bomb was detonated just outside (Cleland and Cashmore, 2018).

‘security’ and the deeper questions instigated by SME securitizations. Thereby, a critical approach to ‘security’ may reveal its true or different meanings that are yet to be sufficiently explored in a SME context which changes drastically in line with new emerging threats (Cleland and Cashmore, 2018). Indeed, in Euro 2020’s case, a highly unexpected ‘security threat’ emerged as a pandemic led to the event’s postponement.

2.5 Pandemics and Infectious Diseases as Mega-Event ‘Security Threats’

This section unpacks the relationship between ‘health’ and ‘security’ with a specific focus on pandemics as mega-event ‘threats’. The truly unprecedented global health crisis caused by COVID-19 comprised another part of the securitization processes of the two largest SMEs in 2020, Euro 2020 and the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo, and resulted in their postponement. The crisis also revealed the key tenets of a ‘securitization’: securitizing actors, receiving audiences, a threat to survival, security referent objects and extraordinary measures (Buzan et al., 1998). As declared by US President, Donald Trump (2020), the pandemic posed a threat to national security. Meanwhile, WHO Director-General, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, called for ‘country leaders to mobilize their plans, coordinating every part of government, not just the health ministry – *security*, diplomacy, finance, commerce, transport, trade, information and more’ (quoted in WHO, 2020b, emphasis added). Against this background, and considering this thesis’s aims, it is necessary to revisit pandemics and infectious diseases as ‘security threats’ or ‘problems’.

The link between ‘health’ and ‘security’ came to fore already in the 1946 WHO Constitution, stating that the ‘health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security’. However, throughout the twentieth century, infectious diseases like pandemic influenza were *not* widely recognized as ‘security threats’ (Kamradt-Scott and McInnes, 2012). Rather, they were considered serious *health threats* (Davis, 2008). Yet, whilst simultaneously representing global health threats, health issues including infectious diseases, epidemics, pandemics and ‘bioterrorism’ have increasingly been included on security agendas over the past decades as non-traditional threats to individuals’ health and well-being, and to states and their societies (Kamradt-Scott and McInnes, 2012; Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014; Davis, 2008; Elbe, 2010, 2011; Rushton, 2011; McInnes and Rushton, 2010). Such inclusion remains

compatible with CSS's desire to widen and broaden the security agenda (Booth, 1991; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010; Nunes, 2014). Meanwhile, the growing scholarship validates Booth's (2007) prophecy holding that global health was likely to become a key subject area in security studies as the security agenda broadened.

Paradoxically, in the late 1970s, confidence existed among public health elites that risks from infectious diseases were declining (Davies, 2008). Especially western countries believed that 'technological progress had halted the spread of these diseases' which were assumed to have been replaced by so-called 'diseases of affluence', like diabetes, cancer and heart diseases (Peterson, 2000: 47). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, such outlook changed drastically. The spread of HIV/AIDS, coinciding with intensified global interconnectedness, amplified anxieties related to worldwide contamination (Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014). This produced a future-oriented shift; away from already known diseases, towards the 'unlimited potential threats residing in the microbial world' (ibid.: 336). It also meant that emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases 'could begin to be discussed as *both* public health hazards *and* security risks' (Kamradt-Scott and McInnes, 2012: 99, original emphasis).

Adding weight to this, the threats posed by SARS and H5N1 ('avian flu') in the 2000s, which received wide media coverage (Wallis and Nerlich, 2005) demonstrated developments that merely intensified arguments maintaining that cyclical infectious diseases should be approached as 'security threats', given the potential threat posed by infectious diseases to public health, human well-being and political and economic stability (Davis, 2008). Pandemics, therefore, were seen as directly posing threats to states by causing enormous socio-economic disruptions (Kamradt-Smith and McInnes, 2012). Elbe (2011: 850) accords this, and highlights that HIV/AIDS, SARS and H5N1 'played crucial, and also quite distinctive, roles in carving out a medical dimension to the international security agenda'.

In academic spheres, one may observe a growing literature concerned with pandemics or infectious diseases which conceptually approaches this as 'biosecurity', or that works within the premises of securitization theory (Kamradt-Scott and McInnes, 2012; Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014; McInnes and Rushton, 2013; Curley and Herington, 2011). Predominantly, this scholarship is concerned with the 'processes through which health issues emerge as security problems' requiring exceptional

responses (Nunes, 2014: 942). However, as demonstrated by Nunes (2014), who works within the security-as-emancipation prism, ‘health issues’ can be broadened and deepened to encompass ‘security problems’ on an individual and less exceptional level. For example, he argues that ‘health issues’ can be ‘security problems’ if they come to ‘restrict in a decisive manner the ability of those involved – individuals, families and/or groups – to shape the course of their lives, either by determining their action or by steering their conduct’ (p. 952). Others challenge the novelty of the ‘health-security’ nexus and the validity of securitization theory, arguing that the relationships between health, medicine and security are historically traceable (Howell, 2014). Notwithstanding, the realization of, and responses to pandemics and infectious diseases as ‘security threats’ can presently be seen in health and security communities (Rushton, 2011).

Accordingly, pandemics as ‘security threats’ must be understood as multifaceted. Their consequences are not merely epidemiological on an individual level, but relate to economic, political and social disruptions in global societies, since pandemic impacts transcend national borders. As such, it is prudent to speak of a duality of security referent objects. Infectious diseases impact individuals and their ‘health’ and ‘well-being’. Concurrently, the state is the main provider of public health capacities and services (Curley and Herington, 2011) and plays a key role in responding to pandemic threats.

Therefore, Elbe (2011) notes that responses to pandemics may be illuminating for more general understandings of ‘security’:

When the domains of health and security intersect, this does not just shape how particular diseases are governed in the international system; it similarly encourages changes to how security is understood, to how security is provided, and indeed to who practises security in contemporary international relations (p. 848-849)

The ‘*securitization of health*’, according to Elbe, has another side: it also involves the ‘*medicalization of insecurity*’. Drawing from medical sociological literature, Elbe highlights particularly three changes to security practices that have led to, or constitute the ‘medicalization of insecurity’. Firstly, as discussed, that is pandemics’ solidified position on the security agenda, as national and international security threats requiring security responses. Secondly, Elbe captures how medical expertise and medical

professionals increasingly have acquired a seat around the ‘security table’ in political landscapes. He argues ‘medical professionals have recently come to play a much more integrated role in security policy’ (ibid.: 853). Therefore, adding to an already densely populated ‘security field’ of actors (Bigo, 2008), individuals with a background in clinical practices, epidemiology and microbiology have increasingly been included in health security programmes and security think tanks while enhancing their social influence (Elbe, 2011). Thirdly, Elbe points towards *how* ‘security’ is provided or ensured.

Accordingly, ‘expertise in clinical practice, epidemiology and microbiology increasingly form part of the new health security programmes established’ (ibid.: 856) over recent years. Therefore, ‘security’ is also provided through more contemporary means such as developing new counter-measures to pandemics and through stockpiling for catastrophic times (see also Elbe et al., 2014). These three transformations feed into the ‘medicalization of insecurity’. Notwithstanding, it remains an important observation that past knowledge about previous diseases is not always sufficient to tackle future pandemics, whereas the desire to ‘secure’ individuals or populations ‘through medical countermeasures is not easily translated into practice’ (Elbe, 2011: 849). Thus, attempts to ‘secure’ do not automatically lead to more or true ‘security’ in health contexts.

Questions remain around the responses to ‘threats’ stemming from infectious diseases and pandemics. Here, WHO plays a key role in monitoring health risks and coordinating responses on a global scale. Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen (2014) examine WHO’s role in the governance of diseases and argue that the supranational organization has emerged as a global emergency governor that not only defines crises and exceptional emergencies, but which provide policy guidelines and guide political responses. They argue WHO’s autonomy in disease surveillance and governance has increased. Meanwhile, Davis (2008) argues that WHO disproportionality prioritizes western, high-income countries and observes how western states and WHO, simultaneously, construct infectious diseases as ‘security threats’, but argues that WHO’s role is limited.

Essentially, the organization still depends on state action, cooperation and state verification of disease outbreaks. Hence, in the security response(s) to health crises,

WHO's autonomy is *delegated* by western states that predominantly are concerned with 'strengthening their domestic borders against the spread of infectious disease epidemics' (ibid.: 313) which can be seen as a 'threat' to states' socio-economic *status quo*. The responses to pandemics as 'security threats' hence reveal a flurry of state interests, supranational authority, exceptionality and a window for examining security dynamics further.

Proceeding, understanding pandemics as 'threats' to SMEs is crucial. This chapter has already argued that 'security' in a SME context must be approached more holistically, and not solely be conflated with 'terrorism', or to a lesser extent, 'hooliganism' or 'crime' in the mega-event theatres. Crucially, limited social scientific research examines the effect of pandemics on SMEs as a distinctive threat. Even less research focuses on how governing bodies in sports and event organizers respond to such 'security threat' posed by pandemics and infectious diseases, although this can facilitate an understanding of questions such as *how* security is practiced or provided, for *whom* it is provided and *what*, exactly, that is 'secured against'. Possibly, these gaps in the literature exist because pandemics seldom lead to SME postponements or cancellations. For instance, the 'Euros' had never previously been postponed, whereas the 2020 Olympics were the first since the World War II not to be staged as planned.

However, that is not to say previous SMEs have not been threatened or influenced by pandemics or diseases. Before the 2002 World Cup in South Korea/Japan, the SARS outbreak was a cause of concern, leading Toohey et al. (2003) to maintain that pandemics must be accounted for when planning for SMEs. More recently, concerns over 'swine flu' existed prior to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa (*The Guardian*, 2010). The 2015 Africa Cup of Nations took place in Equatorial Guinea during the Ebola virus (McCloskey et al., 2020), whereas the Zika virus constituted a public health crisis in Brazil prior to the country's 2016 Olympics. Meanwhile, efforts to prevent sexually transmitted diseases in Olympic Villages are often announced pre-event (*The Telegraph*, 2007). Thus, events have indeed been 'threatened', but proceeded in the absence of any major disease issues (Parnell et al., 2020).

A pandemic threat to a SME is not necessarily a 'security threat' emerging as a result of hosting an event *per se* (Jennings, 2012a). In that respect, it poses a different – more 'naturally occurring' (Kamradt-Scott and McInnes, 2012: 95) security threat than for

example ‘hooliganism’. The pandemic threat is an appropriate illustrator of the argument holding that mega-events are never detached from their broader contexts. Further, SMEs are popular tourist destinations and attract mass crowds. For example, 2.5 million tickets for Euro 2020 were set to be sold to fans (UEFA, 2020e). SMEs can, in an age of global mobility systems (Giulianotti et al., 2015), work to intensify the spread of infectious diseases within the event city itself or elsewhere around the world, when attendees return. Hence, mega-events can operate as amplifiers *and* disseminators of pandemics and must be approached as playing a not insignificant role in light of infectious disease outbreaks. As Dickmann (2013: 81) writes:

Major sporting events pose a unique opportunity for diseases to spread among a broad variety of people: pathogens can travel from or to remote areas of the world infecting naïve, non-immune populations, facilitated by the high density of people gathering and their sometimes risky behaviour

Essentially, the continuous flows of spectators and other individuals (staff, volunteers, reporters, athletes) across transnational borders mean increased likelihood of cross-border transmission of infectious diseases (Jennings, 2012b). Furthermore, this ‘security threat’ *preserves* when those same individuals return to their home city or country. Hence, globalizing forces and the geographic spread of SMEs, especially events like Euro 2020 to be hosted in 12 different countries, mean SMEs are vulnerable and require a broad approach to prevention, preparedness and response that goes beyond the time and location of the event (Dickmann, 2013). Preparedness, in terms of national health services and emergency response team (*ibid.*), is a formal requirement for hosts taking on mega-events (UEFA, n.d.). Furthermore, contingency plans comprise elements of states’ security apparatuses (Adey and Anderson 2011). With regards to preventative measures, media coverage, public health organizations and national health authorities commonly work to raise awareness of infectious diseases pre-event. Yet, as Janiec et al. (2012: 2) find, such messages ‘went unnoticed by a significant number of fans’ attending Euro 2012, underlining the limitations of prevention strategies.

As with other ‘security threats’ mega-events are subject to, there are degrees of unpredictability and uncertainty (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009, 2012) attached to the task of ‘securing’ against pandemic threats. Fundamentally, identifying outbreaks is inherently difficult and adds weight to the list of uncertainties that place restrictions on pre-event planning (Dickmann, 2013). In terms of the practical implications of

pandemic threats, Dickmann (2013: 85) asks ‘[w]hat should organisers of major sporting events do when there is a pandemic influenza six months before a scheduled event?’. Interestingly, this worst-case scenario became a reality for two largest SMEs in 2020, namely the Tokyo Olympics and Euro 2020, although COVID-19, of course, is not a pandemic influenza. In her recommendations, Dickmann writes that:

As the disease is already occurring globally, the risk assessment for major sporting events is based on whether the sporting event comes into conflict with national and international health regulations, recommendations and travel advice. Organisers have to connect and collaborate with the national and international public health authorities in order to make their risk assessment. The basic question is: does this event have a significant negative impact on the society – does this event make the pandemic worse? (p. 85).

Consequently, with regards to event organizers’ and owners’ response to the pandemic ‘security threat’, this illuminates important aspects of organizers’ responsibility and the melange of interplay between organizers, health organizations, governments and governing bodies in sports (i.e. UEFA, FIFA or IOC). This reveals the surface of another central, but under-played question in the literature. That is, whom that ultimately makes the decision to cancel or postpone an event for security purposes, and whether this is a decision by the host country, UEFA or FIFA (Bar-On, 2017) – representing two organizations with no territory where they have jurisdiction (Pound, 2016) – or even WHO (Davis, 2008).

Whilst, in the case of Euro 2020, UEFA seemingly made this decision, it must also be seen as a decision influenced by governments, WHO guidelines and pressure from professional leagues (Chapter Six). Moreover, and completely central to this thesis, the *meanings* of ‘threat’ in such unprecedented contexts remain unclear, in addition to exactly ‘what’ or ‘whom’ that were ‘secured’ and how pandemics were responded to in as a safety or security threat in sporting contexts. As such, the questions asked by Rushton (2011); ‘security for whom?’ and ‘security from what?’ *need to* be emulated in sporting contexts. In this vein, COVID-19 posed an exceptional case for the sociological study of SMEs, which facilitated such reading of governing bodies in sports’ response to the pandemic as threats to sporting events.

Essentially, social research examining the relationships between SMEs, ‘security’ and pandemics remains scant. Potentially, this is related the sentiment that ‘even natural

hazards appear less random than they used to' (Beck, 2006: 332) and since SMEs have been staged as planned, despite existing threats (Goldblatt, 2019; Parnell et al., 2020). As stated, SME cancellations in peacetime are rare occurrences. Yet, COVID-19 significantly altered this when it caused the postponement of international mega-events and led to suspended professional leagues. Existing literature predominantly mention the apocalyptic scenario of a pandemic merely in passing. But evidently pandemics pose real and perceived 'security threats' to SMEs, in a similar way to terror, disorder or crime.

To summarize, more than one decade after it was published, this section adds another emerging SME issue to Giulianotti and Klauser's (2010) research agenda. That is pandemics, still yet to be dedicated critical attention by researchers in a sports context. Similarly, Shipway (2018: 265) argues that there is a need for further research on natural hazards threatening SMEs emanating 'from geological, meteorological, oceanographic, hydrological or biological causes'. This connects with those previously articulated arguments maintaining that a reading of a global health crisis can produce insights into how 'security' is understood, provided or practiced – and how there is both 'space and [a] need for further research on the relationship between securitization and exceptionalism in the crisis politics of international organizations' (Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014: 343).

Most crucially however, this section demonstrates that the linkages between 'health' and 'security' are now well-established in the literature. Though, in spite of this burgeoning research area, there is validity to what Nunes (2014: 943) highlights: 'What lacking is an appreciation of the different meanings that "being secure" can have in the case of health'. This again, relates to questions of to whom infectious diseases, for example, pose a threat to, and to whom they 'inspire dread' (Curley and Herington, 2011: 144). Following this, the unprecedented COVID-19 outbreak – in this thesis's context – allows for critically interrogating the meanings of 'health', 'safety' and 'security' in a mega-event setting, whilst simultaneously disaggregating the processes of 'security' which led to event postponement in the face of a pandemic threat. Overall, this represents another under-researched area within the mega-event/securitization literature.

2.6 Conclusion

As this chapter showed, the relationship between SMEs and ‘security’ remains complex and ever-changing. Though, at this stage, it is also necessary to consider the changing roles of both football fans and ‘security’ within this. First, fans possess a special role within a SME’s spectacle of security. Accepting the broad nature of the term (Giulianotti, 2002), ‘fans’ and elements of fan culture are subjects that are provided with ‘security’ and simultaneously ‘secured against’. Moreover, in the current hyper-commodified era of sport, fans are also consumers of the sport and event spaces (King, 2002; Giulianotti, 2002), and active stakeholders in the broader organization of the policing of matches and mega-events (Numerato, 2018; Cleland et al., 2018). Fans, therefore, play several *roles* in the context of SME securitizations that warrant further exploration.

Yet, these roles play out alongside the changing nature of ‘security’ at football mega-events. Whereas ‘hooliganism’ has received broad coverage and theorization in the existing literature as perhaps *the* primary football-related threat (Dunning, 2000; Armstrong, 1998; Giulianotti, 1995a), 9/11 and recent sports-related incidents, including the attack against the Sri Lankan cricket team bus in Pakistan in 2009 (Cleland, 2019) and the *Stade de France* attack in 2015 (Cleland and Cashmore, 2018) mark important shifts. Now, external threats like ‘terrorism’ are at the forefront of the security planning and delivery of mega-events (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009) which possess global profiles and audiences. Around SMEs like Euro 2020, one may thus observe that the roles of fans and the meanings of ‘security’ have been impacted and changed over the last decades. This makes it imperative to critically engage with how the former is positioned within a SME’s pre-planning of security.

Indeed, under the umbrella of social control, policing and securitization, fans are not solely passive recipients of security measures, new surveillance technologies or public order policing. Instead, there are important and shifting dynamics of power at play in the policing of fans on match-days and within tournaments. As Stott et al. (2008, 2012, 2019) find, using the perspective of the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM), rooted in social psychology, the dynamics of power between crowds of football fans and security services are crucial. Fans, ultimately, compose social groups that can assist constructive policing *if* police communication, facilitation and engagement take place and the policing is perceived as legitimate and proportionate. This, again, may

encourage compliance, empowerment, fans to assist security services and the de-escalation of emerging conflict or aggression. Conversely, if the police are perceived by crowds of fans as operating in a disproportionate manner, then this could increase crowd conflict and aggression, since a shared social identity emerges amongst fans (Stott et al., 2019). The policing of football hence reveals important power dynamics that are subject to change, and based on social relations (Stott et al., 2012), norms and interactions (O’Neill, 2005).

In context of these developments, intergroup dynamics, and the evident roles of fans, it is argued here that the *roles* of fans and fan organizations within the pre-planning of ‘security’ and ‘policing’ at SMEs must be academically engaged with. Succinctly put, ‘[f]ans are important stakeholders in football’ (Cleland et al., 2018: 183), but they also preoccupy several distinctive roles both in an event’s complex organizational phases and throughout the specific events as – somewhat paradoxically – populations to be socially controlled *and* constructively engaged with. At contemporary football mega-events, fans are match-goers to be secured, ‘potential troublemakers’ (Numerato, 2018: 15), information brokers (for example, in Fan Embassies) (Cleland et al., 2018) and consumers (Kolyperas and Sparks, 2018).

Fans are also represented as organized actors, such as Football Supporters Europe (FSE) and SD Europe, which promote social change through institutional participation on a pan-European level, including the 2017 ‘Convention of an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events’ (Numerato, 2018; Cleland et al., 2018) and tournament-specific working groups (FSE, 2019). In this sense, the changing nature and multiple *roles* of fans in relation to ‘security’ and ‘policing’ related matters – in the context of the overarching post-9/11 SME securitization – as well as the intergroup dynamics ever-present *during* relevant tournaments (Stott et al., 2007), mean that there is a pressing need to now engage empirically with the experiences and voices of fans and fan networks. Essentially, supporters are multi-layered subjects within the social world of sports and the complex securitization of Euro 2020 which this thesis examines.

Then, to sum up, this chapter was divided into two sections. First, the existing literature on the relationship between SMEs and ‘security’ was reviewed. Here, contemporary cases and concepts, including ‘security legacies’ and ‘networks’, were addressed.

Second half of the chapter engages in a conceptual unpacking of the ‘essentially contested concept’ (Buzan, 1983: 6) that ‘security’ is. Then, in the context of COVID-19, an introduction into the securitization of health was provided. The chapter argues that despite an upsurge in the academic attention dedicated to SME securitizations, there are still under-researched areas reflecting important research gaps. Every SME securitization is unique, multifaceted and has diverse social implications in short and long terms, whereas security efforts are assembled globally but uniquely delivered locally. As argued here, unexplored terrain exists with regards to how ‘security’ is constructed through processes of lesson-drawing, knowledge exchange (Boyle, 2011; Klauser, 2011a) and future-leaning precautionary assessments (Mythen and Walklate, 2008; Boyle and Haggerty, 2012) under the exceptional geographical and political circumstances that Euro 2020’s 12-country format presented.

With its theoretical discussion, the chapter also argued for a critical approach to ‘security’ at SMEs. Particularly, it is advocated to proceed within the key premises of critical security studies, by asking whom ‘security’ ultimately is *for* and *against*. This is highly compatible with this thesis’s attempt to critically unpack and deepen the understanding of what ‘security’ ultimately means in a SME context. Such insights have seldom been drawn from in the existing mega-event literature. Thus, through research agendas, tactical and empirical accounts, the scholarship succeeds in portraying mega-events as securitized occurrences shaped by wider security dynamics (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009, 2012; Klauser, 2011a). However, the scholarly engagement with what ‘security’ *is* remains limited. Still, there is a need for engagement with the constructions, meanings and perceptions of ‘security’.

Giulianotti and Klauser (2010) concluded by urging for a continued commitment to the critical study of SME securitization. They encouraged researchers to assemble transnational SME case studies, in order ‘to provide sustained, comparative studies of security issues, and processes at different events within varying contexts’ (p. 58). This underscores this chapter’s main argument, maintaining that enhanced understandings of SME securitizations still are required. Particularly so, when the event format in itself is inherently transnational and networked, as in Euro 2020’s case. Against this backdrop, concerning the original scientific contributions this thesis aims to make, I argue that this is where this study will fill a substantial gap which existing research is yet to cover. The contribution comes through examinations of ‘security’ as a concept

and the creation of ‘security’ prior to the continent-wide SME. Having considered this, this thesis’s main research question, rooted in social realities and the need for continued academic research, is:

- *To consider which processes, assessments, activities and policies that may assist the construction of ‘security’ and ‘safety’ in Euro 2020’s context*

The question refers to the multiple dimensions of ‘security’: its *construction*, articulated *meanings* and expressed *perceptions* of it. The question enables an examination of wider security dynamics and developments that, as discussed, shape SME’s ‘security’. Through a critical engagement with this research question, it is argued that the thesis fills unfulfilled spaces in the literature speaking to the constructions, meanings and perceptions of ‘security’ in the context of a completely untested and unprecedented mega-event format. The research question invites and permits an in-depth exploration into the ‘securing’ of Euro 2020, where COVID-19 came to play a special role on the securitization timeline merely months before the mega-event was due to originally commence. Ultimately, the chapter also contends that extremely little research addresses the role of ‘health issues’, including pandemic crises, and how this potentially reconfigure the meanings of ‘security’ and ‘safety’ at SMEs.

More ambitious at heart, answering such research question can produce new ways to our reading of ‘security’ and the wider sociological understanding of the concept. Not solely at transient mega-events, but more broadly in the present-day’s global societies. Exceptional security practices are occasionally tested at SMEs and subsequently transplanted into everyday contexts (Clavel, 2013), whilst a SME’s securing practices and efforts cannot be analysed in complete isolation from broader security and risk contexts in contemporary societies (Tsoukala, 2016). Global developments in the fields of security, policing and surveillance will directly and indirectly influence how a particular SME secured (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009). Consequently, mega-events – and Euro 2020 specifically – constitute vital sites for empirical examinations of the multifaceted, contested and contemporary processes of ‘security’.

Chapter 3

Chapter 3: Methodology, Research Design and Reflections

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the philosophical and methodological underpinnings, the data collection and analysis of this thesis are presented and discussed. To answer the research questions, this thesis utilizes documentary analysis, qualitative stakeholder interviews and official statements and interview material drawn from secondary sources. The reasoning behind these methodological choices and other specific considerations are explained and justified here. This thesis addresses the constructions, meanings and perceptions of ‘security’ at Euro 2020 and seeks to make sociological sense of this mega-event’s securitization. Thus, the methodological considerations were bound to my commitment to critically interrogate how Euro 2020 was ‘secured’, and for whom or what ‘security’ ultimately was constructed for in the mega-event’s pre-planning as articulated in formal discourses, stakeholder interactions and official statements.

I should also openly emphasize that substantial and pragmatic changes were made to this research project in its final phase. As aforementioned, the global COVID-19 pandemic led to the postponement of Euro 2020. This directly impacted this project, which originally had planned to include an ethnographic account of London’s fan zones and interviews with fans about *their* experiences of ‘security’. This chapter (particularly Section 3.4) therefore reflects on social research in a time of ‘social distancing’ and how this impacted my thesis’s objectives, my experiences as a researcher and, ultimately, the methodological choices of this study. Structurally, this chapter is divided in two parts. First, the research design is addressed. Here, the research’s philosophical stance and methods are discussed. The second part explains the data collection, sampling strategies and provides a reflective account and guidance for researchers doing research in a time of crisis. Data analysis processes are also explained here, before this chapter and the first part of the thesis are concluded.

3.2 Philosophical Stance, Research Design and Methods

It was ‘always’ clear that this thesis would have to involve empirical research rather than founding itself solely upon ‘desk-based’ or ‘library-based’ research (Bulmer, 1984). There are numerous reasons for this, but the most obvious one is that, by glancing upon the research questions and objectives (Chapter One), it can be seen how a ‘desk-based’ research would have been practically inconvenient – if not impossible – whilst impeding the research’s potential. Therefore, the study’s data is empirically recorded through systematic data collection and analysis techniques necessary to produce sufficient answers to the research’s objectives which required human interactions with Euro 2020 stakeholders.

All scientific research begins with an ontological starting point. When deciding which ontological position to take, a point that must be used for orientation is whether one considers social units to be objective entities, free from any influence from social actors, or whether one views social entities as constructed by the perceptions and actions of social actors (Bryman, 2016). This research, fundamentally concerned with how social actors shape, influence and construct ‘security’, is ontologically positioned as constructivist. Ontologically, this is juxtaposed to objectivism (Delanty, 1997) which is the ontological position dealing with ‘social facts’ and dominates the natural sciences. In contrast, constructivists maintain that social reality, whilst not completely isolated from the discourses of science, is only partly constituted by science (*ibid.*). Constructivists do not preclude the existence of one external reality, but see realities constructed through ‘interpreting perceptual experiences of the external world’ (Jonassen, 1991: 10).

The constructivist position maintains that social reality is constituted by shared interpretations constructed by social actors. Consequently, and continuously, social reality is produced as social actors undertake their everyday lives (Blaikie, 2010). Constructivism thereby challenges the assumption of organizations and cultures as something pre-given wherein social actors have no influential role (Bryman, 2016). Social actors therefore accomplish social phenomena that are under continual revision and (re-)construction. Hence, to show the compatibility of, and apply my ontological position to this research, I sustain that the underlying and collected data – those perceptions, experiences, and interpretations of the stakeholders and key actors – must be viewed as partly shaping social realities and understandings. ‘Security’ – as a social

phenomenon – is reconstructed by involved individuals positioned on the different sides of the ‘security assemblage’. However, the subjects of the research (interviewees, official documents published *by* individuals/organization, statements given by key actors in the media) all share one common feature, since they are social actors who act as influencers to the realities of ‘security’ and ‘safety’ as phenomena. Crucially, the constructivist ontology enables the understanding of how ‘security’ is ‘socially and organisationally generated and given meaning’ (Fussey, 2015: 215).

Epistemology follows ontology and is concerned with the study of knowledge: how we are to know and how to understand the human world (Jenkins, 2002). Metaphorically, Marsh and Furlong (2002: 17) argue that epistemologies and ontologies are both like a ‘skin rather than a sweater’. This implies that these philosophical stances are implicit – not explicit – but shape the social scientist’s approach to theoretical selections and methodologies. Epistemology is the philosophical branch studying the ‘theory of knowledge’ (Grix, 2002) and an epistemological issue is bound to the question of what is (or should be) considered acceptable knowledge within a discipline (Bryman, 2016).

This study’s epistemological position is interpretivism. This represents the alternative to the positivist epistemology that traditionally is embraced within natural sciences, and emphasizes ‘precise’ data collection, objectivity between the researcher and subjects of the research and the delineation of testable hypotheses or claims (Molnar and Purdy, 2016; Harrison and Callan, 2013). The positivist epistemology rejects the possibility of a socially constructed world and favours one where knowledge can solely be generated in objective processes. Contrarily, interpretivist research tends to utilize qualitative methodologies, thereby breaking from positivist scientific research relying heavily on quantitative methodologies (Harrison and Callan, 2013). Though, it should not be assumed that this research is interpretivist *because* qualitative methods are used. This is a common assumption, but an assumption that runs the risk of equating the methodological and epistemological levels when, in fact, epistemological choices should be informed by how individual researcher sees the world (Petersen-Wagner, 2015).

Interpretivists hold that social phenomena rely on social actors and the interpretations between these actors (Grix, 2002). This epistemological stance reflects on the

distinctiveness of human beings against a natural order, since it allows for an understanding of the subjective meanings of social actions and interpret individuals' lived experiences. In this sense, this research sees those subject to research as subjective actors, it interprets their interpretations, and places them into a social scientific frame (Bryman, 2016: 26-28). Put differently, the ideas, meanings and perceptions from individuals/actors around the mega-event organization are seen as socially multiplexed and not solely shaped by objective processes. This research's epistemology is also consistent with the aforementioned critical security studies project this thesis borrows from. As encouraged by Krause and Williams (1997: 49), International Relations and Security Studies needed an epistemological shift: away from objectivist, rational approaches towards 'interpretive modes of analysis' (p. 49) that facilitate a 'fuller understanding of [...] the conditions under which stability and even security can be achieved' (p. 51).

Metaphorically, Jenkins (2002: 7) asserts that 'if ontology and epistemology are intimate bedfellows, they need to make room beside them for methodology too'. This thesis's methodological choices are now addressed. Concerning the perpetual debate within social sciences, commonly portrayed as quantitative *versus* qualitative methods, the methodological route taken here is qualitative. Here, qualitative research refers to 'any kind of research that procedures findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification' (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 17). Whereas quantitative research often is considered 'more robust', tangible and in certain disciplines given more respect (*ibid.*), the strengths and robustness of any quantitative approaches were arguably outscored by this thesis's appropriately selected qualitative methods.

As robust as any quantitative data could have proved to be, the applicability of statistical methods to my research questions and objectives were debatable. Especially since the research critically seeks to voice perceptions of mega-event stakeholders on how 'security' was planned pre-event whilst also seeking to examine in-depth accounts of 'security' and its multitude of meanings. 'Safety' and 'security' represent two inherently ambiguous and inter-subjective concepts (Zedner, 2009). Whereas statistical approaches admittedly could have yielded an account of what to expect on average, this would largely have been at the cost of in-depth and detailed responses to and interpretations of 'security' in real-life environments. Further, references to the

thesis's key objectives, committed to sociologically examining the meanings, constructions and perceptions of 'security' at Euro 2020, should be repeated. Arguably, unpacking the construction of 'security' and the meaning of 'security issues' or 'threats' would appropriately benefit from qualitative and critical approaches possessing distinctive strengths when seeking in-depth examinations of individuals' experiences and organizational perceptions (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).

Examining what 'security' at a SME *means*, by drawing upon statistical accounts, surveys or datasets, however, was incompatible with the study's underlying aims, epistemology and ontology. That is not to say that datasets, albeit non-existing in this context, or other quantitative approaches could have yielded useful and robust findings. Notwithstanding, this is arguably better suited when describing or *portraying* pictures of the social world and its realities, rather than committing to an active engagement with it (Millward, 2009a), as my study sought to do.

Ultimately, qualitative approaches have distinctive strengths with regards to examining how individuals 'think about, feel and respond' to security (Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016: 1198). As Chapter Two argues, the existing literature suffers from limited qualitative engagement with what 'security' ultimately *means* in a sporting context. Therefore, if committed to empirically investigating this as articulated in stakeholder voices or organizational discourses then qualitative accounts, undeniably, possess advantages over statistical approaches which, ultimately, meant that this thesis anchored itself in the critical and qualitative tradition.

Case Study Research

To collect empirical data, this thesis uses three different data sources and two different methods. Notwithstanding, this multi-method approach must be seen as rooted in an overarching and explorative case study. Case study research can be conducted from both positivist and interpretivist positions, and refers to:

[A]n empirical enquiry which investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1984: 23).

This thesis reflects a case study's key characteristics. It focuses on one site of analysis (Euro 2020) and employs different sources and approaches to collect empirical data

(Yin, 1994). Although occasionally questioned for its ability to provide generalizable findings (Løkke and Sørensen, 2014), case study research possesses strengths in exploratory research – such as this thesis – which addresses contemporary phenomena, or when the researcher seeks to answer ‘why’ or ‘how’ questions (Yin, 1994).

Case studies can also generalize theoretical prepositions (ibid.), and it is also argued that case study findings can be applied to similar contexts if the case is ‘typical’ (Millward, 2009b). Accepting the difficulties related to defining a ‘typical case’, Millward (2009: 67) also asserts that ‘whilst the results of a case study should be treated with some caution, many findings may be important in the wider research arena’. Aitken’s (2020: 13) argument that ‘no matter where mega-events occur, the type of security frameworks adopted at each successive event remains fairly constant’ therefore underpins that this study’s findings, although generated from a single case study potentially *can be* applied to other SME securitization contexts.

In the sociology of sports, where studies not uncommonly are grounded in ‘cases’, in form of a specific league, club, event or supporter movement, such argument stands particularly strong. Although not always framed as such, an event (sometimes more than one) is often equated with a ‘case’ (or ‘cases’) in mega-event research. For example, London 2012 (Armstrong et al., 2017; Giulianotti et al., 2015; Fussey, 2015) or Euro 2008 (Klauser, 2012; Millward, 2010) are not merely events, but cases too, like Euro 2020 is in this thesis. As Chapter One highlights, Euro 2020 represented and was selected as a highly extraordinary case given its 12 host countries. It did not become any *less* extraordinary when it was postponed due to COVID-19, although this happened in the third year of this project. Euro 2020 was also selected since it was the SME closest to my doctoral studies both geographically and temporally.

This thesis in-depth examination of Euro 2020 includes a documentary research of policy documents, in-depth qualitative stakeholder interviews and, in light of COVID-19, an analysis of official statements and interview material as collected from media sources. Whilst the latter stage was not originally planned when I began my PhD research, it can still be argued that the selected methodological approaches inter-link and, in a chronological manner, follow each other, paralleled with key event developments, in the quest that gradually leads to a sufficient and original answer of the research question.

My examination begins with an analysis of official and available policy documents, proceeds with my interactions with stakeholders, before it finishes with an analysis of responses to COVID-19 as a ‘security threat’ so extreme that postponement was the only option. Whereas this cannot facilitate a tracing of the ‘full’ timeline of Euro 2020’s securitization – since Euro 2020 was postponed – it still allows for tracing Euro 2020 from *start* to *postponement* which, after all, represented a historical move in the world of sports and the sociology of mega-events and subsequently enhances this thesis’s original edge. The next sections explain my methods.

3.2.1 Documentary Analysis

In qualitative research, documentary analysis has become an increasingly used method in recent years. It refers to the ‘systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents – both printed and electronic material’ (Bowen, 2009: 27). Documents therefore constitute a form of primary data. As Atkinson and Coffey (1997: 47) state, documents are social facts that are produced, shared and used in ‘socially organized ways’. Consequently, the practice of analyzing documents yields data that can be organized according to themes, frames or categories. Moreover, this method represents what can be described as ‘unobtrusive measures’ because there is no intrusion or influence on individuals or their behavior involved with the method (Berg, 2009).

Overall, this thesis relies upon three different data sources and essentially, documentary analysis represents a method that normally is used in combination with other qualitative methods, including qualitative interviews, focus groups or observations (Yin, 1994). This is because documentary analysis *per se* cannot always prove answers for research questions that require real-life interactions (Berg, 2009). Traditionally, social researchers have employed a variety of official documents and records (*ibid.*) and documents that may be selected for analysis differ in terms of type, intended audience and access both legally and institutionally (Harrison and Callan, 2013). As explained later (Section 3.3), all documents analyzed here were publicly available and official documents retrieved from open-sources. In terms of readership or audience, the selected documents were intended for Euro 2020 bidders, awarded host cities, security stakeholders and other authorities involved in the pre-planning.

Bowen (2009) points out five functions and purposes of documents in the research process. Firstly, Bowen argues that they can provide data on the context in which the

research participants will operate. For example, an analysis of documents often generates data that can be used for interviews at a later stage, or to make sense of data gathered from interviews. This should also be seen as one key reason for why a documentary analysis was selected as the first stage in my threefold data collection. Secondly, documentary data can give life to questions that should be asked and that are required to be observed as a part of the research. Thirdly, Bowen notes that documentary analysis can provide supplementary data. Fourthly, analyzing documents provides the possibilities for tracking change and development in, for example, the organization of an event. Finally, documentary data can proceed to verify or corroborate evidence obtained from other sources (ibid.: 29-30). This flurry of advantages naturally assisted my decision to utilize official policy documents as a data source.

To summarize the strengths of documentary analysis for this thesis, it was clearly a practical starting point. The documents were publicly available online, whereas collection and analysis could be conducted whilst my ethical application and approval were pending. However, documents were not merely analyzed due to practicality. Documents served as a valid mean to voice the perspectives of key stakeholders including the event owner, UEFA, and other hard-to-reach stakeholder organizations. As anticipated, getting the opportunity to interview individuals from football's governing bodies was difficult (discussed later, under 'elite interviews' and 'sampling'). Hence, official policy documents represented these stakeholders' formalized discourses as publicly articulated through their official channels.

Critically, the documentary research was selected because analyzing official documents related to Euro 2020's 'security' could produce significant and original findings in itself, whilst simultaneously – and reflexively – playing an integral role in the successive research stages. Either by informing my interview-guide or by verifying, contrasting or contextualizing my subsequent findings. Hence, the documentary analysis method was appropriately selected as a justifiable methodological starting point, especially given this method's indispensable strengths speaking to its compatibility with other qualitative approaches, and in acting as a foundation for subsequent data collection stages. In order to analyze documents a frame analysis technique was performed.

3.2.1.1 Framed Discourse Analysis

In the process of analyzing the purposively selected documents, this study borrows from Erving Goffman's (1974) *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. It employs a Goffman inspired framed discourse analysis. Like Goffman's other theories, frame analysis is socially constructivist and deals with both interactions' multiplex nature and human interactions as a consequence of social action (for example, Goffman, 1963). The frame analysis technique adopted here was pioneered by Goffman who saw a need for examining ways in which individuals organized *their* unique experiences into meaningful activities. Goffman himself employed letters that were written to newspapers for publication as examples. In these letters Goffman noticed how some discourse was more heavily weighted than other. These forms of language he called a 'frame'. According to Goffman (1974: 21), individuals' discourses become 'meaningful' when they turn 'what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful'. In this thesis, official documents, policy guidelines and official statements from key actors of Euro 2020 serve as applications of such expressions.

Frames can be defined as the organizational principles governing events and our subjective involvement of them. They are used by individuals to define and create discourses that revolve around specific situations or topics (Goffman, 1974). Or, as Manning (1992: 118) writes, frames answer the question 'what is happening here?' whilst telling us 'how to define situations we find ourselves in'. Discourses are integral to frame analyses, and the discourses subject to frame analysis were the textual discourses in official document forms and official statements by key actors of Euro 2020. To clarify, 'discourse' then refers to the 'summation of symbolic interchange, of what is being talked about and written about, of the interrelations of symbols and their systematic occurrence' (Johnston, 1995: 218).

Frame analysis has been used and developed in sociological and social movement research (Millward, 2006, 2009b, 2017; Lee Ludvigsen and Millward, 2020; Johnston, 1995) and in this thesis, this analysis technique allowed for interpreting how broader topics like 'security', 'security threats' or 'issues' – were framed and given meaning in textual and official document discourses. Notwithstanding, Goffman left few directions for how to perform frame analyses (Millward, 2009b). Against this backdrop, with what may be considered an absence of instructions, there are two

extreme interpretations on how to conduct a frame analysis (Millward, 2007, 2009b). First, one that employs it quantitatively and not too differently from content analysis. Second, one that maintains a qualitative focus and resembles a discourse analysis (ibid.). Interpretivist research using documentary data is more inclined towards discourse analysis (Harrison and Callan, 2013) and given this thesis's epistemological position, I was also more inclined towards the qualitative frame analysis interpretation.

Importantly, Millward (2007) also outlines one interpretation located 'in-between' the two extremes where statistical methods are employed to account for every frame incident. This interpretation effectively allows for a mixture between quantitative and qualitative methods (Millward, 2006, 2007, 2017; Lee Ludvigsen, 2017) as those frame incidents recorded at a highest frequency proceed to form the foundation for the subsequent qualitative discussion (see Lee Ludvigsen and Millward, 2020). Frames with a lower frame incident will then be devoted less qualitative discussion. This ensures that dominant frames are given most qualitative attention as likely to represent repeated themes or opinions.

Borrowing from Goffman (1974) and Millward (2006, 2007, 2009b, 2017) I employ, throughout this thesis, what may be referred to as a framed discourse analysis (Millward, 2009b). Predominantly, this technique concerns itself with qualitative discourses. However, the qualitative discussion can simultaneously rest itself upon statistical underpinnings or frame incidents. The implications of this technique on the method, documentary analysis, is that those frames most frequently drawn upon throughout my analysis of policy documents and official statements form the foundations for those chapters discussing the empirical findings of the documentary research.

My decision to maintain such qualitative focus can also be explained for the following reasons. First, documentary analysis requires that data is examined and interpreted in order to 'elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge' (Bowen, 2009: 27). Secondly, if seeking to better understand UEFA's, stakeholders' and policymakers' framing of 'security' and related issues in their discourses, a purely statistical frame analysis would not necessarily have permitted an *in-depth* analysis and exploration of the themes that are central to this study, which ultimately concerns itself with meanings, constructions and perceptions of 'security'. Thirdly, a

documentary analysis is most efficient when used in tandem with other qualitative methods (Bowen, 2009). Therefore, qualitative data extracted from selected documents was always intended to fulfil a role as a qualitative platform for the subsequent data collection stages. Collectively, these methods would then build upon the documentary data in order to answer the central research question and accompanied objectives concerning Euro 2020's 'security'. Furthermore, when a decision was made to collect statements and responses to COVID-19, the technique was again utilized (see Section 3.2.4).

3.2.1.2 Document Analysis in Mega-Event Research

Existing research investigating SME securitizations commonly employs document analysis as a method. Klauser (2011a) examining the policy-transfer of security practices from Germany's 2006 World Cup to Euro 2008 in Austria/Switzerland, draws upon an extensive study of official documents and reports from parliamentary sittings, law enforcements and UEFA. Meanwhile, in her studies investigating state and non-state relations in the case of Euro 2012, Włoch (2013, 2019) also draws from a documentary analysis. Evidently, both authors utilize the documents in concert with other qualitative methods, including stakeholder interviews. Włoch also emphasizes how documents would inform and build scenarios ahead of stakeholder interviews (Włoch, 2019). Studies of Olympic 'security' have also used documentary data (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012; MacDonald and Hunter, 2012). For example, Boyle et al. (2015), analyze declassified documents (released under the Access to Information Act) to examine security planning for the 1976 Montreal Olympics in retrospect.

In spite of this documentary-informed tradition, one caveat outlined by Boyle and Haggerty (2012) is that documents made public before SMEs, 'fantasy documents', as the authors label them, not always correspond with social realities. Occasionally, they are produced and formulated to show that *something* is being done in order to ensure 'security', and to mitigate public insecurities. Regarding their validity, however, it is noted that 'it would be too cynical to regard such documents as outright fabrications' (ibid.: 252). This implies that one should be aware, as a pitfall, that documents and what happens in 'real-life' not automatically correspond. Though, whilst this holds truth, the same can be said about interviews, where statements and realities not always equate (Rookwood, 2009). This underlines why documentary research ideally should be employed together with follow-up methods. To summarize, the use of documents

when examining a SME's 'security' is, in itself, not a unique exercise. However, a systematic frame analysis approach is rarely adopted. Furthermore, documentary research's compatibility with other qualitative methods means that findings generate a foundation for, or add layers to subsequent data collections.

3.2.2 Stakeholder Interviews

The second constituent of this study's threefold research design was qualitative interviews. Since my planned supporter interviews were abandoned when Euro 2020 was postponed in March 2020, all my interviews were carried out with diverse stakeholders in Euro 2020's security, policing and organization (see Section 3.3). I adopt Freeman's (1984) classical definition of a 'stakeholder' as individuals, groups or organizations with a direct or indirect interest or stake in the activities of a particular organization or event. However, it remains essential to underline that stakeholders *do not* represent one homogenous group of people. As Leopkey and Parent (2009a: 188) note:

Stakeholders may have differing viewpoints and concerns (i.e., be heterogeneous within and/or between stakeholder groups) for a particular issue [...] which makes managing stakeholders all the more difficult and understanding their perspectives on risk management critical

Moreover, the mixture of individuals that can be defined as 'stakeholders' 'can result in vastly different and even conflicting interests, approaches and agendas with various other event stakeholders' (Taylor and Toohey, 2015: 375). Hence, it should not be assumed that stakeholders of the same event operate in an echo chamber and articulate identical views, whereas 'stakeholders' must not be conflated with 'shareholders' nor 'event officials'.

