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**Cultural Logics of Honor, Face, and Dignity as Moderators of the Relationship between Group Processes and Pro-Immigrant Collective Action Intention**



**Article**

**Running head: Culture, group, and pro-immigrant actions**

# Cultural logics of honor, face, and dignity as moderators of the relationship between group processes and pro-immigrant collective action intention

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## Abstract

Group identification, efficacy, and injustice appraisals are well-established predictors of willingness to engage in collective action on behalf of one's group or important cause. Here, we extend the analyses of why people engage in collective action by examining the potential role of cultural codes of honor, dignity, and face across cultures. Using data from 22 countries (N = 4,615) we tested whether country-level cultural norms modify the strength of the relationship between the established predictors of collective action and action intentions (perceived injustice, identification, efficacy). We focused on pro-immigrant solidarity collective actions. Our results showed that identification, efficacy, and injustice appraisals were linked to collective action intentions in most countries, but the perception of the dominant cultural code modified the strength of these relationships. That is, the relationship between injustice appraisal and collective action intentions was stronger in countries with weaker honor codes. Similarly, the relationship between identification and collective action was stronger in countries with weaker face orientation. We further discussed the implications and limitations of the results in light of cross-cultural studies of pro-immigrants attitudes and actions. Overall, our findings complemented research on predictors of collective action and the dual-chamber model of collective action by presenting potential cultural constraints.

Keywords: honor; face, dignity; collective action; group identification; cross–cultural psychology; migration

Word count: 6628.

**Cultural logics of honor, face, and dignity as moderators of the relationship of group process and pro-migrant collective action intention**

With the collective movements are gaining momentum worldwide (Carvacho et al., 2023), attempts to cross-culturally validate the psychological mechanisms that play a critical role in intergroup behavior have gained popularity over the years. While doing so, researchers have observed that most concepts have been developed in the WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) societies. Nevertheless, cross-cultural predictors of collective action (i.e. actions taken by group members to improve the conditions of the in-group as a whole or in solidarity with the disadvantaged member of another group) remain understudied (Kosakowska-Berezecka, Besta, et al., 2020; Van Zomeren & Louis, 2017), and it is an ongoing debate whether they are generalizable across cultures. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in investigating what motivates group actions, while taking into account cultural and contextual factors (Besta, et al., 2024; Fischer et al., 2017; Kosakowska-Berezecka et al., 2020; Thomas et al., 2019; Urbiola et al., 2022; van Zomeren, 2015; van Zomeren & Louis, 2017). In their most recent synthesis of 1235 effects (with a total of over 123,000 participants), Agostini and van Zomeren (2021) confirmed the prevalence of the four key motives (moral conviction, group identity, injustice appraisal, and group efficacy) for acting collectively on behalf of one's group across different groups, contexts, and cultures. However, the authors also found some cross-cultural nuances (what they call cultural constraints) in the strength of these associations. Using country-level data on Hofstede's (2010) dimensions and Schwartz's (2007) cultural values, Agostini and van Zomeren (2021) found that the impact of group identification on collective action was less pronounced in more collectivistic (vs. individualistic) cultures, in countries with stronger hierarchies (vs. egalitarian), and in cultures with long-term (vs. short-term) orientation. Thus, these small but robust findings on cross-cultural differences justify further investigation of cross-cultural nuances and constraints to collective action in cultures with different values and ways of life.

A limited amount of research has also found that culture can play an important role in shaping motives for collective action, particularly actions that support values and norms consistent with cultural logic (Drury & Travaglino, 2020; Travaglino et al., 2015; 2016) or cross-cultural variant collective action involving open confrontation to address sexism (Fischer et al., 2017). In the present study, we argue that when studying cultural constraints on different motivations for collective action, it is valuable to adopt the CuPS approach (Culture X Person X Situation approach; Leung & Cohen, 2011) to better account for the personal and social repercussions of said action on individuals from different cultures, while also considering the context of collective action.

Furthermore, Radke et al. (2020) proposed that advantaged groups may be motivated to engage in solidarity collective action for several reasons: (a) to improve the status of disadvantaged groups, (b) provided that their own group's status remains secure, (c) to fulfill their personal needs, and (d) because such actions are consistent with their moral values. In this study, our focus is on solidarity collective action (for previous research on this form of collective action see, e.g., Saab et al., 2015; Wiley, 2012), collective action in solidarity with immigrants in particular. Thus, we examine whether the cultural logics of dignity, honor, and face (Leung & Cohen, 2011) can determine the strength of the three predictors (identity, efficacy, and injustice) of collective action in support of immigrants in 22 countries.

**Honor, Dignity, and Face Cultures**

Cultural value theories such as Hofstede's (2010) and Schwartz's (2007) focus primarily on the social structure of the culture, whereas CuPS approach considers individual variations in a cultural context and the source of self-worth (i.e., an individual's view of his or her own value in society, Ayers, 1984) across cultures. According to Leung and Cohen (2011), by considering not only contextual characteristics and social order (e.g., independence or hierarchical order), but also the source of an individual's worth (e.g., inherent and internal or given by others), it is possible to classify cultures under three distinct logics - dignity, honor, and face. Taking the CuPS approach has an advantage over other cultural theories and classifications in that it focuses on understanding cultural logics while taking into

account individual differences and variations within and between cultures, as well as the characteristics of the situation or behavior. Utilizing such perspective while studying the strength of key predictors of collective action across cultures is novel, yet necessary. Cultural logics not only encompass cultural patterns, values, beliefs, and practices, but also relate to different conceptions of morality, rationality, punishment, and social interactions, and account for the source of the individual's worth in different cultures.

