

The path to enlightenment: limiting costs and maximizing returns from intelligence-led policy and practice in public policing

Abstract

Intelligence-led policing's (ILP) promise to reform policing has attracted many to its cause. Based on empirical research, this paper challenges the validity of some of its claims and explains the ways that ILP may most fruitfully be employed. The research found that the success or failure of ILP depends on people and not on the ILP technologies, organizational structures, or processes that routinely receive attention. ILP may make perfect business sense in principle but human factors will always mitigate its prospects. Justifiably, ILP is the preferred strategy for combating organized crime or 'professional' criminals; the cost of investigations and intrusions into privacy can more readily be warranted. In the policing mainstream, an acceptable return on investment in those same methods is unlikely because the professional skills and specialist resources required to service them are in such short supply. Moreover, in liberal democracies their use is much more difficult to justify in social worlds that, properly, lie largely beyond the institutions' control.

Introduction

The label 'ILP' is attached to a variety of strategies used by law enforcement agencies across the globe. As one of a range of innovative approaches meant to transform public policing in the information age, the brand represents optimism, positivity and dynamism; a smarter form of policing that provides staff with renewed drive and direction and that demonstrates - to staff, stakeholders, and communities - the institution's capacity and willingness to fuse technology, data, and evidence of 'what works?' to transform moribund practice.ⁱ In England and Wales, ILP's advocates promise more rational and scientific solutions to society's ills; approaches that no longer have to rely on that mix of knowledge, experience, and faith usually referred to as 'professional judgement'; in reality, a term as mutable and elastic as 'affordable housing' or 'fair taxation'.

A compelling case can be made for strategies that emerge from rigorous and transparent processes of collection, validation, and selection so that policing's scarce resources are used in what, intelligence suggests, are likely to be the most productive and responsive ways. There is little evidence of that for ILP in the scholarly literature and certainly none to be found in the NIM narrative (see James 2012 and 2013). It is argued here that the acts of creative compliance associated with NIM implementation, that essentially created the fiction that ILP could and would revolutionise public policing, impeded understanding of its real value in the context of organised crime. Arguably, it also undermined the credibility of the service elite; with significant consequences for the institution.

Methodology

The aim of the study was to understand better the situations and circumstances in which those proactive policing methods that have come to be labelled as ILP, may most fruitfully be employed. The data collected to achieve that aim consisted of official reports, scholarly research and empirical data collected by the author in a study of the NIM (2005-12; *N=147*); from primary data collected during research into investigative practice in England and Wales (2012-14; *N=201*); and from research into the UK intelligence milieu (2013-15; *N=113*).ⁱⁱ In each case data were collected through surveys and semi-structured interviews with practitioners and others directly connected to the investigative and intelligence milieus. The NVivo narrative analysis software (which is rapidly becoming the sector standard for qualitative research) was utilised to make sense of the data. The research sample was drawn exclusively from social and organisational settings in England and Wales. Therefore, the findings tend to be more relevant to those settings. Arguably, they also may be relevant in other contexts.

The research does not, by any accepted definition, represent a longitudinal study but its results have been shaped by the author's continuous observation of the policing and police intelligence milieus for more than 14 years. Whilst, individuals largely have not been tracked in these studies, the roles they fill have. Those roles expanded and contracted as

police intelligence practice first grew and then, in this age of austerity for the public services, shrank. That has allowed for comparison of the data collected in each of the studies upon which this paper relies and for inferences to be drawn about the effectiveness and efficacy of that practice over time. No research participant is referred to directly in this paper save Officer A, at one time a senior officer in the Kent force, whose request not to be identified by name has been respected.

Background

Debates about the duties and responsibilities of the public police are unlikely ever to be settled; policing is a highly political and heavily politicised endeavour that polarises opinion; consensus sometimes is found but usually it is a fragile phenomenon that quickly can be undermined and lost. Something that most people can agree on is that policing should be founded on good information and sound reasoning whether it attracts the sobriquet ‘intelligence-led’ or not. This paper argues against the extension of ILP into the policing mainstream. The author acknowledges that in that sense he very much is swimming against the flow. Largely, ILP has been seen as ‘a good thing’ and therefore above serious criticism; or at least that is how it seems. Robert Reiner, one of the foremost authorities on the development of public policing in Britain, observed whimsically that even if ILP is not the panacea that some have suggested, it is infinitely preferable to stupidity-led policing (Reiner, 2012). Few would disagree.