In my critical examination of Euro 2020's pre-planning, qualitative in-depth interviews with stakeholders were completely necessary for this thesis. Essentially, such interactions could provide valuable insights into, and outlooks on, practical and reflective questions associated with Euro 2020's security, policing and organizational arrangements. For such insights, some researchers have utilized observations with, for example, the police (Armstrong et al., 2017). This route was not feasible for this thesis for three reasons and this is ultimately a decision that the researcher must make. First, the difficulties of generating access, which will be returned to. Second, the time-related length of Euro 2020's associated securing efforts. Third, it must be openly admitted

that my thesis, until Euro 2020 was postponed in mid-March 2020, was concerned also with *spectators*' perceptions of 'security', although this was reconfigured when Euro 2020 was provisionally postponed to June 2020, as I reflect on further in Section 3.3. This meant the pathway involving observation of security actors 'from the inside' was never pursued and arguably, this would have composed a full project on itself. Ultimately, the stakeholder interviews were designed into the research as this allowed for me to build upon emerging themes from the document analysis which, supplemented with themes from existing literature, informed my interview focus and questions. Naturally, stakeholder interviews also presented a unique opportunity to meet and interact with individuals possessing longstanding expertise in mega-event security, planning or football policing.

Methodologically, interviews allow for transferring information from the interviewee to the researcher through a professional conversation influenced by its purpose and structure. The method can produce new understandings of social realities since data from interviewees' unique and lived world can be interpreted a number of ways (Brett Davies, 2007). One key purpose of interviews is to acquire descriptions of interviewees' 'life world' so that the interviewer can analyse the 'meaning of described phenomena' (Kvale and Birkman, 2009: 3). Existing literature typically distinguishes between interviews that are 'structured', 'unstructured' and 'semi-structured' (David and Sutton, 2004; Berg and Lune, 2012). Typologically, semi-structured interviews are then located between the two opposites. Notwithstanding, such classifications can be misleading. Interviews commonly fall in-between these extremes (Millward, 2009b) and from my experience, what might begin as a structured interview may degenerate into a semi-structured interview, whereas semi-structured interviews, from my viewpoint, sometimes fade into unstructured interviews. For this research, I opted for the semi-structured approach. At least, this was the starting point that informed the structure and technique of my face-to-face encounters.

'Flexibility' is undeniably the most (over-)cited strength of this approach. Semi-structured interviews provide both interviewer and interviewee greater levels of flexibility when asking and answering questions (Berg and Lune, 2012; Barriball and While, 1994) and allow the interviewer to explore perceptions of highly complex topics – such as mega-event securitization – amongst interviewees (Barriball and While, 1994). However, when adapting this technique, it is integral that the interviewer

attempts to approach the world from the subject's perspective (Berg and Lune, 2012). When designing my research, it was decided that flexibility was necessary in my interviews. Ultimately, semi-structured interviews allow for this, and permitted the engagement in a fruitful dialogue with the stakeholders, whilst allowing them to provide reflective, in-depth answers to my questions. Concerning stakeholder interviews, it was also appropriate to let those with more practical knowledge and insight regarding SME 'security' appear as experts, further justifying the selection of the semi-structured approach.

Although this type of interview is elastic, it still requires the interviewer to come well prepared – and to bring a loose interview-guide containing topics to be covered in the interview.³¹ To maximize the benefits of interviews, this guide should consist of themes or issues participants are likely to have knowledge about. That way, interviewees are likely to engage and expand on given answers (Humphrey and Lee, 2004). Since interviewed stakeholders possessed distinctive areas of expertise (see the breakdown in Section 3.3.2), the interview guide would, occasionally, be modified or revisited prior to each interview. Finally, the semi-structured approach also accounted for the fact that interviewees' first language not necessarily was English. Should this be the case, challenges can arise, and clarifications may be needed (Barriball and While, 1994). Hence, it was with consideration to both my participants and myself that the flexibility offered by the semi-structured approach in the interview process was regarded as a necessary starting point and completely justifiable.

3.2.2.1 Elite Interviews

Prior to the stakeholder interviews, I decided to consult literature on 'elite interviews' for guidance (Lilleker, 2003; Harvey, 2011; Miles, 2013). 'Elite', as a concept, is loosely defined (Darbi and Hall, 2014). 'Elites' also form a heterogeneously mixed group, and exactly what makes an individual or a group 'elite' is beyond the remits of this discussion (Kantola and Kuusela, 2019). This was merely a preliminary measure taken, because some stakeholders were assumed to be highly-educated individuals positioned on football's organizational side. 'Elite interviews' originate from politics and policy-making studies (Dexter, 1970; Miles, 2013) and are advantageous because 'elite subjects' may significantly enhance the research data's quality or quantity 'by

³¹ The interview guide can be found in Appendix I.

the virtue of their power and social, economic and/or political influence’ (Darbi and Hall, 2014: 843).

Identifying, locating and contacting potential ‘elites’ is an important first step (Lilleker, 2013). Here, contacts and connections are crucial (Darbi and Hall, 2014) because access can surface as an obstacle for researchers. Ultimately, for individuals in the football industry’s upper-echelon, as reflected on in Section 3.3.2, there is little to gain from an encounter with a novice researcher (Millward, 2009b; King, 1997). Access and cooperation are challenging when conducting ‘elite interviews’ (Desmond, 2004) and tight mega-event schedules and short event lifespans add to this. Albeit guidelines exist, there is, as is the case with ‘non-elite’ interviews (Darbi and Hall, 2014), no one-size-fits-all approach when interviewing ‘elite’ subjects (Harvey, 2011). Though, micro-measures, including appearance can be taken. For instance, Millward (2009b) dressed more formally for ‘elite interviews’ than for supporter interviews. He outlines the centrality of gaining trust and disguise personal political allegiances. Another measure was to expect that ‘elites’ would seek to control and dominate interviews (Darbi and Hall, 2014). Indeed, flexibility and open-minded interview approaches helped accounting for this.

3.2.2.2 Stakeholder Interviews in Mega-Event Research

Leopkey and Parent (2009a) argued for an increased inclusion of stakeholders in mega-event research and, indeed, stakeholder interviews have become widely used methods in existing research on mega-event ‘security’ (Klauser, 2011a; 2015; Armstrong et al., 2017; Fussey, 2015). In recent years, interviews with stakeholders involve safety officials (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009; 2012), representatives from event owner (Włoch, 2019) stadium managers (Taylor and Toohey, 2011) and law enforcement (Fussey, 2015). Notwithstanding, stakeholders may also include individuals that possess a perhaps ‘less obvious’ or ‘direct’ role in the mega-event pre-planning or security operation. By definition, ‘stakeholders’ might be individuals in independent fan networks (Cleland et al., 2018; Garcia and Llopis-Goig, 2019), airport security personnel (Klauser, 2011a), sponsors, media (Leopkey and Parent, 2009b) or individuals in the tourist industry (McGillivray et al., 2019) and generally individuals in a position to affect/being affected by an organization.

Existing studies drawing from stakeholder interviews have successfully provided first-hand insight into the inner-workings, politics and realities behind a SME's organization. Additionally, stakeholders' versions are occasionally used as a point of comparison and juxtaposed with event attendees' responses or the researchers' own observations that can either reinforce or contrast the stakeholder interviews (McGillivray et al., 2019; Klauser, 2011a). In other words, just like documents help making sense of stakeholder interviews, stakeholder interviews yield unique findings in themselves, whilst contextualising subsequent findings/developments of the research project.

3.2.3 Interview Materials and Official Statements in Newspapers as Data Sources: A Note on Media Accounts and Secondary Sources

The third and final data source used in this thesis includes interview materials and official statements collected through newspapers and news blogs. Newspaper sources, blogs, radio and web-media content and, essentially, the interview material and official statements *within* these media sources have become increasingly utilized as data sources in the sociology of sports (Hayton et al., 2017; Cleland, 2014; Hill et al., 2018; Millward, 2017; May, 2019; Poulton, 2005; Maguire and Poulton, 1999; Rookwood and Millward, 2011; Brannagan and Rookwood, 2016; Atkinson and Young, 2012). There is also a tendency to draw from official statements or interview quotes in research examining the processes through which 'health' problems are securitized or responded to in terms of 'security' (Curley and Herington, 2011; Rushton, 2011; Elbe et al., 2014). Strictly speaking, the interview materials *within* media articles – which remain of concern here – should be considered secondary sources (May, 2019).

That is because the sources reporting on the 'primary' (e.g. interviews with 'football elites' or officials) are in themselves secondary sources originally presented elsewhere. And fundamentally, some of the 'primary' interview material could merely be obtained through secondary sources. Notwithstanding, in social research, the distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' sources is not always straightforward (Bryman, 2016). For example, non-numeric secondary sources may include data that is received 'second-hand' from interviews and conversations (Smith, 2008) like those available in newspapers. On the other hand, I would argue that the aforementioned policy documents subject to documentary analysis represent primary sources. The reason for

this, is that such documentary data is recorded first-hand, ‘directly’ from the relevant organization. As such, this dimension; ‘directly’ *versus* ‘indirectly’ serves as a marker of the inherently blurry ‘primary’/’secondary’ distinction, in this thesis. As Eisenhauer (2013) argues and demonstrates in her study of stakeholder interests at SMEs, even data that is of secondary nature may still be uniquely presented and contribute towards an original narrative. Further, secondary sources also possess distinctive strengths when one is concerned with the socio-cultural meanings of a particular topic in unique contexts (Braun and Clarke, 2013). A valid example of this would be ‘security’ in light of a global pandemic.

The popularity of media sources and interview materials within them in the sociology of sport can be seen in light of three social realities. Firstly, since the public interest in sport is enormous, this again means that sport receives broad and intense coverage on a global scale (Wenner, 1989). Thus, sports journalism is an established industry on its own, with departments within newspapers wholly dedicated to sport (i.e. *BBC Sports* or *Sky Sports*). Therefore, sports journalists, with their journalistic accounts, may be considered brokers of knowledge, reporting from the inside of the sporting world. Or, as Boyle and Haynes (2000: 8) submit, ‘the media, television and the press in particular, are playing a crucial role in producing, reproducing and amplifying many of the discourses associated with sport in the modern world’. Secondly, the intensified sociological turn towards media sources is arguably related to technological progression in a digital age and the emergence of online research methods (Cleland et al., 2020).

This has simplified researchers’ access to media sources that typically are digitally stored in the relevant outlet’s databases and publicly available online repositories like *LexisNexis* or *Google News*. Third, in light of sports’ ‘hyper-commodification’ (Giulianotti, 2002), public (and scholarly) access to professional athletes, staff and ‘sporting elites’ has become increasingly restricted (Bale, 1994). Some of these issues are touched upon where I discuss ‘elite’ and stakeholder sampling and were experienced by King (1997) already throughout the 1990s. This element of access restriction was further constricted by the enormous pressure and scrutiny Euro 2020 stakeholders were under following the suspension of the European sporting calendar. Therefore, my turn towards media sources represented an alternate route mitigating this pronounced inaccessibility. Especially because the media often possesses better

access through, for example, accreditations, off-the-record briefings and since ‘sporting elites’ to a degree rely on media sources for articulation of their views and to broadcast their perspectives (Byun et al., 2020).

The selection of this data source should also be seen as related to the mentioned COVID-19 outbreak, which I reflect further on later. However, this meant changes to my original research plans involving ‘field-interviews’ and a host city ethnography. As discussed later, ethics boards and committees are likely to produce extraordinary guidelines in crisis situations. This can translate into a temporary suspension of empirical projects or ethical approvals. As such, my turn towards media sources must be understood as borne out of both ‘external’ and ‘internal’ complexities and circumstances. Yet, it can be argued that it provided some very substantial social scientific advantages. This thesis’s ‘virtual’ move was fruitful and extremely necessary for completion of the study and to capture Euro 2020’s most extraordinary security development, namely COVID-19.

Furthermore, online media represented one of the primary spaces in which Euro 2020’s future was commented on, discussed or decided upon by those in position to influence its future. Indeed, even UEFA's Executive Committee meeting, where Euro 2020’s postponement was decided upon, took place as a *virtual* videoconference (UEFA, 2020a). More broadly, it is appropriate to argue that news media represented a key source for information, knowledge and insights into public affairs and responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. First, this underlines the importance of the media and statements communicated via the media from a sociological perspective and as a data source in times of crisis. Second, this highlights that secondary sources should not be merely interpreted as or assumed to be inferior alternatives to primary sources. In this thesis, secondary sources ultimately fulfilled the research needs in a project ‘with macro-interests and micro-resources’ (Glaser, 1963: 11) where the researcher was socially distancing throughout much of the spring/summer of 2020. The collection and use of secondary sources as valid and important data sources in their own right and as supplements to my primary sources, are therefore both methodologically justified and explained practically.

In utilizing media sources, the thesis is predominantly concerned with official statements and interview material that is available within the collected newspaper

articles; more so than examining the rhetoric around or portrayal of particular topics, or the production or representation of media-sports texts (e.g. media portrayal of ‘hooliganism’, see Poulton (2005) or ‘identity’, see Maguire and Poulton (1999)). This distinction is of paramount importance. Essentially, this denotes that the unit of analysis shies away from journalistic accounts or descriptions. Instead, the units of analysis, as systemically analysed, are the quotes and statements articulated by key individuals, actors and/or organizations that have been *quoted by* the media articles.

A similar approach, focused on the official statements and interview material from key organizations or individuals in sport, recorded via newspapers and web-media, may be found in Hayton et al.’s (2017) study of Hull City’s club ownership. Here, statements of the owner, Assem Allam, originally given to the media, comprise a data source. Meanwhile, Hill et al. (2018) draw some of their data from newspapers, blogs and web-media content in their examination of the communication and mobilization of the social protest movement *Stand Against Modern Football*. Perhaps most resembling of this thesis, given the focus on a controversial SME, Millward (2017) uses direct statements and interviews from ‘key players’ among the social actors/organizations involved in World Cup 2022 and the treatment of migrant workers in Qatar. The approach thus captures social meanings articulated around complex topics and allows for analysing the views of main protagonists and decision-makers that are unlikely to be available, accept or ‘consent to involvement [in] academic research’ (May, 2019: 961).

Finally, there are some cautions regarding validity that should be clarified *vis-à-vis* this approach. Journalistic accounts should not always be taken at ‘face value’ as automatic ‘facts’ (Downey and Fenton, 2007). As Millward (2017: 762) succinctly puts it:

[E]xtreme caution should be taken when dealing with newspaper articles, especially given that the journalist’s position is less likely to be ‘objective’ and more likely to be matched to the ability to ‘sell’ that article to its targeted audience. This caution is especially needed when dealing with opinion pieces and editorials

Furthermore, media outlets are likely to have varying political allegiances, readerships and editorial approaches (Wallis and Nerlich, 2005). Whilst these are all important caveats, it is also worth reiterating and re-emphasizing that my data was drawn from

direct statements and interview material from key organizations and publicly known actors (in the COVID-19/Euro 2020 ‘nexus’) that were quoted *within* the media articles. If one speculates, it could be that the quotes or statements carry similarities with those of the ‘fantasy documents’ that may be ‘formulated specifically to address public anxieties’ (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012: 253) and it is possible that some quotes/statements had been influenced by journalistic bias or lack of context. Furthermore, to maintain ethical standards, media sources occasionally ensure sources’ anonymity (i.e. by just referring to unnamed spokespersons/sources) and hide identities of sources that may have provided off-the-record briefings. This simultaneously raises some questions around credibility and whom one should attribute the quote to. I thus avoided using quotes originating from ‘unknown spokespeople’. Notwithstanding, a number of the cited quotes were available in several news articles, facilitating, in many cases, cross-checks to mitigate issues. Furthermore, what makes this type of data collection increasingly justifiable and advantageous is that it represented an unobtrusive method that does not intrude the personal lives of those researched (Millward, 2007). This is not merely preferable, but it was also one of the only ‘real’ or viable options during the pandemic’s extraordinary times, where researchers had to take extra care, as explained later.

3.2.4 Methodological Departure Points

The summarize this thesis’s research design, which had to be significantly altered in light of COVID-19, I employed three data sources and two qualitative methods. The three sources of data also represent three inter-linked steps and followed each other progressively in line with the pre-planning and postponement of Euro 2020. First, a documentary analysis was selected as an appropriate methodological starting point which provided a platform for the second step; the qualitative stakeholder interviews. These two methods allowed for original insight into Euro 2020’s pre-planning speaking to ‘security’ and ‘policing’. Admittedly, this was originally meant to be followed by a participant observation in London during Euro 2020. However, due to Euro 2020’s postponement, this became unfeasible. Instead, a decision was made to turn towards secondary sources in form of official statements and interview material within media sources. As I reflect on in Section 3.4, this flexible move *had to be* made. Not merely because the tournament was postponed, but in order to capture the most

recent and extreme ‘safety’ and ‘security’ development in Euro 2020’s context, namely COVID-19.

However, these three gradual steps and the compatibility between the respective methods must not be downplayed. Arguably, the original research plan would have allowed the tracing of Euro 2020’s ‘security’ from *paper to practice*. Yet, due to unforeseen developments my research instead captured Euro 2020’s security from *paper to crisis*, and managed to capture the meanings of ‘security’ in an unprecedented global crisis which led to the event’s future being acted on by UEFA. Hence, despite the unpredictable developments, the research design was carefully reconfigured to allow for new insights, answers and versions of the perceptions, meanings and constructions of ‘security’ before Euro 2020.

3.3 Data Collection

This marks the second part of this chapter. Here, I explain the data collection, sampling strategies and recount my reflections from researching amidst a pandemic crisis. These reflections will place my thesis in a broader context and can assist or resonate with researchers encountering similar obstacles. I also provide a note on the ethical considerations and summarize the interview data analysis.

3.3.1 Policy Documents: Sampling, Discourses and Caveats

Substantial volumes of documentary data were sampled in order to examine the constructions and meanings of ‘security’ at Euro 2020 as articulated in official discourses. The policy and bidding documents, analysed with a Goffman inspired frame analysis technique, involved nine policy documents comprising a total set of 754 text pages with publicly available and formal material. The documents, broken down in *Table 3.1* below, were purposively sampled based on their relevance to Euro 2020’s security delivery, as an event owned by UEFA. However, organizations including the Council of Europe also played a central role in the event’s security planning by initiating the ‘Euro 2020 Working Group’. On reflection, the most useful and directly relevant document proved to be UEFA EURO 2020 Tournament Requirements, retrieved from UEFA’s official channels.

Document Title	Published by	Year of Publication	Number of Pages
Good Practices for safe and secure major sporting events: experiences and lessons from UEFA EURO 2004	UEFA	2005	217
Handbook with Recommendations for International Police Cooperation and Measures to Prevent and Control Violence and Disturbances in Connection with Football Matches with an International Dimension, in which at Least one Member State is Involved (2010/C 165)	Council of the European Union	2010	21
UEFA EURO 2020 Bid Evaluation Report	UEFA	2014	81
UEFA guide to quality stadiums	UEFA	2014	159
Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events	Council of Europe	2016	19
UEFA Stadium Infrastructure Regulations	UEFA	2018	28
UEFA Safety and Security Regulations	UEFA	2019	29
UEFA EURO 2020 Tournament Requirements	UEFA	N/A	194
Information leaflet on the Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events	Council of Europe	N/A	6

Table 3.1: A summary of the analysed policy documents that were all publicly available. The tournament requirements appear to have no publication date (hence, UEFA, n.d.). However, upon searching for this document it appears to have been uploaded 26 April 2013, which also was when the bidding phase was launched.

Indeed, for transparency purposes, a number of documents related to the event's bidding and hosting were easily accessible and listed on UEFA's and other key stakeholders' official channels. The Euro 2020 tournament requirements state clearly that Euro 2020 would require one of the largest safety and security operations in the world from appointed hosts (UEFA, n.d., S6: 1) and includes the formal, security-related requirements which hosts agreed to by being awarded the hosting rights. This policy document was:

[T]he document provided by UEFA to the bidders as part of the bid requirements, which sets out the requirements for hosting matches of UEFA EURO 2020, including organisational, commercial, infrastructure, facilities and financial requirements (UEFA, n.d., S1:4).

Undeniably, this document played a formative role with its formal guidelines for Euro 2020 host cities both throughout the bidding stage and in light of host country confirmations, on the 19 September 2014, meaning each host city had just under six years to plan their 'security'.

My manually performed documentary analysis facilitated a systematic reading of the relevant organizations' official discourses particularly with regards to the event owner's desires and bidding requirements. These discourses, again, provided an original insight into the meanings of 'security'; how 'security' would be assembled, and other questions including whom that were 'secured' or 'secured from' (see Chapter Four). In the 194 pages long Euro 2020 requirements document, it was also a 21 pages long section that separately addressed the event's security and safety requirements (UEFA, n.d., Sector 6).

This section was the most insightful one given its direct focus on the practicalities of 'security' Euro 2020. This section also refers to other policy documents for the hosting right bidders. That included the manual named 'UEFA Euro 2004 Good Practices for Safe and Secure Major Sporting Events (UEFA, 2005).³² Subsequently, this document was retrieved and frame analysed, enabling snowball sampling. Considering that bidders were specifically directed towards this document, it seemingly served as a key document with existing practices from Euro 2004. UEFA (2005) differs significantly from the 2020 tournament requirements, because the manual from 2005 outlines lessons and 'good practice' from Euro 2004, rather than outlining formal and informal security requirements. Indeed, Euro 2004 in Portugal is commonly highlighted as a success story in terms of its policing and security and, indeed, this policy document maintains that 'future major football events should follow [Euro 2004's] example' (UEFA, 2005: 164). This answers *why* this handbook was referred to in the more contemporary requirements manuals.

UEFA also refers to policy documents from other stakeholders. For example, the Council of the European Union's (2010) guidelines for security and policing at football matches with an international dimension. Resultantly, this document was retrieved for analysis. Other documents that were identified, retrieved and analysed included UEFA's (2014) Euro 2020 Bid Evaluation report, a more recent report published by the Council of Europe (2016), identified through press releases from the Council of Europe, and UEFA's (2018, 2019) general regulations on security and safety and stadium security. Whilst publicly accessible and relevant to Euro 2020, they all contained formal versions of how 'security' in European football contexts should be

³² Worked out by COT Institute for Safety and Crisis Management in Netherlands but published by UEFA.

organized and pre-planned, consequently assisting the research objectives speaking to examining ‘security’s’ meanings and constructions.

A framed discourse analysis was manually performed on all the nine policy documents to record dominant security-related frames that are unpacked in Chapters Four and Five. All the sampled documents successfully yielded an insight into ‘security’ outlooks and requirements ahead of Euro 2020 and/or European football more generally. UEFA (n.d.) also demonstrates how processes of categorization and ‘securitized commodification’ (Giulianotti, 2011) is in place years before Euro 2020 would even commence. Hence, the documents provided original insight into the informal and formal dimensions and discursive realities of event ‘security’. Additionally, I supplemented this stage of the research process with press announcements and briefs from Euro 2020’s build-up, but from before COVID-19 came to play an integral role in Euro 2020’s future. In all 16 media articles were found via *Google News*’ database by searching for the combinations ‘Euro 2020, safety, security’ from May 2018 until December 2019.

It is, of course, necessary to reiterate that policy documents should be treated with some caution. And so, it should be accepted that authorities and organizations occasionally make ‘*fantasy documents*’ publicly available before SMEs to reassure the public and convey images of control (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012). Still, it is actually the case that SME bidding books sometimes become the *de facto* planning documents (Braathen et al., 2016) as event owners’ demands sometimes supersede national laws with ‘special rules’ being imposed (Bar-On, 2017). Ultimately, in the present-day, bid books and manuals are of paramount importance for understanding event owners’ and bidders’ perspectives (Byun et al., 2020). This underscores their value as data sources and – as expected – policy documents produced a robust empirical foundation for my subsequent interviews. Some of the stakeholders even brought me hard copies of some of the abovementioned documents.

Essentially, documents offer forms of discourse where, for instance, ‘security threats’ or ‘referent objects’ are more explicitly articulated than in interviews. There is also an argument in that policy documents, despite potential non-correspondence with actual realities, should be treated as the official version and public position of the relevant publishing organization unless stated otherwise. Hence, I argue that just like my

stakeholder interviews, the analysed documents all represent important, original and publicly articulated stakeholder discourses. As will be evidenced, the documentary research provided highly vital and empirically enriched both my subsequent data collection and this thesis's developed conceptual framework which can be used to make sense of mega-event pre-planning: the 'troika of security' (see Chapters Four and Five).

3.3.2 Interviews: Challenges, Sampling and Approach

Nine in-depth interviews were carried out with diverse stakeholders in the securitization of Euro 2020. Despite operating with a broad definition of 'stakeholder' (Freeman, 1984), all interviewed stakeholders (*Table 3.2*) were actively and formally involved in either the pre-planning for Euro 2020, its media coverage, general football policing or crowd management. As such, it is perhaps more appropriate to employ the term 'security stakeholder' (Klauser, 2011a) for some of them.

Name	Stakeholder Description	Interview Type	Nationality
Stakeholder 1	Individual working for a national fan association	In-depth	British
Stakeholder 2	Individual working for European fan network	In-depth	British
Stakeholder 3	Individual working in the national sports media	In-depth	British
Stakeholder 4	Individual associated with a European fan network, central in the Fan Embassy services	In-depth (email)	British
Stakeholder 5	Supporter Liaison Officer in a Euro 2020 host city	In-depth (email)	British
Stakeholder 6	Professional crowd safety expert	In-depth (email)	Norwegian
Stakeholder 7	SD Europe/UEFA Supporter Liaison Officer Coordinator	In-depth (Skype)	German/British
Stakeholder 8	Chief Executive (national fan association)	In-depth (Skype)	British
Stakeholder 9	Euro 2020 Project Manager (European fan network)	In-depth (Skype)	British

Table 3.2: Interviewed stakeholders

As summarized in *Table 3.2*, interviewed stakeholders included one Supporter Liaison Officer (SLO) employed by a club in a Euro 2020 host city; a crowd safety professional; an individual working in national media covering SMEs, and then six individuals that – at different capacities – work for UK and/or European-wide fan organizations. Crucially, European fan organizations like FSE and SD Europe had

formal observer status in the Council of Europe's 'Euro 2020 Working Group' (COE, 2019; see Chapter Five) and are recognized by UEFA. UEFA's (n.d., S3: 7) Euro 2020 requirements highlight '[c]ooperation with Football Supporters Europe (FSE)' as 'good practice' and fan organizations have actively contributed to the organization of previous European Championships (Cleland et al., 2018). Fan organizations are 'incorporated as part of European football's governance network' and is the stakeholder group that receives most trust by European football fans (Garcia and Llopis-Goig, 2019: 5). Recently, Turner (2019) also evidenced how fan organizations, as stakeholders, can impact security or safety related developments in English football.

The six stakeholders associated with fan networks were, in different capacities, involved in planning or organization pre-Euro 2020. Their assignments included close work and liaison with police forces in host cities, attendance at pre-event conventions and observations and organization of fan zones, fan embassies and/or information points. Interviewed stakeholders were also actively involved in the development of security and policing approaches in football throughout the season as they work, communicate and liaise with police forces and working groups. In terms of football security and policing, the interviewees represented experts, uniquely positioned to influence the pre-planned security operation at Euro 2020 through their close work with both the game's fans *and* security forces. These stakeholder groups in football crowd security and policing play an important role in the development of more progressive and effective models of crowd management and football policing (Stott and Pearson, 2016).

The sampling size was deliberately set to a smaller number, but with extremely careful attention to the sample frame's accuracy. This was intentional and not expected to come at the cost of my study's qualitative content. However, it can also be explained by other factors, such as financial constraints, access and importantly: my original focus on *spectators'* perceptions of 'security' in the thesis, although this focus of course was changed following COVID-19. It was also a reality that the pool of Euro 2020 stakeholders *willing* to participate in academic research was not limitless. Some of these issues were touched upon under 'elite interviews' and ultimately, gaining access to and recruiting key stakeholders *before* events take place – even when anonymity is assured – is challenging. But despite this, my sample size is comparable with and reflects similar studies that have used samples of six (Eisenhauer, 2013), nine

(Lauss and Szigetvari, 2010) and 10 (Klauser, 2011a; Taylor and Toohey, 2011) interviewed stakeholders. The challenges related to recruitment was of course amplified by the postponement. This meant stakeholders were under increased pressure to develop new solutions to a congested sporting calendar, whilst facing enormous uncertainties in their professional lives.

Rookwood (2019: 4) acknowledges that when ‘conducting independent scholarly investigations of mega-event organisers, researchers can experience difficulties in accessing senior staff and pursuing candid responses to questions’. Continuing, he also points out that even Sugden and Tomlinson’s (2016) ground-breaking critical investigation of FIFA met such difficulties. Essentially, accessing individuals in positions encompassing big responsibilities and with the highest levels of influence is difficult in research like this. Further, security actors often operate within a ‘legally and socio-culturally closed realm’ (Eski, 2012: 951). Thus, security research is likely to generate some unusual methodological problems related to an ‘assumption amongst security experts that divulging information to the public around risk and security planning would potentially provide valuable information to the wrong hands’ (Aitken, 2020: 9-10).

This comes to fore in Armstrong et al.’s (2017) reflections following their ethnography with the London police in relation to the 2012 Olympics. As a limitation, they acknowledge that certain information ‘may well have resided in a knowledge bubble-floating some way above [their] security clearance’ (p. 174). Indeed, Monaghan and Walby (2012) argue that collecting data on security and policing practices post-9/11 has become increasingly complicated by issues of access. Especially the ‘documentation on past protocols or *future plans*’ for policing (ibid.: 655, emphasis added). As Petersohn (2018) explains, after negotiating access to private security actors, recruitment challenges are often directly linked to access and participants’ reluctance.

On reflection, I agree with Eisenhauer (2013). She argues that the unavailability of many key stakeholders represents a constraint in security-related SME research. However, I do not see this as preventing my thesis from providing a high-quality portrait of Euro 2020’s pre-planning. King’s (1997: 226) experience-based assertion holding that, in the world of football, ‘elite groups often make themselves unavailable

for interview' can also be related to. Upon researching football directors, King experienced that football club directors, especially in so-called 'top clubs' often declined interview requests.

Simply put, in research like this, there is extremely little to gain for 'football elites', senior officials, security agencies or event organizers (who do not necessarily identify *themselves* as 'elites'). This is one reason that stakeholders, occasionally, are reserved against participating when invited. Often, this is illustrated by declined or ignored invitations. This is a practical issue that not only has surfaced before (King, 1997; Eisenhauer, 2013; Sugden and Tomlinson, 2016; Rookwood, 2019), but that future, similar research is likely to encounter. Hence, whilst similar challenges as King (1997) experienced were encountered, I agree with his claim that 'although more acceptances for interview would have been advantageous, the interviews that were conducted proved useful' (*ibid.*). Yet, I would go further than 'useful'. Essentially, it cannot be shied away from that those stakeholders accepting my invitation provided extremely valuable insight.

Following ethical approval, all stakeholders were recruited via email. A formal recruitment email was sent out to 28 pre-defined stakeholders. This contained key information about the research's rationale and intentions. If the recipient did not respond, I would send them one reminder. In the event of no reply, I assumed that my invitation had been rejected. Occasionally, I received rejection emails. These would often be sincere and wish me the best of luck with my study. As my above reflections imply, rejections were anticipated: much because of the inherent melange of secrecy and transience in my research topic's nature. On the occasions where a positive response was returned, an interview was arranged.

Interviews included five face-to-face interviews (one via Skype), one phone interview (via Skype) whilst three were conducted through email (an option chosen by those participants). There are of course, limits to the use of email interviews. Supposedly, these speak to the lack of personal touch and the ability to follow-up on given answers. Therefore, the email interviews contained follow-up questions in the document with questions that interviewees could opt to fill out and expand on. In spite of its limitations, it is undeniable that an email interview is more fruitful than what, in some cases, can be the alternative: no interview. As Young et al. (1998) note, such interviews

are most efficient when both participant and interviewer are comfortable with email communication. In a digital age, dominated by instant chats, direct messages and online-based interactions as means of communication (Petersen-Wagner, 2015), there are also some striking advantages with email interviews because they give the interviewee more time and space to reflect, whilst being cost-efficient. Meanwhile, face-to-face interviews typically had an informal tone over a tea or coffee, and lasted between 25 minutes and 1 hour. Broadly, my interview guide consisted of topics such as Euro 2020's format, security, football policing, and given the nature of the stakeholders, the role played by fan networks in the planning of events like Euro 2020. To ease transcription, face-to-face and Skype interviews were audio-recorded.

Initially, participants were identified through news articles, official channels of football stakeholder organizations, supporter organizations³³ and social media (Twitter and LinkedIn). After my data collection started in January 2019, the auspicious method of snowball sampling was also occasionally deployed. Snowball sampling 'yields a study sample through referrals made among people who share or know of others who possess some characteristics that are of research interest' (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981: 141). However, since contacts are made on personal recommendations it can result in a biased sample, as 'likeminded acquaintances' of the previously interviewed sometimes are suggested or mentioned (Hayton, 2013: 123). Despite this, 'snowballing' can prove extremely helpful if other means of recruitment stagnate (Rubin and Rubin, 1995) and it may, sometimes, be the only – and most practical way – to achieve the sample frame (Becker, 1963).

Finally, qualitative interviews should always be placed in some social context. And upon reflection, it is worth highlighting that the majority of the stakeholders I interviewed were from the UK (see breakdown in *Table 3.2*). Following the central idea within the critical approaches to 'security' maintaining that 'security' ultimately is a derivative concept, how one understands or views 'security', 'security issues' or 'security threats' ultimately derive from how one sees the world or world politics more broadly (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Hence, the nationality, worldview and the relevant culture of security of each stakeholder were likely to shape their perceptions of policing or security-related matters ahead of Euro 2020, as well as their

³³ Typically, key contact information was available on their websites.

wider experiences and perceptions of ‘security’ around SMEs and the police-fan power dynamics.

Further, it is also likely that the interviewees’ nationality and location – mostly in the Northern or Western Europe – can have impacted their attitudes and how they, for example, viewed or compared the football-related security or policing experience in their *own* location to that of other Euro 2020 co-hosts, or how the fan representatives viewed their *own* organization as playing an influential role in national or European football governance and in Euro 2020’s security and safety planning. Thus, whilst interviewees commonly spoke of Euro 2020 and its European-wide ‘security’ planning, it is also imperative to underline that in doing so, they spoke primarily from a Northern or Western-European fan representative perspective, which *Table 3.2* indicates.

Therefore, this study does not include the perspectives of, for example, South European or East European stakeholders or representatives. This remains a limitation of the study which should be openly admitted and provided reflection. Especially so, as fan networks like FSE have active members across the whole European continent (Cleland et al., 2018). Hence, future and similar research should aim to include the voices of fan representatives based in Southern and Eastern Europe for a more comparative and nuanced study. The above point related to the interviewees’ backgrounds is also important as context for the findings presented in Chapter Five, regarding how the themes of ‘institutional memory’ and ‘good practices’ in football policing are situated within the ‘troika of security’ (Chapter Five) and referred to throughout.

3.3.3 Interview Materials and Official Statements in Media Sources: Collection and Approach

As the rumours emerged and the news broke around Euro 2020’s uncertain future and potential postponement following COVID-19, this research’s original plans – including a host city ethnography – had to be abandoned. To complete the final data collection stage and capture the unprecedented events that were unfolding, a decision was made, as stated, to collect interview materials from news media sources and official statements that were made available and/or articulated by key actors or organizations in Euro 2020’s organization and ‘security’.

Notwithstanding, COVID-19 enabled a novel opportunity to explore the ways in which an extraordinary pandemic impacted the world of sports and the sporting responses to it. In the case of Euro 2020, a systematic reading of interview materials and official statements allowed for critically interrogating COVID-19 as a ‘security threat’. Hence, I adopted the approaches of Millward (2017) and May (2019) and I carried out targeted searches for data which was collected through online newspaper and news blog repository provided by Google (called ‘*Google News*’). In short, the *Google News* repository provides a continuous flow of news and media articles and is one the largest news aggregators globally. Further, it provides users with an opportunity to customize and order articles according to publishing date or set preferences. In social and political research, *Google News* has been increasingly utilized by researchers (Stow and Bason, 2020; Weaver and Bimber, 2008). And, compared to similar repositories, like *LexisNexis*, *Google News* provides larger worldwide coverage (Weaver and Bimber, 2008). Furthermore, following Rookwood and Millward (2011), I conducted targeted searches for radio shows and podcasts that addressed COVID-19’s impact on sports and Euro 2020 as well as European football’s responses to it, such as *BBC Sounds*’ ‘Sportshour’.³⁴

In the unfolding and most dramatic period prior to Euro 2020’s postponement, which was between 29 February and 18 March 2020 (described in Chapter Six), I carried out frequent targeted computer searches daily, for online articles that were published between 1 January and 18 March 2020.³⁵ Following 17 March, the day UEFA (2020b) announced Euro 2020’s postponement, my searches were less frequent in accordance with the declining media interest around COVID-19 in reference to Euro 2020. The time window I have sampled articles within is 1 January 2020 – 6 May 2020.

Following Atkinson and Young (2012), I followed no rigid selection criteria that guided my sampling process, but every media account had to consider some aspects of Euro 2020, COVID-19 and mega-events’ responses to COVID-19. The words that informed all my targeted searches were ‘Euro 2020,’ UEFA’, ‘COVID-19’ and

³⁴ Any segments of analytical interest were then manually transcribed since such podcasts often are available online only for a limited time.

³⁵ 1 January was selected because COVID-19 was not announced as a new coronavirus until 8 January 2020 (*Wall Street Journal*, 2020).

‘coronavirus’.³⁶ From these searches, results that yielded communication, interview statements or opinions around Euro 2020, COVID-19 and the future of sports events were identified. Occasionally, when statements or other news articles were referred to in the collected articles, I was directed to these and included them in my sample. Effectively, this meant that snowball sampling procedures were blended with the purposive and convenience sampling.

Furthermore, I manually monitored and collected all the official statements and key communications that were published by key organizations on their respective channels. That included WHO, FIFA, UEFA, individual football associations (in Euro 2020’s 12 host countries) and independent fan networks such as FSE and SD Europe. Articles that mentioned the term ‘Euro 2020’ merely in passing were excluded. Overall, this left me with a sample of 149 articles which included what must be considered to be extremely important statements and interview material from key actors or key players in the COVID-19/Euro 2020 ‘nexus’. The importance and validity of such statements and discourses within them are also addressed where I discuss policy-documents. Moreover, this represents a large sample, considering that the majority of media articles were published within the short timeframe of 18 days, which reflected the enormous public interest in Euro 2020’s and European football’s future following COVID-19.

To elaborate on my approach, a key step involved organizing all sampled articles in a spreadsheet consisting of three key columns. The columns were used to organize the articles’ (i) hyperlinks, (ii) news outlets/organization and (iii) date of publishing. In effect, this assisted the construction of a personal (mini-)archive of secondary sources. Secondly, the sampled media accounts and official communications were all closely read. Indeed, the large corpus of material provided distinctive challenges, but the close reading had to be conducted in order to find official statements and quotes *within* news sources. This task was significantly easier in those official announcements made available by key organizations on their own channels, such as UEFA. Overall, two close readings of the total corpus were conducted. However, on the second reading I

³⁶ From 18 March, I also included ‘Euro 2021’ in my computer searches in case media accounts started to refer to the event as ‘Euro 2021’.

began framing the discourse according to three frames more deliberately. At this stage, dominant themes and actors had also started to emerge.

On the second reading, I downloaded all the key statements and interview material into a new document, as this would ease a third analysis of selected quotes and later assist the process of selecting quotes or terms that most appropriately represented their frames. Working within the key premises of Goffman (1974), described above, these discourses were analysed according to (1) ‘whom’ or ‘what’ that was framed as a ‘security issue’ and (2) ‘whom’ or ‘what’ this ‘security issue’ (COVID-19) was framed as a ‘security threat’ to. Lastly, I analysed the material according an outcome frame. This consisted of statements or discourse revolving around or addressing how COVID-19, as a ‘security threat’, would be resolved or responded to, in order to bring about changed outcomes (Chapter Six). Finally, some limitations to this approach must be clarified. Essentially, my reading of the data does not represent a ‘totalizing representation’ (Atkinson and Young, 2012: 291) of the statements that emerged following COVID-19’s immense impacts on sports. As such, I cannot claim that the understandings presented in Chapter Six compose an ‘all-inclusive’ set of discourses, whereas the bulk of data were statements in English, in addition to some Danish and Norwegian sources that were gathered, given my fluency in these languages.

3.4 Social Research in a Time of Social Distancing: Reflections and Guidance for Researchers

The Chinese word for ‘crisis’ is composed of two ideograms: the first meaning *danger*, the second, *opportunity*. *Danger* to avoid; *opportunity* to grasp (Falloux and Talbot, 1992: xiv). Fittingly, an ‘unprecedented’ or ‘unparalleled’ *crisis* were some of the descriptions attached to the global outbreak of COVID-19 throughout the spring/summer of 2020. A pandemic like COVID-19 demonstrates one *force majeure* element that is inherent, yet downplayed, in mega-event research. There is always a chance however slim that the event serving as a case or site of analysis gets cancelled or postponed. Crises impact research, writing and researchers personally, as Beck (1987) reflects on in light of the Chernobyl disaster which occurred between the submission and appearance of his seminal *Risk Society* (1992).³⁷

³⁷ Originally published as *Risikogesellschaft* (1986) in German.

This section outlines my reflections on researching under conditions of *not knowing* and amidst what can be characterized as ‘chaos’. My principal aim is to provide a reflexive interpretation of the interpretation (Alvesson and Sköldbberg, 2009) and give some experience-based insights into the messy nature of research. In the social sciences (Ferdinand et al., 2007; Hannerz, 2003) and the narrower sociology of sports (Giulianotti, 1995a; Millward, 2009a; Richards, 2018; Poulton, 2012), some extremely useful ‘tales of the field’ – that is, fieldwork reflections – have originated from ethnographic studies. Undoubtedly, these have assisted upcoming generations of sociologists. However, there is undeniably more scope for knowledge extension and sharing on fieldwork that *never actually took place* (see e.g. Horowitz, 1967) – where the field itself became unavailable due to unforeseen circumstances, and the practical implications of this. Thus, I also outline some guidance for researchers undertaking similar research that may encounter similar challenges.

As stated, the worldwide outbreak of the novel coronavirus displayed both the securitization of health and the medicalization of security (Elbe, 2011). Needless to say, it also affected this thesis and me, as a researcher, in a unique and personal way. To be sure, COVID-19 must first and foremost be regarded a global crisis and emergency, and as one of the most serious public health threats in modern time. However, the tangible and intangible impacts of the pandemic also illuminate some of the intricate realities of being a social researcher. In light of WHO confirming that COVID-19 was a pandemic (BBC, 2020c) merely three months before Euro 2020 was due to begin, I had to make or consider a series of decisions that ultimately shaped this thesis and my experiences as a researcher.

Two of the most cited strategies for combatting COVID-19 were ‘quarantines’ and ‘social distancing’. This translated into a spring/summer period with enormous restrictions on everyday life, travelling and crowded gatherings as my research had entered its final phase. Indeed, at this stage substantial fieldwork preparations had been carried out: I had booked transport and accommodation for my planned fieldwork in London, which would include host city and fan zone observations. I had attended football games and pub screenings – on my own – because I thought it prudent to spend time in a somewhat similar environment to what awaited me in London, and to avoid being perceived as a ‘cultural dinosaur’ (Silverstone, 2003: 5) by the football fans I planned to interact with and question. However, as the outbreak intensified hour-by-

hour and uncertainties were articulated even by ‘those who until now [had] pretended to know’ (Beck, 1987: 157), I quickly understood that my research would *not* proceed as envisaged and that my planned ethnographic component involving fan interviews would have to be abandoned. Instead, acting in a socially responsible way by self-isolating, in order to reduce spreading of the virus to more vulnerable populations, was my first action and response.

It is needful to give some context before proceeding. My PhD research had originally been motivated by Euro 2016, staged in a country formally in a state of emergency following a series of terrorist attacks in Paris, including one targeting *Stade de France* in 2015 (Cleland and Cashmore, 2018). My research’s original intention was thus to interview fans at Euro 2020 about their views on ‘security measures’, ‘policing’ and ‘security threats’ including ‘terrorists’, ‘hooligans’ or ‘criminals’ (Chapter Two). Regardless, the events unfolding in the spring of 2020 changed these plans. Instead a reframing of my thesis had to be made with less than 12 months of funding available. Whilst a reframing or restructuring of a PhD thesis is not unusual *per se*, I would still claim the circumstances under which I had to make my alterations were atypical. Not uncommonly, major changes to PhD projects occur relatively early on in the process, and not under the chaotic conditions in which I had to make mine. COVID-19 meant that Euro 2020 was scheduled for 2021 (UEFA, 2020b) – yet for a number of weeks, it seemed like an outright cancellation was a very real option.