According to Leung and Cohen (2011), within the three cultural logics (dignity, honor, and face), the basis of an individual's self-worth varies along the social order and structure of the culture (Aslani et al., 2016). Dignity cultures (e.g., France) value self-interest and autonomy and all individuals are theoretically equal and therefore have an inner worth that is independent of the opinions and evaluations of others (Ayers, 1984). Thus, people are expected to follow their internal standards and are less influenced by other people. Leung and Cohen (2011) argue that the dignity logic is similar to Western cultures in that it emphasizes that individual achievements and reputation is not granted externally by others, but by the individual's own evaluations and standards. In face cultures (e.g., Japan), on the other hand, self-worth is based on the evaluations of others and the fulfillment of socially imposed obligations. These obligations go hand in hand with the status of individuals in social hierarchies - by having low-status groups fulfill their duties and high-status groups assume their responsibilities and protect others, harmony and cooperation in society are achieved (Leung & Cohen, 2011). In such cultures, as the name of the logic suggests, the emphasis is on "face" - all individuals, regardless of their status in society, try not to lose face by valuing hierarchy, showing humility, and seeking harmony. Within the individualism-collectivism continuum, face logic is more similar to collectivistic cultures. Finally, honor cultures (e.g., Pakistan) emphasize the "honor" which must be claimed and at the same time paid by others. Thus, honor logic differs from the other two logics in that self-worth is based on both internal and external factors. In contrast to face cultures, which are characterized by more stable hierarchies, honor cultures have more unstable and even dynamic hierarchies, which pave the way for the foundations of a culture that

emphasizes the protection of individuals and their reputations in times of need and the punishment of those responsible for the grievances. Thus, through competition, one's honor can be gained or taken away.

Since its proposal, "cultural logics" have been used as a framework to examine cultural differences in violent reactions and aggression (Severance et al., 2013), and to analyze humor as a response to provocation (Krys et al., 2017). More recently, Smith et al. (2020) showed that group-level effects of cultural logics explain additional variance to that explained by individual-level effects. At the group level, various associations have been found between cultural logics and other variables. For example, dignity logic is characterized by high levels of consistency and relational mobility; face logic is characterized by low expressiveness and limited relational mobility; and honor logic is defined by low self-restraint and a strong emphasis on honor-related values (Smith et al., 2020). Furthermore, although still in its infancy, there is some evidence emphasizing the role of endorsement of different cultural logics in intergroup relations, such as hostile reactions to outgroup aggression (Barnes et al., 2012), general negative outgroup perceptions (e.g., Levin et al., 2015), and as a framework for understanding intergroup relations in different contexts with different historical and political struggles (Uskul et al., 2023). For example, Psaltis et al. (2023) found that individuals from different cultures may have different attitudes and preferences for retributive justice, while Ceylan-Batur and Uskul (2021) found that cultural logics may determine the emotional and behavioral responses given to threatening situations. Thus, recognizing culturally shaped factors that may play an important role in the links between social identity, perceptions of injustice, and beliefs about group efficacy and collective action intentions may broaden our understanding of the nuances in motivations for collective action across cultures.

**Integrating cultural logics to motivations for collective action**

Since its development, the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2008) and the centrality of identity, efficacy, and injustice motivations to collective action have gained much support in different social contexts, for various groups with different conflicts, and across different forms of collective action. The processes highlighted by the SIMCA model are important in

predicting not only pro-ingroup collective action intentions, but also solidarity actions on behalf of disadvantaged groups. For example, research conducted in Japan, the Philippines and New Zealand showed that anger at injustice, identification with the disadvantaged group, and perceived efficacy of action were associated with willingness to support various disadvantaged groups (e.g. sexual minorities, people with HIV, obese people) (Deguchi et al., 2016). Similarly, a study in Indonesia confirmed that willingness to participate in Palestinian solidarity actions is linked to Muslim identity, efficacy beliefs and group-based anger when examining intercorrelations between variables studied (Shadiqi et al., 2018). Also in the broader context of gender relations, men are more willing to support solidarity collective action for gender equality when they identify more strongly with the struggles of women, when they think men can change the situation of discrimination against women, and when they feel anger and rage at injustice (Ochoa et al., 2019).

According to van Zomeren and colleagues (2008; 2011), perceptions of injustice and the associated negative feelings are among the most central predictors of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008; Agostini & van Zomeren, 2021) and derive from upward social comparison with others (relative deprivation; Runciman, 1966). Anger, the emotional response to injustice, acts as the glue that links perceptions of injustice to stronger willingness to act collectively. In honor cultures, perceived provocation or threats to one's social reputation often lead to violent responses. Smith and colleagues (2016), who compared the anger coping styles of individuals from dignity, face, and honor cultures and found cross-cultural differences, further emphasized that in honor cultures, it may be more acceptable to express anger rather than hold it in. Such situations are likely to be those that are perceived as threatening to one's honor (e.g., Uskul et al., 2015). Thus, compared to face cultures, where maintaining harmonious relationships is important, and dignity cultures, where one's own evaluations and standards are emphasized, perceptions of injustice and group anger may be relatively stronger motivators for collective action in honor cultures than in dignity and face cultures.

Furthermore, because honor cultures emerge in environments where the effectiveness of legal authority is often questioned or ignored, individuals may be inclined to take matters into their own hands

to protect those in need ("enhancing honor") and to punish those who are guilty or threatening ("protecting honor") (Leung & Cohen, 2011). In addition, Uskul and colleagues (2012) found that in Turkey, a culture that values honor more than North America, the honor attacking situations constructed by participants focused more on close others than on the individuals themselves. Thus, individuals in such cultures may often be concerned about the impact of their own behavior on others. Given that perceptions of injustice stemming from group-level disadvantage and related negative emotions (such as anger) experienced on behalf of the group in question are the predictors of collective action, it is reasonable to expect that the relationship between perceived injustice and solidarity-based collective action intentions will be stronger in cultures that value honor more strongly.

Another key motivator of collective action is perceived group efficacy, which according to Agostini and van Zomeren (2021) can refer either to the weighing of costs and benefits of joining the action before the decision is made (derived from resource mobilization theory, Klandermans, 1984), or to the perception that the group can achieve its goals through collective effort (i.e., self-efficacy beliefs, Bandura, 1997). In both definitions, the emphasis is on the perceptions, efforts, and actions of the individuals to achieve group goals-that is, the emphasis is on human agency for the good of the group as a whole. Compared to honor cultures, Leung and Cohen (2011) emphasized that in dignity cultures, individuals are relatively resistant to insults and threats from others, they base their self-worth on individual efforts and actions, and that dignity is the moral center of the individual. Recent studies show that for dignity cultures, the preferred response to provocation may be based on humor and amusement (Krys et al., 2017). Furthermore, in their article comparing face and dignity cultures in terms of the need for self-enhancement, Lee and colleagues (2014) argued that in dignity cultures, individuals may be more promotion-focused (i.e., attaining gains) than in face cultures, where the focus is more on prevention (i.e., avoiding losses), so individuals from dignity cultures may be more approach-oriented. Thus, we might expect the link between efficacy beliefs and collective action intentions to be stronger in dignity cultures than in face and honor cultures.

