Epistemic Rationality Begins Unreflectively

Melis, G ORCID: 0009-0006-9084-884X and Blakey, KH ORCID: 0000-0003-4347-6124 (2025) Epistemic Rationality Begins Unreflectively. Erkenntnis, 91 (4). pp. 1989-2012. ISSN 0165-0106

Preview

Text Epistemic Rationality Begins Unreflectively.pdf - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (796kB) | Preview

Abstract

Recent research in analytic epistemology suggests that one can form a rational belief without being in the position to identify and assess the evidence in its support. The reach of such unreflective responses to evidence has been explored in internalist and externalist theories of epistemic justification. It is also at work in defences of the rationality of non-human animals and young children. Unreflective responsiveness to evidence is in tension with reflective accounts, according to which being in the position to identify and assess the relevant reasons is necessary for rational belief and action. We investigate the relation between these two rival characterizations of rational belief by engaging with recent work in developmental psychology and integrating it with lessons coming from the study of epistemic defeaters. We contend that the roots of epistemic rationality lie in what subjects do at the unreflective level. The arguments we provide speak against the widely held notion that the reflective minds of adult humans differ in kind from the presumed unreflective minds of young children and non-human animals.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	5003 Philosophy; 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies; 5002 History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields; Clinical Research; 2202 History and Philosophy of Specific Fields; 2203 Philosophy; Philosophy; 5003 Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Psychology (from Sep 2019)
Publisher:	Springer
Date of acceptance:	23 April 2025
Date of first compliant Open Access:	15 September 2026
Date Deposited:	15 Sep 2026 08:46
Last Modified:	15 Sep 2026 08:46
DOI or ID number:	10.1007/s10670-025-00977-x
URI:	https://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/id/eprint/29412

View Item