Upon proceeding, the first question I seek to address is how the researcher can deal with such massive uncertainties that are likely to influence most aspects of the overarching research project. Although a cynical argument would be that I should have sufficiently prepared for this, I would argue that was completely unfeasible. As Elbe et al. (2014) remind us, pandemics are inherently unpredictable. My position was that this represented something that could not possibly be more outside the researcher’s control, regardless of how much one might blame oneself for not accounting for such unforeseen circumstances. However, in spite of this element of acquittal, the researcher *does* play a role in how to approach, respond to or deal with such situations impacting the relevant project.

First, questions will emerge; where exactly does a possible postponement or cancellation leave the project? In my case, my original plans had proceeded on the

basis that Euro 2020 would be staged ‘as normal’. When this seemed increasingly unlikely, questions of validity emerged as an initial reaction. Would my project data still be ‘valid’? I had already made a substantial data collection from the event’s pre-planning. Some of this had even been published in journals (see Lee Ludvigsen, 2019). The position I adopted was that, even if a cancellation or postponement would occur, my data would still be valid. A cancellation would still represent a sociologically illuminating and dynamic reality of mega-event ‘security’ and ‘security’ more broadly. Even cancellations are sociologically important. For instance, as Bar-On (2017: 261) highlights, an ‘interesting test case’ for national sovereignty is whether it is governing bodies in sport or national governments that cancel SMEs in the name of ‘public security’.

Cancellations thus do not automatically translate into meaninglessness nor turn the project into a blank slate. Instead, cancellations or postponements should be critically analysed and seen as entrances into new research angles that become defining elements of the research project. Mega-event research carried out in a pre-event context does not become *any less* important *should* the event be postponed/cancelled. Fussey et al.’s (2011) *Securing and Sustaining the Olympic City* would not have been any less of a contribution had the 2012 London Olympics been cancelled, because what happened pre-event, which they capture, had large socio-political and geographical implications in itself.

With regards to relationship between pre-event data and postponement or cancellations; external questions or personal doubts may arise. To give an answer to the question, on whether my research on the pre-planning still would matter, even if Euro 2020 turned into a ‘non-event’ (cf. Atkinson and Young, 2012), I would argue that it undoubtedly would. The data on pre-planning still captures real policies, voices of real people, networking events that took place and measures that were implemented. Even if Euro 2020 was outright cancelled, this data would still have mattered, in a similar way as Budapest’s new stadium, *Puskás Aréna* – built for Euro 2020 – still would have been standing and representing an architectural reminder of a pre-planning that took place, even against a hypothetical cancellation. Potential postponements or cancellations do not change such facts, while collected data does not become ‘outdated’ quicker – than ‘normal data’ – nor lose its sociological importance.

The second theme I will discuss is ‘flexibility’ under the umbrella of operating pragmatically. Flexibility is required in the majority of research projects because most research is prone to unforeseen circumstances (see Millward, 2009a; Giulianotti, 1995a). Indeed, there are degrees of unforeseen circumstances. In mega-event research, postponements or cancellations are possibly two of the biggest challenges, perhaps comparable with a research lab that is shut down for an unspecified amount of time in a natural sciences project. Amplifying this, of course, there are always the realities of project timelines and funding, which must be respected. For me, this meant that even when Euro 2020 was postponed by 12 months, to the summer of 2021, it would have been highly unfeasible for me to wait. Instead, a serious consideration of the new avenues, that were opened for critical exploration, had to be conducted. There were simply few indications on how long ‘social distancing’, ‘quarantines’ and ‘self-isolation’ would remain a key part of global citizens’ vernaculars. As such, there were no guarantees at the time that Euro 2020 even would be able to go on in June 2021, albeit provisionally moved to this month.

Indeed, in the broader context and current academic climate, waiting cannot always represent a realistic option. Therefore, this is a dilemma that other researchers most definitely will encounter too, whether this is related to career progression pressure, funding or institutional expectations. In such situations, I attempted to exercise the acts of observing, anticipating and flexibly reacting. As soon as the rumours around Euro 2020’s future broke, I spent time acquiring an overview of the situation on social media (i.e. by utilizing the Twitter search function frequently). At this stage, not all tweets are necessarily reliable. Yet, this provided me with a platform for being both observing and anticipatory. When the public interest around the future of Euro 2020 ballooned, it was time to be flexible. In this thesis’s context, flexibility related mostly to methodological versatility and pragmatism as my pre-planned ethnography was abandoned.

In this case, modes of recording data that did not require human interactions had to be urgently considered. Also, in crisis situations such as pandemics, university ethics committees may develop specific guidelines for researchers and temporarily suspend empirical projects requiring human interaction. Of course, there are a series of ways of conducting social research *without* methodologies that require human interactions (see, for example, Millward, 2017; Poulton, 2005). However, the issue at stake is not

necessarily the available arsenal of social research methods. Rather, the problem may be that the alternative methods are not always compatible with the original aims or rationales of the research project. This means being pragmatic and able to exercise flexibility – and depart from provisional plans – is of utmost vitality in research encountering similar obstacles.

On a personal level, as explained lengthier already, I decided on collecting public statements, media discourses and framings to empirically and systematically examine how COVID-19 was formally uttered or framed as a ‘security threat’ or ‘security issue’. This was also informed by the fact that extremely little research had focused on this, both in narrower sports contexts (Shipway, 2018) and broader sociology ones. COVID-19 and its global impacts, ultimately, were completely unprecedented and whilst I accept that my approach is not a silver bullet, which provides tangible answers to intangible questions on exactly what to do with regards to methodological choices, the three key lessons that remain are to remain observant, reactive and flexible.

The final question is one of ethics – or to paraphrase Ferdinand et al. (2007) a *very* different kind of ethics – in a crisis situation that requires an exceptional prioritization of health and safety. A majority of Europe and European football went into ‘lockdown’ in late February and early March 2020. Until 17 March 2020, no formal decision was made regarding Euro 2020’s postponement. Thus, in terms of my researcher role, an emerging question which I had to ask myself throughout these weeks was; *if* Euro 2020 would still be played as planned, would it still be ethically justifiable for me to conduct fieldwork? Here, there are two interconnected dimensions that are crucial to consider because, essentially, ethical procedures are not just a question of following the required research demands. Ethical dilemmas should also be reflexively faced. First, *vis-a-vis* health and safety, COVID-19 spreads through human-to-human transmission and reduction of human contact rates were a key measure to mitigate disease transmission. The scenario of Euro 2020 proceeding as planned, and me carrying out fieldwork thus raised some exceptional ethical issues that I had never previously faced.

To offer a hypothetical example, I could potentially be carrying the virus and spread it to interviewees or others. Or, I could be at risk of being infected whilst in the field. This also raises exclusionary questions. Would it, for example, only be justifiable to interview and interact with so-called ‘non-risk’ or ‘non-vulnerable’ groups and

individuals that, statistically, were less ‘vulnerable’ to COVID-19? This would subsequently have been exclusionary for people with underlying health conditions like diabetes, lung diseases or heart diseases, or older adults. Secondly, this therefore connects with the ethics of collecting data amidst chaos. Whilst this, in practice, did not surface as a problem for me, *because* Euro 2020 was postponed, it was something that had to be seriously reflected on until 17 March 2020. Furthermore, it is a not insignificant dilemma which researchers may encounter in a ‘post-pandemic’ future. I mention this because it goes to show that those ethical considerations one makes at the start of a research project are not necessarily those that actually become ethical dilemmas when the research is being carried out (see Millward, 2009a). Thus, although my reflexive soup of guidance here is merely tentative, it is also of paramount importance to follow updated guidelines from WHO, governments, universities and ethics committees.

Simultaneously, although pandemics are relatively unique occurrences, it remains important that ethics boards communicate, make available and/or develop clear guidelines for postgraduates and early career researchers in crisis situations. For example, I experienced repeated knock-backs and difficulties in receiving ethical approval for my planned ethnography due to the supposed threat from intoxicated football fans. I suspect this was partly because football fans, in the broadest sense – as a population – still are followed, if not haunted, by wrongful prejudice and judgement by the virtue of being active followers of a sport (Numerato, 2018). This, despite the fact that it is merely a small minority of football fans which display, for example, violent tendencies (Pearson, 2012a). However, a pandemic – which became the ‘real issue’ – was never really considered by myself nor the ethics committee as an emerging issue. Concurrently, this sheds a light on some of the limitations of ethical processes (and, indeed, my own ethical application), as a pandemic seemed a dystopian fantasy for both parties. Hence, to sum up, the COVID-19 outbreak provided a manifold of valuable lessons that it remained important to not only reflect on, but to learn from. This section draws from the experiences of myself who encountered some of these challenges and it provides preparatory guidance for researchers who meet similar hindrances.

3.5 Ethical Considerations

Qualitative research involving human participants is bound to a set of ethical issues that the researcher must account for and address upon designing the research, but most importantly, when conducting the fieldwork. Ethical research protocols provide protection against any dubious or immoral practices both individually and institutionally (Hughes et al., 2010). Both the legitimization and credibility of research is therefore helped by research ethics (Hallowell et al., 2005). In any research process, decision-making is a constant. Methodological and epistemological decisions, as explained, must be taken. These decisions then generate a new set of reflexive ethical considerations that are attached to the relevant methodological and/or epistemological approaches that were arrived at. Ethical guidelines are, in that sense, acting as a regulator of what the ‘researcher can, cannot, or should not do’, in various aspects of the research in light of methodological settlements (Ferdinand et al., 2007: 520). Indeed, attaining ethical approval for this study’s data collection was not a straightforward process, as already explained. However paradoxically, the aspect of this research that was deemed ‘too risky’ in the evaluations of my ethical application process, the in-field interviews with fans, never actually occurred following COVID-19.

Therefore, the more specific ethical considerations associated with the stakeholder interviews are now outlined. Throughout the research, I subscribed to the guidelines provided by the *British Sociological Association* (2017) and my university’s own ethics committee. To ensure informed consent, all participants had to read a participant information sheet, give informed consent and sign consent forms before interviews (Appendix II). In order to ensure ethical standards and confidentiality, no individuals will be personally identified in the study. Every single participant’s identity is disguised through an allocated pseudonym solely known to the researcher. Every participant was made explicitly aware of this, to reassure them about their anonymity in this thesis. Further, all identifiable information was at all times kept confidential. Participants were informed about this, and the limits of confidentiality.

In order to ensure ethical standards and to, perhaps as important, display decency, every participant was asked for permission before I audio-recorded interviews for the purpose of easing the transcription process. The interview transcripts were stored in a locked cabinet on Liverpool John Moores University’s property with consent forms.

Only the researcher could access these. Following transcription, my audio-recordings were erased. Moreover, each participant was informed that they could access a transcript of their own interview to read through, although none did. Any identifiable data held on participants will, in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act, be destroyed in five years.

3.6 Data Analysis of Interviews

While the policy documents and media sources were distinctively analysed by performing a frame analysis, I took a different approach to interview data. Interview data was analysed by using a basic Straussian approach and an initial open coding technique (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Qualitative data analysis, Thorne (2000: 68) writes, represents the most ‘complex’ and ‘mysterious’ stage of a qualitative research project and can be delineated into six phases (Mason, 2002) although analysis is no linear process (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Mason’s (2002: 148) six stages include (i) familiarizing yourself with your data, (ii) generating initial codes, (iii) searching for themes, (iv) reviewing themes, (v) defining and naming themes and finally (vi) producing the thesis (ibid.: 86-87). It is also suggested that data should be analysed ‘literally, interpretively and reflexively’ (Mason, 2002: 148).

Upon analysing interviews, these stages were followed. At all times, the first step after audio-recorded interviews was manual transcription. Whilst this process is notoriously daunting and occasionally challenging due to background noises, it proved extremely vital and fruitful. Arguably, it enables the researcher to engage with *at least* the first four phases above. Although it allows for tentative pattern-matching (Yin, 1994) it does not necessarily facilitate reflexive analysis (Mason, 2002). Thus, following re-reads of transcripts, where contours of themes start to emerge, themes could, following transcription start to be tentatively defined using open coding.

Open coding refers to the ‘the naming and categorization of phenomena through close examination of data’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 62). This coding technique is drawn from the constructivist version of grounded theory methodology (Chamberlain, 2013) where theory is inductively developed from the systematically collected data, rather than an approach which imposes theory upon data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Grounded theory allows for the researcher to break down data and to conceptualize it and/or re-arrange it (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Using open coding, the interview data

was recorded into categories that were freely generated (Berg, 1989). The employed coding strategy inductively identified key themes from a close reading of transcripts, before ‘conceptual labels’ were analysed and compared to a list of conceptual categories (Konecki, 1997: 144).

This coding stage involved constant comparisons. When one category was identified, it was compared with previous instances (Gray, 2009). Thus, after analysing a number of the transcripts, emerging concepts or themes were sorted into broader groups to establish categories. At this stage, axial and selective coding techniques were employed, whilst it becomes easier to reflexively analyse transcripts too, rather than immediately following transcription. The later stage of axial coding allows for developing categories and concepts and relationships within these categories (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). These categories then serve as the foundation for what is discussed, both in relation to its own value and to the existing literature and theory. The final stage involved selective coding where I identified quotes or excerpts that most appropriately represented their attributed category/concept, which would constitute the forthcoming discussion. The two latter stages critically contributed to this thesis’s development of the ‘troika of security’ concept, laid out in Chapters Four and Five.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter covers and justifies the philosophical, methodological, practical and analytical matters, issues or questions associated with this thesis’s research design, data collection and analysis. As explained, the outbreak of COVID-19 significantly altered this research project’s original design, which originally included a short-term ethnography with field interviews at Euro 2020. In light of Euro 2020’s postponement, this had to be abandoned. The chapter also explains the methodological techniques employed for this study in detail. I argue that the research design allowed for a gradual tracing of Euro 2020’s most important pre-planning including the most exceptional security developments; COVID-19 and the postponement. Empirical data was collected by employing the qualitative methods of documentary analysis and in-depth interviews. Additionally, the thesis includes interview materials and official statements collected through electronic newspapers and news blogs following the pandemic outbreak.

The chapter includes a rigorous justification for employing these exact approaches, and sheds a light upon challenges and ethical issues speaking to being a social researcher in an exceptional time of crisis whilst socially distancing. This concludes not only this chapter, but the part of my thesis dealing with the existing literature, theoretical and conceptual considerations, and methodological questions. In the following chapters, the original findings from the data collection and analysis give an original and insightful account of the perceptions, meanings, and constructions of ‘security’ before Euro 2020.

Part II

Chapter 4

Chapter 4: A 'Euro for Europe'

Security Governance, Practices and Multiple Meanings

4.1 Introduction

This chapter marks the beginning of this thesis's second part. Hereinafter, this thesis's original findings and empirically-informed arguments are presented and developed. The chapter examines pre-event 'security' discourses surrounding Euro 2020, drawn from an analysis of official policy documents and handbooks published by key stakeholder organizations (see Chapter Three). It is argued that despite the emphasis on 'securing' SMEs by adhering to future-oriented security assessments and 'what if?' questions (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009, 2012), significant constituents of Euro 2020's 'security' pre-planning involved drawing upon experiences from past events (Klauser, 2012). Hence, the pre-event planning for Euro 2020 illuminated important dynamics in the transnationalization of security knowledge through the evidenced recirculation of 'security lessons' and 'good practices'. Though, tempo-spatially these lesson-drawing processes occur on both local and transnational levels, because they are transferred across time and borders.

With these findings, the thesis advances towards the concept which Chapter Five conceptualizes and develops in full: the *'troika of security'*. In the 'troika', retrospective and futuristic modes of 'securing' operate in concert, and the concept, which explains the (re)production of SME 'security', may be transferred to other social contexts. Furthermore, by delving into the meanings of 'security' the current chapter documents how the official discourses revealed a dual logic, visible in the ways through which event sponsors and corporate attractiveness were framed as in need for 'security' and 'protection'.

Security issues are at the forefront of SMEs, and the planning before Euro 2020 – the 'Euro for Europe' (UEFA, 2012) – represented no exception. Notably, however, the hosting format facilitated for a security operation on a larger territory than any previous European Championships. This chapter disaggregates how 'security' at the

bidding, planning and pre-event stage, was framed, articulated and negotiated between the event owner, appointed host nations and wider stakeholder groups. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section breaks down the dominant themes of 'good practice' and 'integrated security'. It is argued that the emphasis on 'good practices' can be analytically located as broader 'lesson drawing' processes (Rose, 1991), demonstrating how SME hosts, stakeholders and planners utilize templates and lesson from the past in the efforts to 'secure' the future.

Section two draws from a frame analysis (Goffman, 1974) of 'whom' that were framed as 'responsible' for constructing and maintaining 'security' at Euro 2020. Moreover, seeking to critically interrogate the meanings and referent objects of 'security', this section questions 'whom' or 'what' that was 'secured' and subsequently 'secured against', as 'threats' to Euro 2020. This section argues that the event's people, sites, atmospheres and sponsors were 'secured' from 'threats' determined by incidents at previous SMEs and trends in the wider international security context. Therefore, 'security threats' were both (context-)'specific' and 'general'. The chapter concludes that Euro 2020 hosts had to adapt a precautionary stance regarding a loosely defined future, whereas 'security' also would be recirculated lessons from a time/space diffuse past. Such argument maps the contours of the original concept this thesis introduces: the 'troika of security'.

4.2 Reproducing 'Security': 'Good Practices' and Lesson-Drawing

For the tasks related to constructing 'security', hosts were guided to adapt practices and policies from previous events. This connects with Klauser's (2017) argument holding that policy handbooks, guidelines and standardized norms can serve as mechanisms that enable circulation and reproduction of mega-event specific policies and practices. Upon analysing discourses in the guidelines and handbooks, what is commonly referred to as 'good practices' emerged as a dominant theme before Euro 2020 (UEFA, 2005, 2013). Overall, the term was employed 91 times in the 217 pages long document published after Euro 2004, and 29 times in Euro 2020's tournament requirements. Reinforcing existing findings (Klauser, 2011a, 2012, 2017; Molnar et al., 2019), this section argues that Euro 2020 epitomized the reproduction of existing lessons and that 'the hosting of sport mega events [...] push towards the reproduction of previously tested and subsequently standardized best-practice models' (Klauser,

2012: 1043). I argue that this constituted an underlying base for the subsequent steps of Euro 2020's pre-planning.

However, first it is necessary to ask exactly what 'good practices' are, and how they were to be emulated and implemented into host cities' 'security concepts'. In the context of football policing, 'good practice' is a common term (COE, 2016; Stott and Adang, 2003). Meanwhile, Tsoukala et al. (2016: 170) note how the '[e]xchange of "best practice" in policing and security throughout the EU and Council of Europe nations' is a typical measure of the pan-European responses to 'hooliganism' and in football policing. Furthermore, Klauser (2011a) documents the mechanisms through which Euro 2008 organizers reproduced 'best' practices speaking to 'security' from the 2006 World Cup in Germany.

Notwithstanding, the desire to use measures that have proved efficient is not unique to SMEs. It can be connected to the public policy concept of 'lesson-drawing' (Bennett, 1991; Rose, 1991). As Rose (1991: 4) writes, when '[c]onfronted with a common problem, policymakers in cities, regional governments and nations can learn from how their counterparts elsewhere respond'. In brief, lesson-drawing entails drawing upon knowledge 'from other times and places to improve current programmes' (ibid.: 6). This can explain the documentary research's key findings and suggests that lesson-drawing would be a central process behind Euro 2020's 'security'. One primary lesson was Euro 2004, which seemingly represented an 'available experience elsewhere' that was 'attractive because of evidence that it has been effective' (ibid.: 7). Hence, the experiences from 2004 offered key lessons to be adapted by the Euro 2020 hosts.

Upon proceeding, a rigid line must be drawn between 'good practice' and 'requirements'. Before Euro 2020, requirements were a 'must have' while 'good practices' were 'nice to have' (UEFA, n.d., S3: 2). This allows for interpreting that 'good practices' in themselves were not formally nor legally required, but encouraged – and representing those 'less coercive mechanisms' (Klauser, 2017: 118) that ensure circulation of SME security policies. Although Euro 2020's tournament requirements lack a precise definition of 'good practice', it was defined previously as 'effective methods or innovative practices that contribute to the improved performance of an organisation and are widely accepted as "good" by other peer organisations' (UEFA, 2005: 18). Meanwhile, COE (2016: 9) defines it as 'tried and tested measures [...]

proven to be effective in one or more States, which can be implemented in other countries or other sports'.

These definitions imply a retrospective element and suggest that 'good practices' represent lessons to be drawn upon. However, 'good' is an inherently slippery and intersubjective concept that is never sufficiently defined. Moreover, it is unclear what exactly a 'peer organisation' is in this context. Whereas this invites some critical interrogation, 'good practices' may, despite the definitional ambiguity, be read in this context as practices that are previously tested at past SMEs. They are beneficial to draw upon by 'copying', 'emulating' or using as 'inspiration' (Rose, 1991: 22). The practices' proven records are determinants in making them 'good'. It should also be remarked that 'good practices' as outlined by UEFA are not strictly security-related, but used by UEFA in other contexts too, including technology (see UEFA, n.d.: 4-5).³⁸

In terms of security management, 'good practices' can be seen as one time/space diffuse 'security legacy' and the document evaluating the Euro 2004 experience worked as an informal guide for future hosts, with its evidence-based knowledge and learnt lessons. This included Euro 2020's 12 appointed hosts, who were directly referred the comprehensive manual published in 2005 (UEFA, n.d., Sector 6 (henceforth 'S6'): 5). This handbook states that:

By describing good practices for the housing of major sporting events, we hope to contribute to better planning and the intelligent and cost-efficient organisation of safety and security issues [...] UEFA EURO 2004 made extensive use of knowledge acquired at past events (UEFA, 2005: 41)

As aforementioned, Euro 2004 was selected as a key lesson to draw upon, because this SME *per se* was depicted a 'success story' with regards to safe events (UEFA, 2005: 164). Concerning those 'good practices' that hosts, who were referred to this handbook, were encouraged to draw upon, the analysis revealed the following:

Firstly, this report shows that close cooperation between sports authorities and tournament organisers provides the right platform to *exchange views* on how to organise safety and security [...] Secondly, UEFA EURO 2004 has taught us a great deal about applying general principles of safety and security of major events to *specific host countries* [...] Thirdly, UEFA EURO 2004 showed the importance of highly professional safety and security project management before, during and after major sporting events. [...] Fourthly, UEFA EURO 2004 showed that safety and security

³⁸ Over the course of the whole document, UEFA (n.d.) refer to 'good practice(s)' 28 times.

policy must always be practical and focussed on specific threats. Good practices involve effective methods that work in practice. [...] Fifthly, UEFA EURO 2004 highlighted the importance of continuous learning during the event and the *transfer of good practices* both during and after the event. [...] Sixthly, UEFA EURO 2004 suggested that future organisers should pay special attention to crowd control (UEFA, 2005: 153-154, emphasis added)

Directed towards future SME hosts, this quote emphasizes the value of knowledge exchange and 'transfer of good practices' in security organization. Though, it can be seen how distinctive risk environments ('specific host countries') play a role here. Indeed, lesson-drawing requires 'adaption to take different national circumstances into account' (Rose, 1991: 21). Yet, overall, the quote summarizing the Euro 2004 handbook's rationale underscores the inter-agency cooperation that, again, facilitates knowledge exchange and lesson-drawing (see Boyle, 2011).

The cooperative approaches can also be seen in context of the transnational collaboration and exchange of perspectives in European football policing since the 1990s (Tsoukala, 2007, 2009). For Tsoukala (2007: 6), the end of Cold War bipolarity translated into an 'enemy vacuum' where state threats were filled by 'new perceptions of security threats, focused on internal delinquent actors, including 'hooligans' and 'terrorists', which required collaborative responses. Notions of 'partnership' and 'multi-agency' approaches also represent broader trends across the domains of both public policy and crime prevention (Zedner, 2003a: 163). In terms of transnational football policing, National Football Information Points (NFIPs) have been established on an EU level since 2002.³⁹ Essentially, the NFIPs work as platforms for information and knowledge sharing prior to European football matches (Tsoukala, 2009: 119). Before Euro 2020, NFIPs were mentioned, and hosts were required to have a 'structure [in] place to facilitate the international exchange of police intelligence, e.g. the establishment of a national football information point (NFIP)' (UEFA, 2012, S6: 8).

Furthermore, pre-Euro 2020, UEFA (n.d., S6: 8) also encouraged the:

Full use of all existing international agreements, recommendations and good practices relating to the organisation of international sports events in order to ensure the best possible cooperation between the host, participating, transit and neighbouring countries

³⁹ NFIPs also exist in other non-EU member states which voluntarily set up NFIPs (COE, 2016: 14).

The drive towards the reproduction of 'good practices' and knowledge also comes to fore in the statement from UEFA holding that a 'secure' organization of fan zones would have to include an: 'Acknowledgement of the existence and proposals *to use the existing EU and Council of Europe guidelines* on the management of public viewing areas' (UEFA, n.d., S6: 11, emphasis added). This connects with Klauser's (2011a) examination of how best practices for fan zones were 'transferred' from Germany's 2006 World Cup to Euro 2008 in Austria/Switzerland. Klauser demonstrates how knowledge transfer occurred through multiple channels. This included site visits, guided tours, conferences, exchange programs, but also through ideas, legal documents, handbooks, existing guidelines and plans.

The continued emphasis on the reproduction of existing lessons, templates and 'good practices', paired with desired transnational collaboration, reflects those knowledge-based 'security networks' evident in existing literature (Whelan, 2014; Boyle, 2011) and those legacies speaking to 'strategic partnerships' and 'knowledge and expertise' (Giulianotti, 2013). My findings, therefore, tie into this and demonstrate how Euro 2020's securitization would require both the recirculation of existing knowledge and a (re-)activation of 'security networks'. Especially because Euro 2020's security delivery was to comply with 'identified good practices' (UEFA, n.d., S6: 3). To be sure, my findings demonstrate what Klauser (2011a) finds in a similar documentary analysis, namely that the event owners push hosts towards the reproduction of best-practice models.

Examining Olympic securitization, Fussey et al. (2011) draw upon Bauman's (2000) 'liquid security'. They argue that 'transferable paradigms operate as a form of "liquid security", where a shared *lingua franca* of defensible motifs coalesces into strategies that generate securitized spaces dissociated from their geographical contexts' (Fussey et al., 2011: 61, original emphasis). My findings suggest that hosts were directed towards guidelines that could assist their security planning. As such, these findings extend – in a novel SME context – earlier arguments sustaining that learning from past 'successes' or 'failures' constitutes crucial elements of mega-event security planning (Boyle, 2011; Boyle et al., 2015; Klauser, 2011a, 2012). The reference to, and expected reliance on 'good practice' and other lessons demonstrates that hosts, security planners and agencies had to consider and adapt retrospective logics by asking '*what was?*', as formal and informal knowledge was recirculated for Euro 2020.

Notwithstanding, despite the usefulness of 'good practices' in hosts' efforts to 'secure', there are still a wide range of uncertainties attached to each event where 'maximum security' commonly is promised 'under conditions of radical uncertainty' (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012: 243). Writing on the 'modern world', Bauman (2005: 1) drew attention to how past tests cannot longer account for the rapid and most unpredictable changes in circumstances. Whilst it is not denied here that Euro 2004 represented a successful security operation, the reliance placed upon this specific lesson to this date can, by following Bauman, be questioned.

The event owner showed signs of being alive to this, acknowledging before Euro 2020 that 'good practices' 'continually evolve' (UEFA, n.d., S6: 11). And, indeed, the extent to which 'good practices' much confined to a SME in 2004, matched, reflected or were synonymous with 'good practices' towards the late 2010s and early 2020s can be critically interrogated. Some 'good practices' do not automatically change drastically, and as such, remain relatively similar. Hence, it would be cynical and unfair to invalidate Euro 2004's 'good practices'. However, trends in the realms of global 'security' and supporter cultures can significantly impact how realistic or beneficial it is to comply with 'good practices' – acknowledging that they were not formally required.

As UEFA (2005: 111) admitted, Euro 2004 took place in a country with a comparatively limited history of 'hooliganism' or 'terrorism'. Further, the format of Euro 2004 differed vastly from that of Euro 2020. Not merely in organizational terms and the number of hosting countries, but also when accounting for the history of each 'security threat' in each host country, and the cultural and geopolitical contexts. Essentially, 'security' or 'security threats' cannot be objectively defined (Bigo, 2008). Therefore, 12 host countries translated into the same number of national cultures of security where understandings of 'security' and 'threat' differ. Essentially, national security cultures across states are defined according to world-views on external environments, national identity, instrumental and interaction preferences. Host countries may diverge on what constitutes a 'threat', and on the 'appropriate means for ameliorating it' (Sperling, 2010: 13). Although the operational success of Euro 2004 deserves credit, it can also be suggested that identifying with lessons from 2004 could be problematic for Euro 2020 hosts. Fundamentally, this goes to highlight the

extant limitations of the reproduction of security knowledge before upcoming mega-event contexts.

Further, the document data reveals an assumption that 'good practices' were 'good' for all hosts. As Eick (2011b) reminds us, this may not always be the case. Particularly when local characteristics and circumstances were given limited consideration in the available documents. Moreover, other developments apparent in security fields and the world of mega-events complicate the past lessons' relevance or validity. For example, the security dynamics of fan zones evolve continually: the recent Euro 2016 saw supporters entering fan zones met by airport-style security (Cleland, 2019). This therefore illuminates what is argued here. Essentially, both *internal* (i.e. the popularity of fan zones) and *external* (i.e. the securitization of crowded spaces) developments surrounding a specific SME demonstrate the very limitations of lesson-drawing, existing templates, guidelines and the recirculation of past knowledge when constructing SME 'security'. Meanwhile, this section raises questions around the subjective nature inherent to terms such as 'good practice' since institutional practices define what 'security' is.

4.2.1 'Good Practices' and Facilitation for 'Clean Sites'

At this stage, 'good practices' have been unpacked mostly in relation to what they mean, and their practical or operational implications. This section unpacks the term's wider implications. Hosts were directed towards 'good practices' of security. Naturally, these must be interpreted as tools for minimizing the chances of unwanted behaviour or situations, and linked to the hosts' general obligation of providing public safety. However, the event owner's desire for 'good practice' can also be seen as connected with – and analysed in light of the neoliberalism of global sports (Andrews and Silk, 2012, 2018; Falcous and Silk, 2010; Silk, 2010). As scholars highlight, mega-event owners desire 'clean sites' (Klauser, 2012) or cleansed event environments (Roche, 2000). Before Euro 2020, this policy – the 'clean site principle' – was clearly defined as:

[A]ny official site to be provided for UEFA EURO 2020 free of any contractual obligations throughout the exclusivity period, including, without limitation, obligations arising pursuant to advertising and sponsorship agreements, naming rights agreements, leases, usage agreements, supplier agreement, food, beverage and catering agreements, hospitality agreements and obligations which would limit in any way the

ability in exercising rights or performing obligations in connection with UEFA EURO 2020 (UEFA, n.d., S1: 2).

It was also declared that, 'any stadium at which a UEFA EURO 2020 match will be played, together with all other facilities within the outer security zone or otherwise required to comply with the clean site principle' (ibid.: 4). Further, it is stated that:

UEFA needs the host city to identify and secure free of charge the best sites for the event dressing material, such as flags, banners, billboards and giant banners or any other unconventional dressing opportunities (building wrapping, bridges) well in advance of the event (ibid., S11: 3)

Undeniably, the above requirements connect with Klauser's (2012: 1043) argument maintaining that UEFA creates 'a patchwork of "clean sites" [...] for its official partners' advertisement and merchandise to be displayed'. Though, somewhat more context is required. Expansion into untapped markets, for the purpose of new consumer bases, lies at the core of neoliberalism as one form of economic liberalism (Mudge, 2008). Because of their popularity, SMEs attract huge interest from global corporations and brands chasing new revenue streams, who invest in mega-events as sponsors or official partners (Klauser, 2012).

Against this, 'good' security practices also relate to deep-seated aspirations to create lucrative, tamed and 'clean' environments in which the event owner and global commercial partners can profitably thrive and benefit from, in the month-long mega-event. For Silk (2014: 54) 'the political and economic rationalities of neoliberalism emphasise spectacular SMEs that centre on the production of aesthetic environments', whereas existing research shows an inter-play between securitization and aesthetical considerations (Barnard-Wills et al., 2012; Coaffee et al., 2009). This dimension of aesthetic securitization also applies to mega-events. Kennelly (2015) finds how security measures related the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver intersected with city cleansing and sanitization of spaces, exacerbating the marginalization of homeless youth in the city. Here, the concept of 'corporate kettling' also holds relevance as the process wherein 'physical geography, security measures [...] combine to direct and manoeuvre people into spaces of transnational consumption' (Giulianotti et al., 2015: 132).

The recirculation of 'good practices' then assists organizers' and stakeholders' normative aim regarding 'security'. However, they do not *always* translate into more

objective nor subjective 'security' for all individuals. For example, it is unlikely that the aforementioned Dutch fans felt 'safer' when asked to strip off their trousers upon entry to the stadium, because their trousers bore the badge of a brewery considered a rival to one of the World Cup sponsors (Giulianotti, 2013), although this perhaps represented 'good practice' in commercial terms. The commercial element of mega-event securitization is oft-articulated in existing research. Predominantly in relation to FIFA World Cups and their accompanied security requirements and delegations of risks (Eick, 2011a; 2011b; Eisenhauer et al., 2014; Klauser, 2008), but also at the European Championships (Klauser, 2012; Pearson 2012b). UEFA and FIFA must not be conflated, however.

Following the World Cup in Germany, Eick (2011a) argues that FIFA's attempt to implement 'security' could be interpreted as a neoliberal practice with deep-rooted aims of enhancing financial profits. He writes that FIFA embraced neoliberalism as a neo-communitarian entrepreneur (Eick, 2010, 2011b). Similar arguments emerged in light of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, with Eisenhauer et al. (2014) asserting that the security planning and its delivery – in addition to constituting a mechanism meant to provide reassurance for visitors – served as a mean to maintain event sponsors' and official brands' reputations. Indeed, this linkage makes it appropriate to speak of 'securitized commodification' (Giulianotti, 2011).

Therefore, in order to generate and accumulate profits, brands and sponsors are regularly 'secured' or 'protected' (see Section 4.5). When spaces are 'secured' – and 'cleaned', 'sanitized' or 'undisrupted' from 'rival' brands or products – it assists consumption circuits. As evidence from recent 'Euros' suggests, there are clear connections between 'security', 'branding' and 'urban entrepreneurialism' (Klauser, 2012), while Włoch (2013: 298) argues that UEFA act a 'global governor', and set the rules for global sports as a sphere where the interests of states and transnational corporations are brought together alike.

My documentary data, supplemented with existing literature, therefore challenges the conventional assumption that events reproduce 'good' security practices merely for security management objectives. Indeed, they are adopted for these purposes, too. Arguing anything else would be cynical and unfair. Though, such reading fails to appreciate that besides, 'good' security-related policies or practices are occasionally

adopted to protect business-related interests and sponsors within the SME landscapes. Hagemann's (2010: 725) descriptions from Euro 2008 sum this up most neatly:

Searches at the [fan zone] entrances were therefore not only intended to prevent risks to safety; at the same time, they were meant to minimize the introduction of advertising from external sources in the form of printed T-shirts, baseball caps or flyers, as well as to keep visitors from bringing along their own food and drinks.

Generally neoliberal policies are seldom – if ever – signposted as such. That is the reality in sports too, where neoliberal agendas are covertly normalized to maintain the current order (Andrews and Silk, 2018). Therefore, 'good practices' reproduced or implemented under the banner of 'security' and 'safety' *simultaneously* serve commercial purposes and feed into the political economy of 'sport' and 'security'. Ultimately, this underpins the argument that SME security policies not always share a *unity* – but a *duality* of purposes (Boykoff and Fussey, 2014; Kennelly, 2015), because they facilitate for conditions in which consumption can flourish and corporate attractiveness be sustained. Importantly, all this speaks to the *meanings* of 'security' this thesis critically interrogates. Here, the meanings of 'security' are knitted to the preservation of the current political economy of commodified mega-events.

4.3 Integrating 'Security'

Throughout the documentary analysis, what is referred to as an 'integrated safety and security concept' surfaced as a dominant theme. Overall, Euro 2020's tournament requirements refer to this on 16 occasions. Given the centrality of this theme, this section discusses what this security concept involved, and its main principles, in closer detail. Eick (2011b) writes that other event owners, including IOC and FIFA, normally, require their hosts to develop integrated security solutions. In the context of the UEFA-owned 'Euros', this can be traced back to before 2004, when the Portuguese Football Federation integrated different safety and security topics into a broader 'Safety and Security Operational Concept' (UEFA, 2005: 47). Before Euro 2020 it was clearly articulated that, in ensuring 'security', a key task for every appointed host was to 'develop and present a robust integrated safety and security concept and vision' (UEFA, n.d., S6: 2). The integrated concept would encompass, (i) risk analysis, (ii) capabilities to host the 'Euros', (iii) organizational structure, (iv) action plan and (v) budget (UEFA, n.d., S6: 4). As declared:

Each bidder, in close cooperation and partnership with the relevant public authorities and private partners in its country, must guarantee to develop and present in due time an integrated safety and security concept for UEFA EURO 2020 (UEFA, n.d., S6: 3).

As aforementioned, the 'concept' involved partnerships from both public and private partners. The quote also underpins how all host cities had to guarantee to UEFA that the concept would be developed in time, whilst the concept had to be based on the mutual understanding of responsibilities and tasks, between bidders/hosts and UEFA. Moreover, UEFA (n.d., S6: 2) stated that the concept had to 'take into account the festive nature of the event'.

Here, the event owner, to an extent, confirms what is oft-emphasized. Namely, that there is a shared desire between owner and organizers to allow festivity to 'go on' against a background of 'security' (Clavel, 2013). Consistent with UEFA's discourse, the Council of the EU's guidelines (2010: 13-15) hold that the policing of football games should 'aim to [...] proactively promotes positive images of the event' (p.13), and 'create a welcoming atmosphere and avoid the potential for conflict' (p.15). Therefore, every host – who developed and presented a concept – had to pursue an appropriate balance *vis-à-vis* the visibility and intrusiveness of the security and policing, in order to preserve the event's 'festive nature', and avoid generating additional fears, insecurities or oppressive feelings.

Overt security and policing can be perceived as creating an oppressive sporting event atmosphere (Cleland, 2019). Research also finds that police interventions designed to control public disorder, such as 'riot gear', can be counter-productive an escalate conflict because of such interventions' impact on crowds' social identity (Stott et al., 2007; Stott and Reicher, 1998). Since the security concepts had to preserve festive atmospheres, it is arguable that the *visibility* and *methods* of 'security' and 'policing' would be extremely essential to the 'integrated concepts'. Indeed, liaison-based policing and friendly encounters with fans have proved successful at previous 'Euros' and added to positive fan experiences and reduced aggression (Stott et al., 2007).

Furthermore, UEFA repeatedly outlined other aspects of 'security' that the 'integrated concept' should account for. For example, the concept would be based upon a clear division of 'responsibilities' between active and integrated security providers:

[T]he host association's and host authorities' integrated safety and security concept must outline the roles of national and local authorities, including police and other law enforcement and emergency services, stadium management, private security personnel, stewards and volunteers. The host association and relevant authorities will have to confirm by providing the necessary guarantee that they and all relevant parties are committed to fulfilling their roles as so outlined (UEFA, n.d., S6: 2).

Again, this quote illuminates how host associations and relevant authorities were obliged to guarantee their commitment associated with the 'security concept' (see Section 4.4). Apparently, this applied from the 'top', including the highest level of national authority and law enforcements, and 'down' to steward and volunteer-level. This serves to illustrate how Euro 2020 confirmed the development of inter-organizational relations that blur the lines between internal/external (Bigo, 2000) and private/public (Klauser, 2017) security actors. Nonetheless, the 'integrated concepts' accounted for each of these actors' roles and divisions of assignments and guarantees had to be provided to the event owner assuring that the designated actor would fulfil their relevant assignments. The findings, therefore, demonstrate how the 'integrated concept' was a plight of every appointed host city imposed by the owner.

The chapter has already mentioned transnational collaboration. Within the 'integrated concepts' this would be central, as UEFA (n.d., S6: 3) highlighted the need for 'intensive collaboration between host, participating, transit and neighbouring countries' before Euro 2020. Evidently, the planning and execution of 'security' before Euro 2020 also involved non-hosting countries ('transit and neighbouring countries'), whereas the continued emphasis on inter-agency cooperation parallels recommendations from the Council of the European Union (2010) suggesting a: 'coordinated approach between all the parties involved is a prerequisite of an efficient strategy for the organisation of football matches with an international dimension'. Ultimately, this sheds a light on the European-wide scale of Euro 2020, but also trends speaking to the Europeanization and transnationalization of security and policing (Tsoukala, 2009), which Euro 2020 in distinctive ways epitomized given its networked geographies.

The documents, in themselves, provided little specification on how the 'intensive collaboration' would occur in practice however. This could be related to the public availability of the documents. Ultimately 'security networks' are often marked by secrecy (Eick, 2011b). A caution is also that documents may represent 'fantasy

documents' where plans, statements or reports are released to show the public that something is being done to ease anxieties (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012: 252). Documents released pre-event can provide us with valuable insight, but naturally not a holistic operational analysis of how transnational activities occurred in practice. Such information may not only be unavailable in the years leading up to an event, but even after.

What is clear, is that 'security networks' cannot be established by simply setting up a 'network' (Whelan, 2016: 319). With 12 host cities, there would undeniably be certain hosts that would possess considerably less experience with participating in SME 'security networks'. Cities like Budapest, Copenhagen and Bucharest, for example, would have less recent experience than cities such as London and St Petersburg, who respectively hosted the 2012 Olympics and 2018 World Cup. The documents do not specifically account for this, since the 12 host cities at the time of the tournament requirements' publication, had not yet been assigned. UEFA, however, do acknowledge that:

The host association's and authorities' integrated safety and security concept must be based on the safety and security traditions and practices of previous UEFA European Football Championships [...] The integrated concept should take into account the relevant country's security-related *experience* from previous major events (whether sports-related or not) held in the country, the traditions and practices of previous UEFA European Football Championships, identified good professional practices as well as the security *laws, regulations* and *guidelines* applicable in the bidder's country (UEFA, n.d., S6: 3, emphasis added).

First, this quote speaks to the fact that Euro 2020 hosts have different laws and regulation could impact the event's 'security' (Stura et al., 2017). Secondly, it can be seen again how identified practices and experiences would shape the 'security'. Indeed, this supplements the argument I have already forwarded. Past European Championships and mega-event experiences would be employed as templates for Euro 2020 and 'experiences' and 'good professional practices' would be reproduced in host cities' 'security concepts'.

This section has examined *what* the 'integrated safety and security concept' integrates. It is argued that the concept involved the appropriate appearance of 'security' in terms of visibility and intrusiveness, division of tasks and responsibilities, guarantees to the event owner and transnational cooperation. As such, the 'integrated' concepts,

specifically developed for Euro 2020 were, as suggested by the adjective '*integrated*', an all-encompassing concept which incorporated a wide-range of security-related topics and practices, from pre-event risk analyses to the execution of the security operation itself. In other words, all 'security' and 'safety' related topics were covered, then managed under an umbrella approach that was of 'paramount importance' (ibid.: 3) so that UEFA's security-related requirements were met. The argument emerging from the empirical analysis is that the concept, in itself, was a *plight* of every appointed host. It was also *atmosphere* maintaining, focused on integrated collaboration and past experiences. Finally, it was *responsibility* dividing. 'Responsibility', as a dominant theme in itself, forms the next section's discussion.

4.4 Responsibility and Security

UEFA's tournament requirements served as a guideline for countries bidding for Euro 2020's hosting rights and, subsequently, for appointed hosts. Hence, those organizations or authorities that ultimately were 'responsible' for the manifold of security-related requirements and arrangements at the event were given substantial space in this policy document. Since 'responsibility' emerged as a dominant theme, it was decided to frame which actor/organization that were outlined as 'responsible' for 'safety' and 'security' at 'Euro 2020. Consequently, a frame analysis was performed on the security-related discourses addressing 'responsibility'.

Millward's (2017) study on 'responsibility' for migrant workers in Qatar for the 2022 World Cup's stadium projects underscores the capacity of frame analysis techniques for addressing responsibility-related questions. Adopting Millward's (2017: 762-763) style of performing a frame analysis, statements and discourses in UEFA's security requirements referring to 'responsibility' or the practice of 'being responsible' were analysed according to two frames. First, according to 'whom' that was framed as 'responsible'. Second, according to 'what' was being said about 'responsibility' or the practice/act of being 'responsible'.

Overall, it was recorded that Euro 2020's hosts were framed as 'responsible' on 14 incidents (in UEFA, n.d., Sector 6 addressing security requirements). Meanwhile, the most drawn upon frame was the frame composed of discourses outlining what the host cities' responsibility translated into in practice before or during Euro 2020. UEFA were framed as 'responsible' four times and 'relevant authorities' twice. The official

discourse frequently reiterated that matters of 'security' remained the relevant host associations' (i.e. national FAs) sole 'responsibility', while it was articulated that the event owner under 'no circumstances' would bear any responsibility, nor costs of security measures (UEFA, n.d., S6: 3). Next section examines more precisely *which* security-related 'responsibilities' that hosts agreed to and the practical and legal implications of this.

4.4.1 With Great Power Comes Responsibility, But for What?

In providing examples of how the host associations' undisputed 'responsibility' was presented in the discourse, this is best exemplified by the three following quotes. Here, hosts are not merely framed as 'responsible', but UEFA also frame itself as free for security-related responsibilities:

The host association (together with the relevant authorities) will have full and exclusive responsibility for all aspects of [Euro 2020's] safety and security (UEFA, n.d., S6: 2)

Although the host association has full responsibility for safety and security, it is acknowledged that it will not be able to fulfil such responsibilities without the close cooperation and proactive involvement of the relevant authorities in the host country (ibid.)