Finally, Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) argues that when one's group cannot be or remain positively distinct from others, they may resort to collective action to transform their negative identity into a positive one. Thus, identification with the group that would benefit from the outcomes of the collective action would increase the willingness to engage in the action (e.g., Mummendey et al., 1999). According to the SIT, individuals are more likely to resort to achieving positive distinctiveness through social competition in contexts where social hierarchies are unstable and the group's position is illegitimate (i.e., they are not where they should be). In face cultures, the hierarchies are often firm and cooperative, but for this to be achieved, everyone must play their role, which is essential to maintaining their face and thus maintaining positive social relations with people from other groups (Leung & Cohen, 2011). In their recent research synthesis, Agostini and van Zomeren (2021) found that identity motivation for collective action is stronger in more individualistic and egalitarian countries than in more collectivistic countries that value hierarchy. These findings are consistent with the fact that in face cultures, maintaining harmony and cooperation is valued at the expense of openly seeking direct competition to improve one's group's position in the hierarchy. However, mistreatment of those who are more disadvantaged in the face of the current hierarchy may also be perceived as disruptive to harmony. Thus, any collective attempt to redress the grievances of the disadvantaged outgroup may be perceived as an attempt to restore harmony and cooperation in society. Because people in face cultures work together to preserve each other's faces and cooperate in doing so, identification with the disadvantaged group may be a stronger motivator for solidarity-based collective action in face cultures than in other cultures. However, it can be argued that people in face cultures do not believe that collective attempts to restore harmony are helpful because collective attempts would reduce the face of the government and destroy harmony. Thus, identification with others may demonstrate people’s connection to the group but may not necessarily facilitate solidarity-based actions (especially actions that are against social hierarchy). Thus, in our study, we examine whether identification with others could be a stronger or weaker predictor of collective action in the face cultures.

**The current study**

In the present study, we examine whether the three key motivations to engage in solidarity-based collective action are equally strong in different countries that endorse honor, dignity, and face values. To our knowledge, the role of dignity, honor, and face cultures on motivations to engage in collective action in different contexts has only recently been recognized in intergroup relations and cross-cultural psychology (Fischer et al., 2017; Travaglino et al., 2015; 2016). Agostini and van Zomeren (2021) provided evidence that while the key motivators of collective action are universal and present, the strength of some of the associations (i.e., identity) is constrained by cultural values and dimensions such as hierarchy and collectivism. Thus, our goal is to advance research on cultural constraints on collective action participation by examining whether cultural logic moderates the associations among group identification, group efficacy, injustice appraisal, and collective action intentions in 22 countries.

Based on the aforementioned research, in this study we expect that different cultural logics will play a moderating role in different collective action motivations. More specifically, given that in honor cultures it is usually acceptable to express anger when dealing with honor-threatening situations, as well as concern about protecting others by pointing the finger at the guilty, we argue that country-level cultural logic of honor would moderate the relationship between injustice appraisal and CA (H1). That is, this relationship would be stronger when honor beliefs are high.

Dignity cultures are characterized by being more approach oriented, with an emphasis on how their individual efforts and efficacy matter. Thus, we expect that the country-level cultural logic of dignity would moderate the relationship between group efficacy and CA (H2). That is, this relationship would be stronger when beliefs in dignity are stronger.

In face cultures, restoring harmony in society is essential, and mistreatment of any group in society should therefore be avoided. We expect that the country-level cultural logic of face would moderate the relationship between identification with others and CA (H3). That is, this relationship would be stronger when face beliefs are stronger.

## Method

### Participants and Procedure

Presented results are part of larger projects directed at determinants of collective actions in the context of migration (see blinded OSF at https://osf.io/nurh6/?view_only=2d33987dd5614a05904de2d93e930e60). We collected data between December 2020 and November 2021. Approval has been obtained from the Ethical Committee of the [blinded for Reviews]. Each participating institution obtained separate approval when required. Participants were undergraduate students from various areas (mostly social sciences) and informed consent was collected before starting the survey. The sample consisted of N = 4,615 respondents from 22 countries, with 30.0% self-identifying as men, 67.9% as women, 1.5% as non-binary, and 0.6% not responding to the gender question. The average age across the entire sample was M = 22.92 (SD = 6.62). Detailed information about the sample composition, including the number of participants, gender distribution, and age in each country, is provided in the supplementary materials (see Table S1). The samples from each country were relatively homogeneous in terms of age, with some exceptions—respondents from Malaysia were, on average, older and more age-diverse compared to other countries. However, the samples differed significantly in terms of gender distribution. In Singapore, men were the majority (76.1%), while in most other countries, women were predominant. Only four countries had gender-balanced samples. The percentage of non-binary individuals also varied across countries, ranging from 0% (Kosovo, Malaysia, Singapore) to 3% (United States).

### Measures

We included the following measures as a part of a longer survey (https://osf.io/nurh6/?view_only=2d33987dd5614a05904de2d93e930e60). If not noted otherwise,

participants were asked to rate each item on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

***Group efficacy.*** To measure perceived group efficacy we used two items, based on previous research on collective action (Simon & Grabow, 2010). Items read, "If the people who support migrants in my country acted as a group, they could successfully realize their goals", and "I believe that those people who support migrants in my country can exert influence on political decisions in my country."

***Anger at injustice.*** We used one item to measure negative emotions linked to the perceived unjust treatment of immigrants. Item read, "Thinking about the experiences of migrants in my country, I feel outraged about societal treatment of migrants."

***Identification with pro-immigration movements.*** To measure group identification we included three items from group centrality subscale (Leach et al., 2008). Example items read, "The fact that I am a supporter of migrants in my country, is an important part of my identity", and "I often think about the fact that I am a supporter of migrants."