Policing has always been so much more complex than simply preventing or detecting crime; most police work does not involve crime or criminals at all. Rather, the police deliver a range of services that no-one else is prepared or equipped to deliver or that involve ‘something that ought not to be happening and about which someone had better do something now!’ (Bittner, 1974 p.1). That is to say, the police often must react to events over which, at least initially, they have little control. For example, in this study, managers expressed the view that 80 to 90% of police business was beyond their control and was incapable of being managed (see James, 2012). That of course highlights the dominance of

the reactive paradigm in the mainstream, a feature of which is symbolism. Traditional policing represents series of highly symbolic acts by the state and its agents in attempts to impose order on the complexity, often bordering on chaos, that characterises democratic societies in the information age

That same study also demonstrated the innate conservatism of the police elite. In 2002, the police service of England and Wales introduced the *National Intelligence Model* (NIM). Essentially, this was an attempt to fuse traditional intelligence work with business processes with the aim of achieving more with less (arguably, given the recent budget cuts that have driven police forces to cut what they consider to be ancillary services – that often has amounted to doing less with less). Despite the public claims for the model, conservatism allied to executive indifference, and significant shortcomings in NIM and in its implementation limited meaningful acceptance of it to the intelligence milieu.

Plans to extend ILP into the mainstream via NIM foundered because the organisational energy behind them, never matched the rhetoric. That was a deliberate act (perhaps more accurately, a deliberate omission). Shifts in the traditional relationship between the people and the police epitomised by statements attributed to the founder of modern policing (such as: ‘the police are the people: the people are the police’ – Peel cited in Reith, 1956 p.140) carry huge risks. Few managers were willing to endanger that relationship because they saw that the reforms required to operationalize ILP, threatened organisational: norms; identities; cultures; and values. Moreover, they were bound to test staffs’, stakeholders’ and communities’ normative expectations of the service.

Policing paradigms

Essentially, in standard practice, there are just two policing paradigms; ‘reactive’ and ‘proactive’ but there are several variations on those themes including: community policing; problem-oriented policing; problem solving; and so on (see for example Audit Commission, 1993; Tilley, 2003; 2008). The reactive paradigm represents the traditional ‘fire brigade’ style of policing that prioritises post-hoc investigations and a rapid response to reports of

crime. It is a staple of crime fiction almost everywhere (often through the media of film and television) and therefore commonly represents what the populous understands as policing.

Proactive strategies have been used in Britain and around the world for many years. However, they usually are employed in addition to, rather than as a replacement for, traditional reactive approaches and then only at the margins of policing activity (see James, 2011 and Reiner, 2010). They are rarely significant factors in situations that demand immediate action, or in the kinds of tasks that usually are grouped under the heading of 'service delivery', which together make up such a large proportion of police activity. Arguably, in the UK, the reasons for this go back to the origins of the public police at the beginning of the 19th Century.

Fear of the contagion of revolution elsewhere in the world shaped Britain's new police. Its sponsors and leaders recognised that public acceptance of the institution had to be negotiated carefully. Therefore, at least publicly, police 'spying' was precluded and the role of the institution as preventer, rather than detector, of crime emphasised as a means of securing public consent for the new arrangements. That does not mean that the police did not conduct spying missions; just that for many years – almost until the end of the 20th Century in fact – they were rather adept at concealing this fact until legislation in the form of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, laid bare their covert strategies.

Also, relevant in this context, is the concept of 'high' and 'low' policing (Brodeur, 1983). Initially applied solely to political policing and characterised as policing that aimed to control 'by storing intelligence ... [gathered from] any domain that may further the implementation of state policies' and the 'processing of information, from which future events can be foreseen and, if need be, averted' (Brodeur, 1983 pp.513 and 518) the term is now used much more loosely and encompasses a great deal of police proactivity. Usually it is interpreted as encompassing long-term investigations by specialist detective units that make use of informers, surveillance and the like. Brodeur's conception of low policing as the disparate acts of criminal investigators carrying out their routine duties largely has stood the

test of time but in the last 30 years the kind of intelligence work that traditionally was a feature of high policing has come to be much more a factor in the mainstream. Largely, that is because managers have looked to capitalise on their successes in the higher policing arena.