UEFA will not have any responsibility or bear any liability in respect of safety and security at UEFA EURO 2020 for any reason whatsoever at any time (ibid.: 3).

Once awarded with the rights to host Euro 2020, every host was given some leeway from UEFA concerning how the security concepts were to be operationalized. For example, for risk analysis and risk categories, hosts were able to deploy the methodology and add risks to their checklists, as they found appropriate (UEFA, n.d., S6: 4). However, despite some flexibility each host was obliged to and had to guarantee, and was thus 'responsible', for addressing the following points when their security concepts were designed: (1) Legislation, (2) international cooperation, (3), judicial system, (4) counterterrorism and protective security, (5) policing and law enforcement, (6) public health and safety, (7) stadium safety management, (8) competence and preparedness, (9) supporter empowerment, (10) safety management and public viewing areas and (11) impact of the mobility concept on safety and security (ibid.: 6). Evidently, the hosts' responsibilities were wide-ranging and multifaceted as they covered legal, practical, financial, and political aspects of 'security'.

Mega-events are characterized by their fixed durations and spatial settings (Roche, 2000). Concerning the spatial implications of 'responsibility' it was, as expected, made clear that hosts were 'responsible' for securing the official UEFA sites, including stadiums, their security rings and fan zones (UEFA, n.d., S6: 2). However, an important finding is that spatially, the 'responsibility' for 'securing' stretched beyond sporting spheres. Therefore, it even included spaces like 'airports and railway stations in host cities and outside official sites' (UEFA, n.d., S6: 2). Hence, it is not solely the 'official' event spaces' 'security' that fell under the hosts' responsibility.

Here, the blurry demarcations between mega-events and non-sporting contexts become evident. The issues of defining exactly where hosts' 'responsibility' stops connect with the work of Klauser (2017). He argues that it is not only urban areas and city centres that are drastically transformed and securitized throughout SMEs, but also rural areas which may be the location of team hotels, training facilities and transport hubs. As such, strict conditions were imposed on all 12 host associations and their relevant authorities, which they had to conform to, while hosts had an indisputable 'responsibility' for developing 'security concepts' that met UEFA's criteria and pre-defined standards, so that 'safety' and 'security' could be achieved across 'official' and 'unofficial' Euro 2020 spaces.

Already from the pre-bidding phase, it was articulated by UEFA that hosts would be required to ensure 'the highest standards on safety and security issues and capabilities' (UEFA, n.d., S6: 2). In addition to a 'responsibility' for ensuring 'security' and 'safety', hosts were required by the event owner to 'bear all associated [security] costs' (ibid.: 12), meaning that hosts were financially responsible for the event's 'security'. Further, medical care and services throughout the event was another 'responsibility' of the host association. As UEFA (n.d., S6: 13) state:

In cooperation with their government, ministry of health, and local health authorities, the host association has the responsibility for ensuring that a medical care concept fulfilling all requirements set by UEFA and in accordance with the UEFA staging agreement, is provided for all identified UEFA target groups

The above statements illustrate how the host associations and their relevant authorities involved in the Euro 2020's 'security spectacle' were left entirely responsible for financing, developing and delivering the 'Euros'' security operation and emergency

infrastructures. The operations and infrastructure that were developed, financed, and delivered were, as discussed, adherent to UEFA's pre-defined and imposed conditions, and the aim of constructing 'security' of the highest standards. However, the wide-reaching 'responsibility', framed in terms of the host associations, cannot be said to be unique or new in this context. It was visible in the document from the mid-2000s that the: 'Overall responsibility for safety and security should always rest with the competent authority of the host nation' (UEFA, 2005: 44).

Meanwhile, the tasks which UEFA were framed as 'responsible' for, in addition to the 'football side' of the tournament (i.e. providing teams, referees, rules), were tasks that involved setting out all the formal criteria, such as tournament requirements – for then to ensure that hosts were implementing and fulfilling them with consideration of the required standards and provided guarantees. By this token, host associations, together with local and national authorities had to reflect this by conducting, financing and overseeing the practical implementation of the tournament's 'security'. Whilst this underscores UEFA's role as a 'global governor' (Włoch, 2013) governing the 12 host associations, it can be argued that there is tendency coming to the fore, of UEFA taking 'responsibility' for Euro 2020 as a 'sporting spectacle' – by for example, providing teams and rules – that hosts ultimately were responsible for constructing and 'securing'.

As frequently recorded in the frame analysis, the example below demonstrates accurately how (1) hosts were framed as 'responsible', whilst (2) hosts' related tasks were outlined. This was the most common way discourses around 'responsibility' was framed. Hosts were made explicitly aware of their assignments pre-bid – such as the formal requirement of submitting a written guarantee where 'responsibility' is accepted and the following acknowledged:

This guarantee must include an acknowledgement that UEFA will have no obligations in relation to such safety and security measures at any time in connection with UEFA EURO 2020 and that UEFA will not bear any liability towards the relevant governing authorities, departments and agencies for any of the related costs for such safety and security measures (UEFA, n.d., S6: 3)

Here, hosts are not merely directly framed 'responsible', but simultaneously, UEFA again disclaim their 'responsibility', asserting that they would have 'no obligations'. Moreover, UEFA also reserved their right to revise and change criteria and indicators

that hosts ultimately would be 'responsible' for and required to adapt as the event approached:

As good safety and security practices continuously evolve, UEFA may see the need to revise and change the above set of criteria and indicators [...] Bidders are expected to demonstrate their understanding and their agreement with the scope and challenges of UEFA EURO 2020 safety and security operations by signing the safety and security guarantee. They should be realistic about potential areas of weakness and be aware of their need for continuous improvement of their capabilities (ibid.: 13)

Whereas UEFA here, to some degree, took up a 'responsibility' for adding criteria to the 'list' of risks – subject to its necessity – and seemingly seek to articulate their supportive role for hosts, it ultimately only left hosts with another potential array of 'responsibilities' on their 'to-do-list'. In other words, the event owner imposed itself with the 'responsibility' of adding new assignments, which every host eventually remained 'responsible' for. Concurrently, and importantly, this reservation for potentially revising or changing criteria can be linked back to the exercise of precaution which informs mega-event 'security' as conditions of uncertainty and changes in circumstances may force the event owner to alter the security requirements hosts had to follow.

Moreover, UEFA's disclaimer of 'responsibility' is again framed in a way in which an issue, subsequently, becomes the hosts' 'responsibility':

UEFA intends to support bidders with the above list of criteria and indicators that capture the essence of what should be included, as a minimum, in any high-quality integrated safety and security concept. UEFA emphasises that bidders are solely responsible for drafting a strong and persuasive safety and security concept once appointed (UEFA, n.d., S6: 13).

Only in specific cases, UEFA would consider to 'agree on a case-by-case basis to reimburse the host association in respect of certain costs for private security matters' (ibid.: 3). There is, however, no specification of when the event owner may take a financial responsibility and reimburse hosts for private security matters. UEFA thus, had the task of reviewing security concepts and adding necessary criteria and requirements. Yet, the organization was not 'responsible' for supporting hosts but could voluntarily opt to do so. UEFA's 'responsibility' for overseeing hosts' planning and infrastructural developments was also exemplified by Brussels losing their rights to host four assigned group-stage games, late 2017, since their proposed *Eurostadium*

failed to 'meet the conditions imposed by the UEFA Executive Committee' (UEFA, 2017). It also came to fore when UEFA announced that Euro 2020 was postponed because of COVID-19 (Chapter Six).

In a wider context, the extraordinary responsibilities hosts took on are not exclusive to Euro 2020's case. In fact, this is usual before SMEs. In some cases, the strict terms and conditions have led to cities' reluctance in pursuing hosting rights (Bull, 2018). A similar division of responsibility can, for instance, be found at the Olympics, where the organizing committee (IOC) is not responsible for the event's 'security' (Toohey and Taylor, 2008; Pound, 2016). The responsibility lies at the hands of the host city, since events take place on a nation's territory, and supranational organizations like IOC, FIFA and UEFA have no such territory where they have jurisdiction (Pound, 2016). Thus, the issue of 'responsibility' was undeniably a matter Euro 2020 hosts were aware of *before* bidding for the hosting rights. As a respondent asserted in Hagemann's (2010) study on Euro 2008, the rules are very clear from the beginning. This section makes it possible to replicate such stance. My analysis shows that conditions of 'responsibility' were made clear to hosts pursuing the prestigious rights to stage Euro 2020. However, with the hosting rights came great 'responsibilities'.

The spatial implications of 'responsibility' were discussed above. Indeed, 'the potential breadth of "wider security"' (Fussey et al., 2012: 274) emerged as problematic and loosely defined. Regarding 'time', against the backdrop of responsibility-related discourse, it is similarly noticeable how there is little specification with regards to where 'responsibilities' ended. It may be assumed from the discourse that the hosts' undisputed 'responsibility' started the day when the respective hosts were awarded hosting rights and began the development of security concepts (that was 19 September 2014, see UEFA, 2014). Notwithstanding, on a spatio-temporal level, it was unclear where 'responsibility' *ended*. For example, it was not specified whether a host's 'responsibility' ended on the day of the last match in that relevant host nation – or if it stopped when Euro 2020, which was prolonged for another year, ended as a tournament. Similar questions can be asked regarding the spaces 'outside official sites' (UEFA, n.d., S6: 2), and what this encompasses (apart from e.g. transport hubs), and where this *end*.

Returning to the initial question around the meanings of 'responsibility' in this context, the analysed discourse makes it possible to argue that 'responsibility' here was the unconditional financial, legal and practical liabilities for hosting a Euro 2020 that had the highest standards of 'security', both within 'official' and (loosely defined) 'unofficial' event spaces. The framed discourse demonstrates how, by bidding and agreeing to take on hosting rights for Euro 2020, and *if* appointed, Euro 2020's host associations and relevant authorities were responsible for financing, developing, assessing, guaranteeing, and physically and practically implementing the 'security'. Further, hosts were responsible for flexibly reacting to added formal criteria and 'responsibilities' in line with global events or developments.

4.5 Security's Meanings: Protecting Whom from What?

The undisputed but expected 'responsibility' of host associations to ensure a 'safe' event was clearly and frequently framed by UEFA in their formal discourse. However, this leads to a question completely central to this thesis. Exactly 'whom' were hosts responsible for 'securing'? And, 'whom' were they responsible for 'securing against'? As Kennelly (2015: 9) writes: 'While the chimera of safety makes for persuasive public rhetoric, an important question to be asked is "safety for whom"'. Further, 'attempts to secure space against terrorism or other associated risks and national hazards raise questions about what exactly is being secured and for what purposes [and which] populations or activities are included or excluded from a space' (Barnard-Wills et al., 2012: 92).

Obvious answers to the above questions, based upon already presented findings, is the spectators and (un-)official sites (i.e. stadiums or transport hubs). Meanwhile, the literature normally presents SMEs as protected against 'terrorists', 'criminals' or 'hooligans' (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010). However, as rightful as this is, these answers fail to provide any deeper or contextualizing account of *why* and *how* such actors or spaces are being secured or securitized in official discourse. Such answers fail to appreciate the expressive dimensions of mega-event 'security' and therefore this section critically examines, and zooms in on the internalized meanings of 'security'.

This thesis takes a critical approach 'security' (Chapter Two). It was highlighted how 'deepening' the security agenda was one of CSS's main motivations. Such deepening refers to the 'uncovering and exploring the implications of the idea that attitudes and

behavior in relation to security are derivative of underlying and contested theories about the nature of world politics' (Booth, 2005: 14). Since this thesis is concerned with critically interrogating the concept of 'security' and to assist a deeper understanding of it, in Euro 2020's case, it is purposeful to go closer into the above questions. Only then, a deeper understanding can be acquired regarding 'whom' *exactly* that the host countries were responsible for 'securing'. Subsequently, this enables an understanding of 'whom' or 'what' those in need for 'security' were threatened by or requiring freedom from. In order to critically engage with these questions, a frame analysis was performed on UEFA's tournament requirements, because this handbook addressed Euro 2020 directly. This time, official discourses were framed according to: (a) whom or what that was 'secured' or 'secured against', and (b) what is said about 'security' or 'safety'. These frames are now unpacked.

4.5.1 The Tangible: (Un)official People, Objects, Sponsors and Spaces

To provide an answer to the first question, concerning 'whom' that was 'secured', it was unsurprisingly the event's people, objects, sponsors and spaces that were framed as in need for 'security' and thereby composed the referent objects of Euro 2020's 'security'. This becomes most apparent in the quote below, evidencing how host cities were required to develop:

A comprehensive plan to protect target groups, property and vehicles, e.g. general public, teams, VIPs, sponsors, media, officials and security personnel, and protection for all official sites within the theatre of operations [...] An accreditation policy to be strictly applied to prevent unauthorised access of people and objects to official sites, e.g. stadiums, hotels, training facilities, fan zones and other UEFA EURO 2020 sites (UEFA, n.d., S6: 9)

The individuals, objects and sites which UEFA required their hosts to protect are distinctively framed above. UEFA also categorized individuals in need for protection and attending individuals into subgroups like teams, referees and match officials, guests and VIPs, staff and the 'UEFA family',⁴⁰ service providers at venues, media and, of course, the supporters at the venues (ibid.: 15). Arguably, the subjects to be secured are, as Klauser (2017: 73) writes, categorized according to occupation into target groups and risk categories. Processes of classification and socially sorting thereby occur (Lyon, 2007) and one's allocated category subsequently determines

⁴⁰ This is a term commonly used in the 'Tournament Requirements' manual, e.g. UEFA (n.d., S6: 16).

'authorized' or 'unauthorized' access to the 'secured' spaces including stadiums, fan zones, VIP areas or team hotels.

Important to highlight, these are precautionary processes of categorization and segregation that occur in documentary form several years before the event (Bulley and Lisle, 2012). Furthermore, such categories remain inconstant and highly fluid. For example, if a supporter who is 'secured' upon entering a stadium enters a secured space where the same supporter is not accredited to – the VIP area or players' changing rooms – the same supporter that initially was 'secured' immediately becomes 'secured against'. Being 'secured' is thus pre-defined, but spatially dependent, conditional or subject to change. Anthropologist Augé (1995), writing on globalized and accelerated 'non-places' lacking historical roots or identity contended that the users of these space – in order to prove themselves as generic, admissible individuals – are always required to prove their 'innocence'. For example, by verifying their identity by providing identification, boarding cards, tickets or paying tollbooths. Without conflating a stadium, fan zone or a SME with an Augean 'non-place'; a resembling logic *vis-à-vis* authorization and access may be identified. Access to socially constructed, categorized and 'secured' spaces is subject to appropriate accreditations. These again, are directly linked to one's allocated category which, to a degree, is based upon one's innocence.

Further, as discussed and visible above, sponsors were to be provided protection in the Euro 2020 landscapes, so that they could thrive in the cleansed environments and monopolized spaces with blank slates for branding, merchandizing (Klauser, 2017) and profit enhancement (Eick, 2011a; Eisenhauer et al., 2014). The discourse therefore reinforces the neoliberal dimension of SME security governance. Eick (2011a) argued following the 2006 World Cup that security activity centred on the aim of profit enhancement. Eick (2011a: 91) noted that FIFA, as the World Cup's owner, 'not only set the commercial rules but the preconditions for security settings as well'. Accepting the differences between FIFA and UEFA, this quote in itself carries applicability to the European Championships (Klauser, 2012, 2017). It helps contextualizing this thesis's findings speaking to a concurrent, intertwined and pluralist 'securing' of spectators and commercial partners' activities and positions. Indeed, Włoch (2013) argues the 'strongest manifestation' of UEFA's role as a 'global governor' is exactly:

its involvement in guarantees concerning special intellectual and industrial property rights [...] such as the legal protection of names and logos of the

Championships, counteracting ambush marketing and the production of illegal gadgets, dishonest ticketing practices, and unlicensed commercial public viewing (p. 306)

Existing research repeatedly finds that security practices inside fan zones and stadium rings are business-driven, and occasionally enabled to temporarily re-territorialize attractive parts of host cities in the best interest of the relevant event's commercial partners and local stakeholders with regards to visibility and branding (Klauser, 2012; Hagemann, 2010). Through security-related policies, official sponsors are offered monopolized and fixed event spaces, which simultaneously are free from the 'presence' of companies that can be considered competitors or that provide similar products or services, which the aforementioned episode involving Dutch fans wearing Bavaria-trousers demonstrates (Giulianotti, 2013). Yet, hypothetically and practically this allows for mundane items and articles such as sausages to be framed as 'security issues' (Eick, 2011b: 3334).

By drawing from the formal discourses, this section answers the 'highly relevant question' (Kennelly, 2015: 10) about 'whom' that was 'secured' before Euro 2020. This again, yields an insight into 'security's' multiple meanings. I argue that 'security', originally, was constructed for the event's (categorized) people, official and unofficial sites and commercial partners and sponsors, although this was reconfigured following COVID-19 as Chapter Six shows. Regardless, this section has also revealed how a dual logic in the mega-event's 'security' had to be ensured. It documents how spaces and individuals were categorized into pre-defined, but non-neutral social groups. Remarkably, however, this dual security logic was enhanced by the fact that a far more intangible element – the event's atmosphere – was framed as requiring 'security' from negative 'flows' positioned externally and internally (see Fussey, 2015).

4.5.2 The Intangible: 'A Welcoming Atmosphere'

Under conditions of radical uncertainty, the public must be reassured that those providing 'security' have the capacity to adequately do so (Boyle et al., 2015). This reassuring logic lies at the very heart of 'security spectacles' (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009). Notwithstanding, organizers and security planners will also attempt to keep security as unobtrusive and invisible as possible to avoid exacerbating perceptions of oppression (Clavel, 2013; Coaffee et al., 2009). This section argues that Euro 2020's atmospheres – somewhat paradoxically – were 'secured', so that security assemblages

and other disruptive elements would not hamper, nor sanitize the event's desired joyfulness. This was particularly clear as UEFA framed the appropriate policing method as one 'keeping with the spirit' of Euro 2020 (UEFA, n.d. S6: 9). Meanwhile, the security concept, as stated, had to keep with the event's festive nature, whereas a key assignment for host cities was related to:

Creating a *welcoming atmosphere* for foreign visitors is crucial to minimising public order risks and to making the tournament a great national and football occasion [...] The host population should be encouraged to perceive the tournament as a great opportunity to join in the festivities, demonstrate their hospitality and make the tournament a memorable occasion for all concerned (UEFA, n.d., S6: 4, emphasis added)

This discourses above suggest a potential link between a 'welcoming atmosphere' and minimized public order risks. As such, 'securing' the atmospheres and 'purifying' spaces (Douglas, 1966) became formal tasks for host cities. These atmospheres would then be promoted by 'dressing programmes' which would:

[B]e based on the overall event brand and will be consistent across all host cities, building up the overall look and feel of UEFA EURO 2020 to contribute to an overall festive tournament atmosphere (UEFA, n.d., S11: 3).

Overall, the importance attached to event atmospheres makes it possible to draw parallels with Olympic security operations. Klauser (2010: 334) observes that these are intentionally designed:

[N]ot only to physically secure the games, but also to create a hospitable environment, a climate of joy; in short, a jointly inhabited 'Olympic atmosphere'. To achieve this aim, toxic elements and people, as well as bad news and attempts at undermining, had to be kept out [to provide] a sense of physical and psychopolitical security and togetherness.

The pursued environment, the climate of joy, reflects those of theme parks (see Roche, 2000: 135-138) and depends on 'safe' and 'hospitable' atmospheres. Moreover, the ideal environment should be characterized by 'order' and 'stability', which means 'exceptions' and 'phenomena' that *do not* generate this, or challenge this, 'fall outside these idealized categories' (Fussey et al., 2012: 264).

'Security' and 'atmospheres' are related, and for Adey (2014) security is atmospheric. Increasingly, he notes, atmospheres are becoming a 'security dispositif', whilst security is becoming attuned to 'affective atmospheres'. Atmospheres are powerful

forces that – compared to people or concrete places – are far more intangible, subjective and occasionally perceived as being 'in the air'. Atmospheres can also tie consumption contexts together (Biehl-Missal and Saren, 2012), affect bodies and alter behaviour (Hill, 2016). Importantly, they are notoriously hard to measure qualitatively or quantitatively. Regardless, they are considered crucial for the 'success' of SMEs which, by their very nature, are collectively memorized and spectacular moments (Roche, 2000). Atmospheric dimensions feed into the mega-event 'spectacle' and contribute to the festivalization of urban public space (Klauser, 2012). In the case of Euro 2020, the evidence suggests that UEFA and its host cities intended to ensure that a festive and welcoming atmosphere remained undisrupted by both external and internal 'undesirables'. However, such interrelations between security-related policies and commodification processes have implications.

When watching football in stadiums, fan zones or pubs, supporters seek 'authentic' experiences. Such 'authentic' experiences are, in part, derived from atmospheres (Pearson, 2012a; Millward, 2009a; Weed, 2007). Therefore, ticketless fans visit spaces like fan zones and pubs that share attributes and dynamics with stadiums and provide 'communal experience' and fulfil need for 'proximity' (Weed, 2007: 410). Notwithstanding, whilst supporters 'accept the need for security initiatives and are willing to aid the authorities' (Cleland and Cashmore, 2018: 466), some will feel that excessive security can enhance an oppressive atmosphere (Cleland and Cashmore, 2018; Cleland, 2019). Supporters will not uncritically endorse panoptic or draconian security measure that may hamper or sanitize atmospheres (Numerato, 2018).

The balancing-act required to 'secure' atmospheres – to prevent their oppressive dimensions – connects with Bauman's (2005) writings on the trade-off between 'security' and 'freedom'. Placed in context, extraordinary security measures may occasionally impair freedom and/or democratic values. Mythen and Walklate (2008: 336) argue that 'if the pursuit of security comes at the expense of human rights, then not only is the quality of security compromised, but the very principles of democracy are threatened'. Following 9/11, such concerns have also been articulated in the SME literature (Samatas, 2007). Bauman's (2005) 'freedom' may here be read as the freedom to enjoy the event 'authentically' without oppressive atmospheres. As Bauman continues, a fully satisfying security-freedom balance is rarely achieved. Accordingly, when 'freedom is missing, security feels like a slavery or prison' (ibid.:

36). Yet, when security is missing, freedom can 'hardly be exercised', whereas an 'increase in freedom may be read as a decrease of security and vice versa' (ibid.).

This may assist the sociological sensemaking of *why* 'security' should be proportionate and reassuring *and* intimidating or spectacular, however, not to the extent where it deters attendees' enjoyment or consumption (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009). Whereas 'security' implies reassurance, it can have the opposite effect (Zedner, 2003a). Zedner (2003a) notes that when precautions are taken, the feelings of insecurity may become self-fulfilling, and the means by which security is sought (e.g. highly visible military presence at SMEs) influence perceptions of insecurity. Arguably, with the emphasis on maintaining festive atmospheres, organizers intended to avoid this. As Chapter Five expands on empirically, this argument also links up to the 'policing' of the event, since police-fan interactions can impact this (Stott and Pearson, 2007).

Overall, balancing the 'security-atmosphere' couplet is highly important in order not to 'disrupt the circuits of capital and consumption' (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009: 264). As this chapter empirically records, an oppressive atmosphere hanging over the event caused by the event's security assemblage was outlined as potentially incompatible with its desired global corporate attractiveness partly derived from atmospheres. The analysis hence reveals how 'security' becomes a 'means of both physical protection and macro-spherical assurance and insulation' which opposes a 'supposedly unitary inside to a threatening outside' (Klauser, 2017: 87). The documentary data therefore extends the link between 'security' and festivity-loaded atmospheres. Ultimately, this meant that the latter was framed as a subject to be 'secured'. Naturally, this relates to hosts' obligation to provide public safety, but it may also be linked back to the desire to ensure visitor flows and the event's commercial value (McGillivray et al., 2019). On another level, spreading images of a festive tournament can also be considered a political message to those that would seek to threaten or disrupt the event. Such outward message would articulate that threats will not deter enjoyment or the state from its way of life (Divišová, 2019).

To this end, this section shows another, but under-explored side of 'security's' multiple meanings. It empirically establishes that, in addition to the mega-event's people, spaces and sponsors, the owner also sought to 'secure' festivity and atmospheric elements, as a far more intangible and inter-subjective referent object. But essentially,

'secured' atmospheres could not merely reduce prospects of disorder, but promote 'stable' and 'ordered' conditions for spectacle-oriented consumption.

4.5.3 Secure from What? 'General' and 'Specific' Threats

This section examines the meanings of 'security threats'. In the disaggregation of 'whom' or 'what' the event owners intended to protect the event from, there were a number of 'adversaries' or 'undesirable' behaviours or people which Euro 2020 was 'secured against', as potentially threatening the tournament's people, sponsors, spaces and atmospheres. The discursively framed threats included: anti-social behaviour, criminal activity, logistical vulnerabilities, social and political unrest (including strikes, political demonstrations, terrorism), health issues and finally, risks associated the international security context (UEFA, n.d., S6: 5-6). When framing 'whom' or 'what' Euro 2020 was protected from, UEFA predominantly framed the relevant 'security threat' while simultaneously describing how this specific threat could be minimized in hosts' 'security concepts'. For example, through the development of '[a] strategy regarding access to safe places in case of war, riots and natural disaster' (ibid.: S6: 9) or by having:

Tested contingency plans for medical relief and emergency services, e.g. in case of terrorism and other attacks, large-scale traffic accidents, *epidemics*, stadium disasters, etc [and] [a] strategy for the deployment of relief and emergency services proportionate to the scale of the incident(s) (ibid., emphasis added)

The quotes illuminate how contingency plans had to account for worst-case scenarios of threats posed by, *inter alia*, riots, terrorism, disasters and epidemics. Interestingly, an epidemic became a very real 'threat' to Euro 2020, yet is only mentioned once in the policy document. The shift from endemic threats (like riots, 'hooliganism', disasters, 'terrorism') *towards* the epidemic threat is captured in Chapters Five and Six. The remarkable correspondence between the framed 'threats' above is that they all are inherently uncontrollable threats characterized by uncertainty (see Beck, 1992). Collectively, the framed 'threats' call for speculative and future-oriented security outlooks from the emergency services, security agencies and stakeholders (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012). As such, the postponement of Euro 2020 (caused by a global pandemic) combined with those other framed 'threats' (i.e. attacks, riots, terrorism or disasters) demonstrate exactly why the exercise of precaution must be deeply

embedded into mega-event 'security' and sit alongside existing lessons and templates (see Chapters Five and Six).

As stated, the 'threats' to Euro 2020 appeared primarily in discourses stating how the relevant 'threat' could be mitigated or approached. For example, UEFA stressed that:

The host population has a major role to play and should be reassured that the overwhelming majority of visiting supporters will not be *hooligans* but football-loving tourists (UEFA, n.d., Sector 6: 4, emphasis added).

Here, 'hooligans' are framed as a 'threat', which the public needed reassurance would merely be a minority at Euro 2020. Though, no definition of the term is provided despite the term's legal and definitional vagueness (Rookwood and Pearson, 2010). Euro 2020 also required a 'well-defined structure for counterterrorism and protective security' (ibid.: 9). Clearly, the need for counterterrorism structures insinuates that Euro 2020 had to be secured from 'terrorism'. However, little specification is provided around these contested terms. Furthermore, 'political demonstrations', symbolizing potential 'bad news', were secured against. Overall, these could collectively and separately represent 'toxic elements' (Klauser, 2010) which, if present within the cleansed spaces, could impede the aforementioned and desired joyfulness.

The pre-defined 'threats' were expected since SMEs, broadly, are exposed to similar threats (Jennings, 2012a; Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010). Observably, however, there are certain 'threats' that have been neglected in existing research, such as epidemics, health issues, logistical vulnerabilities, natural disasters and severe weather (UEFA, n.d., S6: 6). Undoubtedly, these can impact SME 'security' – as epitomized by COVID-19. It is also important to emphasize that the framed 'threats', as UEFA acknowledged, were non-exhaustive, meaning that additional 'threats' could emerge as the event approached; again calling for a flexible and reactive stance from the planners.

One important implication of these findings is that they reinforce the notion of post-9/11 security policies becoming increasingly precautionary in nature (Coaffee and Wood, 2006; Mythen and Walklate, 2016). Arguably, the range of uncertainties, including but not limited to natural disasters, infectious diseases and terrorism (see UEFA, (2013, S6: 6) for an overview), would inform a 'precautionary stance that [sought] to govern potentially catastrophic futures through aggressive and pre-emptive security measures' (Boyle et al., 2015: 111). As highlighted, '[r]isks related to the

international security context' (UEFA, n.d., S6: 6) could emerge as threats. As such, hosts had to acknowledge 'the need for contingency management to respond quickly to global events' (ibid.). With regards to the quick responses to COVID-19, this will be captured in Chapter Six.

However, especially two dimensions of these findings are notable. First, this demonstrates why a precautionary logic must be embedded in SME security governance (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012). Second, the findings empirically manifest exactly why SME 'security' cannot be disconnected from wider risk contexts in contemporary societies (Tsoukala, 2016). In her work on 'counter-hooliganism', Tsoukala (2007: 7) writes that in the European-wide security continuum:

[E]ach of the phenomena included or to be included in the security threats continuum has become a specific threat, following the criminalisation or harsher punishment of some of its aspects or even control of its deviant characteristics, while simultaneously becoming a general threat, owing to the absence of any delimitation of the threat itself

Borrowing from this, it is appropriate to argue that Euro 2020's 'security threats' represented both 'specific threats' and 'general threats'. By then following Bigo (2008: 12), this would also allow security managers and professionals to 'determine what exactly constitutes security' guided by formally framed 'security threats'. Hence, the broader implications of these findings are that they accurately encapsulate how SME 'security' and 'security' operate concertedly.

For example, natural disasters, health issues and logistical vulnerabilities are not necessarily consequences of housing a mega-event (Jennings, 2012a). Yet, as the generational crisis caused by COVID-19 demonstrates, such external events or threats will impact an event's 'security'. Furthermore, those adversaries or incidents securitized in the mega-event landscape resonates clearly with what is 'secured' against in the broader society (Bigo, 2008). Thus, these are also 'general threats'. The threats of 'terrorism', 'crime', 'anti-social behaviour' and 'health issues' are also 'secured against' in the 'everyday life' (Stevens and Vaughan-Williams, 2017; Rushton, 2011), but are embedded into – and acquire specific meanings – as 'threats' in the SME context.

Overall, this has huge implications for the meanings of 'security' which this thesis zooms in on. 'Security' in Euro 2020's case must be seen as referring to the presence

and well-being of 'good inflows' and contemporaneous absence or concealment of 'bad inflows'. 'Good inflows' were encouraged, and encompassed officials, workers, joyful atmospheres and 'football-loving tourists'. Consequently, these were the subjects to be provided with 'security'. In stark contrast, pre-defined 'bad inflows' like epidemics, 'hooligans', 'terrorists', 'criminals' or 'protesters' had to be 'secured against' and – as far as possible – refused entry (Klauser, 2017; Fussey, 2015). By linking this back to the discussion around 'responsibility', this compose empirical grounds for arguing that each host – by accepting hosting rights – were responsible for adopting the appropriate and precautionary policies and stances that adequately could address the pre-defined 'threats' apparent in the requirements handbook. Hence, this chapter shows that Euro 2020's 'security' was facilitated for the event's people, sponsors, spaces and atmospheres which, again, had to be 'secured' from an array of pre-defined 'threats' that depended on international, local and situational contexts and historical relations.

4.6 Conclusion: Towards the 'Troika of Security'

In a progressively threat-conscious post-9/11 world, Mythen and Walklate (2008) observe that contemporary security assessments are increasingly directed by speculative 'what if?' questions. Transplanting this notion into the realm of SMEs, it can be seen that planners, organizers and experts of 'security' must appear to account for 'imagined catastrophes' and 'all possible risks' under conditions of uncertainty (Boyle et al., 2015: 115). The findings presented here, demonstrating exactly 'what' or 'whom' that were framed as threats to Euro 2020 – as apparent in formal discourses – reinforce this perspective in the context of a novel SME. To an extent, threats from 'terrorism', epidemics or disasters call for 'what if?' questions. Notwithstanding, this chapter's findings also complicate this. The chapter proves how the past – the *retrospective* – also plays a guiding role in the construction of SME 'security'. As argued, relevant organizations, agencies and authorities in the 12 host countries would also construct 'security' by considering 'what was?' and reproducing 'what worked'.

This chapter presents this thesis's first set of empirical data, as emerging from a large volume of policy documents relevant to Euro 2020's pre-planning. First, the discourse from the main stakeholder and event owner, UEFA, in relation to 'good practice' and 'integrated security concepts' were unpacked. Secondly, a frame analysis was performed according to 'whom' that ultimately were 'responsible' for ensuring

'security'. This generated a critical examination of exactly 'whom' the event owner required the responsible host nations to 'secure' and 'secure from' as threats to Euro 2020. With its original findings and arguments, this chapter critically extends discussions around security discourses and practices before SMEs. Importantly, it also answers under-researched questions related to the meanings and constructions of 'security' prior to Euro 2020. As shown, a great deal of the security construction based itself upon retrospective estimations and templates from past events.

The conditions and parameters for the reproduction of security strategies and practices across time/space were set. Essentially, Euro 2020 can exemplify how lesson-drawing processes, imitation and the reproduction of security practices and policies are integral components of mega-event 'security'. However, such processes of learning occur against the background of precautionary stances and futuristic risk assessments that *also* are required. In light of the 'securing' of the 2014 Brisbane G20 summit, Molnar et al. (2019) offer a similar argument, suggesting that policy-transfer and imagination of catastrophic scenarios occur in parallel. Building upon their suggestion, this chapter's data has mapped the contours of this thesis's empirically-grounded concept – the 'troika of security' – which tentatively becomes visible here. Here, 'what was?' and 'what if?' questions play indispensable roles and the coalescence of retrospective and futuristic assessments helps explaining the construction of 'security' before Euro 2020.

Besides, I am arguing that the repeated emphasis on 'good' security practices and policies is one way of facilitating for neoliberal aims inherent to SME staging. As demonstrated, pre-defined 'good' security practices and requirements may reinforce 'clean' environments. Hence, in addition to providing 'security' for those individuals, organizations or spaces framed in need for this, the tested practices and requirements also advance 'conditions within which consumption practices can flourish' (McGillivray et al., 2019: 4). Here, sponsors can thrive financially with minimal disruption (Silk, 2014) from 'bad inflows' and pre-defined 'security threats' depending on socio-political, historical and current contexts and trends. With regards to the *meanings* of 'security', this demonstrates how security-related policies intertwine with both operational and commercial purposes. 'Security' appears multidimensional and means that individuals, spaces and the current political economy of sports are provided protection throughout and beyond the mega-event landscapes.

This chapter's original insights assist this thesis's overarching aims since the key parameters for Euro 2020's security pre-planning have been mapped out. Thus, the chapter's findings provide indications of what 'security' before Euro 2020 meant and how it was to be constructed. However, as caution it is important that the pre-defined threats did not necessarily correspond with 'whom' or 'what' event spectators, eventually, would consider as threatening. Such answers can hardly be extracted from policy documents. Further, questions still remain around how 'security' – more practically – would be implemented in order to create 'safe events'. As Włoch (2019) argued following a similar documentary analysis related to Euro 2012, documents allow for flexible scenarios to be built before interviews. Reflecting this, and to gain an *even* richer insight into Euro 2020's 'security', Chapter Five focuses more specifically on one host city and presents stakeholder interview data. The upcoming chapter's findings will be synthesized with this chapter's findings when I introduce the new concept, the 'troika of security', as a framework through which the 'securing' of Euro 2020 can be explained and understood.

Chapter 5

Chapter 5: The ‘Troika of Security’

Merging Retrospective and Futuristic Assessments in the Construction of ‘Security’

5.1 Introduction

In explaining how Euro 2020 would be ‘secured’, this chapter will present new findings that are brought together with findings from Chapter Four. It will also build upon and extend work on security governance in the twenty-first century (Mythen and Walklate, 2008, 2016; Boyle and Haggerty, 2009, 2012; Klauser, 2011a, 2012, 2017). The chapter argues that in order to construct ‘safety’ and ‘security’ at Euro 2020, the wide group of actors involved in the event’s ‘security’ pre-planning adhered to future-oriented precautionary logics and governance, whilst simultaneously relying heavily upon existing templates, past experiences and tests (see Klauser, 2012), combined with the respective host cities’ and their security agencies’ ‘institutional memories’. Drawing from existing insights, Chapter Four and new empirical records, this thesis’s original concept, preliminarily touched upon already, the ‘*troika of security*’, is fully developed. This concept, which utilizes a ‘troika’, referring to a set of threes – as a metaphor – can be used as an analytical tool to understand or make better sociological sense of contemporary ‘security’ pre-planning and practices around SMEs. The concept is sociologically valuable since it offers a framework for understanding post-9/11 ‘security governance’, and can have transferable potential to other social contexts and securitized events with ‘potentially threatening collective behaviors’ (Tsoukala, 2007: 13)

The chapter’s findings solidify the ‘troika’ and yield unique insight into its components’ presence before Euro 2020. Essentially, the main argument of this chapter is that the security governance was based on a combination of both retrospective assessments and lessons together with a futuristic outlook. Such argument allows for understanding SME ‘security’ not solely as the prevention of ‘high-profile and extremely serious security incidents’ and attacks (Fussey, 2015:

216). SME ‘security’ essentially relates to a manifold of threats, tasks, and the construction of ‘security’ perceptions for the general and visiting public.

Focusing predominantly on London as a host city, this chapter draws upon a series of in-depth interviews with stakeholders in Euro 2020’s security, policing and general SME organization. The displayed narratives and quotes in this chapter provide an accurate description of the perceptions and ideas expressed by stakeholders. The stakeholders were sampled because of their expertise and/or active involvement in the planning of Euro 2020’s ‘security’ and ‘safety’, and their more general involvement in event security and football policing. Interviews were supplemented by press announcements and occasionally synthesized with the findings presented in Chapter Four. Following interview analysis, dominant themes were divided into categories which this chapter explains in detail. This included London’s mega-event experience and repertoire of security strategies, knowledge-transfer and networking activities, policing and, lastly, fan zone security. First, however, the chapter highlights how the categories – when unpacked – work to enhance Chapter Four’s tentative contours of the developed ‘troika’.

The chapter is divided into two parts. To begin with, the introduced concept, the ‘troika of security’, is conceptualized and discussed. The second part presents findings from stakeholder interviews and unpacks the dominant categories. The chapter’s conclusion maintains that a precautionary and flexible stance, and the speculative task of ‘looking forward’ are crucial parts of the construction of SME ‘security’. However, so are the circulation of knowledge and the retrospective mechanisms of SME security (Klauser, 2012, 2017; Molnar et al., 2019). By presenting these facets of SME ‘security’ in a new, untested and uncertain context, it is argued that for Euro 2020, the past was consulted; whereas the future – as far as possible – had to be predicted.

5.2 Conceptualizing the ‘Troika of Security’

This chapter’s findings combined with Chapter Four’s documentary research provide grounds for introducing a new concept that can explain the construction of ‘security’ at SMEs. I call this the *‘troika of security’*. This concept is born out of empirical work and offers a conceptual extension to existing sociological, criminological (Mythen and Walklate, 2008, 2016; Molnar et al., 2019), critical geographical (Klauser, 2012) and security literature (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009, 2012; De Goede, 2008). Ultimately, this

thesis ties these insights together and presents these relevant elements of 'security governance' in the novel mega-event context of Euro 2020.

Theoretically, it is informed by perspectives on 'security' and 'risk' governance in the twenty-first century (Mythen and Walklate, 2008; 2016). Thereby, it reflects the call within critical security studies for engagement with 'risk-based and threat-based interpretations of (in)security' (Case Collective, 2006: 468-469). It also draws from the 'lesson-drawing' and 'policy-transfer' literature (Rose, 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). As my data demonstrates, the components within the 'troika of security' were integral for Euro 2020's security planning that sought to 'secure' the tournament from an array of pre-defined threats (Chapter Four). The 'troika of security' encapsulates the inter-play between the distinctive logics, activities, practices and processes that fulfill each other's limitations and informed Euro 2020's security professionals and stakeholders.

In the 'troika' one may locate (i) *institutional memory*, (ii) *lesson-drawing* and (iii) *precautionary logics*. Firstly, here 'institutional memory' refers to those advantages and collectively acquired strategic repertoires that are stored, available and offered to a SME's security assemblage by security services', an organization's or a host city's (regular) encounters with SMEs, football matches or other cultural events that attract mass crowds and, subsequently, require large-scale policing and security operations. Security and emergency planners develop 'habits' (O'Grady, 2019), and a repository of habits and 'experiences that happen often enough' (Stakeholder 3) work as a foundation for the upcoming, relevant operation.

Due to the nature of *institutional memory*, the past is consulted when operationally 'securing' the future. Such is also the case with the 'troika's' second component: 'lesson-drawing' (Rose, 1991). Though, 'lesson-drawing' occurs in more formalized (i.e. networking events, peer-reviews or conferences) and less-fixed tempo-spatial settings. Meanwhile, 'institutional memory' is concentrated more locally within the relevant organization. As Chapter Four evidences, 'lesson-drawing' processes in SME security are apparent through the emulation or reproduction of 'good' or 'best' practices (Klauser, 2011a), the avoidance of non-successes – and the general reference back to past successes and/or failures. Consequently, drawing upon or emulating

'security successes' and avoiding not-to-be repeated failures (Molnar et al., 2019) assist the normative desire for 'secure' events.

Collectively, 'institutional memory' and 'lesson-drawing' can provide advantages for 'external' and 'internal' SME planners, security professionals and other stakeholders groups tasked with management or identification of threats (Bigo, 2000). These, Bigo (2002: 75) calls 'managers of unease'. Despite such advantages, however, it is still required that the professionals of unease adopt precautionary logics and principles (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009; Toohey and Taylor, 2008), and to the speculative-natured 'security imagination' (De Goede, 2008). This, in order to best account for the omnipresence of 'uncertainties' and 'unknowns' circulating around SMEs – and the fact that even the most 'ridiculous "what-ifs"' must be taken seriously (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009: 261). This is reinforced by the fact that an absence of 'threat' or 'risk' is epistemologically unachievable, which underscores the very limitations of the 'past' (institutional memory and lesson-drawing) in the planning of future events.

As came to fore in the interviews, it is simply unknown whom exactly that would attend the events, whilst some threats, such as 'terrorism', are inherently unpredictable. As Stakeholder 1 commented: 'In fact, when you talk to police in London, their operations are more about counterterrorism than they are about disorder'. The adopted precautionary position is also demonstrated by discourses and images of preparedness – showing that 'security' is being managed – that are publicized and transmitted before events (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012), often through news reports or announcements of pre-event exercises or security technologies.

To an extent, this confirms that security assessments in a post-9/11 world are directed by the speculative and inexplicable question 'what if?' (Mythen and Walklate, 2008: 244). Undeniably, despite a plethora of institutional memories and standardized templates from the past, 'what if'-questions must still be asked. Writing on counterterrorism, Mythen and Walklate (2008) note that in order to mitigate risks, security assessments after 2001 no longer predict the future by focusing on the past. In another study, the same authors note that:

The logic of anticipatory risk, a future-centric logic—which prioritizes predictive horizon scanning for upcoming attacks—has increasingly informed the making of tiers of legislation over the last two decades [...] The pre-emptive moment takes place prior to anything having happened and

thus occurs at a point at which threats may be inexact and uncertain. This anticipatory logic of risk seeks not so much to prevent an occurrence through the interpretation of past incidents but to pre-empt the unravelling of emergent events in relation to the horizon of projected futures (Mythen and Walklate, 2016: 1111)

Hence, through a 'methodology of calculation, uncertainties over threat are made legible by transforming those threats into calculable risk under conditions of likelihood and severity' (Adey and Anderson, 2012: 111). Increasingly subscribed to are the speculative precautions and imagined are 'scenarios that appear low in probability but high in consequence' (Betts, 2002: 49) which underline how, as De Goede (2008: 155) argues, that 'techniques of imagining the future have taken on new political significance'. 'What if?' questions emerge as a response to 'not knowing enough [and simultaneously] *knowing* that we not know enough' (Walklate and Mythen, 2010: 59, original emphasis).

Although these authors analyze 'security' more generally in contemporary societies, these logics are embedded into SME's security governance. At SMEs, accounting for 'terrorist threats' is based upon precautionary 'outside-the-box' thinking (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009: 360). Although notoriously difficult to provide empirical evidence of pre-event, it can be illustrated by heightened security budgets, and additionally, deployment of troops or, for example, surface-to-air missiles (Fussey, 2015), biometrics, surveillance and pre-event exercises that deal with apocalyptic scenarios (Armstrong et al., 2017: 99-102). Precautionary policies can also assist 'securitized commodification' (Giulianotti, 2011) and thereby ensure 'controlled' and 'clean' sites: free from both dangerous articles and rival brands or products. The precautionary principles are visible through extensive use of risk-management initiatives and security measures, together with authorities' or organizers' press releases and announcements (Toohey and Taylor, 2008) which work as rhetoric tools and exhibit that 'security' *is* being addressed (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012). Future-oriented SME security thereby 'identifies and prepares for events that will happen in the future [and] those who work in the industry always prepare for the worst-case scenarios, even though these are the least likely to occur' (Gaffney, 2019: 384).