***Logic of dignity, honor and face.*** To assess the moderating effect of cultural logic on association between identification, efficacy and injustice and collective action, we included measures of cultural logic. We used items based on Yao et al. (2017) measurement for dignity, face, and honor cultural norms. Participants were presented with instruction to individually rate a series of statements about different ways that people in a given culture think, feel, or act. This scale includes six items from dignity cultural logic (e.g. "In your culture people should speak their mind", and "In your culture people should stand up for what they believe in even when others disagree"), six from face logic (e.g. "In your culture people should be very humble to maintain good relationships", and "In your culture people should minimize conflict in social relationships at all costs"), and four items to measure logic of honor (e.g. "In your culture people are

concerned about their family having a bad reputation", and "In your culture people do not allow others to insult their family").

***Collective action to support immigrants.*** Intention to participate in moderate solidarity collective action was measured with nine items based on measures previously developed for used for pro-environmental actions (Alisat & Reimer, 2015) and cross-culturally validated in the context of gender equality activism (Kosakowska-Berezecka et al., 2020). On the same 7-point Likert type scale, participants indicated the degree to which you intend to take each action. Example items read, "…participate in an educational event (e.g., workshop) related to positive sides of migration to my country", and "…attend a rally focused on the support for immigration."

## Results

### Preliminary Analyses

We conducted several key analyses to ensure the validity of our cross-country comparisons and the accurate interpretation of key variables at the national level. First, we assessed measurement invariance across countries for the dependent variable—collective action to support immigrants (CASI). This step was essential to justify comparing this variable across different countries (Byrne & Matsumoto, 2021; Milfont & Fischer, 2010). Achieving scalar invariance, which requires equal factor loadings and item intercepts across countries, allows researchers to compare average latent scores, as it shows that the scale functions the same way in all groups (Milfont & Fisher, 2010). The results, presented in the supplementary materials (see Table S2), indicate that measurement invariance was established for CASI at the partial scalar level, after relaxing the requirement for equal intercepts between countries for four items. This finding allows us to conclude that the CASI measure provides comparable estimates of

collective actions across the 22 countries studied. Partial invariance acknowledges that some differences in specific items do not prevent meaningful group comparisons (Byrne et al., 1989).

Next, we assessed psychometric isomorphism for the variables related to the cultural logics of dignity, honor, and face. This analysis was conducted to support the interpretation of these cultural logics at the national level in our subsequent analyses. Establishing psychometric isomorphism allowed us to reliably interpret and compare the aggregated measures of dignity, honor, and face as cultural variables across countries. This means that scores collected at the individual level can be assumed to reflect a country-level property with a similar meaning (Tay et al., 2014).

Following Tay et al. (2014), we tested both configural and metric isomorphism for the logics of dignity, honor, and face. Configural isomorphism indicates that the same number of factors and the pattern of factor loadings are consistent across levels. Metric isomorphism means that the factor loadings are similar at both the individual and country levels. As Tay et al. (2014) argue, "the presence of metric isomorphism would suggest that the interpretation of the common factors is similar across levels" (p. 94). As shown in the supplementary materials (see Table S3), metric isomorphism was established [N = 4,594; $\chi^2(215) = 1{,}242.48$, $p < 0.01$; CFI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.032; $SRMR_{within} = 0.040$; $SRMR_{between} = 0.113$], demonstrating that the strength of the relationship between observed variables and their underlying latent constructs is consistent across levels. Strong isomorphism ensures that the items are equally relevant and important not only at the individual level but also at the country level, allowing for meaningful interpretation of these variables at the second level of analysis.

**Primary Analyses**

To test our hypotheses, we employed a multilevel modeling approach, which is particularly well-suited for analyzing data from 22 countries, especially when country-level variables act as moderators in the models. Multilevel analysis appropriately accounts for the nested structure of our data, where individuals are grouped within countries, ensuring that both individual-level and country-level variations are captured (Heck & Thomas, 2020).

Given the complexity of the relationships under investigation—where country-level cultural logics are expected to moderate the effects of individual-level motivations on collective action to support immigrants (CASI)—multilevel modeling was the most suitable method. This approach allowed us to accurately assess the cross-level interactions between national cultural logics (honor, dignity, and face) and individual motivations for collective action (injustice appraisal, group efficacy, and identification with pro-immigration movements), ensuring that our findings reflect the true moderating effects of cultural context.

However, to provide additional clarity to our findings, we also tested simple regression models for each country separately. This allowed us to conveniently illustrate how the strength of the associations between group identification, group efficacy, injustice appraisal, and collective action intentions varied across the 22 countries, in relation to the country-level cultural logics of dignity, honor, and face.

In the multilevel approach, we tested a sequence of four models (A–D) for each hypothesis. Models labeled "A" included only individual-level (L1) predictors corresponding to the specific hypothesis: injustice appraisal (Model 1A), group efficacy (Model 2A), and identification with pro-immigration movements (Model 3A). Next, in models labeled "B," the initial models were expanded by adding the corresponding country-level (L2) variables in line with the hypotheses: honor (Model 1B), dignity (Model 2B), and face (Model 3B). In the subsequent models labeled "C," a cross-level interaction component was

introduced. Models “A” through “C” are random intercept models, meaning that each country has its own unique starting point (intercept), but the effect of the predictor on the outcome variable is assumed to be the same across all countries. Finally, the models labeled “D” are random slope models, which align most closely with our hypotheses. These models not only allow for different baseline levels of the outcome across countries but also permit the relationship between the predictor and the outcome to vary between countries. Table 1 presents the results of all multilevel models predicting collective action to support immigrants.

As shown, the results of models 1A-D indicate that the stronger the injustice appraisal, the stronger the collective action (CA). Moreover, this relationship is significantly moderated by the country-level cultural logic of honor. However, the direction of this interaction is opposite to what was hypothesized in Hypothesis 1. Specifically, a stronger relationship between injustice appraisal and CA was observed in countries where honor beliefs are weaker. This effect is clearly evident when examining the results of simple regression models tested separately for each country (see Table 2), as well as when plotting the standardized regression coefficients for each of the 22 countries, corresponding to the strength of the relationship between injustice appraisal and CA, against the country-level cultural logic of honor (see Figure 1).