Claims for ILP

The true meaning of the term ILP has never really been settled. In Britain, it has been applied to a variety of crime-fighting processes that depend upon the efforts of analysts and other intelligence specialists, engaged *inter alia* in crime mapping, crime pattern analysis, and social network analysis, to target groups, individuals, and public space using covert methods; with their arrest, or some other intervention to prevent further offending, the intended outcome. ILP sometimes has been confused with evidence-based policing (EBP). While they share some characteristics, EBP is not a policing model in its own right but a way in which ‘researchers attempt to determine “what works best” for police forces... particularly in terms of the “crime-fighting” function of the police’ (Brunger *et al*, 2015).

Commonly, the development of ILP has been linked to concerns about organised crime, the search for best evidence, and the discrediting of confessions as evidence. Initially, ILP attracted a great deal of scholarly interest - see for example: Tilley, 2003, Maguire and John, 2004; and Innes *et al*, 2005. Scholars broadly were positive but also were equivocal about its future prospects for ILP; arguing that it was too early in the strategy’s life, to assess its real impact on policing or on communities. Simply, the scholarly consensus was that ILP was promising and claims for it seemed reasonable but they were not yet proved. Kleiven’s (2004) study only confirmed those concerns.

Arguably, policymakers and police professionals registered the positives but paid much less attention to the caveats that accompanied them. Certainly, there is little evidence that they were considered in any meaningful way. Enthusiasm for ILP has grown; unchecked and largely unchallenged (see for example: OSCE, 2016; and UNODC, 2006). ILP has been lauded as ‘scientific’; in common parlance, a method of inquiry is said to be scientific if it is based on empirical data. In this context, that data is in a form that can be managed,

measured and used to provide evidence of what does and does not work and of course the crime mapping and other techniques applied in the ILP paradigm allowed the police to link and analyze data to identify crime hotspots, criminal markets and the like. It is claimed that the scientific method necessarily supports rational, targeted and cost-effective decision-making (Sweeten, 2016), which may well be a valid claim in an ideal world but no world is ideal. Policing's complexities and contradictions are only compounded by the fact that almost all of its actions are mediated by political and organisational factors including occupational cultures. That applies just as much to ILP as any other policing strategy.

Hidden costs

The research showed that the costs of ILP are less well understood but they may be considerable. Beyond the generic factors referred to earlier, the heavy emphases on data and direction, demand significant investment in information technology, skilled staff, and myriad processes needed to support the operation of systems, which include an intelligence-focused secretariat whose work is underpinned by the principles of the intelligence cycle and whose job it is to ensure that operational plans are lawful and otherwise accord with human rights principles. In other words, that the police's responsibilities under the Human Rights Act, 1998 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 are fulfilled.

One of the most significant operational costs is incurred in developing a cohort of officers, to be held in reserve, capable of dealing effectively with the intelligence that is collected. Readers will be well aware that in the real world police resources are scarce; there are not troops of officers standing by around the world, waiting to respond to the next lead supplied by their intelligence departments. Ordinarily, staff are fully employed. Therefore, that 'spare' capacity has to be created by stripping away resources from other departments, making tough choices on the basis of subjective analyses of need. Choices that always have the potential to generate tension between police managers and their local stakeholders and to stimulate conflict in their communities. Moreover, staff rarely welcome change; resistance

(often covert in nature) is the norm. Unsurprisingly, few managers have been willing to tread that path.

In Britain, the experiment that seems to have been truest to the ILP ideal was the Kent Policing Model (KPM). Wholly committed to the cause and driven on by a charismatic and powerful leader, the Kent force seemed to embrace ILP with a passion. Intelligence practice was prioritised, patrols were redeployed so that they were available during periods and in places that intelligence analysis had determined had the greatest policing needs and novel policing methods were embraced. This policing nirvana was short lived.

Many communities and local stakeholders complained that their needs were being neglected; the complaints reached such a volume that one of the force's senior officers attended more than 300 community and local council meetings to keep the plan on track (Officer A, personal communication with the author, May 2010). Despite the officer's efforts, the force was obliged to return patrols to town centres and the like, even though there was no intelligence to support those redeployments. Readers may feel it noteworthy that despite the rhetoric around the success of the KPM, it was never subjected to independent scrutiny (James, 2013; Amey *et al*, 1996). It has now faded into history to be replaced, in the words of Kent's Police and Crime Commissioner, by a more traditional 'locally-focused service' (Barnes, 2016 p.2).