Concurrently, it is important not to conflate SME security strategies with counterterrorism strategies. As presented findings demonstrate, threats to SMEs are not confined to 'terrorism', which fortunately, seldom materializes at events (Atkinson

and Young, 2012). Yet, such relative infrequency does not mean it should not be taken seriously, since 'worst cases *do* happen' (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012: 254, original emphasis). Nonetheless, certain SMEs – football tournaments particularly – have historically been affected more by supporter violence than 'terrorism' (Jennings and Lodge, 2011). Thus, SMEs do not and cannot rely solely on worst-case scenario planning.

As my empirical records have demonstrated already – and as this chapter delves into, the policing of fans in order to prevent disorder and more broadly, crime control, are based largely on experiences from the past. The history of a relevant fan group or a specific fixture, the previous effectiveness of a policing approach or the housing experience of an Olympic spectacle inform how similar, upcoming events are 'secured'. Importantly, the 'troika' captures the inter-play between futuristic and retrospective assessments when planning for future events.

By searching in the past, not only what *worked* is learnt, but also what not to repeat (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). This creates foundations for what Molnar et al. (2019) call 'failure-inspired' learning. Writing on 'stockpiling' supplies as a security device, in relation to (imagined) worst-case scenarios, Folkers (2019: 5) notes that 'stockpiles seek to assemble a repertoire of stuff in the present that matches and thereby neutralizes what the future might have in "in store"'. Against the background of not knowing what the future holds, 'stockpiling' thus partly compensates for not knowing. To an extent, this argument carries transferable value and can be applied to mega-events, where practices and policies drawn from past events are stockpiled. Consequently, this has 'a securing effect in the present' even when the anticipated future 'never comes to fruition' (ibid.).

In times of uncertainty, Bauman (2007: 3) submits that 'past successes do not necessarily increase the probability of future victories, let alone guarantee them'. Therefore, past successes – represented in the troika by 'institutional memory' and 'lesson-drawing' – operate triangularly and intersect with the future-leaning precautionary logic. In order to enable the highest standards of 'security', the three are required and adhered to. They underpin the complex SME security pre-planning process this thesis examines. Hence, my empirical underpinnings make it possible to argue that this was how 'security' was planned – through a 'troika of security' in which

operational and institutional knowledge derived from the past worked collectively with futuristic estimations.

Potentially, the ‘troika’ can also be transferred to other social and securitized contexts, including urban (mega-)events, festivals (i.e. Carnival, Pride) and demonstrations. Molnar et al. (2019) express a similar argument in their examination of ‘policy-transfer’ in relation to the policing and securing of the Brisbane G20 political summit in 2014. The authors suggested that failure-inspired learning ‘sits alongside the imagination of potential worst-case scenarios as a significant driver in the scope and scale of mega-event security’ (ibid.: 119). This suggestion is important for this thesis’s findings. Indeed, the ‘troika’ reaffirms such idea, but extends it, by presenting this in a completely new SME context. Through an unpacking of the dominant categories that emerged from the stakeholder interactions, the tentative silhouette of the ‘troika’, emerging in Chapter Four, will become increasingly crystallized and contextualized.

5.3 Institutional Memory Against a Background of Uncertainty

UEFA’s security requirements sustained that hosts’ ‘[security] concept should take into account the relevant country’s security-related experience from previous major events (whether sports-related or not)’ (UEFA, n.d., S6: 3). In London’s case, it can be argued, based on interview data, that relevant London organizations’ (i.e. the Metropolitan Police) ‘institutional memory’ derived from previously housing a series of large-scale cultural and sporting events, was expected to play an integral role for the construction of ‘security’ and the security operation’s eventual execution phase at Euro 2020. However, findings also make it possible to claim that experience *in itself* would not be a panacea for ‘safe events’ due to the range of unknowns and unpredictable scenarios. These findings add significant empirical weight to the discussed ‘troika’.

Following London’s successful hosting rights bid, UEFA’s evaluation contended that ‘the city’s experience in hosting major events is outstanding’ (UEFA, 2014: 29), and that ‘London wish[ed] to be at the heart of the event’ (ibid.: 28). When Brussels lost their hosting rights, London was assigned four additional games, amplifying London’s position at the heart of Euro 2020. London’s organizationally central position at Euro 2020 was commonly pointed out by stakeholders, and given London’s high number of assigned games, one interviewee described London as ‘acting as a hub in an event that

is taking place across different nations' (Stakeholder 3). London was uniquely situated in the geographically complex event with seven games to be staged in it, including the final.

In the sporting world, London has long-standing traditions of housing SMEs (Roche, 2017: 246-254). London's sporting events include the 2012 Olympics, Euro 1996 and the 1966 World Cup, in addition to single *Tour de France* stages; over 100 EPL matches each season and the Wimbledon Tennis Championship. However, since London would stage games from group stage to the final, this would temporally prolong the Euro 2020 related security operation in the city, compared to other host cities. Notwithstanding, the city's already existing experience with staging SMEs and regular encounters with large-scale games and inflows of visitors were considered extremely important and seen as assisting the housing of a safe Euro 2020 and the planning and execution of the associated security operation. As Stakeholder 1 commented, this was 'hugely important... hugely', but this is also demonstrated by the three examples below:

London is very, very used to hosting big events, the Met [the Metropolitan Police] have got matches up at Wembley every odd week. They're really, really good at what they do (Stakeholder 1).

I think in any major city, especially somewhere like London that has a lot of experience, not just with the sporting events, but with major culture events, with things like carnival, the infrastructure is in place. It is not unusual for a city like London either, to have an influx of international visitors (Stakeholder 2)

They're [the hosts] all used to in their own way to organize big matches (Stakeholder 7).

The quotes highlight the importance of past experiences and existing infrastructure when securing upcoming mega-events. Although Stakeholder 7 downplays the different experience levels *between* host cities, emphasis is still placed on experience and being 'used to' organize big events. Arguably, those security agencies and emergency services that regularly participate in the security management and policing of large-scale events and games, such as 'the Met', possess a bank of institutional memory that would be used for the Euro 2020's security operation in London. An institution acquires 'an institutional memory based upon past experiences' (Rose, 1991: 13). As Seifert (2007) writes, institutional memory is stored knowledge within the relevant organization and based upon post-analysis of events. This knowledge is

stored, before it is taught or narrated across the organization to new members. Moreover, Seifert argues institutional memory 'reduces the likelihood of repeating past mistakes and increases the accuracy of perception by transferring insights from similar incidents from similar incidents of the past to current responders' (p. 114). Hence, given London's longstanding but recent mega-event experiences, the city and its security providers' ability to act upon a repository of institutional memories were pointed out in interviews:

It is kind of like an *institutional memory* as well [assisting the security pre-planning], and that's there in somewhere like London, but it might not be there in somewhere like, I don't know... Budapest (Stakeholder 2, emphasis added.).

Another interviewee supported this, speaking of the Euro 2020 pre-planning:

London has an enormous amount of experience [...] The scenes in London last night [for a Football League trophy final, March 2019] were extraordinary, and London can cope with pretty much anything that is thrown at it from that point of view (Stakeholder 3).

Drawing from such insights, it can be argued that institutional memory, comprising a set of collective knowledge and experiences within the relevant organization (i.e. the outlined Metropolitan Police, the FA or private security companies) were relied upon when planning and executing the security operations at London's Euro 2020 match-days. Kilgallon (2019: 2) writes that the 'Metropolitan Police Service plans hundreds of public order policing operations each year' in London. In that sense, they are likely to be the 'most experienced police service in the country' (ibid.). Whilst this demonstrates extensive experience, the Metropolitan Police Service, nevertheless, also face 'intense pressure [...] to "get it right" with regards to the complexities of managing interactions with the public' (ibid.).

London's experience in planning for and executing large-scale events was also hinted towards in Armstrong et al.'s (2017) study of the London Police in relation to the 2012 Olympics in the city. Accordingly, 'many senior officers considered the Games to have been "just another event"' (p. 116). This thesis's empirical records underpin this notion, as it was expected that the involved organizations' institutional memory would ease or assist the security planning and policing. Further, the interviewees trusted the same organizations to 'get it right' because of this experience.

Broadly, the trust placed on London's existing security infrastructures can be connected to the city's resilience and 'ability to detect, prevent and if necessary, handle disruptive challenges' (Coaffee and Wood, 2006: 504). Since the 1990s, London has possessed a mature security infrastructure that accounts for real and perceived 'terrorism threats' through the 'adoption of physical, technological and managerial approaches to security at a variety of expanding spatial scales' (Coaffee et al., 2011: 3317). However, the theme of 'institutional memory' also connects with the concept of 'habits' in emergency response (O'Grady, 2019) and the 'security legacies' discussed before. Especially those 'security legacies' speaking to expertise, knowledge and policing (Giulianotti, 2013).

Fundamentally, 'security legacies' are remnants from past events that are 'activated' or drawn upon for future events. However, given the difficulties in measuring 'legacies' (Preuss, 2007), it is notoriously hard to ascribe exactly which 'memories' – including knowledge, practices or tools – that were 'reactivated' from regular EPL games or which memories that derived from the 2012 Olympics. Instead, it is argued that London's holistic platform and its organizations' institutional memory, built up longitudinally by the manifold and complexity of already staged cultural and sporting events, were seen as extremely important by the stakeholders ahead of Euro 2020's new challenges. The findings then strengthen the claim that in creating 'security' at Euro 2020, past experiences were integral and influenced stakeholders' trust in the responsible security agencies.

Against the background of stakeholders repeatedly making retrospective references to past events – predominantly London 2012 – it was acknowledged that, while 'what was' and existing templates provided advantages before the upcoming event, it did not automatically translate into 'safe' or 'undisrupted' events. Neither could it prevent institutional memory loss. Despite being premised on the acting on memories, habits and routines, each performance of 'security' also 'embody difference in each recurrence' (O'Grady, 2019: 457). Hence, uncertainties were still present and underpinned that speculative means of risk-assessment had to be adopted, although, in a pre-event setting, the exact security measures that are implemented are not necessarily publicly known given 'security's' clandestine nature (Kerr, 2008). One of these uncertainties included the unpredictable changes to risk and security environments, especially related to terrorism:

The Olympics back in 2012, when the environment was quite different, I don't think the terrorist threat was as strong as it is now. And the Olympics was a global event and they kept it right so there was a huge amount of work done [...] I think there's probably going to be an awful lot of police that we don't see, that we don't even know are there [...] terrorism is going to be the main focus, not dealing with disorder (Stakeholder 1)

It was noticeable in France [for Euro 2016] that a lot of security was focused not around threats from football hooliganism, but the threat posed by terrorism (Stakeholder 3)

Though, it was also pointed towards uncertainties originating from mass crowds of football fans making planning and policing an increasingly complicated task:

Author: How important is experience when it comes to 2020, in terms of housing so many fans?

Stakeholder 3: [...] I remember Euro '96 and London 2012, for comparable events. London '96 had six matches in London, same as this time, and it was a slightly different situation then, because fewer people travelled from abroad. I think the same is true at 2012, in that ... although a lot of people came, *it wasn't the standard football crowd*. [...] *We don't know who's coming to London*. (Emphasis added).

Closer to Euro 2020's original commencement, at a stage where it was confirmed that Croatia and the Czech Republic would be in the same group as England, this notion again came to fore. The conversation below demonstrates how fan cultures and emerging fixture lists impact policing:

Author: So, do you expect it [the policing] to be quite similar to club football, so to how the Premier League or FA Cup are policed? Will they adopt those measures in the Euros in London?

Stakeholder 8: There's obviously an extra dimension given the international aspect. And there's also challenges to the lack of familiarity too. You don't know enough about the fan cultures of those we'll be playing against.

Author: Yeah, yeah?

Stakeholder 8: So, when the Croatian fan base comes to London, it's not the same as the Liverpool fan base coming to London for a Premier League match or whatever. Those challenges are around the incoming fans rather than the policing style. The policing style generally I think will be the same in London, regardless of who comes.

Noticeably, this conversation gives insight into how fan cultures and emerging fixture lists play a role in the policing and place limitations on the circulation of knowledge. Yet, this stakeholder thought the policing style still would be low-key in London.

In an era of globalized insecurity dynamics (Bauman, 2005) every upcoming SME brings new sets of risks. In London's case, this meant that despite having executed 'the largest peacetime mobilization of security and policing personnel in the UK' (Armstrong et al., 2017: 8) eight years before, there were certain factors that simply could not be accounted for. Forces' institutional knowledge could therefore, by itself, provide no guarantees for 'successful' security operations. Risk climates and international security contexts are unpredictable (Toohey, 2008), and ultimately, mega-events do not operate in vacuums. However, unknowns are also related to crowd differences between football mega-events and the Olympics. Moreover, football fans are divided into categories based on the supposed 'risk' they pose (Stott, 2003). Whilst this is based on their past history and behavior(s) in football contexts, the reality is that fans arriving at a SME without intentions of causing problems may, because of the emergence of a 'social identity', end up in conflict with rival fans or the police (Stott and Pearson, 2007). Hence, the unpredictability of football crowds and crowds more generally feed into the omnipresence of uncertainty prior to SMEs.

To a degree, these uncertainties reinforce why 'events are one institutional, discursive, and spatial-temporal domain where precautionary thinking and the requisite imagination of worst-case scenarios has burgeoned' (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012: 245). Whilst related to potential terrorist attacks, precautionary thinking also contemplates whom that will travel to follow their team or be in attendance. As Stakeholder 3's response above highlights, there are important differences between Olympic Games and European Championships here. Compared with Olympics, where the main concern is terrorism, international football tournaments are more decentralized and more associated with public disorder, violence and organized 'hooliganism' (Jennings and Lodge, 2011). Whilst both events attract large crowds, Olympic visitors tend to not 'divide their support across different teams that symbolize historical lines of national conflict' (ibid.: 8). Team rivalry, related aggression and spectator violence stand stronger in football World Cups and 'Euros' where disorder occasionally is based on territorial and cultural tensions (Jennings and Lodge, 2011).

Collectively, such findings feed into the precautionary facet of the 'troika of security'. Amidst these unknowns, SME planners and security professionals would have to resort to a range of precautionary logics where unthinkable scenarios of 'terrorism'

were considered pre-events (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009, 2012). Apart from ‘terrorism’, however, there are also other elements that *cannot* be accounted for. These elements call for flexibility and include emerging fixture lists and attending fan cultures. Adding epidemics, logistical vulnerabilities and natural disasters (UEFA, n.d., S6: 6) to this, it becomes evident *why* speculative ‘what if?’ questions must be asked, despite underlying strategic repertoires. Uncertainties are omnipresent at events. And they are also interconnected with the unpredictable outcomes ‘on-the-pitch’ from stage to stage. Hence, large-crowds are expected though exactly ‘*who is coming*’ remains unclear.

This section’s findings first underpin the importance of ‘institutional memory’ of security agencies and stakeholders in Euro 2020’s planning. However, the stakeholder accounts also nuance this, by suggesting that an organization’s institutional memory must be supplemented by future-oriented assessments (Mythen and Walklate, 2008). In explaining the processes and assessments central to Euro 2020’s pre-planning, these empirical records feed into the ‘troika of security’. As this section captures, previously tested practices or strategies assist the upcoming security delivery. Notwithstanding, new potential uncertainties cannot be shied away from.

5.4 Networking, Knowledge Exchange and Lessons from the Past

Supplementing Chapter Four’s argument, this section provide insight into the processes of transnational knowledge exchanges and networking activities that facilitated ‘lesson-drawing’ (Rose, 1991) throughout Euro 2020’s pre-planning. It is also shown *when* such exchanges took place, and *how* they were to benefit the event’s ‘security’. For Rose (2005: 16), a ‘lesson’ refers to ‘the outcome of learning; it specifies a programme drawing on knowledge of programmes in other countries dealing with much the same problem’. This section argues that existing templates and formal knowledge of SME security – representing tested lessons – were transferred practically and formally through networking activities and transnational exchanges between relevant authorities, security professionals and other stakeholders. Consequently, it is empirically documented how ‘lesson-drawing’, as one component of the ‘troika’, occurs in practice in a novel SME context, with existing knowledge from the past being transferred across space/time onto the forthcoming event. Findings also suggest that independent fan organizations have increased their impact in the security and policing planning prior to Euro 2020.

Expert conferences, exercises and progress monitoring ensure circulation of security-related policies for SMEs (Klauser, 2017). In Euro 2020’s build-up, as summarized in *Table 5.1*, it was frequently reported about meetings and conventions where the event’s security planning featured on the agenda. UEFA (2020f) also reported that ‘[w]ork has continued with the European Union and the Council of Europe [...] on preparations for UEFA EURO 2020’. Already in December 2016, an *ad hoc* working group was announced for the purpose of Euro 2020’s security. This was established by the Council of Europe (COE). The working group first met in Paris in February 2017 and then next in May 2017 (COE, n.d.). Furthermore, COE (2018) reported that the first ‘consultative visit’, where Euro 2020’s ‘safety’, ‘security’ and ‘service’ – the three tenets of the Council’s Convention (COE, 2015) – were on the agenda, took place in host city Baku in October, 2018. Alongside UEFA observers, the meeting was attended by:

A team of international experts from Denmark, Hungary, Romania, Turkey and the United Kingdom, accompanied by some observers to the Convention as UEFA and Supporters Direct Europe, along with the Secretariat of the Council of Europe (Council of Europe, 2018).

Key event/Activity	When?
Host cities confirmed by UEFA	September 2014
Euro 2020 Working Group Established	December 2016
Euro 2020 Working Group’s First Meeting	February 2017
Euro 2020 Working Group’s Second Meeting	May 2017
First consultative visit for the Standing Committee in Baku	October 2018
Consultative visit for the Standing Committee in Budapest	November 2018
Consultative visit for the Standing Committee in Bilbao	February 2019
First meeting of UEFA EURO 2020 Advisory Group on Legal Issues (Held by Council of Europe)	March 2019
UEFA organized Stadium Operator workshop before Euro 2020	April 2019
Peer-review exercise in London (Wembley)	May 2019
Ad Hoc Working Group meeting in Strasbourg	December 2019
Euro 2020 postponed due to COVID-19	March 2020

Table 5.1: A summary of publicly reported key events, meetings and networking activities in the pre-planning and build-up to Euro 2020 (2014-2020).

Notably, the meeting in Baku was also attended by representatives from EPL clubs and the FA – for the purpose of exchanging ‘policies and practices in the field of safety, security and service at sports events’ (ibid.). From this, it can be extracted that it is not merely ‘good practice’ from previous European Championships (Chapter Four) that were drawn upon or consulted ahead of Euro 2020. Seemingly, security strategies and experiences from time-and-space *diffuse* SMEs (Giulianotti, 2011), were in part ‘transferred’ onto their time and/or space *specific* cousins. As Stakeholder 2 clarified, these meetings were also intended for the planning of other UEFA tournaments like the Champions League and Europa League.

In February 2019, a third consultative visit was held in Bilbao. Again, the meeting included a number of security experts that were ‘accompanied by three observers to the Convention - UEFA, Football Supporters Europe and Supporters Direct Europe’ (Council of Europe, 2019a). Accordingly, the three-day long visit involved a number of activities enabling knowledge exchange between hosts:

In Bilbao, there were two aspects of it. So, it was three days. The first aspect is presentations by local authorities, in this case the Basque government and Bilbao local authorities, police, fire services, health and also stadium authorities of Bilbao. Second part was a practical observation which was going to a game (Stakeholder 2)

This quote gives insight into the consultative visits which facilitate transnational exchanges and represent learning arenas for local authorities, local stakeholders, experts, agencies and stakeholders from elsewhere. The consultative visits also underscore how the security stakeholders of Euro 2020 were transnationally organized, while the case of Euro 2020’s pre-planning displays how ‘different bureaucracies’ (Bigo, 2002: 75) are linked together in the management of specific threats that are addressed collectively as a common ‘enemy’ (see Bigo, 2000, 2002).

The networking activities pre-Euro 2020 also reflect Tsoukala’s (2009) argument. Tsoukala, who uses some of Bigo’s ideas, argues that football policing and security has become increasingly convergent in a European context. Simultaneously, however, it has become de-compartmentalized, because of the entanglement of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security agencies in the practical and legal ‘securing’ of ‘threats’ to European football. Through presentations, exercises and practical observations of security management on a match-day at a Euro 2020 stadium, *San Mamés*, formal

knowledge, established practices and experiences were exchanged. Ultimately, they were exchanged so that they could inform the planning of forthcoming events such as Euro 2020.

It was also announced that a fourth visit took place in Rome. Additionally, a first meeting for ‘Euro 2020 Advisory Group on Legal Issues’ was held in Paris, in March 2019. This meeting’s main objective was to ‘promote the cooperation and communication among the relevant authorities of the 12 organizing countries of the tournament’ (Council of Europe, 2019b). In April 2019, UEFA also organized a ‘EURO Stadium Operator Workshop’ in Nyon (UEFA, 2019b). This workshop ‘provided the opportunity for various EURO 2020 projects to formally present their roles, deliverables and responsibilities in advance of the final tournament’ (ibid.). Meanwhile, a peer-review exercise took place at Wembley during the FA Cup final in May 2019. This involved exchanges on ‘national policies and practices in the field of safety, security and service at sports events’ (Council of Europe, 2019c). The Working Group met again in December 2019 in Strasbourg (Council of Europe, 2019d). Explaining the benefits from peer-review exercises and consultative visits, one interviewee declared that:

The exchange between the different countries, the host nations, that I am witnessing in the Council of Europe level, aims to cut out any problems like that [related to SME housing experience] *by learning from each other, a lot of peer review, a lot of consultative visits taking place to different countries to review the procedures [...]* And as well as the Council of Europe consultative visits, and UEFA visits, there’s also peer review exercises taking place in the different countries at police level for example. So, there’s one taking place in Netherlands soon where colleagues *can go and see how they’re working and learning from each other* (Stakeholder 7, emphasis added)

It is clear that this statement highlights the importance of ‘lesson-drawing’ processes in Euro 2020’s planning. It also underlines how knowledge, policies and practices from other countries are circulated and reviewed. Considering the frequency of the meetings and consultative visits before Euro 2020, in addition to their aims and activities, this thesis’s data undeniably support the argument that networking activities allow for the ‘the establishment and modulation of networks of expertise’ (Klauser, 2012: 1048). Meanwhile, the press releases reporting on the activities of knowledge exchange serve to demonstrate ‘how security authorities say and show they are planning for the worst’

in an exercise of maintaining rhetorical control under conditions of uncertainty (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012: 254).

With its first-hand insights, this section exemplifies how transnational exchanges enable 'lesson-drawing', which constitutes a key part of SME security creation. Gold (2011), writing on Olympic 'security' highlighted how 'every new host city receives transfers of knowledge from previous hosts and capitalizes on repertoires of established knowledge' (p. 920). Based on presented findings, it can be argued that this quote can be replicated and accurately describes the realities of Euro 2020's security planning. If a lesson is the outcome of learning (Rose, 1991, 2005), it may be observed that the wide group of security stakeholders facing a problem – that is, ensuring 'security' at Euro 2020 – looked towards other states and experts that had previously dealt with or faced similar problems. Through conventions, peer-reviews and meet-ups, previous experiences, efficient (or inefficient) measures and organizations' perspectives were exchanged. Subsequently, they could be drawn upon by those responsible for the security delivery when the event, eventually, would take place. These presented findings can answer how, when, by whom and from whom lessons from the past were drawn. In other words, it provides insight into the transnational movements of event-specific security expertise (Boyle, 2011) and the reproduction dynamics of security practices and strategies at SMEs. Importantly, this feeds empirical layers into the 'lesson-drawing' component on the 'troika of security's' retrospective wing.

Finally, there are some caveats to this section given the clandestine nature of 'security networks' and security actors' pro-active undertakings (Eick, 2011b). Methodological issues of access restrictions were highlighted (Chapter Three), and there are inherent difficulties in empirically demonstrating exactly how networks of local, national and international security agencies acquire 'know-how' (Boyle et al. 2015: 119). Possibly, some meet-ups or exercises may have taken place *without* being publicly announced. In other words, these findings draw from official reports, publicly announced meetings and accessible stakeholders. Thereby, whilst it may not provide a complete picture, the data still paints a high-quality picture of the repertoire of measures taken and pre-event networking activities taking place.

5.4.1 The Role of Independent Fan Organizations

Another key finding unpacked here relates to the role of independent fan organizations in the security and policing of football mega-events. As aforementioned, organizations such as FSE and SD Europe were present at networking events and involved in the Euro 2020 Working Group. First, this should be seen context of a convention signed in 2016 (Council of Europe, 2016) emphasizing the need for including supporter voices into sport events planning (Numerato, 2018). It could also be viewed as related to the increased prominence of non-state actors in the transnational networking activities before SMEs (Boyle, 2011). Stakeholder accounts, especially from those stakeholders involved in fan networks, suggested that supporter voices were not solely included, but increasingly impactful around security and policing matters.

Supporter organizations have become increasingly active stakeholders in modern football and its governance (Hill et al., 2018; Garcia and Welford, 2015). FSE and SD Europe have, since 2009 and 2016 respectively, had observer status on the Council of Europe Standing Committee of the Convention on Spectator Violence and regularly participate on consultative visits (FSE, 2019; Numerato, 2018: 75). Since their foundation in July 2008, FSE has been actively organizing European tournament's fan embassies and involved around fan zones where they provide information, assistance and guidance for travelling fans (Cleland et al., 2018). This was also the case prior to Euro 2020. The democratically organized independent fan network is also 'recognized as an association of supporters' by UEFA, but also beyond the football world by the Council of Europe (ibid.). When asked about what the observer role involved, one interviewee summarized this as the following:

There are two aspects to it. One is information sharing and that's a two-way process. It's just as important that we like ... do stakeholders in football know what the fans are thinking? And they let us know what the security services and local authorities are thinking. The second part is actual practical observation (Stakeholder 2)

According to interviewees, this recognition was a crucial measure and the inclusion of fan organizations meant that these could work closely with local authorities and exchange information, opinions and knowledge, but beyond this, influence how Euro 2020 was secured:

I'd like to say, the observer status, fans and fan organizations being a part of the process, it works. And it doesn't just work for us. It works for UEFA (Stakeholder 2)

Just on 2020, I know that the work has already started. I know the Met Police are talking to FSE. They won't want it to go wrong. They want it to be an overwhelmingly successful event. I'm sure it will (Stakeholder 1)

[FSE] attend regular meetings with stakeholders at major tournaments well in advance of events like 2020, which will be a particularly difficult tournament for members due to it being shared by so many different countries [and moreover] The FSE coordinates Fan Embassy teams at major events (Stakeholder 4)

Now, we're members of this Euro 2020 Working Group. We have this remit. It is our role. So, we started promoting the [SLO] role a lot more at national team level and with the results we have seen, several national associations make appointments (Stakeholder 7)

Overall, the inclusion was seen as positive. Stakeholder 7 elaborated by commenting that SD Europe's promotion of the SLO role for international teams had impact and that SLO's were used at the 2019 Women's World Cup in France and for Sweden's national team before Euro 2020. SLOs are designated individuals working to enhance dialogue between the police, security, football organizations and fans. As Stakeholder 7 summarized it: 'So, we have gone from having no influence, no role, to now [have a role] through promotion of SLO's'. Overall, the quotes reveal a sense of perceived influence amongst supporter networks in the event planning and highlight inclusion as crucial and as a 'win-win' situation for all involved stakeholders. From Stakeholder 1's statement, it can be seen how the dialogue and planning started early, and that there was a shared interest in organizing an 'overwhelmingly successful event'.

When granted observer status, fan representatives are given an opportunity to have a say in the discussions on European conventions and pan-European football policing projects (Numerato, 2018). However, as Numerato's (2018) longitudinal study of fan activism across Europe shows, although fan movements like FSE have become increasingly active stakeholders in football policing and security operation, this does not automatically mean a fruitful dialogue is the outcome. Despite fan sophistication, he argues the impact of fan movements is limited across Europe. Though, as Numerato acknowledges, reflexive pressure from fan networks can bring some changes to football culture.

According to Cleland et al. (2018), the fact that fan networks are recognized by UEFA as a dialogue partner for European fans, shows that fan networks have a level of access to football's political structures and *a priori* potential to influence the decision-making. Nevertheless, this does not automatically mean the groups' input will be listened to. Yet, FSE was, for example, a part of the discussions when the 'Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events' was developed by the Council of Europe (ibid.). Therefore, an emerging argument here is that supporters are not merely passive recipients of 'security' or 'policing' at SMEs. Supporters, instead, are active stakeholders and brokers of knowledge before mega-events like Euro 2020.

Estimating the actual impact achieved from supporter networks in the security and safety planning remains outside the remit of this thesis. Indeed, it could possibly produce a thesis by itself. Notwithstanding, the meaning of 'impact' depends on how one defines or measures it. Whereas it could mean influencing a decision in the shorter-term (i.e. the use of SLOs in international games), it could also be being recognized or the sheer integration of supporter networks into the security planning and decision-making processes in itself. Importantly, some organizations 'feel they have achieved success through being consulted and listened to' (Garcia and Welford, 2010: 523).

Thus, whilst it previously has been argued that independent supporter networks' impact remains limited and that their presence around the meeting tables does not mean that their voices are heard, their sheer presence and the recognition of supporter organizations, by governing bodies like UEFA represent forms of impact. Undeniably, it also confirms these networks' role as what Garcia and Welford (2015) call 'legitimate stakeholders'. Therefore, a subsidiary argument is that Euro 2020's case calls for a more nuanced view which recognizes fan networks as an influential force in European football with regards to the security planning and policing of SMEs, since they are brokers of knowledge and relevant expertise. The empirical records document that Euro 2020 upheld the trend where relevant authorities and sporting bodies included organized supporter networks in the pre-event networking activities (Cleland et al., 2018).

5.5 Policing Football and Police-Fan Interactions

This section unpacks the 'policing' and 'security' *nexus* in relation to Euro 2020. Policing is a central process in mega-event securitizations (Armstrong et al., 2017) and analyzed policy documents placed a strong emphasis on maintenance of a festive atmosphere and the utilization of 'appropriate policing model in keeping with the spirit of UEFA EURO 2020 as a major sports event' (UEFA, n.d., S6: 9). The indicators of this model included 'appropriate visibility', 'early intervention' and a 'low profile' (ibid.). Discussing 'policing', Reiner (1997: 1005) distinguishes between 'police practice' and 'policing', with the latter being a distinctive type of social control. Policing 'connotes efforts to provide security through surveillance and the threat of sanctioning [and is] the set of activities directed at preserving the security of a particular social order' (ibid.). Hence, 'security' and 'order' are underlying aims of 'policing'.

Regarding the policing of fans at Euro 2020 in London, interviewees largely expected that this would be informed by established practices influenced by existing research (Stott et al., 2008, 2011). A policing approach with a 'threshold of tolerance' (Tsoukala, 2009: 121), emphasizing interaction and dialogue between fans and the police was advocated and believed to assist perceptions of 'security'. Moreover, given Euro 2020's hosting format, 'consistency' in the policing across all 12 countries was highlighted as an urgent event-specific matter.

Chapter Four's findings suggest a link between festive, welcoming event atmospheres and the reduction of disorder. The interviewees' outlooks supported this. Before Euro 2020, a low-key and friendly policing style was expected in London:

I think the policing style will be low-key, friendly, engaging, welcoming. Because we're all on show to the world. I have no doubt there will be extra resources in the background if needed (Stakeholder 1)

One thing that's changed a lot over the years is that you actually see the police lots less than used to be the case. The police now wait, they probably spend the match sat in the van, as much as the possibly can (Stakeholder 3)

Evidently, stakeholders expected that the law enforcements visible to the public would take a 'low-key' approach that appeared welcoming for attendees, in what could be a new, unfamiliar city for some. Nonetheless, it is observable how 'Stakeholder 1' was confident that there would be 'extra resources in the

background’, should it be necessary with a security flex. Consistent with UEFA’s desired ‘early intervention’, another stakeholder expressed the importance of this, highlighting that:

I would like to think that the police and security are learning that lesson [to take an interactive approach], and I think they are aware of that. And the key is always to deescalate a situation rather than escalating it (Stakeholder 2).

Further, this quote also highlights the appearance of lesson-drawing processes in policing and security fields. In many ways, the policing outlooks for Euro 2020 confirm how lessons are drawn by the police and security officials. However, not solely lessons that have *worked* in the past, but also those that did not work and were to avoid (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Repeatedly, stakeholders articulated the importance of de-escalating situations, should situations develop or escalate requiring de-escalation. This is much line with findings from the recent Euro 2016. Here, key lessons included the timing of police intervention, while early de-escalation was considered key factors in preventing further spread of violence (Strang, 2018). The role of existing policing experiences should therefore not be downplayed in Euro 2020’s case. Again, this comes to the fore below, where one stakeholder was asked about the expected policing style in London:

Stakeholder 3: Generally, very permissive. *It will be based on experiences that happen often enough.* Last night, you had the whole of Trafalgar Square [in London] covered in Sunderland fans, with flags, in the fountains and everything, and the police are quite happy for these kinds of things to go on

Author: Yeah?

Stakeholder 3: They know where the red lines are, and they understand, also, that football is of enormous cultural importance. And they don’t see it as a threat. I think that England has a particular problem with its national team and supporters travelling abroad, but although there are security problems around club matches, they are nonetheless on a smaller scale than what you will see in Italy or Spain (emphasis added).

In many ways, my findings speaking to ‘policing’ reinforced the ‘lesson-drawing’ component of the ‘troika of security’. Expectedly, episodes that *‘happen often enough’* in the relevant context were expected to inform future strategies. The above quote, however, also reveals that levels of discretion, leeway and abandonment from norms, rules and laws were expected from the police towards fans in relation to

football games, whether fans were in the stadia or elsewhere. This connects with existing work on football policing and social interaction (O'Neill, 2005; Pearson, 2012a).

Based on observations of policing in Scottish football, O'Neill (2005: 189) argued that football supporters 'are indeed a rule-governed group, [but] the rules in questions are not the formal ones known publicly, but a more informal and unofficial group of rules developed in conjunction with the police'. These 'subtle yet vital negotiations and interactions', occurring between police and supporters, 'produce the informal rules of interactions' and as O'Neill states, rather than the formal legal sanctions, it is these normalized, negotiated rules that 'keep order in place' (ibid.: 190).

Similarly, Pearson (2012a) identifies unspoken negotiations between the police and fans in the context of English club football. Although the relationship is renegotiated continually for the relevant fixture, Pearson's ethnographic research leads him to argue that when the police 'was perceived as treating the fans fairly by facilitating their desire to create a non-violent football carnival of drinking, colour and song, [it] was likely to be one that was respected and listened to' (ibid.: 131). Such findings contextualize Stakeholder 3's view maintaining that the police, to some degree, would be tolerant towards festiveness, chanting and cheering, even in public squares and urban centers, where such behavior, under 'normal' circumstances, would have been reacted upon. The normative order, where the police are 'in control' is therefore – if not reversed – challenged. Pearson, for example, notes that the police, commonly, would leave fans 'to their own devices, often turning a blind eye to minor infractions of the law' (ibid.: 113) such as public drinking, which the police, occasionally, are aware of. Yet, at the same time, there are certain boundaries – or 'red lines' (Stakeholder 3) – that expectedly would result in police interception.

Stakeholder accounts revealed degrees of a mutual understanding of where the boundaries lie; between festiveness and fun, and unlawful or unacceptable behavior that would result in law enforcement intervention, because they feel 'compelled to do so by public shows of illegality' (Pearson, 2012a: 113). This mutual understanding is developed from past encounters. In a RAND study, following the 2018 World Cup in Russia, it was argued that the policing tactics were relatively tolerant towards supporters, whilst the police managed to find the balance a high security level, whilst

not interfering with fan enjoyment, or being perceived as disproportionate. One of the study’s recommendations, similarly to existing work, was to ensure that fans perceived security measures to be reasonable and proportionate (Taylor et al., 2018). It is therefore worth noticing the vitality of social interaction and understanding fan cultures in football policing. The examples highlight the need for this in order to foster perceptions of ‘security’ among spectators.

Tsoukala (2009) observes that a ‘human factor’ was embedded into football policing in the late 1990s. This meant increasingly proactive policing that operated with clear distinctions ‘between football hooligans and the vast majority of peaceful football supporters’ (Tsoukala, 2009: 121). Commonly, available and impactful studies addressing the policing of football crowds advocate a low-key or ‘firm-but-friendly’ policing approach. These emphasize the dynamic fan-police interactions and work *within* the crowds, and have effectively reduced disorder at previous international tournaments. Contrarily, policing experienced by fans as disproportionate or heavy-handed is likely to be interpreted by fans as illegitimate and escalate conflicts (Reicher et al., 2004; Stott et al., 2012; Stott and Reicher, 1998).⁴¹ This has impacted policy, and available guidelines now underline the benefits of police-fan communication and cooperation (Council of the EU, 2010). And importantly, the data presented here underscores how the stakeholders advocated such policing before Euro 2020. The stakeholder perceptions, overall, were consistent with the recommendations made by Reicher et al. (2004: 570) sustaining that:

[P]olice officers [should] consider crowds as an opportunity and seek to enable them. Then crowd members and their wider communities may cease to see the police as a problem and thereby start to side with them in controlling those who would cause disruption

The stakeholder accounts, as the following examples illustrate, reinforced such position:

Our message is: make sure you’re engaging in dialogue and make sure your communicating with fans. Make sure that dialogue is taking place, make sure your focus on is making sure or trying to make the best match day experience for supporters, whether that’s in terms of hospitality, which

⁴¹ The theory informing this is rooted in social psychology and the ESIM of crowd behaviour (Reicher, 1996)

is important, but also in terms of getting the information out to supports that they need when attending games (Stakeholder 7)

I can only comment on the three forces that I've spoken with. London, Glasgow and Dublin. And having seen Dublin present [...] and the UK Football Policing Unit, they did a presentation [and] they were virtually identical. And they seem to have the same approach and the main approach when dealing with any issues is engagement. They want to engage before having to step in to do anything that could potentially make things worse (Stakeholder 9)

There's an ongoing program around that about promoting a model of dynamic risk assessment, early, low-level intervention in policing, and communication and dialogue, and police officers seeing themselves as facilitating football fans and their experiences (Stakeholder 8)

One interviewee even referred to scholarly research and guidelines:

[The research] found that public disorder at football matches can be reduced when police adopt a policy of dialogue and facilitation rather than deterrence and force. [...] That is in my experience the best way to deal with football supporters [...] It is all about respect and that has to go both ways (Stakeholder 4)

Likewise, other interviewees contended that:

Policing style has a major impact on the atmosphere [and] an over aggressive style tends to create resentment and puts fans on edge creating an unpleasant and unwelcome atmosphere which is not enjoyable. A more relaxed and laid-back approach allows fans to express themselves (Stakeholder 5)

It's always better when there is a festive atmosphere with fans from different countries and cultures mix in a friendly, party sort of way, it really makes it so much better for everyone and a much more enjoyable experience [...] Respect, inclusion, and consistency is what the supporters should receive and expect on visiting an event, that has proven to be the best practice for great tournaments (Stakeholder 4).

It sounds simple and a bit of a cliché, but it's true. If you're treated well, if you are hosted in a friendly manner, if everything is working fine and there's no problems then you're much less likely to cause problems or experience problems (Stakeholder 7)

Indeed, communication is integral for social order and, from the interviews, communication emerged as crucial: both to foster perceptions of 'security' and perceptions of the police as a present and legitimate actor. Again, parallels with other events, characterized by large crowds and high police presence (i.e. Notting Hill Carnival and Pride festivals) were made:

I think it's important that the police sort of engage and play into that dynamic of festivity, you know how they do it at the Notting Hill Carnival or Pride events, they're all there with their paint on, dancing and everything else. So, come to 2020, if they are [the police] sort of seen as participants within that, I think that would be very helpful (Stakeholder 1).

Kilgallon (2019: 13) examines policing of the Notting Hill Carnival. She finds that policing this event is not entirely straightforward, yet the police would 'work with people to mediate and negotiate co-produced solutions'. Working with the idea of football as a carnivalesque experience, Pearson (2012a: 130) also argued that the police and fans 'could be either participants in the same carnival, helping each other in the creation of a peaceful environment, sharing jokes [...] or they could be violent adversaries'. In their outlook on Euro 2020, the stakeholder accounts clearly favored the former. Moreover, the findings can be connected with O'Neill (2004: 101) who observed that outside stadiums, police interactions with supporters would usually be in a 'friendly and jovial way'. Arguably, this fit into the description from Stakeholder 1, who also noted that ground-level engagement with fans also was crucial in order to create a sense of law enforcements as an ally, rather than a third party positioned in-between rival or opposed fans.

A pro-active and dialogue-based approach towards football fans was unequivocally endorsed amongst stakeholders, in order to avoid initiation of an 'us versus them' sentiment and antagonistic atmospheres. In may be made an argument holding that engagement, communication and an almost participatory approach, in terms of football policing, may only strengthen the interdependent and negotiable relationship between fan and authorities and also positive perceptions of those in charge of ensuring 'safety' and 'security'. Furthermore, focusing on facilitation and communication provides security actors the foundation that allows for efficient use of resources and reinforcement of positive fan relations (Stott et al., 2008).

However, it must be acknowledged that despite the emphasis on pro-active policing that keeps with the spirit, the creation of 'secure' events is a two-way process whilst pro-activeness and interactivity are not synonymous with a *laissez-faire* approach to fans. It is not necessarily a case of one-size-fits-all (Davies and Dawson, 2018) whilst specific fixtures, intelligence and kick-off times may mean departure from the advocated approach. Regarding the two-way process, Strang (2018: 18) contended following Euro 2016 that the establishment of 'mutually respectful relations with fans

and facilitating positive behaviors through dialogue may afford police officers a perception of legitimacy' and simultaneously enhance crowd cooperation. However, 'authorities must also be prepared to utilize a variety of tactics, including scaling up their response to violence and disorder, to maintain public safety' (ibid.). Thus, relationship and trust building between fans and law enforcements through, for example, deployment of SLOs, as discussed, were seen by some stakeholders as fruitful and adding to the friendly, festivity-maintaining approach that proceeds 'within the parameters of a predetermined threshold of tolerance' (Tsoukala, 2009: 121).

5.5.1 The Media's Role

The media plays a key role prior to SMEs (see Chapter Two), and the stakeholder interviews provided insight into how media narratives had the capacity to inform or influence the eventual policing realities at Euro 2020. Interestingly, during the period where I conducted some of the interviews, public and media debates around policing and security in English football sparked up following a series of incidents. This occurred months before the Euro 2020 circus was originally meant to arrive in London. For instance, during Euro 2020's qualification rounds, the *Daily Mail* (2019) claimed that there was a 'new breed' of English 'hooligans', called the 'stag-do brigade', which followed England in the Nations League and displayed threatening behavior whilst 'drunk and drugged up'. Stakeholder 3 contended that this was a 'fair description', but acknowledged that this was 'usual' ahead of big football tournaments and emphasized that only a small minority of supporters were troublemakers whereas: 'one, ten, fifteen idiots, that's not something that should be blown out of proportion'.

The interview accounts also suggested that the media plays a role in how fans are policed in international tournaments. Essentially, alarmist coverage may pressure authorities to employ specific measures for fans' safety, although 'the media has a job to try to keep things in perspective' (Stakeholder 3). Interestingly, none of the stakeholders explicitly announced that they, in any form, expected large-scale 'hooliganism' outbreaks in London, apart from isolated incidents of violence or 'anti-social behavior' from a minority, which could negatively impact the event:

What will happen, as happened to the World Cup [in 2018], there will be people that aren’t football fans, but will see this as an opportunity to go out and drink. They’re the ones causing troubles, like we saw the last summer with the woman on the top of the ambulance.⁴² (Stakeholder 1)

It is, of course, a possibility that this perspective, that merely a minority of fans would be involved in ‘troubles’ can be connected to why stakeholders expected policing to be low-key and interactive. Predominantly, however, interviewees agreed and confidently expressed that, in London, the tournament would run smoothly.

5.5.2 Consistency as an Event-Specific Challenge

Stakeholder 8: The problem we got with this one, or the extra challenge we got with this one, is that when you got 12 host cities then you got 12 host police forces...

Author: That was literally what I was going to ask you next as well

Stakeholder 8: That will have very different policing styles

An important finding speaking to the policing of Euro 2020 – encapsulated by the above dialogue – was related to the event’s novel format. These findings’ importance will merely increase if staging mega-events across a higher number of countries and cultural contexts becomes increasingly normal.⁴³ Since Euro 2020 was assigned to 12 co-hosting countries, interviewed stakeholders repeatedly acknowledged that the policing styles would potentially differ. This could prove problematic. Interviewees also acknowledged that the appropriate policing model in England perhaps was less traditional or prevalent in other host countries:

We’d anticipate that we’d encounter a different style of policing in Copenhagen compared to that of Rome. There is a variation, clearly. And we know that UEFA works to try to spread messages about styles of policing, they try to make this as uniform as possible. But whereas in some tournaments you get generally a uniform style of policing across the whole tournament with maybe a little bit of variation from city to city. *With this one, it’s inherently built into the structure that there will be very difference policing styles match-by-match* (Stakeholder 8, emphasis added.)

It’s going to be very different to any other tournament. So, for example, for the Euro 2016 although you had the multiple different provinces in

⁴² The episode referred to here occurred in London, after England’s win against Sweden in the quarter final. In the post-match celebratory scenes, a group of people jumped on the top of an ambulance, danced on it and subsequently damaged it. The episode received much media attention.

⁴³ Perhaps indicated by FIFA’s decision to award rights for the 2026 World Cup to Canada, Mexico and the US as co-hosts

France, ultimately, they all worked under the same title. Whereas now you deal with the Spanish police [...] Spain’s even more complex because you got the Basque police, then the Spanish police. So, they operate differently anyway [...] and have their own independent police force, and so on. Then you have the police in Dublin for example, who are very, very cooperative (Stakeholder 9)

Evidently, variations in the policing were seen as inherent to the event format. Indeed, lack of consistency has been a challenge at past events within one country too (i.e. Euro 2004, Portugal), where different forces within the police may operate dissimilarly (Stott et al., 2007). Notwithstanding, Euro 2020 presented an entirely new test.