As shown in Table 1, the stronger the perceived group efficacy, the greater the intention to participate in collective actions to support immigrants (Models 2A and 2B). This is generally supported by the results of the regression analyses conducted for each country (see Table 3), where, except for Japan and Poland, the relationship between these variables is positive and statistically significant. However, after accounting for the country-level cultural logic of dignity in the multilevel model (see Models 2C and 2D, Table 1), neither the predictors nor the cross-level interaction between them were statistically

significant, providing no support for Hypothesis 2. As illustrated in Figure 2, the standardized regression coefficients representing the strength of the relationship between group efficacy and collective action generally range between 0.2 and 0.4, regardless of the country-level cultural logic of dignity.

Finally, with regard to Hypothesis 3, the results of models 3A-D indicate that the stronger the identification with pro-immigration movements, the stronger the collective action (CA). This relationship is significantly moderated by the country-level cultural logic of face (although in the opposite direction to what was hypothesized in Hypothesis 3), but only in the random intercept model (Model 3C). When the random slope is included in the model (Model 3D), the interaction ceases to be statistically significant. One possible explanation for this inconsistency is that the random slope model allows for variability in the strength of the relationship between the predictor and the outcome across countries. This added complexity may account for country-specific differences in how face-related cultural values influence the link between the predictor and collective action. In the random intercept model, where only the intercept varies across countries, the moderation effect may appear more pronounced due to an oversimplification of the variability in the predictor-outcome relationship. Some clarity on this situation is provided by examining the results of simple regression models tested separately for each country (see Table 4), as well as by plotting the standardized regression coefficients for each of the 22 countries, corresponding to the strength of the relationship between identification and CA, against the country-level cultural logic of face (see Figure 3). The plot shows that, generally, in countries where face beliefs are weaker, a stronger relationship between identification and CA was observed. However, the results for countries such as Malaysia and Italy suggest that the tested relationship between these variables may have a more complex underlying basis.

**Table 1.** Results of Multilevel Models Predicting Collective Action to Support Immigrants

| Model's parameter | | Model 1A-1D | | | | Model 2A-2D | | | | Model 3A-3D | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Random intercept | Random intercept | Random intercept | Random slope | Random intercept | Random intercept | Random intercept | Random slope | Random intercept | Random intercept | Random intercept | Random slope |
| Individual-level variables (L1) | *Intercept* | 1.96** | 0.80 | –2.81** | –2.63* | 1.94** | 1.87* | 2.70* | 2.96* | 1.49** | 0.76 | –0.13 | –0.28 |
| | Injustice Appraisal (IA) | 0.38** | 0.38** | 1.10** | 1.05** | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| | Group Efficacy (GE) | – | – | – | – | 0.42** | 0.42** | 0.24 | 0.18 | – | – | – | – |
| | Identification with pro-immigration movements (IPIM) | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 0.61** | 0.61** | 0.85** | 0.88** |
| Country-level variables (L2) | Honor | – | 0.23 | 0.92** | 0.88** | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| | Dignity | – | – | – | – | | 0.01 | –0.16 | –0.21 | – | – | – | – |
| | Face | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 0.15 | 0.34* | 0.38* |
| Cross-levels interaction component | IA x Honor | – | – | –0.14** | –0.13** | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| | GE x Dignity | – | – | – | – | – | – | 0.04 | 0.05 | – | – | – | – |
| | IPIM x Face | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | –0.05* | –0.06 |
| Random effects | Residual | 1.81 | 1.81 | 1.79 | 1.78 | 1.91 | 1.91 | 1.91 | 0.77 | 1.34 | 1.34 | 1.33 | 1.32 |
| | Intercept | 0.21 | 0.20 | 0.20 | 0.40 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.16 |
| | Slope | – | – | – | 0.01 | – | – | – | 0.01 | – | – | – | 0.01 |
| Fit Indices | BIC | 15,808 | 15,814 | 15,777 | 15,773 | 16,049 | 16,057 | 16,064 | 16,071 | 14,420 | 14,427 | 14,429 | 14,408 |
| | -2logLik | 15,774 | 15,772 | 15,727 | 15,706 | 16,015 | 16,015 | 16,014 | 16,004 | 14,386 | 14,384 | 14,378 | 14,341 |
| | df | 4 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 8 |

*Notes.* ICC = 0.13; $N_{Model1}$ = 4,575; $N_{Model2}$ = 4,574; $N_{Model3}$ = 4,579.

**Table 2.** Results of the Linear Regression Model Testing the Relationship Between Injustice Appraisal and Collective Action to Support Immigrants in Each Country Separately

| Country | N | $R^2$(%) | B | $\beta$ | Honor (country average) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 216 | 23 | 0.50 | 0.49 | 4.83 |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 153 | 19 | 0.35 | 0.44 | 4.46 |
| Canada | 156 | 16 | 0.41 | 0.41 | 4.92 |
| Chile | 182 | 13 | 0.31 | 0.37 | 5.21 |
| France | 212 | 27 | 0.58 | 0.52 | 4.59 |
| Germany | 219 | 30 | 0.62 | 0.55 | 4.08 |
| Hungary | 196 | 20 | 0.42 | 0.45 | 5.19 |
| Italy | 352 | 21 | 0.49 | 0.46 | 5.42 |
| Japan | 67 | 10 | 0.27 | 0.33 | 5.56 |
| Kosovo | 309 | 4 | 0.17 | 0.22 | 5.97 |
| Malaysia | 220 | 19 | 0.48 | 0.44 | 5.64 |
| Nepal | 218 | 8 | 0.21 | 0.30 | 5.55 |
| Netherlands | 197 | 9 | 0.32 | 0.31 | 3.43 |
| New Zealand | 208 | 17 | 0.40 | 0.42 | 5.31 |
| Norway | 172 | 32 | 0.73 | 0.57 | 3.46 |
| Poland | 210 | 23 | 0.40 | 0.48 | 5.42 |
| Singapore | 218 | 9 | 0.31 | 0.31 | 5.77 |
| Spain | 208 | 67 | 0.25 | 0.27 | 5.38 |
| Turkey | 229 | 12 | 0.31 | 0.35 | 5.49 |
| UK | 190 | 26 | 0.52 | 0.52 | 4.77 |
| Ukraine | 247 | 7 | 0.23 | 0.27 | 5.88 |
| United States | 195 | 30 | 0.52 | 0.55 | 4.87 |

*Notes.* B = unstandardized coefficients; β = standardized coefficients. All effects are significant at $p < 0.01$

**Figure 1.** Country-Level Honor as a Moderator of the Relationship Between Anger at Injustice and Collective Action (Country-Averaged Honor Cultural Code Perception on the Y-Axis; Strength of the Relationship Between Injustice Appraisal and Collective Action on the X-Axis; Dots Represent Countries).