In the twenty-first century, Tsoukala (2009: 117) writes that ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security agencies became ‘entangled’ and policing methods and practices decompartmentalized. This decompartmentalization paired with the untested and novel hosting format meant consistency was seen as highly necessary, but as a potential challenge in the pre-event planning. One episode that was mentioned, was when England had played an away game in Spain. As Stakeholder 5 commented ‘the [policing] experience in Europe varies quite significantly from country to country’. As such, Stakeholder 4 stated that a key task was to make policing ‘more uniformed so that fans get treated the same regardless of which country games are played in’.

As such, Euro 2020, due to its many host countries, promised some pronounced and novel uncertainties. As Stakeholder 3 put it: ‘there’s lots of uncertainties and unknowns about this tournament, versus anyone that’s been previously organized’ (Stakeholder 3). Evidently, one of these unknowns stemmed from questions around consistency:

Consistency is the key, as I pointed out there are different policing styles across Europe and what is allowed in one country may not be permitted in another. It’s important that guidelines are set out and clearly communicated so that fans understand the circumstances surrounding the match they are attending. It’s vital that there is a consistent approach [...] throughout the tournament (Stakeholder 5)

This time you’re dealing with 12 different [countries], so it’s presenting a big problem in that, there’s different ways of working in the different countries and that’s one of the reasons why Council of Europe’s Working Group was brought into existence, to try to streamline procedures to get a degree of uniformity and to exchange good practices between the host countries so that they can learn from each other (Stakeholder 7)

The main thing that supporters want though is consistency and clear instructions regardless of which country/city the game is being played, for instance you don't want to be met by riot police at one venue being very heavy handed and strict and then the opposite at the next venue. Fans expect to encounter queues, searches, security and ticket checks confiscation of drinks etc at entrances, but it needs to be consistent, if flags/cameras etc are allowed at venue X then they must also be allowed at venue Y. If there are perimeter ticket checks in in three zones approaching the stadium then that must be the case in all venues (Stakeholder 4).

One thing I would say as a caveat is that it's okay to have brilliant policing. But then, if you get into the stadium and the stewarding is poorly, it kind of doesn't make a difference in many ways (Stakeholder 2)

The above outlooks clearly display concerns around the extent to which the desired uniformity could be achieved in reality. Yet, one can also observe how consistency was worked towards and enabled by the previously discussed networking events. For example, following UEFA's Stadium Operator meeting prior to Euro 2020, it was announced that 'the work ahead now is to create consistency of experience for the spectators and all the parties working at the stadiums' (UEFA, 2019). Thus, whilst it was clear which approach stakeholders advocated, problems were expected with regards to implementing this on a tournament-wide scale. The importance of tournament-wide consistency must therefore be seen in relation to (i) Euro 2020's untested and pioneering format and (ii) the flurry of present security actors at contemporary SMEs (Fussey, 2015; Tsoukala, 2009).

Overall, the stakeholders' outlooks on policing were generally consistent with Chapter Four's findings. At the pre-event stage, the stakeholders agreed and expected that, in London, the policing of the event would benefit largely from building upon the available guidelines influenced by existing academic research (Stott et al., 2012). These maintain that football policing ideally should be proportionate, so that the police are viewed as legitimate and enabling. Existing guidelines also recommend early interception and de-escalation but firm action if required (Strang, 2018). Moreover, the interviewees expected that informal, unspoken rules that were established and (re)negotiated between fans and police in the context of previous games and tournaments would be serving as a base for maintaining order and peace. The presented evidence therefore serves to indicate how established knowledge in the realm of football policing would be recirculated and informed Euro 2020's pre-

planning. Meanwhile, the subsidiary theme of ‘consistency’ illuminates some of the event-specific challenges related to Euro 2020’s policing and security governance.

5.6 Fan Zones as a Solution and Problem

Throughout the interviews, the roles of fan zones were frequently touched upon. This section outlines some of the security challenges and advantages of fan zones, as articulated by the stakeholders. It is argued that examples from the past demonstrate the strengths of fan zones as contributors to less disorder, ‘safe events’ and social interaction between visitors. However, the accounts also show that fan zones are securitized as sites of potential clashes or attacks. Therefore, fan zones were considered useful since they attract crowds that operate within regulated and fixed areas. Simultaneously, this means the importance of ‘securing’ fan zones increases paralleled with their popularity which makes them zones of risk. Put differently, fan zones represent ‘both an answer and a new problem’ for organizers and law enforcements (Lauss and Szigetvari, 2010: 742).

Before COVID-19, large influxes of spectators into fan zones were highly anticipated by UEFA for Euro 2020. As contended pre-event, a ‘large number of visitors without tickets will travel to the host cities to soak in the atmosphere and watch the match in public viewing areas provided in the city centre and elsewhere in the city’ (UEFA, n.d., S8: 4). In the Euro 2020 Bid Evaluation Report (UEFA, 2014) a map of London, with key assembly points for the event is available. Here, the London fan zone was pinpointed in the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park in Stratford. However, the selection of this location did not conform to UEFA’s recommendations concerning the setup of a fan zone in a *central* location in the relevant host city, that was ‘customary for gathering of crowds at major occasions (national day, celebrations, major sport events)’ (UEFA, n.d., S11: 4). As the bid evaluation sustained, however, the fan zone proposal was ‘satisfactory’, despite not being in a central location (UEFA, 2014: 29). Then, a London fan zone in Greenwich was announced in late July 2019, whilst UEFA for the first time planned a ‘UEFA Festival’ which involved a Football Village with free entry, live match screenings and consumption opportunities (UEFA, 2019c).⁴⁴

⁴⁴ UEFA (2019c) described the fan zone as ‘the big brother’ of the Football Village.

This section first addresses some of the security challenges related to fan zones at Euro 2020. Existing research commonly draws links between fan zones and SME securitizations (Klauser, 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2017; Lauss and Szigetvari 2010). Meanwhile, Klauser (2011a) documents how fan zone security exemplars are transferred from event to event and thereby reproduced. In Chapter Four it was evident how fan zones were meant to be treated like stadiums in terms of ‘security’, and how hosts were referred to ‘good practices’ speaking to fan zone ‘security’. One of the key challenges with fan zones was related to the mass crowds within them.

Millward’s (2009a) study from the chaotic Manchester fan zone is arguably the best example of why fan zones must be sufficiently planned ahead of the relevant event. One of Millward’s conclusions were that disorder emerged partly because of organizational errors. The fan zone was announced only six days before the 2008 UEFA Cup final between Glasgow Rangers and Zenit Saint Petersburg. Although this was not the case in Euro 2020 – that the fan zone was confirmed six days before commencement – the initial delay around the confirmation of the fan zone location was not optimal due to its implications on the overall security operation for each host city:

One observation I would like to make is that, it is [the tournament] one year away, and each city has an integrated plan for traffic flows, segregation, crowd control. It would be best if a decision was made soon. Because you would assume that, wherever the fan zones are placed, it will have an impact on those integrated plans (Stakeholder 2)

Fan zones can be more spontaneous than stadiums (Kolyperas and Sparks, 2018), and as Klauser (2011: 3204) argues, they ‘provide a secured space for the collection and integration of individual spectators into commercialized spheres of emotions and analogous rituals, moving beyond the traditional stadium in restructuring and appropriating urban public space more generally’ (p. 3204). Yet, as Kolyperas and Sparks (2018: 75) point out, the ‘difficulty in creating such events and experiences is that anticipation is heightened and the events have to both function and satisfy demands at various levels’. Moreover, the mixture of mass crowds and cluttered environment can result in uncomfortable situations, like when: ‘Someone let off firecrackers and there was a panic within the fan zone, with people fleeing and running’ (Stakeholder 3). References were made to previous fan zones, including those at Euro 2016. Here, due to searches upon entry, the wait for attendees to get inside fan zones

was long. Concurrently, it is also worth emphasizing that France, at the time, was in a state of emergency after having been hit by a series of terrorist attacks, including one targeting *Stade de France*, where the suicide bomber did not get past the security checks outside the stadium, only months before Euro 2016 (Cleland and Cashmore, 2018).

Cleland and Cashmore (2018: 465) write that, after this attack, football quickly saw 'greater visibility on the level of security present in the practice of crowd management'. In part, this may explain why the queues to get in were long, body and bag searches were frequent and why fan zone 'security' was described as 'airport like' by interviewees. As fan zones' popularity increases, as pre-defined and regulated spaces where large numbers of fans can party, drink, watch screened games and socialize, so does the crucial need for 'securing' these spaces. As such, there are similarities between fan zones and stadiums as two of the primary destinations of contemporary SME. Yet, there are certain distinctive security and policing challenges that emerge from fan zones:

[In stadiums] with CCTV coming in, it's deterred people from causing trouble in the football grounds, there is every chance you'd be identified. You go a game and see signs. If somebody is causing trouble, text this [phone] number and their seat and block and everything, and they will be taken away (Stakeholder 3)

Fan zones, however, make it 'harder to identify somebody if something serious happens' (Stakeholder 3). Despite the presence of CCTV and security personnel: 'Fan zones are less organized, people are not tied to seats. [At] the same time, you're in a captive area' (Stakeholder 3).

Despite the distinctive security challenges fan zones present, interview data makes it possible to argue that the introduction of fan zones generally was perceived to have positive impacts on SME 'security' and reduction of disorder. The ability of the fan zone to collect people in fixed and regulated spaces emerged throughout interviews. Stakeholder 1 noted that a fan zone 'puts people in one place, for starters', whilst it was highlighted that:

It [the fan zone] gives the organizer areas to focus both planning wise and resource allocation rather than having to plan for city wide events with no boundaries (Stakeholder 6)

Stakeholder 1 referred to a recent fan zone at another UEFA event – the 2018 Champions League final – as a success for the preservation of atmosphere and safety.

Stakeholder 1: And I know like, when Liverpool have been abroad, fan zones have been set up which I am sure you know about, and they've been an absolutely fantastic. Was it the Champions League final last year?

Author: Yeah, in Kiev?

Stakeholder 1: The authorities there, effectively, said: "Here's a square mile, get on with it". And the results were amazing, weren't they? Because Liverpoolians respected that and behaved. And it truly was a celebration and I don't think there was any disorder at all was there?

Whilst the above accounts speak to the organizational advantages of fan zones, this makes a connection to the work of Lauss and Szigetvari (2010). They argue that fan zones are regulated and harmonized spaces where fans are 'governed by fun'. Hagemann (2010: 725) notes that fan zones are extensions of a mega-event's carnivalesque dimensions, where the branded avenues leading to the fan zone are stage-managed and 'referred to as "Fan Miles" or "Fan Boulevards"'. As such, from the interviews, a key strength of a fan zone was attributed to its ability to work as a regulated arena for ticketless fans, and beyond this, provide social experiences and collective memories:

Since then [World Cup 1998], Germany 2006 was a real turning point. They [fan zones] were there in Portugal [...] but Germany really did a fantastic job in 2006 with them, where they were encouraging people to come to Germany, simply to watch the games in fan parks in effect. [...] What struck me as weird with what FIFA did, was that, although there were fan parks in South Africa in 2010, which had a fascinating effect on South Africa, Cape Town in particular [...] Reading the papers in Cape Town [...] about people saying how amazing it was just to do something simple, to get to the fan zone, the Fan Mile I think it was, and you walk through, and there was South African families, who would just never have dreamt to do it, and people were determined that this view of the city wouldn't die when people went home after football (Stakeholder 3)

Supporting this notion, Stakeholder 2 claimed that: 'Fan zones work for a lot of people. They create a congealing environment where fans from different countries can mix'. Indeed, the operational value of fan zones lies in their 'ability to link the feeling of a free, open space, while simultaneously creating barriers to maintain crowd security and control' (Kolyperas and Sparks, 2018: 80). And, again illustrating fan

zones' capacity for reducing disorder, another interviewee highlighted that fan zones merely attract a minority of troublemakers due to 'airport like' security:

It makes it easier to segregate the genuine fans from those in the minority who will be looking to cause problems, why? Because the huge numbers of law-abiding citizens are happy to enter these zones, which have airport like screening and searches, making them very safe and off putting to potential troublemakers. Less people are spread out throughout the city and that makes it easier for the police to identify potential risk supporters (Stakeholder 4)

I think they [fans attending fan zones] wanted that collective feeling, the collective identity of being with fellow [fans] (Stakeholder 1)

Here, fan zones are first framed in terms of 'security'. Then, one may observe a clear reference to a core idea behind fan zones – as sites where fans from different cultures, supporting different teams, can interact, socialize, party and create collective experiences within a SME. Sports festivals can provide liminal spaces that facilitate social mixing (Sterchele and Saint-Blancat, 2015) and as argued here, fan zones, according to stakeholders, offer a socio-cultural 'event within the event' experience.

Moreover, the data suggests that fan zones generally were seen as safe, with searches and security having a deterrent effect on 'potential troublemakers' although not all supporters necessarily or automatically are interested in fan zones and may still cause disorder in host cities. Even still, fan zones were seen as advantageous since they largely prevent ticketless fans from spreading across urban areas. The evidence suggests that stakeholders did not anticipate, or view fan zones as particularly prone to, outbreaks of disorder. Rather, they were considered to be safe and family-friendly spaces that were once described as characterized by 'heavy branding' (Stakeholder 2), in a reference to how the '[e]vent organisers intentionally control both space and the visitor's gaze' (McGillivray et al., 2019: 4).

Collectively, the stakeholder accounts provide a significant insight into how fan zones represent an advantageous tool for promotion of peaceful and safe mega-events in the twenty-first century. However, on the condition that they were organized with sufficient time ahead of the event's commencement. It was expected that the London fan zones would play crucial roles as meeting points, when the city would act as a hub for the month-long event. Yet, as this section argues, given the mass crowds within them, fan zone 'security' would still have to prepare for worst-case scenarios

– as potential spaces of risk – which the expected ‘airport-esque’ security and surveillance of fan zones underpin. As argued, fan zones represent both a solution and a distinctive challenge for mega-event planners. A solution to an alternative scenario; where hordes of ticketless supporters are diffusely dispersed across host cities, whilst concurrently, an emerging challenge because fan zones, reflexively, become a potential site for issues associated with mass crowds, including panic, overcrowding and attacks. As vital sites, therefore, fan zones operate between ‘security’ and ‘festivity’.

5.7 Conclusion: Working the Past, Looking Forward

To sum up, I am arguing that in Euro 2020’s pre-planning, the authorities, agencies and security professionals responsible for ‘security’ were faced with a number of unavoidable uncertainties and novel situations. In terms of the security governance, the emerging challenges required the involved actors to – as far as possible – look forward and anticipate the future whilst simultaneously look back in the past. Uncertainties included the untested tournament format, ‘terrorism’ risks, but also other risks prevalent at football mega-events. That includes ‘hooliganism’ and unknowns surfacing as a result of what happened on the event’s sporting path, like a rival fixture. This proceeds to demonstrate that precautionary positions and speculative estimations concerning what *might* happen must be adhered to. Particularly, but not solely with regards to real and perceived ‘terrorism’ threats SMEs are subject to (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009, 2012).

Notwithstanding, as argued throughout, my findings demonstrate that in the case of Euro 2020, it is most appropriate to interpret the ‘securing’ of the event as a coalescence of learnt lessons from *the past* (Rose, 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996) with anticipations and forecasts of *the future* (Mythen and Walklate, 2008; De Goede, 2008). Scholars observe how SME security professionals draw upon a series of lessons from previous experiences (Klauser, 2011a, 2012; Boyle, 2011). Hence, the concept of ‘lesson-drawing’ (Rose, 1991) can be constructively borrowed and applied to SME ‘security’ planning in an era where security knowledge has undergone transnational shifts (Bigo, 2008; Tsoukala, 2009).

Supporting this, my empirical records demonstrate that *the past*, in form of institutional memory and the strategic and operational repertoire of an organization, authority or

host city, together with lessons drawn from existing practices and examples and *what was*, representing formal knowledge, constitute significant aspects of a SME's pre-planning. Importantly, Klauser (2011a) argued for a continued examination of the recirculation of security exemplars at SMEs. He argued that '[b]y multiplying such studies, we may discover one of the major driving-forces underpinning the current developments in contemporary security governance' (p. 3217). By doing exactly this, and bridging existing insights to allow for a comparative study, this chapter empirically locates these processes in an under-researched case and novel context. Namely, the efforts to 'secure' Euro 2020. To this end, this thesis empirically locates two broader developments in contemporary security governance: *recirculation* and *precaution*.

To enhance the sensemaking of SME security governance, the chapter introduces the 'troika of security'. In the 'troika', one may locate processes of (i) institutional memory, (ii) lesson-drawing and (iii) precautionary logics. The concept, which is empirically rooted and theoretically expanded on, explains and demonstrates how SME 'security' is planned and (re-)produced from established exemplars (Klauser, 2011a), whilst also based on security and risk assessments based on 'outlooks of the future' (Mythen and Walklate, 2008: 221). It thereby conceptualizes the idea that pre-existing lessons and imagination sit alongside each other (Molnar et al., 2019).

Whereas SME 'security' is oft-viewed as a question of preventing 'terrorism' (Atkinson and Young, 2012), significant aspects of a SME's security apparatus are not dealing with this exceptional and ontologically unpredictable threat. In fact, to provide objective and subjective 'security' for the crowds of event visitors, experience-based measures that have worked and have likelihood of working again are subscribed to and transferred through knowledge-based networks in the event build-up. Thereby, lessons are transferred across space and time and encapsulate the transnationalization of security. Thus, the data presented to this point makes it appropriate to introduce the 'troika of security', which subsequently represents both an extension of existing insights and a framework through which retrospective and prospective orientations of SME security can be identified.

The 'troika's' sociological value lies in its capacity to provide a framework through which the processes, activities and assessments that inform SME security governance

can be understood. In relation to pre-existing research, it provides a conceptual tool that borrows from studies focused on both the precautionary elements embedded in SME security (Toohey and Taylor, 2008; Boyle and Haggerty, 2009, 2012) *and* studies focused on knowledge transfer and security governance (Boyle, 2011; Klauser, 2011a, 2012). Adding to the concept’s value, it may be transferred to other social contexts and securitized events including urban events, festivals, political summits and demonstrations. It also verifies the usefulness of ‘risk theory’ in the study of mega-event securitizations as proposed by Giulianotti and Klauser (2010).

This chapter draws from series of in-depth interviews with stakeholders of SME security, policing and organization. A number of these stakeholders were in a position to directly influence the ‘security’ and ‘policing’ at Euro 2020 and even attended knowledge exchange meetings in Euro 2020’s build-up. The interview data suggested that London’s wide experience of, and platform for mega-events, mass crowds and tourism would serve as a highly advantageous ‘legacy’ ahead of and during Euro 2020 in terms of aiding the tournament’s security and policing. The chapter also provides insight into knowledge transfer and transnational networking activities which fan organizations increasingly are an important part of. Furthermore, and consistent with findings presented in Chapter Four and existing research on football policing (Stott et al., 2012; Stott and Reicher, 1998), it emerged here that communication, de-escalation and dialogue were regarded extremely vital by stakeholders for the generation of ‘security’ and ‘safety’ perceptions amongst spectators. Pre-event, interviewed stakeholders viewed such policing strategy advantageous and uniformly advocated its implementation in Euro 2020’s security apparatus.

The conceptual value of the ‘troika of security’ has been discussed. But beside this, this chapter also provides original and significant insights into Euro 2020’s event-specific challenges and the social negotiations forming the foundation for the fan-police relations. With reference to my study’s objectives, the original findings presented thus far explain the processes, activities and assessments through which Euro 2020’s ‘security’ was planned and constructed. To explain this most efficiently, the chapter introduced a new conceptual framework. However, the presented findings cannot answer the extent to which the documents or stakeholders’ perspectives were

synonymous with the realities *at* the event nor how ‘security’, eventually, was experienced by those at the receiving end of it.⁴⁵

Finally, whilst this chapter has focused predominantly on the ‘threats’ posed by ‘terrorism’ and ‘hooliganism’, it was however a completely different ‘threat’ that emerged and symbolized the peak of Euro 2020’s security-related pre-event timeline. Indeed, this demonstrated the limitations of both retrospective *and* futuristic security and risks assessments and a shift from *endemic threats* towards a sudden *epidemic and pandemic threat*. Of course, this was the unprecedented global crisis caused by COVID-19, which transpired merely months before Euro 2020’s original dates, after the majority of my stakeholder interviews had been conducted. As Chapter Three reflects on, this impacted my research project. Therefore, the next chapter investigates COVID-19 as the generational and unexpected ‘threat’ which became synonymous with the lockdown of sports and societies, and ultimately meant that Euro 2020 – in the name of ‘health’ and ‘safety’ – was postponed provisionally for 12 months (UEFA, 2020b).

⁴⁵ As Borch (2013: 596) draws attention to, ‘there is no causal link’ between guidelines (i.e. police literature, training programmes, documents) and ‘actual police behaviour’.

Chapter 6

Chapter 6: For Now, The Show Must Not Go On

The Pandemic Threat of COVID-19, The Collapse of Sport, and Euro 2020's Postponement

Nobody knows that an epidemic is starting. By definition, an epidemic is already under way; it already has disturbing and dangerous momentum. It's even harder to know that an epidemic of an entirely new infectious disease has begun. Everything is confusion and turmoil. Everyone makes mistakes (Brooks and Khan, 2005: 1)

6.1 Introduction

Mega-event owners and organizers will normally strive for 'the show to go on' amidst heightened threat levels, the militarization of urban spaces and spectacular security measures that run the risk of sanitizing the festivities (Goldblatt, 2019; Coaffee et al., 2011; Boyle and Haggerty, 2009). However, extremely rarely, 'the show' *cannot go on* as planned, let alone commence. The global outbreak of the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, saw the two largest SMEs of 2020, Euro 2020 and the Tokyo Olympics, provisionally postponed for one year (IOC, 2020a; UEFA, 2020b). The pandemic therefore impacted the mega-event case study of this thesis and had devastating and collapsing effects on sports. Worldwide, events and competitions were postponed, cancelled or declared 'null and void' (Parnell et al., 2020; Corsini et al., 2020; Mann et al., 2020). Against such truly exceptional background, this chapter critically examines the meanings of the 'pandemic threat' in a SME context. It addresses the question of whose 'health', 'safety' and 'security' that were ultimately protected, and analyses sporting bodies' responses to COVID-19 in a broader context.

This chapter argues that COVID-19 not only reconfigured the meanings of SME 'security' following its outbreak, but that sports organizations' responses to the 'threat' reflected reactive, adaptive and flexible countermeasures through which pandemics are responded to in wider political circles (Chapter Two). As argued, the governance of COVID-19 in sports worked as a microcosm for the wider regulatory mechanisms through which COVID-19 was responded to. This again reinforces the perspective sustaining that social analyses of global issues (here, a pandemic) in sports can

strengthen the more general analysis of the same global issues (Giulianotti and Robertson, 2004, 2009). In Euro 2020's context, my subsidiary arguments are that COVID-19 represented an unexpected 'threat' in form of a 'faceless' virus, an infectious disease and a public health crisis. Yet, given the modes of transmission and pathogen spread, through human-to-human contact, infected people essentially represented the anthropomorphic element of this 'threat' which threatened the 'health' and 'safety' of a loosely defined and overlapping 'footballing community' *and* the general public. Furthermore, the task of resolving COVID-19 saw discourses of 'health experts' and 'science' embedded into SME's 'management of disease' (cf. Bigo, 2002). With its material and argument, this chapter provides an original insight into the inter-play between 'security', 'safety' and 'health' and how the pandemic crisis was responded to by event owners and sporting communities. Consequently, this is one of the first sociological analyses of the social meanings of COVID-19 as a 'threat'.

The rarity of mega-event postponements demonstrates why they possess a special sociological importance. Goldblatt (2019) predicted that Euro 2016 was unlikely to be the last 'Euros' to ever be staged under a state of emergency. With COVID-19 placing immense pressure on societies and public services around the globe, Goldblatt's prediction seemed to become a reality again for Euro 2020. Yet, instead of being staged under a continent-wide state of emergency, Euro 2020 never commenced at all in June 2020.⁴⁶ Postponements do, notwithstanding, require serious evaluation (Bar-On, 2017). Furthermore, a critical analysis of the pandemic's impact on sports can reveal wider trends speaking to the nexus of 'security' and 'health' (Elbe, 2011; Rushton, 2011; Kamradt-Scott and McInnes, 2012).

This was the first time in history that the 'Euros' were postponed. The Olympics had not been suspended since the World War II, and Tovar (2020: 2) argues that, on a global scale, '[n]ot even the terrible events of the Second World War were enough to close soccer as the COVID-19 pandemic has'. Abnormal postponements raise a host of sociologically unanswered questions, whereas the 'threat' of pandemics is mentioned mostly in passing in the mega-event securitization literature. Possibly, that is because pandemics rarely break out or translate into postponements. Consequently,

⁴⁶ For example, Euro 2020 host, Spain, declared a 15-day state of emergency in March 2020. Meanwhile, Switzerland – where UEFA, FIFA and other sporting governing bodies are based – declared a state of emergency on the 16 March.

whereas this thesis's empirical chapters, until now, have conceptualized the *pre-planning* of Euro 2020, this chapter will cover what arguably was *the* key event on Euro 2020's pre-event securitization timeline. That was the generational COVID-19 outbreak which, simultaneously, underlined the limitations of both the futuristic and retrospective assessments directing the mentioned planning (Chapter Five).

Adapting Millward's (2017) approach, this chapter's data is drawn from a frame analysis (Goffman, 1974) of interview materials and official statements collected through 149 media articles and official channels (Chapter Three). These statements must be deemed extremely important material. Essentially, the media represented the key platform for the articulation of responses to COVID-19 both in sports, health and political circles (Garrett, 2020). Structurally, the chapter begins with a *tour d'horizon* of how sports gradually came to a standstill. Then, the chapter interrogates the meanings of 'threat' with postponement being the 'only' option, and 'whom' or 'what' that needed protection from COVID-19. Attention is then given to how the pandemic was to be resolved, as framed by key sports' actors. Finally, I provide this chapter's concluding remarks and broader implications. Here, it is also discussed how this chapter connects with Chapter Five. Collectively, these chapters empirically capture a shifting form of security management. This apparent shift demonstrates a move away from *endemic* and more 'regular' 'security threats' (Chapters Four and Five) towards an *epidemic* 'threat' which is temporally characterized by a suddenness and exceptional moment. Therefore, the chapters illuminate how the meanings of 'security' not only may be subject to change, but how they actually were reconfigured, in a SME context.

6.2 The Event is Now: The Collapse of Sport following COVID-19

This section provides a chronological narrative of sporting responses to COVID-19. This is necessary, in order to understand COVID-19's impacts on Euro 2020 and SMEs more widely. Here, the pandemic's outbreak and subsequent impacts on sports are divided into three phases that capture the rapid escalation and the need to appropriately respond to the unfolding 'threat'. The delineated phases, not to be confused with medical, pharmaceutical or clinical phases, are: (1) the *unfolding phase*, (2), the *uncertainty phase* and (3) *D-day* (17 March, 2020).

Phase 1 – The Unfolding Phase (December 2019 to 29 February 2020)

The first phase was characterized by inconsistent responses to a rapidly unfolding health and safety threat. As explained in Chapter One, the novel coronavirus was detected in January 2020, following an outbreak in December 2019. In this phase, WHO still treated COVID-19 as an epidemic and it was unclear which exact impacts the outbreak would have on Euro 2020. In China, where the virus was first detected, the Chinese Super League was suspended on 30 January (Tovar, 2020). In Europe, ‘despite the outbreak phenomenon, professional sports were not stopped’ initially (Corsini et al., 2020: 1). Until late February 2020, the ‘Euros’ seemed to be staged as planned. As aforementioned, the ‘threats’ posed by a pandemic or epidemics were never touched upon by any of the interviewed stakeholders before February 2020. Nor did I, with an interview-guide informed by existing literature and the documentary research, press for questions around this. Although ‘tested contingency plans’ for epidemics was one formal requirement of Euro 2020 hosts (UEFA, n.d., S6: 9), ‘epidemics’ were only once mentioned in the UEFA’s tournament requirements. Pandemics were never mentioned at all, underlining the uniqueness of the unfolding situation.

Nevertheless, some indications on what awaited emerged when Italian Serie A games had to be played behind closed doors, since the outbreak hit Italy relatively early compared to other European countries (Corsini et al., 2020). Further, a Rugby Six Nations game between the Republic of Ireland and Italy (to be played in Dublin on 7 March) was postponed on the 26 February over ‘health concerns’, at the time where North Italy was in ‘lockdown’ (BBC, 2020a). Interestingly, this coincided with my interview with Stakeholder 9 on 28 February. On the same day, but before the interview commenced, *the Independent* (2020a) reported that the virus had forced UEFA into ‘crisis talks’ as fears over Euro 2020’s future intensified. UEFA vice-president, Michele Uva, was then cited commenting that: ‘We are monitoring country by country, and football must follow the orders of the individual countries. The sporting path will only be closed if the situation gets worse’ (quoted in *The Independent*, 2020a). Similarly, this was the first time one of my interviewees referred to the uncertain ‘threat’ of an epidemic or pandemic, after being asked in the interview:

Author: So, this is a question I’ve not been able to ask anyone else because it’s so recent [...] in terms of the coronavirus. I’m not sure if you have a medical background, but how is this likely to impact, or is it likely to

impact the Euros, do you think? Because I saw some statements the other day that it was being considered?

Stakeholder 9: Yeah, there's been some interesting stuff in the media hasn't it? [...] Nothing clear around it yet, suppose it'll be impacted nation by nation. There's been moves in Italy already. Inter Milan played behind closed doors yesterday, I believe?

Author: Yeah, they did.

Stakeholder 9: So, there's already concerns, but how far that goes I am not too sure.

Author: Yeah, I don't think anyone knows. Not even the medical experts. So, it's very difficult obviously to speculate.

Stakeholder 9: That's it. I don't know if you know but the game between Ireland and Italy, in rugby, was postponed. So, that's interesting, that's the case.

The dialogue illuminates a gradually unfolding 'threat' that produced an uncertain situation where little consensus existed on the degree to which COVID-19 would impact Euro 2020 and, more broadly, public health. Yet it is clear that this phase was marked by a gradual impact on sports events and that concerns existed. This called for a precautionary stance where Euro 2020's multi-national format emerged as particularly prone to an outbreak, as visible in the statements commenting that the 'threat' would be monitored 'nation by nation'. Only two days after the interview, a new phase was entered. This was the uncertainty phase, where the number of suspended/postponed competitions or events increased rapidly.

Phase 2 – The Uncertainty Phase, 1 March-16 March 2020

The second phase in professional European sports was characterized by uncertainty and inconsistent responses to COVID-19. On 5 March, the *Daily Mail* (2020a) reported that a postponement or cancellation of Euro 2020 was possible if the coronavirus escalated further. Yet, UEFA President, Aleksander Čeferin, urged for optimism, stating: 'Let's try to be optimistic', and, 'Let's not think about dark scenarios' (Čeferin quoted in the *Daily Mail*, 2020a).

The UEFA Champions League fixtures played on 10 March were marked by inconsistencies in their health and security management. Some games were postponed or played in front of empty stands, whereas others were played as usual. In Spain,

Valencia versus Atalanta was played behind closed doors. In Germany, RB Leipzig versus Tottenham was played in front of a full stadium. The day after, WHO confirmed that COVID-19 was a pandemic (Corsini et al., 2020). On the same day, Paris Saint Germain played against Borussia Dortmund behind closed doors. In England, Liverpool's game against Atletico Madrid was staged as normal. However, 34 miles away, in Manchester, Manchester City's EPL game against Arsenal was postponed, following reports of Arsenal players being quarantined. In that sense, this phase was marked by inconsistencies within the same tournament, between European countries and even within the same country, like the UK. The turning points in European sports were WHO's assessments, the declaration of the pandemic and when players and managers reportedly had become infected (BBC, 2020b). As can be seen in *Table 6.1*, professional sports, for the most part, entered a 'lockdown' between 12 and 13 March.

Table 6.1: Selected events or competitions that were postponed or suspended as COVID-19 broke out in early 2020.

Date (Reported)	Event/Competition	Action
24 February	Rugby, Six Nations (Ireland-Italy)	Postponed
24 February	Serie A (Italy)	Closed doors
9 March	Serie A (Italy)	Suspended
10 March	Valencia-Atalanta (UCL)	Closed Doors
11 March	Manchester City-Arsenal (EPL)	Cancelled
11 March	Liverpool-Atletico Madrid (UCL)	None
11 March	PSG-Dortmund (Champions League)	Closed doors
12 March	National Basketball League (USA)	Suspended
12 March	Major League Soccer (USA)	Suspended
12 March	La Liga (Spain)	Suspended
12 March	Eredivisie (the Netherlands)	Suspended
13 March	Premier League (England)	Suspended
13 March	UEFA Europa League and Champions League	Suspended
17 March	Euro 2020	Postponed to 2021
24 March	Olympic Games 2020	Postponed to 2021

The events of 12 March and the suspensions of several domestic leagues meant that action was required in relation to UEFA-owned tournaments, including Euro 2020. In an official communication by UEFA on this day, the organization invited stakeholders to an emergency video-conference meeting on how to respond to COVID-19:

Stakeholder meeting called by UEFA 12 March 2020. In the light of the ongoing developments in the spread of COVID-19 across Europe and the changing analysis of the World Health Organisation, UEFA has today

invited representatives of its 55 member associations, together with the boards of the European Club Association and the European Leagues and a representative of FIFPro, to attend meetings by videoconference on Tuesday 17 March to discuss European football's response to the outbreak. Discussions will include all domestic and European competitions, including UEFA EURO 2020 (UEFA, 2020a).

The following day, 91 days before Euro 2020 was due to kick off in Rome, WHO Director-General, Dr. Tedros Adhanom, employing a natural disaster metaphor (Wallis and Nerlich, 2005) could announce that 'Europe has now become the epicentre of the pandemic, with more reported cases and deaths than the rest of the world combined, apart from China' (BBC, 2020c). On the same day, the UEFA Champions League, UEFA Europa League and the English Premier League were suspended.

In the four days between the news of UEFA calling an extraordinary meeting, media speculations continued around Euro 2020's future. A postponement was cited as the most likely outcome. UEFA Executive Member, Evelina Christellin, declared that:

There were no delays in suspending the Champions League and Europa League, because UEFA is a confederation and could not have acted unilaterally anyway [...] I do believe it is opportune to leave time for the national leagues to conclude, postponing the Euros by a year [...] We are therefore evaluating whether to postpone Euro 2020 to next year' (quoted in *Bleacher Report*, 2020)

Meanwhile, the international governing body in football, FIFA, released an official statement on 13 March, which made postponement or cancellation of the Euro 2020 seem increasingly likely:

FIFA understands that to hold the matches under current circumstances might not only present potential health risks to players (and to the general public) but would also, most likely, compromise the sporting integrity of such matches insofar as certain teams may be deprived of their best squads whilst others may not [...] we therefore recommend that all international matches previously scheduled to take place in March and April should now be postponed until such time that they can take place in a safe and secure environment, both for players and for the general public. (FIFA, 2020a).

This phase, loaded with uncertainty, documents how the sporting world entered a temporary standstill as the emergency developed. It was in this phase that most of the European competitions that had already commenced were suspended. Yet it is also clear that tangible guidelines were absent, which led to heightened uncertainty around

a number of issues, related to the hyper-commodification of sports (Giulianotti, 2002), including an increasingly congested sporting calendar, broadcasting revenues, existing standings, logistics and the organizational and financial impacts of COVID-19 on sports. Reflecting the public interest in the uncertainty phase, it was subject to immense media interest and conflicting political and economic interests, as the build up towards UEFA's extraordinary meeting intensified. Arguably, this meeting was built up to be a pivotal moment in European football's response to COVID-19.

Phase 3 – D-Day: A defining day in European football governance (17 March 2020)

The meeting, taking place virtually, should be regarded as a defining moment in European football's governance in the twenty first-century and a key moment in Euro 2020's securitization. As the *Daily Mail* (2020b) reported: 'European football unites for a HISTORIC meeting on Tuesday and the fate of Euro 2020, the Champions League and more will be decided'. On the morning before the meeting, *Sky Sports* (2020) declared that 'European Football was set for [a] defining day'. 17 March 2020 represented a phase on itself, as the consequences of the decisions taken this day would have enormous long-term effects on European sports. Around 12pm, it was first confirmed, somewhat surprisingly, by the Norwegian FA on Twitter, that Euro 2020 had been moved to the summer of 2021 (VG, 2020). Then, around 2pm on the 17 March, the marquee announcement from UEFA was published on the organization's official channels:

UEFA today announced the postponement of its flagship national team competition, UEFA EURO 2020, due to be played in June and July this year. [...] UEFA EURO 2020 was scheduled to take place in twelve cities across Europe from 12 June to 12 July 2020. The proposed new dates are 11 June - 11 July 2021 (UEFA, 2020b)

From an historical perspective, this statement must be regarded as extremely important. SME postponement in peacetime are extremely rare (Tovar, 2020) and cancellations are traumatic for involved stakeholders (Memish et al., 2020). Organizers and involved stakeholders will strive for the events to go on (Goldblatt, 2019). However, faced with COVID-19, this was unfeasible. Euro 2020 had to be moved to 2021, as will be unpacked later, in the name of the involved people's 'health', 'safety' and to ease the strain on national public services. The decision of UEFA also provided a gap for

European competitions to complete their respective competitions, which were suspended in *Phase 2*. Thus, 17 March marked a unique day in the history of the sport and the sociology of SMEs.

In addition to Euro 2020, *Copa America* was also postponed for one year and the importance of this date was arguably reflected by the UEFA President's statement maintaining that COVID-19 was the 'the biggest crisis that football faced in history' (quoted in the *Daily Mirror*, 2020a) which required a response so extreme that it meant a European Championship was postponed for the first time in history. UEFA's decision also set the scene for the subsequent, but more time diffuse aftermath. While the general public had no access to the virtual conference *per se* it may still be argued that the meeting represented a key, mediatized event under the Euro 2020 umbrella, while the aftermath would have widespread consequences for the governance of sports as the Olympic Games were postponed on 24 March 2020 (IOC, 2020a).

For Rosenberg (1989), epidemics are social dramaturgic events that occur over three acts. An initial period of denial lasts until the stage where ignorance is no longer an option, and pressure is on authorities to recognize the problem. The final act is when authorities frame the problem and publicly respond. I have deliberately abstained from applying Rosenberg's acts to my delineated phases. Primarily because countries reacted *differently* to COVID-19, since COVID-19 peaked at different times, given COVID-19's *pandemic* status and because European sports is a multi-national venture. However, one may still draw distinctive parallels between Rosenberg's acts and the gradually intensifying lockdown captured above. Furthermore, Giulianotti (2019) observes how key events and episodes in the history of football are crucial to the construction of personal and collective understandings of the sport on local, national and transnational levels. Ultimately, it is arguable that the 'sporting collapse', as heavily mediatized and responded to on social media,⁴⁷ can be understood as a defining, social drama *within* an even larger dramaturgy (that is, the pandemic on a 'general'

⁴⁷ For example, to collate the enormous masses of reactions to COVID-19's impact on sports, certain media outlets (i.e. *SkySports*, 2020c) had dedicated 'live blogs' that were updated continuously with the latest coronavirus news in sports.

level) which, following Roche (2003), has the potential to work as a time-structuring reference point through its occurrence within the ‘mesosocial sphere’.⁴⁸

This section captures the pandemic outbreak that led to the temporary collapse in European sports. If one revisits the pre-event securitization timeline of Euro 2020 (Chapters Four and Five), which begins with the decision to award the hosting rights to 12 countries in 2014, the postponement caused by COVID-19 demonstrated *the* main ‘security event’ in Euro 2020’s context and the sociological making of this very event. Faced with a ‘threat’ so unpredictable and generational, the only justifiable option in terms of ‘health’ and ‘safety’ was to postpone the event. Consequently, this joint in the event’s securitization process raises a number of questions that the next sections will address. That includes what exactly ‘threat’ meant in this context and the practical implications of COVID-19 as a ‘threat’ and who ultimately needed protection from COVID-19. The next section therefore disaggregates the processes that reveal the meanings of ‘threat’, referent objects and the interplay between actors in the efforts to resolve the COVID-19 crisis.

6.3 ‘Security’ and ‘Safety’ from What?

This section examines exactly what was diagnostically framed, by sports bodies and key actors, as representing a ‘threat’. This question is asked in the context of UEFA’s 12-month postponement of Euro 2020 following the COVID-19 outbreak, at a time wherein European football, similarly to many European countries, was in a ‘lockdown’. The diagnostic frame is concerned with identifying the underlying issue of relevance and the question orienting this section is ‘security from what?’ (see Rushton, 2011) as Euro 2020 and sports were directly impacted by the global pandemic. The logical and obvious answer to this question is COVID-19. However, this answer provides no deeper nor critical meaning and reveal no practical implications of COVID-19 as a so crucial ‘threat’ to ‘health’, ‘safety’ and ‘security’ that this SME could not proceed as planned.

It is argued here that this ‘threat’, in the sheer epidemiological meaning of COVID-19, was a faceless, non-discriminatory and rapidly spreading *virus*, which again caused an *infectious disease*. Whilst this accords the argument that ‘the health threats most

⁴⁸ This refers to ‘the intermediary sphere through which the life world, and its “microsocial” processes, is connected with “macrosocial” systems’ (Roche, 2003: 100).

suitable for securitization are outbreaks of infectious diseases’ (Enemark, 2007: 8), the virus and the infectious disease caused by it also resulted in an exceptionally uncertain period of ‘*crisis*’ that, in itself, also emerged as a COVID-19 produced ‘threat’, as the ‘network of relations’ constituting the pandemic (Thacker, 2009). ‘Crisis’ then refers to ‘a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions’ (Rosenthal et al., 1989: 10). As argued throughout, COVID-19 represented a threefold ‘threat’ in form of a virus, a disease *and* a crisis. The broader implications of this relate to the anthropomorphic element of such a ‘threat’. Since the virus spreads predominantly through human-to-human contact, this effectively means that individuals infected by, or carrying the virus, or even displaying symptoms represented ‘threats’ rather than victims or ‘objects of compassion’ (Wallis and Nerlich, 2005: 2635).

It may be to state the obvious that what ‘threatened’ Euro 2020 and the wider sporting world in the spring/summer of 2020 – as with the rest of the world – was a pandemic infectious disease. At the time of writing, no medicines or vaccines existed that could protect against COVID-19 or offer immunity.⁴⁹ As such, in the emerging official statements, it was the *virus*, as the infectious, ‘faceless’ agent that posed the main ‘threat’ to ‘health’ and ‘safety’. The statements, however, also illuminated the realities of the social construction of a global crisis as a ‘threat’ produced by the virus, as the virus ‘threatened’ not merely individuals’ health, but socio-economic elements of sports and wider structures. Throughout, the ‘threat’ was commonly referred to as ‘exceptional’, ‘unprecedented’, ‘unexpected’ and as comprising a ‘crisis’ or ‘emergency’ where “‘business as usual” [would] not suffice and extraordinary measures [were] required’ (Kamradt-Scott and McInnes, 2012: 96). In an interview statement from UEFA President, Aleksander Čeferin, this becomes evident:

I would say [COVID-19] is *the biggest crisis that football faced in history*. But it's also a possibility to, as you said, to reset some things, put some things differently [...] We all know that *this terrible virus* that is all across Europe made football and all life in Europe quite impossible. We knew we have to *stop the competitions* (quoted in the *Daily Mirror*, 2020a, emphasis added).

⁴⁹ In March 2020, it was believed that vaccines could be between 12 and 18 months away from availability.

Here the ‘threat’, according to Čeferin, is the ‘terrible virus’. The ‘terrible virus’ caused what is referred to as the ‘biggest crisis’ in the sport’s history, whose unclear impacts had to be secured from as a ‘threat’ to Euro 2020, European football and, more broadly, ‘all life in Europe’. Thus, the ‘threatening’ elements here refer to both the ‘virus’ and the related ‘crisis’ impacting public life. In a different statement on UEFA’s official channels, the same key actor, Čeferin, declared that: ‘We are at the helm of a sport that vast numbers of people live and breathe that has been laid low by *this invisible and fast-moving opponent*’ (UEFA, 2020b, emphasis added). Again, he emphasized that the situation represented a ‘crisis’: ‘In the face of this crisis, football has shown its best side with openness, solidarity and tolerance’ (ibid.).

It is remarkable here to observe that Čeferin, as a natural leader in this context – given his mandate as UEFA President – emphasized a faceless, ‘invisible’ and ‘fast-moving’ opponent which framed the threat’s detrimental nature. His statements therefore reflect the unpredictable and rapidly spreading nature of the virus, which are time/space characteristics that have led to a ‘clearer recognition of the threats posed by disease in a globalised world’ (Rushton, 2011: 779). The acceleration-based traits of this ‘threat’ thus contributed to its severity and urgency legitimizing exceptional measures in sports (i.e. ‘stop the competitions’).