**Table 3.** Results of the Linear Regression Model Testing the Relationship Between Group Efficacy and Collective Action to Support Immigrants in Each Country Separately

| Country | N | $R^2$ (%) | B | Beta | Dignity (country average) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 216 | 17 | 0.57 | 0.41 | 5.60 |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 153 | 8 | 0.30 | 0.29 | 4.67 |
| Canada | 154 | 9 | 0.44 | 0.30 | 5.58 |
| Chile | 182 | 6 | 0.30 | 0.26 | 5.38 |
| France | 212 | 14 | 0.49 | 0.38 | 4.55 |
| Germany | 220 | 10 | 0.48 | 0.32 | 5.27 |
| Hungary | 196 | 14 | 0.43 | 0.38 | 4.86 |
| Italy | 352 | 10 | 0.45 | 0.32 | 5.39 |
| Japan | 67 | 4 | 0.24 | 0.23 | 3.02 |
| Kosovo | 309 | 10 | 0.37 | 0.33 | 5.02 |
| Malaysia | 220 | 37 | 0.67 | 0.61 | 4.77 |
| Nepal | 218 | 10 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 4.06 |
| Netherlands | 197 | 9 | 0.45 | 0.31 | 5.38 |
| New Zealand | 208 | 13 | 0.41 | 0.36 | 4.38 |
| Norway | 172 | 7 | 0.45 | 0.27 | 5.62 |
| Poland | 210 | <1 | 0.11 | 0.09 | 5.10 |
| Singapore | 218 | 13 | 0.40 | 0.37 | 4.58 |
| Spain | 208 | 16 | 0.58 | 0.41 | 5.52 |
| Turkey | 230 | 76 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 4.75 |
| UK | 190 | 14 | 0.50 | 0.38 | 5.42 |
| Ukraine | 246 | 14 | 0.50 | 0.38 | 3.77 |
| United States | 194 | 8 | 0.32 | 0.29 | 4.94 |

*Notes.* B = unstandardized coefficients; β = standardized coefficients. All effects are significant at $p < 0.01$, except for Japan and Poland (not significant).

**Figure 2.** Country-Level Dignity as a Moderator of the Relationship Between Group Efficacy and Collective Action (Country-Averaged Dignity Cultural Code Perception on the Y-Axis; Strength of the Relationship Between Group Efficacy and Collective Action on the X-Axis; Dots Represent Countries).



**Table 4.** Results of the Linear Regression Model Testing the Relationship Between Identification with Pro-Immigration Movements and Collective Action to Support Immigrants in Each Country Separately

| Country | N | $R^2$ (%) | B | Beta | Face (country average) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 216 | 39 | 0.64 | 0.63 | 5.10 |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 153 | 27 | 0.58 | 0.53 | 4.20 |
| Canada | 155 | 30 | 0.53 | 0.56 | 4.98 |
| Chile | 182 | 28 | 0.52 | 0.53 | 5.17 |
| France | 212 | 43 | 0.67 | 0.66 | 4.70 |
| Germany | 221 | 55 | 0.71 | 0.74 | 3.50 |
| Hungary | 196 | 37 | 0.60 | 0.61 | 4.34 |
| Italy | 353 | 58 | 0.72 | 0.76 | 5.18 |
| Japan | 67 | 11 | 0.35 | 0.36 | 5.63 |
| Kosovo | 309 | 14 | 0.35 | 0.38 | 5.18 |
| Malaysia | 220 | 43 | 0.64 | 0.66 | 5.65 |
| Nepal | 218 | 17 | 0.42 | 0.41 | 5.49 |
| Netherlands | 197 | 34 | 0.59 | 0.59 | 3.56 |
| New Zealand | 208 | 41 | 0.62 | 0.65 | 5.13 |
| Norway | 172 | 47 | 0.66 | 0.69 | 4.04 |
| Poland | 210 | 38 | 0.57 | 0.62 | 4.20 |
| Singapore | 218 | 34 | 0.55 | 0.61 | 5.53 |
| Spain | 208 | 44 | 0.74 | 0.66 | 5.12 |
| Turkey | 230 | 32 | 0.56 | 0.57 | 4.73 |
| UK | 190 | 49 | 0.75 | 0.70 | 4.78 |
| Ukraine | 247 | 42 | 0.66 | 0.65 | 4.42 |
| United States | 195 | 37 | 0.59 | 0.61 | 4.72 |

*Notes.* B = unstandardized coefficients; β = standardized coefficients. All effects are significant at $p < 0.01$

**Figure 3.** Country-Level Face as a Moderator of the Relationship Between Identification with Pro-Immigration Movements and Collective Action (Country-Averaged Face Cultural Code Perception on the Y-Axis; Strength of the Relationship Between Identification with Pro-Immigration Movements and Collective Action on the X-Axis; Dots Represent Countries).



## Discussion

Although research on motivations for collective action has increased over the past decades, cultural constraints on the strength of these motivations on intentions to act have only recently attracted attention (Agostini & van Zomeren, 2021). In this study, we aimed to increase knowledge about how cultural values and dimensions can moderate the effects of key socio-psychological motivations (i.e., identity, efficacy, and injustice) for collective action by incorporating the CuPS approach (Leung & Cohen, 2011), which classifies cultures under three distinct logics: honor, dignity, and face. We hypothesized that these logics would moderate the effects of motivations to engage in collective action in support of immigration across 22 different countries - specifically, we argued that honor logic would moderate injustice motivation, dignity would moderate efficacy motivation, and face would moderate identity motivation. Our analysis yielded intriguing results that shed light on how different motivations to engage in collective action may affect individuals from different cultures.

Based on research and theory on the characteristics of honor cultures and intergroup relations in such contexts, we hypothesized that injustice motivation would be moderated by endorsement of honor beliefs, and that the more a culture endorsed honor logic, the stronger injustice motivation would be for collective action intentions. Our results showed that although, as expected, honor beliefs moderated the injustice path, the direction of the effect was reversed - for individuals from cultures that endorsed less honor beliefs, this association was stronger. We argue that these unexpected results may be attributed to the fact that we assessed participants' willingness to engage in collective action to support immigrants, rather than collective action aimed at improving the situation of their own group.

Research on intergroup relations in honor cultures (Uskul et al., 2023) has particularly highlighted the role of masculine honor ideology in violent responses to outgroup attacks (Barnes et al.,

2012) and support for aggressive security measures, including increased immigration restrictions (Saucier et al., 2018). Such responses may be motivated by a desire to protect one's country and others from being disrespected (dishonored) by outgroups (Levin et al., 2015). Given that in cultures that endorse honor values, the focus may be more on protecting oneself and the ingroup from the outsiders who could potentially harm and/or dishonor them, such perceptions of immigrants being treated unfairly may not have as much impact on them as it would have on their own group, as they may not have favorable attitudes toward the immigrants and thus do not view them as ingroup members. Future research aimed at disentangling the relationship between injustice perceptions and solidarity-based collective action in honor cultures would benefit from taking into account the intergroup relations between the majority group and the beneficiaries of the collective action, as well as their support for the laws and policies surrounding the context of the collective action.

Second, consistent with the emphasis on individual agency and achievement in dignity cultures, we hypothesized that efficacy motivation would be moderated by endorsement of dignity beliefs. However, this hypothesis was not supported. These unexpected results may be due to the fact that the SIMCA model (van Zomeren et al., 2008) and researchers who have highlighted the role of efficacy in collective action have emphasized the concept of group efficacy beliefs (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2012). While group efficacy beliefs include individual agency and one's own efforts to achieve group goals, the focus remains on group goals and the collective effort required to achieve them (Mummendey et al., 1999). However, in dignity cultures, individuals pursue their own individual goals and focus more on their own accomplishments than in honor and face cultures.

While group efficacy differs from self-efficacy in that it is task-specific and focuses on the group's ability to perform a task (Bandura, 1997), self-efficacy beliefs can be related to group efficacy beliefs (Parker, 1994), and individual goals can be aligned with group goals. Thus, one possible mechanism by which efficacy may be a stronger predictor of collective action in dignity cultures may be the degree of overlap between personal and group goals, through recognizing the impact of identification

with the said group, as well as political orientation and individual values that are consistent with what the collective action aims to achieve in society. Furthermore, respect and agency-based self-worth are the moral center of individuals from dignity cultures, and not acting in accordance with one's moral principles, beliefs, and ideology can lead to feelings of guilt (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Thus, endorsement of dignity beliefs may also be a cultural factor that can influence the fourth key motivator for collective action, moral convictions regarding the issue (van Zomeren et al., 2011; 2013; Agostini & van Zomeren, 2021). This could be particularly true for solidarity-based collective action. Future research could benefit from also examining whether dignity logic moderates moral motivation for collective action.

Finally, given the emphasis in face cultures on harmony as well as avoiding mistreatment of any group in society, we hypothesized that the identity motivation (i.e., identification with the protesting group) would be moderated by endorsement of face beliefs, and that the more a culture endorsed face logic, the stronger the influence of identity motivation would be on collective action intentions. Our hypothesis was partially supported: while endorsement of face beliefs did moderate the relationship between identity and collective action intentions, the effect was in the opposite direction than expected. This lends support to our alternative explanation—that identification with pro-immigrant groups may not suffice to prevent avoidance of confrontation in face cultures, whereas it plays a more critical role in fostering action in non-face cultures. Our results showed that the less a culture endorsed face beliefs, the stronger the identification with disadvantaged groups is linked to willingness to engage in collective action to support immigrants. Again, these findings may be explained by the fact that face cultures emphasize not disrupting social harmony and maintaining hierarchy (Leung & Cohen, 2011) - thus, engaging in collective action, which is by definition counter-normative, may be perceived as going against the values of face cultures. However, as we argued above, mistreating the disadvantaged groups in crisis may also be perceived as disrupting harmony by individuals who not only endorse face beliefs, but may also endorse other values and beliefs that are pro-immigration.

Limitations of the present study should also be mentioned. In this study we did not distinguish between the types of collective actions that individuals can take to support immigrants. Collective action can range from normative or low-cost, such as signing a petition, to non-normative or high-cost, which may include disruptive behavior. For individuals from face cultures, participation in non-normative forms of collective action may be non-negotiable, regardless of how much they identify with the group and its struggles, but for low-cost normative forms of collective action, the aforementioned motivations may play a role in their willingness to raise their voices for the greater good. Thus, future research aimed at uncovering constraints to participation in collective action in face cultures should consider not only individual-level factors, but also the characteristics of the action and the nature of the intergroup conflict in the given context. In addition, the student sample must be mentioned as a limitation. As university students in many societies are often socio-economically privileged groups, differences in cultural codes may be less pronounced in this population than in community samples. We also have some small national samples and results from those countries should be treated with caution.

**Conclusions**

In this study we examined whether the relationship between the key socio-psychological motivations (identity, efficacy, and injustice) and intentions to engage in solidarity-based collective action is moderated by different types of cultural logics. Our results contribute to the blossoming research on the cross-cultural nuances and constraints to collective action and provide further evidence that while the key predictors of collective action are universally prevalent, the strength of these predictors on individuals' solidarity-based collective action intentions varies across cultures. Specifically, we found that for the individuals from cultures that endorsed less honor beliefs, perceived injustice was a stronger predictor of collective action intentions as compared to other countries. In addition, in cultures that endorsed more face beliefs, the link between group identification and collective action intentions was weaker as compared to other countries. Meanwhile, the strength of the relationship between perceived efficacy and collective action intentions was similar across countries. Our findings highlight the importance of

adopting a nuanced approach that accounts for cultural dimensions and their influence on motivations for engaging in collective action. Collective action is essential in democratic societies as it enables citizens to express their opinions and participate in decision-making, thereby promoting active citizenship. Thus, these findings can help organizations and policymakers who seek to mobilize individuals for collective action by highlighting the importance of tailoring their strategies to the cultural context.