The dimensions touched on by Čeferin remain important to this section’s argument because they underline and connect the transnational scope and speedy nature of the *virus* (SARS-CoV-2) which causes the *infectious disease* (COVID-19) and ultimately the *general crisis* or the ‘COVID-19 emergency’ which in itself was a situation with ‘limited but unknown duration in which some form of harm or damage is in the midst of emerging’ (Adey et al., 2015: 5). Not too dissimilarly, a statement by the European Club Association (ECA) chairman and UEFA ExCo member, Andrea Agnelli, also reflects this:

Europe is facing its biggest challenge in a generation, one which is impacting all levels of society including football. The challenge to our game is massive and as leaders we have a responsibility to do all we can to protect its long-term well-being by mitigating the impact of the virus. Today’s decision to postpone the UEFA EURO 2020 is testament to the unity and collaborative efforts of professional game stakeholders to engage in collective decision-making in the best interest of the game (quoted in ECA, 2020, emphasis added).

Again, one can observe how the virus is diagnosed as the ‘threat’ causing another larger (‘generational’) challenge and crisis that is characterized by uncertainty. This meant, according to Čeferin, the establishment of a situation in which: ‘Even the expert doctors don’t know when this will finish’, but where ‘the more we will respect that [government guidelines], the faster the crisis will finish’ (Čeferin quoted in *USA Today*, 2020).

Hence, the pandemic characterized by an inherent unpredictability gave life to a crisis situation that, likewise, was inherently unpredictable. This threefold and extremely powerful uncertainty – caused by the (i) virus, (ii) the infectious disease and (iii) their unprecedented impacts on ‘health’, ‘safety’ and the society, whilst representing ‘threats’ in themselves, also composed a collectively accumulated ‘threat’ that made the postponement of Euro 2020 the only ‘real’ and justifiable option. As Gabriele Gravina, the President of Italy’s Football Federation, originally due to stage Euro 2020’s opening match, declared: ‘nobody ever expected to face an emergency like this’ (quoted in the *Daily Mirror*, 2020b). Furthermore, Gianni Infantino, President of FIFA, as football’s governing body, stated that: ‘This exceptional situation requires exceptional measures and decisions. This crisis impacts the entire world and that is why solutions need to take into account the interests of all stakeholders around the world’ (FIFA, 2020a). Furthermore, the official statement from German FA President, Fritz Keller, is remarkable since one may see how COVID-19 – as a ‘threat’ to a Euro 2020 staged as planned – also symbolized a crisis facilitating a possible demarcation between the sport in a *pre-COVID-19* and *post-COVID-19* context:

There is no alternative to postponing the EUROs. Now is the time to make the health and well-being of all people, not just in Germany and in Europe, but around the world a priority. At the same time, we also need to start thinking about how football will *continue on after the pandemic* (quoted by the German FA, 2020, emphasis added)

The framing of ‘the pandemic’ as the cause of a period of crisis is again evident. UEFA also repeatedly referred to the crisis caused by COVID-19 as a ‘global health crisis’ and an ‘unsettling, challenging and *unprecedented situation*’ (UEFA, 2020b, emphasis added). FSE (2020a) similarly stated that the ‘coronavirus pandemic is an unprecedented situation’ and was an ‘exceptional public health crisis’ (FSE, 2020b). Interestingly, FSE’s statements again display the connections between the virus and the crisis period as threatening the event’s ‘safety’:

Safety must come first [...] FSE commend UEFA for recognising and acting upon this by suspending its competitions until further notice. Football must take all necessary actions to prevent or limit the spread of the virus (ibid., emphasis added)

The statement above points toward a ‘virus’ which football organizations, seemingly, could play a role in limiting the spread of by suspending competitions that would attract mass crowds of potentially contagious individuals, which subsequently would put athletes, fans and other involved individuals at risk. The ‘virus’ is therefore framed as incompatible with notions of basic public safety – which event organizers are obliged to provide (Roche, 2017). Collectively, this evidence provides insights into what ‘threat’ meant in the context of European football and Euro 2020 more specifically. The intrinsic meanings of ‘threats’ framed throughout spoke to the novel, fast-spreading coronavirus and COVID-19, as a contagious disease in itself. But more broadly, the subsequent and unprecedented crisis *caused by* the virus was also a threat.

There are several implications of this argument. Firstly, the statements capture what Beck (1987: 158) called a ‘fully uncomprehended emergency-scientization of everyday life’. An unclear emergency characterized by – as discussed later – a turn towards ‘health experts’ and ‘science’ however defined. As Čeferin declared again in another interview: ‘Nobody knows when the pandemic will end’ (quoted in *Sky Sports*, 2020b). Thus, the ‘threat’s’ temporal limits and true extent were unknown upon framing the threat. Secondly, it is clear now that what comprised a ‘threat’ in this context ‘began’ from a virus. An etiological agent that causes human fatalities and new risks to human life; a coronavirus that is unselective and that does not discriminate. To again quote Beck, the framed ‘threat’ here was ‘unselective’, ‘global’ and did not differentiate between established societal divisions: cultures, nations or ‘poor and rich’ (Beck, 1987: 158). The virus was not framed as a ‘threat’ that solely broke out in ‘isolated pockets around the world’ (Memish et al., 2020: 1). Rather, within a globalization discourse, the virus ‘threat’ was framed as an agent that did not ‘not respect national boundaries’ (Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014: 335-336), because a majority of human beings were susceptible to being infected, effectively causing universal vulnerability. This served to amplify the pandemic’s disruptive potential.

Bringing this into a mega-event setting, events may, as Chapter Two argued, operate both as amplifiers and disseminators of infectious diseases (Dickmann, 2013). Yet, the

amplification or dissemination is *not* restricted to a sports context. Particularly so, when the event would be organized under such extraordinary geographical conditions as Euro 2020 was planned within. This again meant that *if* Euro 2020 – expecting an influx of more than 2.5 million spectators across 12 countries (*Daily Mail*, 2020a) – was staged as planned, this could have extended the already unprecedented crisis that was so frequently framed by key actors. As Memish et al. (2020: 1) argued in their case for suspending mass gatherings, ‘the density of the typical mass gathering renders social distancing and continued disinfection of hard surfaces impossible’. As such, mass gatherings had ‘the potential to endanger millions of attendees and upon return home also those who remained in their countries of origin’ (ibid.). As such, the architectural (i.e. stadium seats immediately next to each other, concealed fan zones) and physical dimensions (mass gatherings, football as a ‘contact sport’, hugging, celebrating, handshakes) embedded into SMEs, coupled with the geographies of Euro 2020 and the fact that COVID-19 peaked at different times in different countries meant that there is strong a case for, as Parnell et al. (2020) write, that Euro 2020 could have intensified the spread of COVID-19 by both amplifying and disseminating COVID-19.

Naturally, for most SMEs originally scheduled to take place in 2020, this meant a fundamental shift and a reconfiguration of what ‘security’ could look like. This relates to the shift from *endemic threats* addressed pre-event towards the sudden *epidemic threat*. A move away from the ‘absence’ of the ‘usual suspects’ of ‘terrorists’, ‘criminals’ and ‘hooligans’, towards a wholly unexpected and unpredictable ‘suspect’: an infectious disease threat and the associated coronavirus-related global crisis. Therefore, one answer to the ‘security from what?’-question is the potential lethal or damaging consequences on individuals’ health and the socio-economic disruptions that were caused by a rapidly spreading, non-discriminatory infectious disease which crowded events could help to intensify *if* staged.

However, by operationalizing the presented statements framing the COVID-19 ‘threat’, there are some important broader implications, perhaps less visible or less signposted in the discourse. Since the virus, in itself, was ‘faceless’ – or to quote the UEFA President, an ‘invisible opponent’, as a sub-microscopic infectious agent, this implies that individuals infected by or displaying symptoms of COVID-19 simultaneously represented a ‘threat’ that non-infected individuals had to be ‘secured

from'. Fundamentally, the virus is transmitted through respiratory droplets and *human* contact. *People* therefore became a 'threat' to *other people*, as the damage caused by the virus and disease co-depended on human-to-human transmission and proximity. As aforementioned, but extremely important here, SMEs attract enormous groups of *people* to their stadia, fan zones and host cities. By their nature, SMEs are social gatherings (Roche, 2000).

Here, connections may be drawn with Foucault's (2008 [1977]) writings on the plague. For Foucault, the plague induced a carnivalesque festival of transgression:

A whole literary fiction of the festival grew up around the plague: suspended laws, lifted prohibitions, the frenzy of passing time, *bodies mingling together without respect, individuals unmasked*, abandoning their statutory identity and the figure under which they had been recognized, allowing a quite different truth to appear (ibid.: 3, emphasis added)

Though, as Foucault warns, discipline emerges as the antidote to this celebratory festival, exemplifying his ideas holding that plagues were defining moments in which new mechanisms of state power were developed:

[T]here was also a political dream of the plague, which was exactly its reverse: not the collective festival, but strict division; not laws transgressed, but the penetration of regulation into even the smallest details of everyday life [...] not masks that were put on and taken off, but the assignment to each individual of his "true" name, his "true" place, his "true" body, his "true" disease (ibid.)

The context of COVID-19 complicates Foucault's account, since this sense of liberation, apparent in his notion of the festival, did not emerge on a general level nor blend in with the carnivalesque festivities of a mega-event. This absence of a festival is related to my argument of *people* as 'threats' to other *people*. The nature of the new coronavirus blurred the *virus free/virus carrier* dichotomy to a degree where the epidemic legacy was no collective festival of mingling, but rather new forms of power, regulation and new meanings of 'security'.

What occurs here, is that infected individuals become 'carriers' or 'cases' – and subsequently 'a danger' to others, rather than victims of an infectious disease requiring concern and affection, which they – of course – concurrently are (Wallis and Nerlich, 2005). As Thacker (2009: 143) highlights, '[t]he strange form of life that is the epidemic is at once the life that must be secured, and the life that must be secured

against'. Following Foucault (2008[1977]), the risk is thus that the regulatory mechanisms through which COVID-19 was responded to, give rise to 'disciplinary projects' and the development of new exclusionary forms of biopower acquired through the surveillance of individuals' health and body. Consequently, this may demonstrate the problem of 'correlation between the technique of security and the population as at once object and subject of these security mechanisms' (Foucault, 2004: 13). Indeed, such biopolitical element connects with one of the warned pitfalls and counterproductive risks related to the securitization of pandemics. Potentially this may 'create a space where individuals are seen as the enemy rather than the pathogens that affect them' (O'Manique and Fourie, 2009: 250) and where '[a]nything and everything is "sick" or can actually or potentially make one "sick" – quite independently of how a person actually feels' (Beck, 1992: 205).

Consequently, the meanings of desired 'undisrupted' or 'clean' environments change too. Instead of referring to environments free of non-official brands, rival products, or 'undesirable' behaviours (Eisenhauer et al., 2014; Klauser, 2012a; Chapter Four), 'clean environments' instead became synonymous with events and stadia without *people*. As Lars-Christer Olsson, the President of European Leagues and active in UEFA's emergency working group declared, in regard to the resumption of European football: 'The idea is growing now that you can have a clean environment in closed stadiums without spectators for a period, and fans still have the opportunity to watch the games on various platforms' (quoted in *The Times*, 2020).

Still, however, what *remains* present within these cleansed and hermetically sealed off spaces is the visibility of official brands and partners, whose presence is rather unaffected. If anything, these spaces, 'themed with the brand decor of the event' (Eisenhauer, 2013: 35) are increasingly centralized and broadcasted globally in the absence of people or 'disruptive' elements. The pandemic 'threat' thus reconfigured the meanings of 'safety' and 'security' in the SME context – and potentially at sports in a post-COVID-19 world – and 'virus carriers', while serving as a warning of the failures or limitations of securitization, further provide a human face to the 'faceless' virus and thereby 'threaten' other, non-infected individuals or populations.

The repeatedly framed 'virus' (SARS-CoV-2) almost becomes anthropomorphized as it infects (or is *believed* to infect) a 'human host' (Thacker, 2009) and this results in

numerous security risks being signified through humans, which again results in draconian and regulatory measures and the wider securitization of freedom of movement through, for example, travel bans, quarantines or curfews. Ultimately, it also resulted in mega-event postponement to minimize pathogen spread. Consequently, this adds another layer to what Chapter Four finds. Namely, that mega-event ‘threats’ are fluid, contextual and subject to change according to spatial conditions. Notwithstanding, COVID-19 demonstrated that individuals’ medical conditions also influence this; and to what extent one is a threat *to* ‘security’ or in need *for* ‘security’. As such, to restrict the damage of COVID-19, event postponement mitigated the ‘threat’ of infected individuals transmitting the virus onto individuals lacking immunity in the stadia, fan zones and when returning to their home communities. Hence, it simultaneously served to limit the threefold of framed ‘threats’ of the virus, the disease and the crisis.

This section has zoomed in on the meanings of ‘threat’ in relation to the COVID-19 related postponement of Euro 2020. Whilst COVID-19 is an obvious answer to the question ‘security from what?’, this section generates a deeper unpacking of what the ‘threat’ *was* or *meant* in light of COVID-19’s impact on the realm of sports. This evidence also speaks to the complete unexpectedness of this ‘threat’ in the context, merely briefly mentioned in the pre-planning documents and interviews. It may be suggested that this underscores the unlikelihood of the pandemic ‘threat’ to Euro 2020. As argued here, COVID-19 comprised a ‘threat’ with different but inter-connected dimensions: a virus, a disease, and a crisis. The virus as an infectious agent *per se*, which could cause the infectious disease of COVID-19, to which no vaccines or cures were available at the time of writing. The infectious disease then caused an unprecedented crisis whose duration and ‘full’ impacts on social, political and economic life were unknown. This was evidenced through how statements repeatedly framed the crisis as ‘unprecedented’, ‘exceptional’, unexpected’.

Despite being faced with a novel set of ‘unknowns’ (cf. Horne, 2007), what was *known* was sports would not be exempt from the wider disease-related crisis. Importantly, since the rapidly spreading virus was an ‘invisible opponent’, this meant that the ‘visible’ or human element of this threat – in form of individuals that were infected or carrying symptoms – were ‘secured against’ as a ‘threat’. Hence, in answering the overarching questions in this section of ‘whom that composed a threat?’ or ‘security

from what?', this was the virus, infectious disease and crisis which collectively comprised the COVID-19 threat. Though in practice, this meant that people *with* the virus constituted a 'threat' so exceptional that it permitted Euro 2020's postponement.

6.4 'Security' and 'Safety' for Whom?

Having engaged in a critical interrogation of the meanings of 'threat' in the face of the global COVID-19 outbreak, this section sets out to address what emerges as a natural follow-up question. That is, 'whom' or 'what' COVID-19 – as a virus, disease and global crisis – posed a 'threat' to in Euro 2020's context, as referent objects. This is particularly important to address, since '[a]ttempts to securitise global health discourses involve the securitisation of multiple and possibly competing referent objects' (Curley and Herington, 2011: 162). My advanced argument here is twofold, but must be understood in the context of COVID-19's global nature and how 'health' reinforces or intersects with 'safety' and 'security' (Rushton, 2011; Elbe, 2011; see Chapter Two). 'Health' and 'security' do not equate. Yet, neither are they mutually isolated. A critical security perspective would maintain that the former can be fundamental to the objective and subjective conditions of the latter and therefore paramount to include in an analysis of 'security' (Booth, 1991, 2007; Nunes, 2014). By drawing from a corpus of material, this section argues that Euro 2020's postponement was predominantly framed in the name of 'health', 'safety' and 'security' for a loosely defined 'football community' and, more broadly, for the 'general public', both whom had to be protected from COVID-19. Notwithstanding, evidence also allows for arguing that states' services, stability and infrastructures required levels of protection. Indeed, one of the reasons behind Euro 2020's postponement was, partly, to avoid any unnecessary pressure on national public services (UEFA, 2020b).

With an inward facing extremity 'threat', 'health', 'safety' and 'security' were articulated primarily in reference to the welfare of *individuals*, and to a lesser degree, *state objects*. Furthermore, the framing of 'safety' would often be accompanied by a precautionary-action lauding 'safety first' sentiment which repeatedly came to fore. The 'safety first' frame endorses pre-emptive emergency responses which prioritize 'health' and 'safety', whilst simultaneously downplaying the importance of sports when juxtaposed to supposedly 'larger' global issues (Lee Ludvigsen and Millward, 2020).

The individual ‘safety first’ frame was demonstrated by UEFA’s coined term, ‘purpose over profit’, which was the organization’s ‘guiding principle in taking [the] decision [to postpone] for the good of European football as a whole’ (UEFA, 2020b). This implies that ‘purpose’ – as the protection and priority given to fans, players and staff (Parnell and Widdop, 2020) – outscored ‘profit’, which would have been synonymous with allowing sporting competitions to proceed as planned, considering the financial losses associated with postponement. As Aleksander Čeferin admitted in an interview on 17 March 2020: ‘It was important that, as the governing body of European football, UEFA led the process and made the biggest sacrifice. Moving EURO 2020 comes at a huge cost for UEFA’ (UEFA, 2020b). Accordingly, the postponement came at an estimated financial cost of €300 million (Parnell et al., 2020).

Prior to this, a postponement was publicly called for. Gabriele Gravina called for ‘an act of responsibility and a contribution to all Federations to a path that aims for the safeguard of the health of all athletes, fans and citizens of the world’ (quoted in *Sky Sports*, 2020c). FIFA President, Gianni Infantino, meanwhile, stated that: ‘People’s health is much more important than any game’ (quoted in the *Daily Mail*, 2020c). Already here, one may spot the references to a vaguely defined ‘football community’ (‘athletes’ and ‘fans’) and the ‘general public’ (‘citizens of the world’). Moreover, FIFA (2020a) urged to avoid ‘unnecessary health risks’ to players and the general public in need of what FIFA referred to as a ‘safe and secure environment’. Similarly, when the anticipated decision of postponement was announced, the following statement was given by UEFA (2020b, emphasis added):

The health of all those involved in the game is the priority, as well as to avoid placing any unnecessary pressure on national public services involved in staging matches. The move will help all domestic competitions, currently on hold due to the COVID-19 emergency, to be completed

In the same announcement, UEFA President, Čeferin, declared that:

The health of fans, staff and players has to be our number one priority and, in that spirit, UEFA tabled a range of options so that competitions can finish this season safely and I am proud of the response of my colleagues across European football. There was a real spirit of cooperation, with everyone recognising that they had to sacrifice something in order to achieve the best result (quoted in UEFA, 2020b, emphasis added).

At face value, these statements reveal two distinctive referent objects central to this section. First, and predominantly, that is individuals (‘those involved in the game’,

‘fans, staff and players’) whose health had to be – and was made the ‘number one priority’. Thus, on an individual level, COVID-19 was framed as a ‘threat’ which individuals had to be ‘secured from’. Second, it can be seen that the state, as a referent object, is not completely absent above. The states’ services (‘national public services’) that – if subject to the ‘unnecessary pressure’ of a mega-event could seemingly impact the states’ stability, economy and infrastructures (Davis, 2008) – are highlighted. Although the latter framing was less frequent, it still remained extremely important, because this was one of the outlined reasons in UEFA’s postponement announcement.

National services were therefore also outlined as in need for protection. This must be viewed in context of the timing of the statement. At the time, numerous national public services already faced large challenges related to hospital admissions caused by COVID-19 (Memish et al., 2020; Parnell et al., 2020; *The Guardian*, 2020a). Additionally, even in non-pandemic times, mega-events place significant burdens on host countries’ public services. As such, the rapidly spreading coronavirus, transcending transnational borders, posed a ‘threat’ to the welfare of individuals and state services. These frames will be further unpacked, but this demonstrates the *duality* of pandemics threats. Whilst primarily affecting ‘communities of individuals with little reference to the political borders which contain them’ (Curley and Herington, 2011: 141), the state still remains the chief provider of public health capacities, and is the ‘most significant actor within the political arena of global public health protection’ (ibid.: 142).

In several collected reactions to UEFA’s decision to postpone Euro 2020, the need to ensure ‘healthy’ and ‘safe’ solutions for those ‘involved in the game’ *and* the general public is documented. For example, the Interim CEO of the Irish FA, Gary Owens, declared that ‘UEFA has made the right decision today in the interests of the health and well-being of football players, fans and staff alike’ (quoted by the *Independent*, 2020b). Similarly, the CEO of the English FA, Mark Bullingham, stated that: ‘People’s health and well-being has to be the primary concern for us all, so we fully support UEFA’s decision to postpone Euro 2020’ (quoted in *Independent*, 2020c). Meanwhile, SD Europe (2020) declared that: ‘We agree that football is quite simply not a priority over the health of fans, players and other professionals working in the European game, nor the population as a whole’. UEFA also announced a resolution

related to the coordinated response to the impact of COVID-19 on competitions, signed by UEFA, the European Club Association, European Leagues and FIFPRO Europe. Here, the organizations stressed their ‘fundamental commitment to *protecting the health, safety, and well-being* of players, clubs, supporters, officials, staff and *the broader football community*’ (UEFA, 2020c, emphasis added).

Evidently, this frame of statements was composed of the repeated and uniform framing of individuals’ ‘health’ and ‘safety’ as the main orientation point in the decision-making when faced by the pandemic. Interestingly, this refers to the ‘health’ and ‘safety’ of individuals within what may be characterized as a loosely defined ‘football community’. The exact members of this constructed ‘community’ seemed – at least tentatively – to be players, staff and others connected to the sport in a professional capacity. However, these are also members of the frequently framed ‘general public’, also in need for protection. But whilst the ‘football community’ fits under the umbrella of the ‘general public’, not all individuals in the ‘general public’ would consider themselves, or be considered a part of the discursive ‘football community’. What can be extracted from the above discourses is the *externalization of threat* (Curley and Herington, 2011), as the focus is not merely on the ‘safety’ required for the ‘football community’ or sporting context, but extended beyond this, to encompass and refer to the ‘general public’.

Despite this, the crossing of the two remains central here, because the nature of the pathogen ‘threat’ ultimately did not distinguish and could spread between the ‘football community’ and the ‘general public’. Hence, the sports bodies’ decisions to postpone events were not solely made in the name of attending fans or competing athletes. This relates back to mega-events as amplifiers and disseminators of diseases. For example, when attendees (or other members of the ‘football community’) travel back to their host cities and hypothetically spread the pathogen to the general public there (Dickmann, 2013). Hence, amid attempts to distinguish between sports-based and *non-sports-based* populations, these distinctions are in fact weakened when faced with a global pandemic, as the groups essentially were composed of many of the same individuals sharing a mutual need for ‘safety’. The sporting bodies’ articulated need to protect both sporting communities *and* the ‘externalised’ general public, through discursive exercises, should therefore be understood as related to the fundamental

intersection between individuals in sport and the wider society. In practical terms, disconnecting the two is unworkable.

Furthermore, one important dimension that is evident in the framed statements above is how the statements visibly provide assessments of the decision to postpone Euro 2020. The assessment is oriented by a prioritization process: individuals' health/safety *versus* allowing the event to be staged. One implication of this is the aforementioned 'safety first' frame that is apparent in statements. This frame was initially developed in what may be considered a preliminary study to this thesis in relation to how *fans* talked about 'security' and 'safety' following a 'suspicious package' that caused the postponement of an EPL game (see Lee Ludvigsen and Millward, 2020). Notwithstanding, the remarkable dimension enriching the 'safety first' frame here, is that it was articulated by top stakeholders and key actors in sports' governing bodies on global, European and national levels.

The 'safety first' logic is characterized by a sentimental attitude maintaining that priority *has to be* given to resolving supposedly 'larger' issue at stake in the society (i.e. a pandemic), than what sports represent (ibid.). Interestingly, this sentiment touches the surface of the ideological criticisms of sports by Umberto Eco (1986) and Noam Chomsky (1983, 2004). Their critiques of sports' position in society maintain that sports work as a socio-political distraction; that absorbs attention that could have been dedicated to more pressing issues.⁵⁰ In part, the 'safety first' frame underscores this: sports must, unquestionably, evade for 'real' issues that 'really' matter. In a crisis, the sacrifice of SMEs (i.e. by postponing them) thus becomes a matter of course and a minor price to pay when concretely or hypothetically juxtaposed to notions of individuals' 'health' and 'safety'. This comes to fore again in the below statements:

It is a question about *safety first* and that public health at all times *is more important than football*. Therefore, we fully agree with UEFA's decision and are satisfied with the decision both for the national team and clubs. (Danish FA President, Jesper Møller quoted in Danish FA, 2020, emphasis added).⁵¹

⁵⁰ For example, Eco (1986: 186) linked football 'with the absence of purpose and the vanity of all things'. Chomsky (2004: 100) meanwhile observes how sports divert the masses away 'from things that really matter'

⁵¹ Author's own translation from Danish.

In this dramatic moment, the most important thing is people's health and getting out of this crisis (Čeferin quoted in *The Telegraph*, 2020a)

The progress of COVID-19 remains unclear and we can reassure everyone the health and welfare of players, staff and supporters are our priority. We will continue to follow Government advice and work collaboratively to keep the situation under review (Joint statement from the English FA, EPL and EFL, 2020).

In light of the current Covid-19 outbreak, UEFA have now taken the decision to postpone the Men's EURO tournament to 2021. While this will come as disappointing news to many, the health of fans, players, officials and the general public must be the priority [...] *The safety of the public will always come first* (The Mayor of London, 2020, emphasis added)

Further, as Čeferin declared in an interview in a response to the likelihood on when European football was likely to resume:

The only wrong decision we could make now would be to play in a way that puts the health and safety of players, fans and referees at risk. However, if we are in secure conditions, then I don't see the problem (Čeferin quoted in the *Daily Mail*, 2020d)

Again, these statements collectively demonstrate a series of sociologically important issues. Firstly, they again underline how sports contexts and the wider societal context became increasingly inseparable when faced by a 'threat' that, as discussed, did not distinguish between sports or non-sports settings. In the presented reactions to COVID-19, 'health' and 'safety' are repeatedly framed both in sporting terms and in terms of the 'general public'.

Secondly, the above statements reinforce how a precautionary decision justified in terms of 'health' and 'safety', reflected by the decision to *postpone*, was uniformly agreed-upon and endorsed by key actors and sports bodies reacting to UEFA's decision. Simultaneously, this reveals how a *cancellation* of the event – or making the 'Euros' 'null and void' – in the name of 'safety' – was not called for; it is the postponement that is commended. This suggests that even in spite of a pandemic, SMEs were not merely an insignificant distraction that easily could be erased (cf. Eco, 1968; Chomsky, 2004) without complications. Instead, conditions for a flexible rescheduling process permitting 'secure conditions' were facilitated. Furthermore, in the context of sports' neoliberal 'hyper-commodification' (Giulianotti, 2002), a full-scale cancellation could have translated into additional financial losses from lost sponsorship, broadcasting and match-day revenues. In that sense, 'safety first' does

not equate with a full-scale abandonment of original intensions or sports-related interests. Whereas this presents an important edge to the ‘safety first’ argument – in that top stakeholders seemingly preferred a postponement over cancellation, the section has demonstrated how ‘health’ and ‘safety’ for individuals were not merely repeatedly referred to, but discursively framed as the only justifiable and logical option to prioritize, in an uncertain period and in line with medical practitioners’ recommendations (Corsini et al., 2020; Memish et al., 2020).

Having engaged with the question ‘security for whom?’, there are possibilities of drawing comparisons with Chapter Four, which asked a similar question based on a critical analysis of pre-event policy documents. There are, however, some limitations to such comparisons, since COVID-19 was unexpected and utterly unprecedented. Whereas those in need for protection from ‘threats’ have not changed significantly and, as such, underline some correspondence – despite the completely unexpected pandemic threat – it can be seen that the ‘football community’s’ and public’s *health* primarily was what needed protection. Faced with the pandemic ‘threat’, ‘health’ served as a more prominent contributing condition to notions of ‘safety’ and ‘security’, than in pre-planning documents. Thacker (2009: 138-139) argues that epidemics are always ‘against the people’ and something ‘held in common’. This can be seen in light of COVID-19, as the ‘general public’ – or the ‘citizens of the world’ (Gravina quoted in *Sky Sports*, 2020c) – were framed as in need for ‘safety’ more regularly on a global level, rather than only the individuals expected to be apparent in Euro 2020’s host cities. Further, this connects with the aforementioned global nature of the COVID-19 crisis and that the pandemic, seemingly, was approached by sports bodies as a matter of global public health and not merely a sports-specific ‘threat’.

To summarize, securitization processes are contextual. Security-related discourses therefore reveal referents that are unique to the context they are articulated in and the audiences they are articulated to (Curley and Harington, 2011). Consequently, this section argues that when faced with an unprecedented and rapidly intensifying ‘threat’, top stakeholders and sports’ governing bodies framed ‘health’, ‘safety’ and ‘security’ predominantly in reference to individuals’ welfare. That is not to say states were completely eschewed from the discourses, because over-stretched national services, and thus potential state instability, were outlined as in need for protection in

the event owner's justification to move the competition. Therefore, a reading of the relationship between COVID-19 and sporting responses reveals how 'health' and 'safety' for individuals, and to a lesser degree, states, trumped the usual desire to allow 'the show to go on' (cf. Chapter Two). In the realm of sports, the 'health' and 'safety' of a loosely defined 'football community' and an externalized referent in the 'general public' ultimately had to be prioritized – or *come first*.

6.5 Resolving and Controlling the COVID-19 'Threat'

Global pandemic crises require immediate responses (Rushton, 2011; Ingram, 2009). Indeed, Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen (2014) align globalized pandemics to terrorist attacks, financial breakdowns and environmental disasters since they all epitomize 'prototypical crisis scenarios in which high-speed decisionmaking and rapid political interventions are seen to be needed' (p. 336). The need to respond urgently to pandemic crises was, as demonstrated by COVID-19, detectable in professional sports' domain. Hence, this section maps out the prognostically framed outcomes of the COVID-19 in sports, and how this multifaceted global 'threat' was to be 'resolved', 'controlled' and generally responded to in light of the sporting lockdown.

Whilst the suspension of SMEs represented key responses; this did not in itself eliminate the COVID-19 'threat' nor serve to 'desecuritize' it. Rather, cancellations/postponements *contained* the pandemic outbreak whilst a vaccination or drug were under scientific development. As argued here, sports bodies' responses to COVID-19 mirrored wider political responses marked by 'science' and 'health experts' becoming embedded into the discourses of how sport was to overcome COVID-19. Ultimately, this section yields an insight into the inter-play between a flurry of actors; including UEFA, FIFA, football associations, WHO, governments and 'health experts'.

The efforts to resolve COVID-19 in sports reflect the politics of knowledge and a 'hierarchy of expertise', with the nature and novelty of COVID-19 meaning that overcoming it was a 'scientific' question. As such, sports bodies' responses centred on flexibly adapting to the provided guidelines from a heterogenous 'scientific community' of health experts and WHO. Notwithstanding, whilst sports bodies turned towards 'health experts' and WHO, the health organization without authority to postpone events mutually depended on sports bodies to take action. Further, I argue

here that there are some similarities with the ‘semiotic shift’ in mega-event securitization (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009).

Hence, conveying images of the efforts made to mitigate a ‘threat’ through, for example, public statements and announcements becomes key, although the ‘threat’ in itself is largely uncontrollable on an epistemological level and threat elimination is a question of ‘scientific progress’. Moreover, sports organizations’ conveyed images and actions served to not undermine or oppose governments’ recommendations. Therefore, while sports bodies’ efforts to contain COVID-19 in sports were ‘evidence-based’ (Parnell et al., 2020) or ‘science-based’, the actual prevention of the disease represented a task for actors positioned under the umbrella of ‘science’ and ‘health experts’. Scientific guidelines would then inform sporting responses to COVID-19, demonstrating – as argued – how scientific progression was embedded into sports bodies’ attempts to resolve COVID-19.

The sports/non-sports distinction related to resolving COVID-19 is vital here. Ultimately, this boils down to a question regarding ‘responsibility’. Although COVID-19 was seen as a ‘threat’ to the welfare of individuals in both sports and in the general public, it was responded to as a ‘threat’ to sports by supranational organizations such as UEFA, IOC and FIFA. However, resolving COVID-19 *within* sports also depended on resolving the threat *beyond* sports where, as expected, states, international organizations and ‘health experts’ played a crucial role (Rushton, 2011; Elbe, 2011; Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014). Primarily and expectedly, it was the COVID-19 ‘threat’ in the sporting context which sports bodies took up a responsibility to counter; given the socio-economic impacts the crisis had on ‘football communities’ and the sporting calendar. This is clear in the statement by UEFA (2020c) declaring a coordinated response to COVID-19’s impact on competitions and events:

As representatives of the major professional football organisations at European level, the Parties [European Club Association, European Leagues, FIFPRO Europe] consider it is their duty to take a responsible lead in developing a united European approach in response to the global pandemic which has led to the suspension of the vast majority of competitions on the continent

Through such discursive framing, it is visible that, in resolving COVID-19’s impacts on European football, UEFA and fellow European-wide sports organizations imposed a responsibility on themselves to address sports-related matters of COVID-19

(suspended competitions, the ‘health’ and ‘safety’ of the ‘football community’ and a congested sporting calendar) by developing a contingency plan. However, the below framing from the same statement also reveals that the sports-wide response would be greatly informed by key actors and organizations positioned on the outside of sports, concerned primarily with the wider response to and governance of infectious diseases, including health organizations and governments (Davies, 2008; Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014; Smith, 2009). As declared:

The Parties [European Club Association, European Leagues, FIFPRO Europe] are convinced that this contingency plan is the best course of action at this moment in time. *It takes into consideration the advice of international health experts as well as the restrictive orders issued by national governments and local authorities* (UEFA, 2020c, emphasis added)

Meanwhile, IOC (2020b) declared that WHO had been ‘instrumental in providing real-time information’ throughout the Olympic postponement process. Hence, the influence of ‘international health experts’, located externally to sports, on the sports-oriented contingency plan is noticeable. It is also known that the extraordinary meeting leading to UEFA’s postponement of Euro 2020 was called as a result of the ‘*changing analysis of the World Health Organisation*’ (UEFA, 2020a, emphasis added). As such, the responses of sports bodies – illustrated by UEFA here – were directly influenced by the directives and changing assessments provided by actors on the ‘outside’ of sports, including WHO, ‘health experts’, national governments and local authorities.

In an interview statement, UEFA President, Aleksander Čeferin, also framed the outcome of COVID-19 in terms recommendations from ‘health experts’ who impacted the decision-making processes:

I would also like to thank Alejandro Domínguez [...] who have agreed to move CONMEBOL's 2020 Copa America in *order to follow the recommendations issued by the international public health organisations* to enact extreme measures and as a result of EURO 2020 being postponed (quoted in UEFA, 2020b, emphasis added)

These statements illustrate how the postponement decisions for Euro 2020 and its South American equivalent, *Copa America*, were informed by a set of recommendations from ‘health organizations’. Faced with a global pandemic, the framed turn towards global and local ‘health experts’ in the efforts to counter the infectious disease is also exemplified below:

It is too early to say when football will be played again. As we have done since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, *UEFA will continue to liaise with the World Health Organization (WHO) and national authorities to guide European football's response to a constantly changing crisis*. While Tuesday's decisions show that we are ready to make difficult choices, *they will always be based on expert advice and put the health of all those involved first* (UEFAc, 2020d, emphasis added)

Generally, the quoted statements demonstrate a highly conscious turn towards and a pronounced adaptability to the 'expert advice' from health organizations and scientific communities in the rapidly unfolding crisis. At face value, that is unsurprising. As Rushton (2011: 758) submits: '[a]ll agree that protecting health security requires international cooperation within a robust global regime'. Furthermore, as Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen (2014: 336) write, it is normal that during global crisis situations characterized by the securitization of global health, then the 'pressure is high and rapid decisions are needed'. Hence a turn towards international organizations becomes a 'natural choice because of both their centralization and their expertise' (ibid.).

However, the remarkable point here is that it is not merely governments that look towards 'health experts'. Such stance was consciously adopted by supranational sporting bodies too, as sports organizations' attempts to resolve the crisis mirrored wider political responses. Moreover, it was not only the international health organizations that were turned towards, but national and local authorities too. As the English FA's Mark Bullingham stated, reacting to Euro 2020's postponement: 'Until then [football can be resumed], we will continue to follow the advice of Government and the health authorities' (quoted in the *Independent*, 2020c). As Bullingham's colleague in the FA, Greg Clarke, declared: 'Football needs to pay attention to the economic effects of the pandemic as well as rigorously following public health guidance' (quoted by the FA, 2020). Therefore, whereas sports bodies possessed a self-imposed responsibility for resolving COVID-19 in the sports domain; the decision-making processes were still significantly moulded by expert voices from the hierarchy of expertise, dominated by 'health experts', which according to the presented statements had to be externally found: *outside* the domain of sports.

Interestingly, sports bodies and 'sports' were also outlined as key actors by those they sought advice from. For example, the governing body of football on a global scale, FIFA, donated \$10 million to WHO's COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund (FIFA,

2020a). In a subsequent statement from WHO Director-General, Tedros Adhanom, he declared that:

Be it through campaigns or funding, FIFA has stood up to the coronavirus, and I am delighted that world football is supporting WHO to kick out the coronavirus. I have no doubt with this type of support that together we will win (quoted in FIFA, 2020b)

As such, this statement yields insight into the inter-play between global health actors and sports bodies faced with a common crisis. Yet, WHO's position at the upper echelon of the 'expert hierarchy' is visible; essentially 'world football' is framed as *supporting* WHO and not vice-versa. This implies WHO's leading role in resolving COVID-19 but beyond donations, WHO still relied on sports bodies' actions. Though this must be seen in a broader context. Although WHO has the authority to report disease outbreaks, they lack the authority to compel states to verify outbreaks (Davies, 2008). Thus, WHO's authority is *delegated* rather than organically assigned in the international system (ibid.). In the realm of sports, this meant that WHO could not cancel nor postpone events. Therefore, a degree of mutual dependency emerges as a necessity.

Whereas WHO – as repeatedly framed – were actively consulted for guidelines by sporting organizations, WHO simultaneously depended on sports bodies to take action and postpone events. As WHO spokesman, Tarik Jasarevic, commented regarding WHO's position in respect to SMEs:

It is not the role of WHO to call off or not call off any type of events [...]
As each international mass gathering is different, the factors to consider when determining if the event should be cancelled may also differ. Any decision to change a planned international gathering should be based on a careful assessment of the risks and how they can be managed, and the level of event planning (quoted in *The Guardian*, 2020b, emphasis added)

The statement reveals how one of the organizations looked towards in the crisis, WHO, still was restricted in their mandate. Simultaneously, this speaks to the autonomous decisions of UEFA and IOC to postpone Euro 2020 and the Tokyo Olympics, respectively. As the Director of Global Initiatives for Human Rights Watch, Minky Worden, stated: 'Sports bodies have a responsibility to lower risks to athletes, insist on the free flow of information, and conduct themselves in an open and transparent way' (quoted in FSE, 2020b). Furthermore, the more overarching, limited authority of WHO comes to fore in their following statement: 'Every single country must assess

their own situation and context, including virus spread, measures in place and social acceptability' (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2020).

In other words, in resolving COVID-19, the limitations of the organizations of relevance here fulfil each other. Sports bodies lacking the necessary 'health expertise' and authority in public health contexts looked towards WHO and health organizations. WHO, lacking the authority to cancel/postpone SMEs relied on sports bodies or governments to do exactly this. In this vein, it is argued here that this can explain the dynamics behind the sports' bodies responses to COVID-19 following March 2020. Thus, the relevant sports bodies' efforts to control or resolve the 'threat' were closely knitted to flexibly reacting to information provided by 'health experts' and ensuring that their advice was implemented and followed before upcoming mega-events.

Having engaged with these questions of inter-organizational dynamics and responsibility, the question that emerges is how sports bodies' efforts to resolve COVID-19 then may be located under the broader socio-political responses to the crisis. Further, what exactly are the practical implications of the turn towards 'health experts', 'health organizations' and 'scientific communities', that all can be positioned under the umbrella of 'science'? As argued here, the sports bodies' responses reflect broader political and governmental responses to the pandemic threat which had no available 'quick-fix' (i.e. the vaccine). Thus, an important caveat that limited any attempt to resolve the 'threat' was that '[t]he desire to secure populations against pandemic threats' through medical responses does always succeed in practice (Elbe, 2011: 849).

However, in the management of 'unease' (Bigo, 2020) or, in this context, *disease*, the turn towards 'health experts' and 'science' was not restricted to the realm of sports. The political efforts to manage the situation was captured accurately by the UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson's statement, when he declared that the management of the disease had to be 'guided by the science' (quoted in *BBC*, 2020d). Such political turn towards 'science' connects with Beck's (1992, 2016) ideas of the risk society which is characterized by risks so complex that politicians and individuals increasingly are dependent on scientific knowledge. Faced with COVID-19, the tacit implication of this was 'that specialized scientific and medical knowledge is somehow more or the most appropriate to guide pandemic planning and responses (Nygren and Olofsson,

2020: 3). Consequently, the adherence to and trust in the ‘infection control techniques informed by scientific and biomedical experts’ become a part of the strategy (ibid.).

Essentially, the wider responses to COVID-19 were also characterized by the flexible adaption of ‘health expert’ recommendations, scientific evidence, involvement of ‘scientific experts’ (Elbe, 2011) in the already densely populated security fields (Bigo, 2002). As such, faced with the exceptional ‘threat’, the umbrella terms of ‘science’ and ‘health experts’ seemingly came to possess a relative monopoly on the relevant health knowledge that could bring about change and manage the ‘disease’ *if* acted upon.

Therefore, the realm of scientific progress and debate was embedded into the political *and* sporting responses to COVID-19 and the eventual attempts to ‘desecuritize’ (Wæver, 1995) the pandemic. The desecuritization of COVID-19 hence, relied largely on scientific progress and expertise. There are implications of this however. Essentially, ‘science’ and ‘health’ experts are not marked by uniformity. Rather, the ‘scientific debate’ is one containing opposing views and what Beck (1992: 157) called a ‘heterogeneous supply of scientific interpretations’. Epitomizing this, two commentaries in *The Lancet* were published in March 2020, questioning if it was justifiable to allow sports events with mass gatherings to be staged. Two opposing conclusions were presented. McCloskey et al. (2020) recommended that events were suspended subject to context-based and formal risk assessments. Responding to this, Memish et al. (2020) argued, less leniently, that with a multitude of remaining unknowns attached to COVID-19, suspending events was the only option. The scientific debates submerging into the political and sporting responses to COVID-19 thus translated into a situation in which tangible answers were sought from non-uniform scientific or health communities.

The wider implications of this make it possible to borrow an analytical relation from Boyle and Haggerty (2009). They highlight how event organizers and security agencies – facing a situation with radical uncertainty before SMEs – convey images of the efforts that are made to mitigate this very ‘threat’. This, despite the fact that *actually* resolving the ‘threat’ can be epistemologically impossible. Or, in this case – a task residing with ‘health experts’ and ‘scientists’. That way, the images, formulated through statements, discourses and interviews –reassure the public that *something*, at

least, is being done to bring about change. Similarly, in the responses to COVID-19 in sports, it may first be argued that sports bodies' turn towards 'health experts' was not merely to flexibly adapt their guidelines, but simultaneously to display that sports bodies' were seriously attempting to managing the 'threat'. Secondly, the responses (by, for example, postponing events) must also be understood as a communication to the public which reinforced public health messages given to the public. Therefore, a consideration of staging the event as planned could have been confusing and undermining of the political responses (Memish et al., 2020).

To summarize, this section illuminates how the processes related to 'overcoming' the COVID-19 'threat' were framed. It is argued that sports bodies' responses to COVID-19 and commitment to contain the pandemic mirrored the wider political turn towards 'science' and 'health experts' such as WHO. Thus, contested scientific debates were embedded into the sporting responses to COVID-19 as a 'threat'. Furthermore, it is argued that sports bodies flexibly reacted to and acted upon recommendations from 'health experts' by, in Euro 2020's case, deciding on event postponement. This was necessary given the limited authority of WHO in the domain of sports. Primarily, this was how sports played a role in the management of the disease: through containment. The pandemic outbreak, therefore, yields an insight into the dynamics of how sports consciously turned towards the top of a 'hierarchy of experts' that were externally positioned to sports, but subsequently informed sporting-related decision-making.

6.6 Conclusion: From Endemic Threats to the Epidemic Threat

This chapter argues that COVID-19 caused a reconfiguration of the meanings of 'safety' and 'security' in a SME context, and that a systematic reading of COVID-19 as a pandemic threat in a sporting context reflects the broader reactive, adaptive and flexible responses and logics apparent in socio-political fields in the face of an infectious disease-related catastrophe, which gave rise to an indefinite period characterized by radical uncertainty. In this vein, it may be sustained that the relevant apparatuses of governance around SMEs and in professional football and their responses to COVID-19, in distinctive ways and brought together, represented a microcosm for the analysis of the broader regulatory mechanisms through which pandemic crises and infectious diseases – as globalized crises – are responded to, processed or framed on political and social levels through, for example, extraordinary and precautionary responses, distinctive referent objects in need for 'safety' and

securitizing acts and discourses (Elbe, 2011; Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014; Curley and Herington, 2011).

When brought together with Chapter Five's findings, this chapter demonstrates a shift in the meanings and management of SME 'security'. In Chapter Five, the 'troika of security' predominantly speaks to how pre-planning for *endemic* 'security threats' occurs. Whilst potentially damaging, these threats, such as 'terrorism' or 'hooliganism', are more regular and endemic in mega-event landscapes, where they possess historical relations through previous incidents (Cleland, 2019; Stott, 2003). They are defined by limits to space and time and, whilst unpredictable, *some* lessons and knowledge on how to 'secure' against these exist. Synthesized, Chapters Five and Six therefore capture the shift from *endemic* threats towards an *epidemic* threat characterized by an exceptional moment as it transpired. The epidemic threat is 'faceless', marked by a temporal suddenness, spatial diffuseness and completely novel. It also reveals new overlapping threat actors and referent objects. It requires new extraordinary responses. Thus, Chapters Five and Six evidence that meanings of 'security' at SMEs are not solely subject to change, which Chapter Four argues. Collectively, they evidence exactly *how* the meanings of 'security' changed and under which conditions.