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## Supplementary Materials

**Table S1.** Sample Composition Across 22 Countries: Participant Numbers, Gender Distribution, and Age Characteristics

| Country | N | Age | | Gender | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | M | SD | Female (%) | Male (%) | Non-binary (%) | Missing data (%) |
| Australia | 216 | 23.66 | 9.20 | 80.6 | 16.7 | 2.8 | 0.0 |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 153 | 25.97 | 10.47 | 65.4 | 33.3 | 1.3 | 0.0 |
| Canada | 164 | 21.07 | 3.79 | 79.9 | 17.1 | 2.4 | 0.6 |
| Chile | 182 | 23.17 | 3.75 | 48.4 | 49.5 | 2.2 | 0.0 |
| France | 222 | 26.26 | 8.89 | 76.6 | 16.2 | 2.3 | 5.0 |
| Germany | 225 | 22.90 | 3.50 | 75.6 | 19.1 | 2.2 | 3.1 |
| Hungary | 196 | 21.86 | 3.74 | 73.5 | 26.0 | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| Italy | 356 | 21.49 | 4.52 | 84.6 | 13.8 | 1.1 | 0.6 |
| Japan | 67 | 19.48 | 1.16 | 83.6 | 13.4 | 3.0 | 0.0 |
| Kosovo | 309 | 22.94 | 4.36 | 50.8 | 48.9 | 0.0 | 0.3 |
| Malaysia | 220 | 31.41 | 10.09 | 50.0 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Nepal | 218 | 23.81 | 6.03 | 52.3 | 46.3 | 1.4 | 0.0 |
| Netherlands | 198 | 19.69 | 1.85 | 78.3 | 20.7 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| New Zealand | 210 | 20.74 | 3.55 | 78.1 | 20.0 | 1.4 | 0.5 |
| Norway | 172 | 24.15 | 3.91 | 70.9 | 26.7 | 2.3 | 0.0 |
| Poland | 210 | 21.31 | 3.03 | 84.8 | 14.8 | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| Singapore | 218 | 22.03 | 2.05 | 23.9 | 76.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Spain | 208 | 23.19 | 5.26 | 67.8 | 29.8 | 2.4 | 0.0 |
| Turkey | 231 | 23.68 | 12.47 | 70.6 | 26.8 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| UK | 191 | 25.07 | 7.70 | 70.2 | 27.7 | 2.1 | 0.0 |
| Ukraine | 251 | 19.60 | 3.09 | 66.5 | 30.3 | 2.4 | 0.8 |
| United States | 198 | 19.85 | 1.37 | 71.2 | 25.8 | 3.0 | 0.0 |
| **Total** | **4,615** | **22.92** | **6.62** | **67.9** | **30.0** | **1.5** | **0.6** |

**Table S2.** Measurement Invariance Testing for Collective Action to Support Immigrants (CASI) across 22 Countries

| Model | df | BIC | $\chi^2$ | CFI | RMSEA | SRMR | ΔCFI | ΔRMSEA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total sample | 27 | 135841 | 1366.43 | .96 | .103 | .030 | – | – |
| Configural MI level | 594 | 136385 | 3031.93 | .94 | .124 | .041 | – | – |
| Metric MI level | 762 | 136385 | 3486.81 | .93 | .118 | .079 | .01 | .006 |
| Partial scalar MI level [a] | 846 | 135172 | 3943.25 | .92 | .122 | .083 | .01 | .004 |
| Scalar MI level | 930 | 135799 | 5278.20 | .88 | .143 | .103 | .05 | .025 |

*Note.* [a] The intercepts for items #6, #7, #8, and #9 differ across countries.

**Table S3.** Psychometric Isomorphism of Cultural Logics (Honor, Dignity, and Face) Across Individual and Country Levels: Standardized Coefficients

| | | Level 1 (within) | | Level 2 (between) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Item** | **ICC** | $\lambda$ | $\sigma$ | $\lambda$ | $\sigma$ |
| honor1 | .19 | .74 | .45 | .98 | .05 |
| honor2 | .15 | .59 | .65 | .89 | .20 |
| honor3 | .21 | .84 | .30 | .98 | .05 |
| honor4 | .18 | .74 | .45 | .93 | .14 |
| dignity1 | .21 | .62 | .62 | .78 | .39 |
| dignity2 | .16 | .74 | .45 | .98 | .05 |
| dignity3 | .17 | .84 | .29 | .99 | .01 |
| dignity4 | .17 | .74 | .45 | .93 | .13 |
| dignity5 | .07 | .52 | .73 | .77 | .40 |
| dignity6 | .18 | .62 | .62 | .91 | .17 |
| face1 | .21 | .50 | .75 | .69 | .53 |
| face2 | .13 | .53 | .72 | .81 | .35 |
| face3 | .18 | .66 | .56 | .96 | .08 |
| face4 | .16 | .67 | .55 | .96 | .08 |
| face5 | .10 | .59 | .65 | .94 | .11 |
| face6 | .18 | .56 | .68 | .89 | .20 |

*Notes.* ICC – Intraclass Correlation Coefficient, λ – loading, σ – residual variance.

The results of the psychometric isomorphism analysis revealed that the constructs of dignity, honor, and face exhibited configural and metric levels of isomorphism across individual and country levels. For the 3-factor model, configural isomorphism was established [N = 4,594; $\chi^2(202) = 1{,}207.13$, $p < .01$; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .033; $SRMR_{within} = .040$; $SRMR_{between} = .109$], indicating that the overall factor structure was consistent across levels. Strong (metric) isomorphism was also achieved, with all factor loadings being equivalent across individual and country levels [N = 4,594; $\chi^2(215) = 1{,}242.48$, $p < .01$; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .032; $SRMR_{within} = .040$; $SRMR_{between} = .113$]. The correlations between latent variables at the individual level were as follows: Honor–Dignity = .04, $p < .05$; Honor–Face = .46, $p < .01$; Dignity–Face = .14, $p < .01$.

The correlations between latent variables at the country level were: Honor–Dignity = –.45, $p = .06$; Honor–Face = .79, $p < .01$; Dignity–Face = –.33, $p = .16$.