Crucially, given the global dimension of COVID-19 as a 'threat', in this context, this underscores the contention that an analysis of how global issues (e.g. the response to infectious diseases) play out in sports may enhance the more mainstream understanding of the same global issues (Giulianotti and Robertson, 2004, 2009). Similarly, SMEs work as an entrance for analysing wider securitization trends (Klauser, 2017; Boyle and Haggerty, 2009). Hence, this chapter enriches the understanding of global security issues through an analysis of a type of threat that is yet to be given much serious attention in the study of society through sports, namely that of *pandemics*. Hence, whereas this reaffirms SME's status as applicable case studies for studying broader social and political issues or trends, the presented arguments simultaneously possess relevance beyond the social study of SMEs since they can speak to how pandemics are responded to.

Such argument rests firmly upon my four subsidiary arguments. First, it is maintained that on Euro 2020's planning timeline, the outbreak of COVID-19, as the first

pandemic of the twenty-first century (Memish et al., 2020), represented *the* main ‘security event’. The highly mediated collapse of sports occurred as a social drama within an overarching dramaturgy. Second, the ‘threat’ of COVID-19, as unpacked, was threefold. It was discursively framed as a virus, an infectious disease and a crisis; the latter being the network of relations constituted by the non-discriminatory infectious disease. Concurrently, this validates my claims throughout this thesis holding that ‘security’ at SMEs must be read holistically: it cannot be conflated with ‘hooligan’ or ‘terrorist’ threats. Third, those framed in need for ‘safety’ and ‘security’ were individuals in a loosely defined ‘football community’ and a more externalized yet overlapping referent; the ‘general public’. Notwithstanding, protection was also required for over-stretched national services, as one of the reasons for Euro 2020’s postponement. This indicates that states, and states’ stability were not completely absent from the discourses. Finally, it was evidenced how efforts to resolve COVID-19 in sport were marked by ‘health experts’ and ‘scientific progress’ becoming embedded into the sports bodies’ ‘management of disease’ (cf. Bigo, 2002).

Another dimension to this chapter, enhancing its sociological value, is its potential to act as a preliminary base and lay some foundations for future and empirical scholarship. Over a decade ago, Booth (2007: 458) argued that ‘global health is one of today’s battlegrounds, and one of tomorrow’s subject areas in security studies’. Such argument can now be replicated in a manifold of sociological fields in what will be a ‘post-pandemic’ epoch. It can confidently be transferred into the study of SMEs and it is not unlikely that COVID-19’s impact on sports and societies will become a key field of future research. Minimal research exists on sporting responses to pandemics and biological threats. This is related to the fact that generational crises like COVID-19, fortunately, are extremely rare occurrences. However, this adds substantial weight to the importance of responsively and critically analysing such crises when they occur, as this chapter has done. No one knows for certain exactly when a pandemic will next disrupt all human and social life. What is for certain is that this is a ‘when?’ rather than ‘what if?’ question, and that sports will *not* be exempt. Therefore, while there are some limitations related to this chapter’s principal focus on European elite sports and lack of primary sources, it still generates lessons that may inform future events. It also produces a critical and original interrogation of the meanings, perceptions and constructions of ‘safety’ and ‘security’ against a

completely unprecedented background which – for the first time since World War II – saw the devastating collapse of global sports.

Chapter 7

Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion

When the Floodlights Fade

7.1 Thesis Summary

Security efforts made before SMEs provide us with a ‘glimpse into the most painstaking security planning outside of warfare’ (Boyle et al., 2015: 112). Aiming to make better sense of the social realities surrounding SME securitizations, whilst continuing the tradition of investigating mainstream sociological issues through global sport, this thesis has empirically examined the *constructions, meanings* and *perceptions* of ‘security’ in the under-researched case of Euro 2020. To sum up, I am arguing that in a society increasingly preoccupied with ‘security’, ‘safety’ and ‘risk’ (Bauman, 2005; Beck, 1992; Bigo, 2000; Zedner, 2003a, 2009), Euro 2020’s ‘security’ pre-planning and construction, assembled to eventually protect the geographically unique event, proves an *exemplary site* for particularly two distinct practices of security governance in the present-day world. Such an argument is extremely important – and has implications beyond sports – because it confirms mega-event security’s position as *end-products* and *expressions* of wider security dynamics, developments and outlooks.

First, this relates to the recirculation of (in)formal security-related policies, knowledge and practices on a transnational scale. This again, must be seen within the wider frame of a turn towards cooperation networks and European-wide knowledge sharing developments in what can be characterized as a transnationalized era of ‘security’ (Bigo, 2000; Tsoukala, 2009). Secondly, Euro 2020 manifested the exercise of precaution and future-oriented security outlooks. These outlooks too, are shaping security assessments more broadly in a post-9/11 world (Mythen and Walklate, 2008). Whilst these driving forces have appeared in existing research on SMEs (Klauser, 2011a; Boyle and Haggerty, 2009), the reality is that every SME possesses unique local characteristics and contexts which they are planned and delivered within (Houlihan and Giulianotti, 2012). This claim comes especially true in relation to Euro 2020 which, for the first time, was to be staged across 12 European countries. In addition to ensuring ‘safe’ or ‘secure’ events that account for changing dynamics in

the international system, I also argue that these underpinning processes tie firmly into commercial and sanitizing processes that are brought together under the umbrella of ‘security’.

As such, the *construction* of ‘security’ sheds a light on what ‘security’ *means*. Ultimately, this means that ‘security’ does not solely serve purposes related to basic public safety. It also relates to a range of private interests and business-related aspirations. As security complexes at SMEs intensify and the need to ‘secure’ becomes increasingly apparent, these may be concealed or shielded. Referring back to the two major processes, recirculation of security policies or practices may then ensure commercially fruitful spheres. Meanwhile, precaution can work to justify those policies that *are* reproduced in new contexts or assist the implementation of new extraordinary security measures.

Furthermore, this thesis argues that the meanings of ‘security’ in a SME context were significantly reconfigured in light of COVID-19. Ultimately, Chapters Five and Six empirically captures a security management shift: away from endemic ‘security threats’ towards the ‘epidemic threat’ characterized by its inherent suddenness, an exceptional moment and geographic diffuseness. Because the nature of the securitized virus meant that people represented both the ‘security threat’ *and* subject to be ‘secured’, the meanings of cleansed and secure spaces also changed, and referred to spaces with *no people*, but wherein official brands could remain present. Faced by such ‘invisible threat’, the lines between ‘threat’ and the subjects to be secured became so blurred that, despite existing knowledge or future-leaning stances, differentiating the two became non-viable. Consequently, ‘security’ related to the act of postponing sporting events until the distinctions between ‘threat’ and ‘referent object’ became clearer.

This thesis’s main arguments, presented above, are developed over this thesis’s seven chapters. First, *Chapter One* lays out the foundations of this thesis. It justifies the research and presents the study’s aims and objectives. *Chapter Two* highlights the research gaps based on a review of the pre-existing literature and contemporary concepts relevant to SME securitizations. Further, this chapter borrows from critical security studies and applies such perspectives to sports. Then, I discuss the ‘health’ and ‘security’ couplet, with a specific reference to COVID-19 and pandemic mega-

event threats. The chapter's argument feeds into this research's aims and objectives. Based on the outlined research lacunas, I argue for a deeper engagement with the constructions and meanings of 'security' via the continued engagement with event-specific security governance and strategies, as exemplified by Euro 2020.

Chapter Three explains and justifies this thesis's research design and methodology. I explain the data collection and analysis and reflect on the significant impacts that COVID-19 had on my originally planned project. COVID-19 altered the focus of my thesis. Instead of a host city ethnography – allowing for interactions with football fans – my project had to react pragmatically and promptly to the global pandemic which saw sports collapse and Euro 2020 be postponed for 12 months. This impacted Chapter Six which, instead of examining fan responses to 'security', offers a critical interrogation of sporting organizations' responses to COVID-19 and COVID-19 as a 'threat'. Methods used in this thesis include semi-structured interviews with diverse stakeholders and documentary analysis of policy handbooks and guidelines. I also provide an analysis of interview statements from key actors and governing bodies that were given to media sources in light of COVID-19.

In the thesis's empirical Part II, *Chapter Four* and *Chapter Five* examine Euro 2020's 'security' pre-planning by drawing from documentary and stakeholder interview data. Particularly in Chapter Four, what comes to fore is the dual logic of SME 'security'. This speaks to the meanings of 'security'. As recorded, 'security' does not solely relate to objective or subjective 'security' for event spectators or event spaces. 'Security' and its related policies also refer to the ideal conditions for consumption patterns to flourish and commercial attractiveness to be sustained for the purpose of event owners and sponsors. Furthermore, the key findings of Chapters Four and Five – when brought together – are conceptualized in a framework original to this thesis. In Euro 2020's context, these findings underscore the coalescence of (re-)circulated security-related policies and practices and a precautionary outlook adopted by stakeholders. Building on existing insights (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009; Klauser, 2017; Molnar et al., 2019) and my empirical records, I introduce a new concept in this thesis. This is called the '*troika of security*'. Some of the practical implications of the 'troika' and the role of fans within this model are discussed later in the current chapter.

Chapter Six addresses the unprecedented impacts of COVID-19 on elite sports and SMEs. It unpacks the meanings of ‘security threat’, referent objects and organizational responses in the time wherein Euro 2020 and the majority of the sporting world were faced with the generational pandemic (Tovar, 2020). Drawing from a large volume of public statements from key actors and organizations, this chapter argues that COVID-19 reconfigured the meanings of what ‘security’ is, in a SME context, and documented how sporting bodies’ responses to COVID-19, in distinctive ways, mirrored broader regulatory mechanisms and actions through which COVID-19 was responded to in the realms of politics and health. Subsequently, this chapter enhances *sport’s* position as a site for more general analyses of global issues.

7.2 Original Contributions to Knowledge

This thesis makes a number of contributions to knowledge which are now presented. I do this by cross-referencing with the research aims and objectives presented in Chapter One. In this sense, the thesis’s contributions must be viewed in context of how my objectives were accomplished.

To consider which processes, assessments, activities and policies that may assist the construction of ‘security’ and ‘safety’ in Euro 2020’s context

This thesis provides original insight to, and a framework for understanding the multiple mechanisms through which ‘security’ is constructed in the pre-planning of a SME. I explain this through the ‘troika of security’ which captures the processes, policies and activities that enable lesson-drawing, precautionary logics, and the use of institutional memory. The processes, assessments, activities, and policies that assist the construction of ‘security’ at SMEs are largely shaped by broader processes that aim to construct ‘security’ in the present-day world (Mythen and Walklate, 2008). As such, by building on existing insights from past mega-events (Klauser, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2017; Armstrong et al., 2017; Fussey, 2015; Fussey et al., 2011), this thesis has located retrospective and future-oriented processes and assessments that collectively encapsulate the securitization of Euro 2020 and, essentially, contribute to notions and aims of ‘security’. Therefore, this thesis contributes with original knowledge and with a concept that assist the sensemaking of exactly how the circulation of existing models and templates occurs *alongside* the contemplation of worst-case scenarios in the interrogation of the under-researched case of Euro 2020.

My thesis also reflects the call for production of new case studies of event-specific security strategies and governance for a more comparative study of SMEs (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010).

The thesis offers an original contribution to the field in terms of a robust framework which identifies and extends key processes in SME securitizations. This originates from the Euro 2020 case study, as a highly extraordinary yet underappreciated SME. And, it is the most comprehensive study of Euro 2020's securitization to date. Never in the history had a planned SME been assigned such a geographically unique format, and never in the history of the 'Euros' had a tournament been postponed. Through critical engagement with policy documents, guidelines and diverse stakeholders, the thesis successfully provides an original breakdown of the processes of learning, knowledge exchange, policing, the realities of uncertainty and the requirements that collectively informed the planned security assemblage of Euro 2020. The 'troika' also positions the multiple roles of contemporary football fandom within mega-event security constructions. With its empirical data and framework, the thesis – by employing a SME as a site of analysis – contributes to wider debates in sociology, criminology and security studies with an understanding of the mechanisms through which 'security' is pursued, constructed or managed in post-9/11 societies and (macro-)securitized contexts. These drivers for security governance are based on recirculation and precaution and encapsulate wider social processes in the modern society.

(i) Explore 'whom' or 'what' 'security' was to be provided for in Euro 2020's context; (ii) consider 'whom' or 'what' that constituted a 'security threat' in Euro 2020's context, and, (iii) critically engage with the meanings of 'security' in a SME setting, given the contested conceptual nature of 'security'

It is clear that SMEs have become increasingly securitized (Cleland, 2019; Boyle and Haggerty, 2009). Scholars also argue that SMEs are likely to become increasingly securitized as new threats emerge (Cleland and Cashmore, 2018). In spite of public and academic discourses around mega-event 'security', extremely limited research considers the deeper meanings of 'security'. Hence, this thesis has been committed to a critical analysis of what the contested concepts of 'security' and 'safety' mean (or *can* mean) in a SME context.

Here, this thesis borrows insights from critical security studies. These are yet to be made full use of, if any, in the study of SME securitization or the social study of sports. Beyond merely showing that these insights are applicable and ready for deployment in the study of SME securitizations, and in terms of its wider contributions, this thesis offers an empirical but theoretically underpinned understanding of the meanings of ‘security’ in a SME context. The study therefore contributes to existing knowledge on the social meanings and roles of ‘security’ in the twenty-first century (Jarvis and Lister, 2012). This is done; not by *redefining* what is oft-considered an essentially contested concept (Baldwin, 1997), but rather by engaging in a *rethinking* exercise of what ‘security’ means at SMEs.

Ultimately, what constitutes a ‘security threat’ or ‘referent object’ in a SME context is highly contested. Whilst often impacted by developments occurring in a domain external to sport (i.e. a pandemic or a terrorist attack), the ‘threat’ and ‘referent object’ are given a specific meaning in the SME realm. The meanings of ‘security’ and ‘threat’ are contextual, fluid and, as demonstrated by COVID-19, subject to drastic change. This thesis offers an empirical recording of how ‘security’ refers not merely to the subjective or objective perceptions of event spectators or athletes, nor the relative absence of ‘hooligans’ or ‘terrorists’. Instead, ‘security’ has dual meanings and spatial dimensions that relate directly to the efforts to guarantee ‘clean’ or ‘sanitized’ spaces in which security-policies ultimately ensure high commercial activity that is compatible with the profitable aspirations of event owners, sponsors and hosts. At one stage in the pre-planning, ‘security’ therefore referred to the absence of pre-defined ‘threats’, ‘problems’ and brands which could not be allowed to disrupt the event’s people, atmospheres nor consumption circuits. This thesis records this in the case of Euro 2020.

Yet, the meanings of ‘security’ do not end there. I argue that the meanings of ‘security’ were substantially reconfigured following COVID-19. The ‘invisible’ nature of this sub-microscopic ‘threat’ meant that infected people (or people *with* or *without* symptoms) could be ‘threats’ to other people. Given the anthropomorphic facet of COVID-19, this ‘threat’ therefore blurred the already indefinite lines between ‘whom’ (or ‘what’) that were ‘secured’, and ‘whom’ or ‘what’ that were ‘secured against’. Capturing this shift, my thesis thereby offers an empirical account of what ‘security’

could mean at Euro 2020 and further, how the meanings of ‘security’ are not merely subject to change; but how they actually change and under which conditions.

Provide an overview of, and examine, sport bodies’ and key stakeholders’ responses to the global COVID-19 pandemic’s impact in the world of SMEs.

This thesis also contributes with one of the first sociological analyses of COVID-19’s impact on the sporting world. It is also one of the first studies that critically approaches COVID-19 as a ‘security threat’ or ‘problem’, under the frames of the broader securitization of ‘health’ (Chapter Two). Considering the empirical work likely to emerge in the ‘post-pandemic’ society, examining the relationship between the pandemic and sports, or the pandemic as a ‘security issue’, this thesis offers a substantial foundation for future empirical work with its unpacking of COVID-19 as a ‘security threat’ and pandemic responses.

Ultimately, this thesis offers an original account of what ‘security threat’ meant in the context of COVID-19. I disaggregate discourses revealing exactly ‘whom’ or ‘what’ that were discursively framed as in need for ‘security’ and ‘safety’, whilst I capture how international and national sporting bodies responded to COVID-19. These novel contributions, related to my analysis of COVID-19, feed firmly into the thesis’s larger contributions speaking both to the meanings of ‘security’ and the governance of ‘security’ at SMEs, and further enhance the sociological value of this study. Finally, there are some practical dimensions of my findings that provide grounds for outlining recommendations for practice. These recommendations also comprise a key contribution of the thesis and I address these next.

7.3 Practical Implications and Recommendations for Policy and Practice

This thesis explains the construction of mega-event ‘security’ at a pre-event stage. The relevant research question was addressed and then empirically accomplished over Chapters Four and Five, where the ‘troika of security’ was introduced and conceptualized. Additionally, this objective lends itself upon secondary data in the form of existing research reviewed in Chapter Two which supplements my own empirical findings. Whilst this, conceptually and empirically, represents a key

contribution, the ‘troika’ also arrives with wider implications that have not yet been discussed.

As argued, the empirically developed ‘troika of security’ extends and offers conceptual frames that can explain the construction of ‘security’ in which learning works alongside the imagination of worst-case scenarios (Molnar et al., 2019). As a concept, this can therefore be partially placed under the wider label of ‘security legacies’ that remain post-event, since two of its typologies reflect the reading of ‘knowledge’ and ‘expertise’ as distinctive ‘security legacies’ (Giulianotti, 2013). Therefore, *if* ‘security’ was solely an end-product of forward-looking, futuristic security assessments, then the analytical, material, and utilitarian value of these retrospective ‘security legacies’ would have been limited. Moreover, the ‘troika’ accounts for the merging global and local forces that ultimately shape how a contemporary SME is ‘secured’ (Houlihan and Giulianotti, 2012).

Below, *Figure 7.1* presents a visualization of the ‘troika’. Here, the three related curves share a mutual aim: to provide conditions for objective and subjective ‘security’ to flourish. In relation to this, the role of fans and mega-event attendees will be returned to in the next section. However, as can be seen, each curve also possesses distinctive limitations or elements of temporal uncertainty that explain why they are inter-related. Where one curve possesses limits, the two other act as a ‘buffer’ to overcome this. The three components in the ‘troika’ all ‘reduce uncertainty by establishing something to bank on in the face of an unknown future’ (Folkers, 2019: 5).




Figure 7.1: Visualizing the ‘Troika of Security’.

As argued throughout, the ‘troika’ can explain the construction of ‘security’ at SMEs and is transferable to other social contexts. Whereas this invites future research from researchers who may use it as an analytical relation to the study of SMEs, protests or other cultural events, it is also here the concept’s current sociological value and potential lies. The conceptual relations can be utilized by researchers to better understand ‘security’ and ‘safety’ in relation to cultural festivals (i.e. Carnival), other mega-events, protests or urban events (i.e. Pride) that all have fixed temporal settings, are policed, securitized through discourses, practices and/or policies and comprise contexts wherein ‘security’ and ‘threats’ are contested terms between the attending public, organizers and/or security providers.

While the conceptual usefulness of the ‘troika’ has been closely discussed (Chapter Five), the concept also has some practical implications beyond academic spheres which derive from the retrospective and futuristic dimensions within it. Essentially, while the ‘troika’s’ processes normatively seek establishment of ‘security’, it may not successfully provide this on a subjective level for, for example, attending football fans. In their discussion of ‘futuraity’ and ‘risk’, Mythen and Walklate (2008: 236) submit that ‘true security cannot and should not depend on inflicting insecurity on another’.

Such argument remains compatible with this thesis's critical approach to 'security' and would be shared by other critical security scholars (Zedner, 2003a; Booth, 2005). This demonstrates the 'troika's' pitfalls. For whereas the 'troika' can explain how security actors work towards the idyllic conditions of optimal security, a number of the processes situated within the 'troika' are contested by the social groups impacted by the implemented policies or modes of social control, such as football fans.

As documented, the reliance on precautionary measures like surveillance technologies (Sugden, 2012), 'securitized commodification' (Giulianotti, 2011) in the desire for 'clean spaces', as evidenced by official documents, or implemented legislative changes (Divišová, 2019) can come at the cost of both civil liberties and may lead to the exclusion of social groups (Kennelly, 2015; Hassan, 2014; Armstrong et al., 2017). More generally, the adherence to precautionary principles may translate into suspension of 'normal democratic freedoms' in the name of collective security (Zedner, 2003a: 169). Divišová (2019) provides some examples of how this may occur in relation to SMEs. She argues that the 'terrorism threat' posed to Euro 2016 in France during the state of emergency allowed for minimal opposition to a precautionary 'counter-hooligan' law which, she argues, remained as a 'security legacy' in the French domestic football culture. Since the 'terrorist' and 'hooligan threats', as Divišová writes, 'sometimes intermingle in the security considerations', the potential consequences for this are that "[o]rdinary" football fans can [be] easily caught in the middle, and such an impact can outlive the championship for much longer' (p. 757). The role of football fans within the 'troika' will be returned to in the next section.

However, the danger is when, as aforementioned, SMEs become testing grounds for new legislation, technologies or policies (Clavel, 2013) that by their nature are precautionary measures for the control of pre-defined yet contested and uncertain 'threats' – and later implemented elsewhere. This way, SMEs are initially influenced by wider security developments (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009). But then, the SMEs become arenas for piloting new, often exceptional, modes of 'securing' (Schimmel, 2011). Sometimes, this exceptional moment is then transferred into 'everyday' spheres after the event (Kitchen and Rygiel, 2014), as was the case with the blurred 'counter-terrorism' and 'hooligan' legislation post-Euro 2016, which impacted 'ordinary' fans of French clubs (Divišová, 2019). This displays again how the relationship between 'security' and 'SME security' not only is inter-dependent but mutually reinforcing.

‘Security’ *elsewhere* impacts SMEs, and SMEs impact ‘security’ *elsewhere*, in form of everyday settings and forthcoming events.

Notwithstanding, it is not solely this futuristic component of the ‘troika’ that possesses potential negative implications and the potential to inflict ‘insecurity’ on citizens. Whilst the retrospective elements (i.e. lesson-drawing, ‘good practices’) may be viewed by some as ‘effective’ in providing ‘security’, this does not mean they cannot be intrusive, counter-productive and, in fact, exacerbate perceptions of ‘insecurity’. Instead, it means that they are regarded as ‘effective’ by those with the power to define this, and classify what ‘security’ *is* (Bigo, 2008). Furthermore, the transfer of knowledge can mean that security-related policies generally disliked or resisted by fan cultures are reproduced and transferred. As this thesis shows and as research suggests, examples of this can include the use of riot gear (unless necessary), disproportionate policing, heavy-handed stewarding (Pearson, 2012a; Numerato, 2018), or the commercialization of so-called or pre-defined ‘rival brands’ (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010). As Tsoukala et al. (2016: 177) note, football supporters in Europe are ‘still considered a threat to public order, and a social group that requires both innovative new laws and policing strategies to prevent them from engaging in violence or disorder’. The processes of the ‘troika’ may thus facilitate conditions for the (re)introduction of controversial strategies or legislation that seek to sustain the governing and social control of fans as a social group.

Against this backdrop, it is a positive development that organizations like FSE and SD Europe have observer status, a platform and a voice in the networking activities that occur before Championships, despite limited guarantees that their ideas will be listened to (Numerato, 2018; Cleland et al., 2018). Concerning the potential implications that reproduction of policies or practices, disliked by attending fans and fan cultures, can have on spectators perceived ‘security’ in addition to my empirical findings, one practical recommendation growing directly from this thesis’s findings is that the inclusion of fan networks should be maintained at future events. This, to ensure that ‘fans’ – accepting the different typologies subordinated to this term (Giulianotti, 2002) – preserve a say in security and policing planning and practice.

Another recommendation from this thesis is consistent with previous findings speaking to football policing (Stott et al., 2008, 2018; Stott and Pearson, 2007;

Millward, 2009a) and advocates the use of crowd management techniques and policing approaches to football supporters that emphasizes pro-activity and dialogue. This was clearly favoured and advocated by stakeholder organizations and individual stakeholders as the most effective way to police football (Chapter Five). Finally, there are potential benefits related to enhancing the role and use of SLOs at international mega-events and in international football. SLOs work to enhance the dialogues and relationships between clubs, football associations, fans, security, and police. Hence, this is consistent with earlier research into the SLO role in Swedish club football holding that SLOs can positively reduce conflict (Stott et al., 2020). This could also reflect supporters' important observer or stakeholder position in the planning stages with regards to policing and security management before international tournaments like the European Championships (Cleland et al., 2018).

In sum, it can be argued that even the recirculation of knowledge and practices must not be viewed as an unequivocally or unconditionally 'positive' exercise, because these previously tested lessons may not be seen as effective by those at 'security's' receiving ends, who can end up feeling socially excluded, targeted or marginalized (Armstrong et al., 2017; Numerato, 2018). The same may be said around the exercise of precaution (Mythen and Walklate, 2008). The 'troika' therefore scratches the surface of the far more overarching and philosophical question regarding the trade-off between civil liberties and 'security' (Bauman, 2005; Bauman and Bordini, 2014; Zedner, 2003a). The different processes adding up to the 'troika of security' therefore highlight and further validate the perspectives that sustain SME 'security' and 'surveillance' – and their practices and indeed 'legacies', may come at the cost of human rights, rights to privacy or civil liberties (Spaaij, 2013; Hassan, 2014; Sugden, 2012; Samatas, 2007; Boykoff, 2020). Hence, these complex issues highlight the problematic nature that is inherent to 'securing efforts' in present-day societies. A final remark can be issued holding that that whereas the processes within the 'troika of security' can all assist the facilitation for optimal conditions for ensuring *objective* 'security', they cannot necessarily guarantee *subjective* feelings of 'security'. This comes particularly true in relation to one social group situated centrally in the 'troika of security': the fans.

7.3.1 Situating Fans within the ‘Troika of Security’

The securitized fields of a mega-event are ‘heavily populated with multiplicities of actors, agencies and organizations’ (Fussey, 2015: 222). This is confirmed by this thesis’s ‘troika of security’. However, as this thesis argues, football fans play integral and occasionally contradictory roles within these populated security fields. Often, however, ‘the voices of fans are absent from the literature on security and SMEs’ (Doidge et al., 2019: 713). Hence, it is necessary to situate, and return to fans’ position within the ‘troika of security’ as this thesis’s model which explains SME ‘security’ construction.

As this thesis argues, fans at football mega-events play different yet crucial roles within the ‘troika of security’ and wider event securitization. First, as mentioned, some groups of fans and their behaviour are occasionally ‘secured against’ as posing a potential ‘security threat’ to other fans and general public order (see Chapter Four) in public and media discourses (Tsoukala, 2009). By considering the three components of the ‘troika’ then; *lessons* may, for example, be drawn from previous events in relation to how to police *fans* through dialogue or communication (Chapter Five). Or, an agency’s *institutional memory* on how to police a particular game may be characterized by previous interactions with specific *fan groups*. Moreover, the precautionary categorization processes will also typically impact how an individual fan or fan group are approached or policed. Here, one can see how fans, in part, constitute what the processes of the ‘troika’ attempt to govern and keep under control.

Then, fans concurrently represent the primary consumers and participants of a SME’s official spaces, including fan zones or the stadiums (Kolyperas and Sparks, 2018). At SMEs where processes of securitization and commodification intersect (Giulianotti, 2011), fans therefore also constitute those referent objects of ‘security’ that are to be provided with, and expect ‘safety’ in ‘secure’ environments upon visiting a mega-event, and subsequently protection from other ‘internal enemies’ like ‘hooligans’ (Divišová, 2019), or external threats like terrorism, crime or pandemics. Making fans feel ‘secure’ or ‘safe’ during mega-events is hence central in relation to maintaining an event’s consumer attraction (Eick, 2010) and ensuring that fans, objectively, remain separated from outlined ‘security threats’.

Lastly, within the ‘troika’, fans also possess a distinctive presence in form of organized fan networks. These actively contribute in the pre-planning of security before events like Euro 2020. Here, fans play an important and recognized security stakeholder role in the wider hierarchy of powerful actors, such as UEFA, local security forces and the Council of Europe. As the thesis argues, it is crucial to recognize fans as powerful actors within the ‘troika’ as subjects to be ‘secured from’, event consumers and, lastly, *influencers* in the security-related planning and eventual delivery in Euro 2020’s context. With respect to the latter, Numerato (2018: 75) noted that:

Throughout their [FSE’s and SD Europe’s] participation in the Committee, the fans have the opportunity to contribute to discussions of the body, which monitors the application of the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events. Moreover, the FSE have been actively involved in the Pan European Football policing Training Project. The aim of the project was to develop innovative policing strategies, foster the communication of police with supporters and prevent escalation of conflicts. The signature of the Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events could be understood as another significant institutional response to fans’ transnational activism; the convention signed in 2016 emphasised the necessity of taking into consideration the perspective of supporters during the organisation of sport events

In many ways, the case of Euro 2020 – captured by the ‘troika’ – empirically documents fans’ active and continued roles in the pre-planning of ‘security’ and their input on police-fan relations. Thus, it is argued that fans are present in the ‘troika’, where they possess a threefold role: as subjects to be ‘secured against’; consumers to be provided with ‘security’; and influential actors that can impact the security delivered by those providing security before and during the relevant event.

Moving forward, and in the context of COVID-19, there is already evidence of how fans can play a crucial role in the ‘safe return’ of spectators to the stadiums on a European level. For the 2020 UEFA Super Cup Final in September 2020 – staged at Budapest’s Euro 2020 stadium, *Puskás Arena* – FSE reportedly liaised with UEFA, the organizing committee, Hungarian police and Hungarian fans, and conducted a survey which examined the ‘viability of fans returning to stadia in UEFA club and national team competitions’ (FSE, 2020c: 2). Some of the recommendations provided in FSE’s (2020c) final report included close engagement between organizers and fan

representatives and the ‘precise communication on important public health and safety matters to ensure that fans are as safe as possible when attending game’ (ibid.: 16).

In a way, this demonstrates why the ‘troika’ – despite emanating from a Euro 2020 case study – can be extended into novel and securitized contexts. Now, it may be asked how the experiences of the Super Cup Final can assist Euro 2020, how Euro 2020 may make use of lessons from the UEFA Super Cup, and how groups like FSE and SD Europe continue the work towards Euro 2024 in Germany. Whilst this illustrates that the ‘troika’ can be extended into new event-specific, security and fan contexts, it also underlines the important and *constant* role of fans within the ‘troika’. Ultimately, as forthcoming mega-events take place, fans are again likely to occupy roles as *users* and *subjects* of, and *contributors* to ‘security’, impacted by and impacting an event’s security providers and hierarchies of power. And here, the ‘troika’ can assist in unpacking the contested processes that are entangled in a mega-event’s security delivery, and how techniques of social and crowd control ‘can later be applied to other fields of activity’ beyond sport (Tsoukala, 2009: 118). Finally, it remains important that the perceptions of fans *at* Euro 2020 – *if* the event does take place in front of spectators – remain subject to critical examination. This will add new layers of understanding to the ‘troika’, so that fans’ perceptions of ‘security’ are juxtaposed to, or integrated into the discourses and processes making up the ‘troika’.

7.4 Limitations and Emerging Research Agendas

This thesis’s limitations are predominantly related to the issues of access, sample size and demographic, the study’s explorative nature and the study being rooted in a single case study. Ultimately, my main focus is on *one* mega-event. As discussed in Chapter Three, caution must be exercised when drawing extensive claims from single case studies. Although the following argument does not justify such limitation: this is not entirely uncommon in mega-event research, where separate SMEs typically represent cases. These limitations and the themes of validity were given attention in Chapter Three, especially in light of this study’s use of media sources and interviewee demographics. This chapter also touched upon the obstacles that may surface when examining the concept of ‘security’ empirically and conceptually. Security-related research may present distinctive challenges speaking to secrecy, access and individuals’ willingness to voice their ideas in academic research (Eski, 2012; Aitken, 2020). This may translate into recruitment or sampling challenges. Nevertheless, my

study's sample size is still comparable with similar studies (see Eisenhauer, 2013; Klauser, 2011a; Lauss and Szigetvari, 2010; Taylor and Toohey, 2011).

As Bigo (2014: 221) acknowledges, '[t]he secrecy and the fear of the hierarchy is one of the transversal characteristics of the professionals of security'. In this thesis, I deliberately took a different route than some other researchers with unique 'insider access' to security professionals, like Armstrong et al.'s (2017) ethnography with police forces in London for the 2012 Olympics. Still, this thesis draws from empirical records including formal discourses in available policy documents and personal interviews with stakeholders actively involved in Euro 2020's organization, securitization or with general football policing expertise. Whilst the sample may be seen as a possible limitation, it does not prevent the thesis from providing a high-quality portrait of Euro 2020's security processes in the pre-planning stage. However, it is worth openly acknowledging: both as a possible limitation and as guidance for other researchers seeking to empirically examine 'security'. Ultimately, thick veils of secrecy and interview recruitment issues are likely to emerge as challenges to such research.

Throughout, I have openly acknowledged my study's limitations. Perhaps equally as important, I have appropriately mitigated these when possible. Moreover, these limitations possess two dimensions. While representing possible limitations to the completed study, they also invite future research projects and questions that could utilize this thesis as a scholarly starting point. Hence, against the background of the potential limitations, some of which are inherent to qualitative research, this study's findings are still relevant, valid and significant. Collectively, the findings empirically advance the sociological understanding of mega-event 'security'.

Finally, some specific avenues for future research are delineated. At the time of writing, it is a decade ago since Giulianotti and Klauser's (2010) interdisciplinary research agenda was published, consisting of what was emerging issues at the time. Hence, this section contributes with an emerging research agenda for this field for the 2020s and onwards. To be sure, there are still gaps in the literature. In many ways, this was confirmed by Tian and Wise's (2019) timely knowledge domain assessment and

survey of 870 academic articles published in three international journals dedicated to the social study of sports, between 2008 and 2018.⁵²

Acknowledging that research on mega-event ‘security’ sometimes is published in mainstream journals or as monographs, it is still highly remarkable that ‘security’, ‘securitization’, ‘policing’ or ‘surveillance’ do *not* emerge from this survey as any of the most covered areas or key words in the sociology of sport from 2008 to date. Clearly, this highlights the pressing need for continued development in the field. The avenues for future investigation could, however, be approached by academics from various fields, and not as confined to the sociology of sports. Indeed, one of the key strengths of the current literature is its interdisciplinary nature boasting important and sometimes collaborative contributions from sociologists, security scholars, criminologists, urban geographers, management and legal scholars and political scientists, to name a few of the represented subject areas.

Going forward, it is highly important that this field preserves its interdisciplinary nature. Not merely in terms of its active scholars, but also in terms of the theoretical approaches to ‘security’. In that vein, there is more scope in future research for looking, to an even larger degree, towards the fields of International Relations, and particularly critical security studies’ approaches. Like this thesis, this could be by considering or working within the key premises of, or acknowledging, the theoretical frameworks of the Copenhagen School’s securitization approach (Chapter One), or the Welsh School’s reading of ‘security’ as a derivative concept (Chapter Two). However, scholars could also increasingly consult other critical approaches to ‘security’, like the Paris School, commonly associated with Bigo and Tsoukala, whose work has been consulted over the course of this thesis (Tsoukala, 2008, 2009, 2016; Bigo, 2000, 2002).

Briefly, the Paris School draws upon Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ and thereby ‘fuses a concern with discourses of security and constructions of danger with a focus on security *practices*’ (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 69, original emphasis). The focus is often directed at the social relations between security professionals, like the police, private security actors, border control agencies and

⁵² The three journals include *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* and *Sociology of Sport Journal*.

intelligence actors in a globalized era (Bigo, 2002). Moreover, the Paris School is concerned with ‘how security and insecurity are mutually constituted through elite knowledge and routinized bureaucratic practices’ (Browning and McDonald, 2011: 240).

Bigo argues that the habitus of security relations has been transformed with distinctions between internal and external ‘security’ becoming increasingly blurred and occupied by clusters of private and public agencies (Bigo, 2000, 2002, 2014). As this thesis has reaffirmed, SMEs demonstrate this blurredness, and there is a theoretical purchase in consulting this international political sociology approach to critically understand ‘(in)security’ in future research. Moreover, and on a more general level, future research should regardless uphold the trend of examining individual SMEs empirically and theoretically, which the ‘troika of security’ ultimately is a product of. As aforementioned, the ‘troika of security’ could be employed, built upon or extended in future studies.

Then, it remains important to study spectators’ perceptions of ‘security’ and ‘safety’ in relation to SME (non-)attendance. This was, admittedly, one of the provisional aims of this thesis that were abandoned following the outbreak of COVID-19. In this area, there is substantial scope for building on existing work (Cleland and Cashmore, 2018; Cleland, 2019; Lee Ludvigsen and Millward, 2020) and to consider how COVID-19 has impacted the ways in which spectators consider their own ‘security’, ‘safety’ or ‘health’ when attending sporting events. Simultaneously, it remains crucial not to neglect the residents of the neighbourhoods and local communities that mega-events are staged within, around or upon. Residents will often experience the build-up and peak times of a mega-event’s security and policing operations (Aitken, 2020). But even when the floodlights fade and ‘when “the show” appears to be over’ (Roche, 2000: xi) residents may find their everyday lives impacted in some way by distinctive post-event ‘security legacies’. Here, there is leeway for combining the commitment to the empirically study ‘security legacies’ whilst subscribing to the aforementioned and critical approaches to ‘security’. Existing scholarship finds that local residents not uncommonly feel excluded from the extraordinary mega-event spaces and spectacles (Armstrong et al., 2017; Kennelly and Watt, 2011; Watt, 2013; Kennelly, 2015; Aitken, 2020).

In a mega-event's build up, it has become common to either forcibly remove 'undesirable' individuals, communities or local businesses, or displacing them through neoliberal market or security policies that may intertwine (Kennelly and Watt, 2011). Against this, it is encouraged here to gather individuals' lived experiences of heightened policing, increased surveillance and generally, the mega-event circus which can be longitudinal undertaking when accounting for the diffuse time period from when a city decides to bid for hosting rights to long after the circus leaves the town. Methodologically, this invites qualitative ethnographic methods, interviews and focus groups. Though, inspired by van Blerk et al. (2018), such 'bottom-up' research can also engage constructively with participatory, creative and visual methods with excluded social groups or individuals. Whilst this undeniably would supplement and deepen the academic study of mega-events and 'security', findings from such research also have capacity to speak to broader neoliberal, urban and gentrifying processes impacting local communities in global and/or contemporary cities.

Finally, the impacts of COVID-19 on the security strategies of future SMEs remain central to examine empirically. As Parnell et al. (2020: 6) suggest, 'certainly, when the next pandemic comes (which it will), we are better prepared in sport and society'. This implies that COVID-19 has generated a set of valuable lessons and further consideration points for SME security stakeholders of future events. The questions that remain are 'how?', and 'which *exact* lessons?'. Researchers may draw upon insights from this thesis, such as the 'troika of security' and previous research to analyse how processes of lesson drawing, knowledge exchange and precautionary measures feed into the attempts to 'secure' against future pandemic or epidemic 'threats' before sporting events. Hence, to summarize, this section rests upon this thesis, its limitations and recent developments. It argues that the study of SME securitization is continually evolving and still promises an array of intriguing avenues for interdisciplinary research.

7.5 Final Remarks

So while Euro 2016 will be the first European football championship to be held during a state of emergency, *it is unlikely to be the last*. Declared in the aftermath of the Paris attacks of November 2015, which included an attempted suicide bombing of the France-Germany match at Stade de France, the state of emergency has recently been extended to cover the

football [...] Consequently, nearly 80,000 state security personnel will be supplemented by 15,000 private security guards and a 10,000-strong military reserve, trained to deal with catastrophic bomb attacks on the fanzones and chemical warfare in the stadiums. *It is interesting to note that while the official and commercial zones for outdoor viewing will be going ahead*, secured with tens of millions of euros of additional funding, no one else will be allowed to hold their own unofficial outdoor events or screenings. Such is the fate of public space in an era of asymmetrical warfare (Goldblatt, 2016, emphasis added)

The above extract from David Goldblatt marks the closure of my thesis. Effectively, it reflects the socio-political realities and exceptionalities of SME ‘security’ in the present-day. It is now prudent to ask whether the norm defines the exception – or if the exception, in fact, defines the norm in mega-event ‘security’. Instead of Euro 2020 ‘going ahead’ in a state of emergency, as Goldblatt may have hinted towards, the tournament was not staged at all in June and July 2020. Rather, it was postponed – so it could be staged in June and July 2021. It is not unlikely though, that the future envisaged by Goldblatt becomes a reality, where notions of festivity and spectacle ‘goes ahead’ despite background noises triggered by exceptionalism, enhanced state powers and alertness.

Since the nineteenth century, mega-events’ social significance has merely intensified (Roche, 2000). Following 9/11, the exact same may be observed regarding the ‘securing’ of mega-events and ‘security’ more broadly (Zedner, 2009). Recently, Cleland and Cashmore (2018) highlighted that in line with new, emerging threats, security and surveillance measures at SMEs are likely to develop even further. Undoubtedly, a pandemic now represents one of the ‘new threats’ hinted towards. Cleland and Cashmore’s suggestion connects with my next argument. What the findings of this thesis confirm, when added together, is the appropriateness of arguing that SMEs function as a ‘*mirror*’ and ‘*motor*’ (cf. Giulianotti and Robertson, 2007) of securitization processes. As UEFA (2020f) states, ‘[c]onflicts around Europe and the world mean that our continent is more prone than ever to threats. Because football mirrors society, these problems are reflected in football’. SMEs provide specular reflections of wider security dynamics and may be the driver behind securitization techniques. Notwithstanding, in light of this study’s findings, it is prudent to take this metaphor even further and again paraphrase Giulianotti and Robertson (2004) who argued that sport is one of the most sociologically illuminating domains of ‘globalization’.

Drawing inspiration from their claim, this thesis argues that sport also has proven and manifested itself as an extremely illuminating domain of global, national and local ‘securitization’ processes, exemplified by contemporary concepts such as ‘security legacies’ (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010), SME ‘security networks’ (Whelan, 2014), and the ‘troika of security’, which my thesis introduces. Relatedly, empirical records, theorizations and analyses of ‘security’ discourses, practices and perceptions in sport possess the potential to significantly improve how ‘security’ is understood or problematized in modern societies. As a site of analysis, sport has the capacity to illuminate how ‘security’ is resisted, contested, or constructed. Fundamentally, my thesis underscores *exactly this*. Sport must therefore consistently be critically approached – and treated seriously – by social researchers seeking to understand ‘security’, ‘surveillance’, ‘social control’ and ‘health security’. Such argument leans upon my empirical findings and is extremely important.

If Goldblatt’s (2016, 2019) predictions prove correct, and reflect what Walter Benjamin observed, namely that the ‘state of emergency’ is not the *exception*, but instead ‘the rule’ or the ‘norm’, then it remains crucial that the components constituting the ‘troika of security’, the impact of COVID-19 and the perceptions of ‘security’ among supporters are critically explored by academics. Indeed, from a scholarly point of view, the forthcoming years present interesting case studies. However, more crucially and beyond academic spheres, they will all be revealing. First out is the controversial 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar. Then, Euro 2024 in Germany, before the 2026 FIFA World Cup will be co-hosted by Canada, Mexico and the US under the banner of ‘United 2026’.

Although the respective geographical, political, cultural and social attributes of these mega-events differ greatly, which translates into distinctive ‘risk’ and ‘security’ contexts, one thing these events *do* have in common is that even in times of emergency, uncertainty, unknowns or insecurity, the show *must* and *will* go on. And so, in the unlikely event of a global pandemic; postponements can ensure that the show *eventually* goes on.

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Appendix

Appendix 1

Interview Guide

I. General

1. In what ways have your organization become increasingly active in the governance of football
2. Has your organization increased/changed their role in recent years?
3. What roles do you/organization have in the planning before European competitions?
4. How do you work with other involved organizations and stakeholders?
5. How is your organization in a position to influence or impact the event's security and/or policing?
6. How does that continue work from previous Euro's or events?

II. Specific

7. What type(s) of policing and security do you envisage ahead of Euro 2020?
8. How can security actors, policing and organizers impact perceptions of security among attendees?
9. How can policing and stewarding impact atmospheres in stadia/fan zones?
10. In which way(s) have fan zones altered the dynamics at mega-events?
11. How does Euro 2020's format impact the security and policing?
12. How does experience play a part in the security and policing?
13. In London, how do you envisage the policing of fans to take place?
14. Does London's infrastructure assist the policing/security?

III. Other

15. What is your view on the 12-host format?
16. How does it create challenges for fans?

Appendix 2

Consent Form Example



LIVERPOOL JOHN MOORES UNIVERSITY

CONSENT FORM

'Sport Mega-Events and Security – The 2020 Euros and Spectators' perceptions of security'

Jan Andre Lee Ludvigsen, Liverpool John Moores University (j.a.ludvigsen@2018.ljmu.ac.uk)

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information provided for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason and that this will not affect my legal rights.

3. I understand that any personal information collected during the study will be anonymised and remain confidential

4. I agree to take part in a semi-structured interview relating to the topic discussed in the Participant Information Sheet

5. I understand that the interview will be audio recorded and I am happy to proceed

6. I understand that parts of our conversation may be used verbatim in future publications or presentations but that such quotes will be anonymised.

Name of Participant

Date

Signature

Name of Researcher

Date

Signature