The limits of ILP

That managers often have shied away from making decisions about resource allocation that may privilege one section of the community over another, destabilize the organisation, or explode the myth that the police institution is not just a 'can do' but a 'can always do' kind of operation should not surprise anyone. The image of the public police as the primary agency of social control, standing ready to defend the state and its citizens whenever needed, remains highly symbolic even if, in the information age, some are a little less convinced by that depiction than once they were.

All policing decisions carry political risks. Most managers operate in virtual goldfish bowls; their actions, behaviours, and pronouncements questioned at almost every turn (see for example; Caless, 2011). Arguably, if they can mitigate some of those risks and deflect a portion of the criticism that comes their way, they will. That would be only human. Though an undesirable consequence of such action is the phenomenon of creative compliance where managers invest enough intellectual capital and generate enough organisational activity to give the impression that tough decisions are being taken and substantial changes being made when in fact nothing very meaningful is happening at all. That certainly was a significant feature of the story of the UK's NIM (James, 2012).

Formal rules (such as the NIM's statutory code) are merely presentational; justifying conduct but not affecting practice in meaningful ways. Reiner (2010) describes that kind of behaviour as interactionist. In that context, making sense of policing subcultures is the key to understanding practice. Arguably, compliance for its own sake represents the worst of both worlds. It may, in some small way, buttress the police's image but it also results in the dissipation of public money and other scarce resources with little tangible effect. Certainly, few of the ILP strategies that have come to be cited as evidence of best (or at least better) practice, and therefore worthy of imitation, have been subjected to meaningful independent scrutiny beyond that carried out into the NIM (see for example: James, 2013 and 2012; Collier, 2006; and Kleiven, 2004).

When ILP is, or is perceived to have been, applied inappropriately, it may threaten the very legitimacy of public policing. One has only to consider the consequences of the ILP operation that led to the police shooting of Mark Duggan in North London in 2013 to understand the fragility of the social contract that underpins policing. Whereas traditional reactive policing largely relies upon members of the public deciding when a situation has become so intolerable that it demands an intervention, proactive approaches prioritise 'agendas set by the police' (Maguire, 2008 p.437). The fundamental difference between the two paradigms is that in the former it is the public's and not the police's definition of order that usually takes precedence. In contrast, proactive policing often entails the imposition of a

police conception of order and the arbitrary reconstruction of the social world (Waddington, 1993).

Philosophical issues like these may not be of the greatest concern to action-oriented practitioners but there are, equally valid, instrumental factors that should be of concern. The development of an ILP paradigm in the mainstream can have a meaningful and measurable impact only if it is accompanied by substantial organisational change (Flood and Gaspar, 2003). Despite the police's best efforts to do more with less (which arguably has sometimes amounted to doing less with less – see for example Whitehead, 2011 on the subject of case screening and Merrill, 2015 on police non-attendance at crime scenes), the need for that kind of reform has proved a significant obstacle to the implementation of ILP. Change on such a scale invariably threatens the established order, the culture and identity of the organisation and the norms, values and morale of its staff; largely it has been disdained. That has meant that the service has been unable to create the operational reserves – working hand-in-glove with intelligence staffs – that a meaningful commitment to ILP demands.

These kinds of contradictions were evident in the NIM narrative (see James, 2013 and 2012). The consequences were a bifurcated approach to policing problems with intelligence units creating performance-related data rather than influencing the deployments of the operational teams whose activities remained largely reactive in nature. Even though the police understood the intelligence picture more clearly, their ability to influence it in significant ways was no greater than it was before the NIM was introduced.

ILP demands a range of skills and abilities that are not routinely found in the mainstream. Most of the activities encapsulated by the term involve intrusion into the lives of citizens. Such intrusions are legitimate only when they are proportionate, lawful, and accountable, and can be shown to be necessary for a policing purpose. These are simple terms, nevertheless they carry a powerful message about the human rights of citizens and their relationships with the state and in the modern era that has been reflected in the legislative and regulatory arrangements that have provided the, previously lacking, legal certainty around these kinds of policing activities.ⁱⁱⁱ Assessing the validity of a plan to intrude

into, for example, an individual's private space demands expertise in law, professional skill and emotional intelligence. Making the case for such an intrusion requires the investigation of existential as well as legal and practical matters. The expertise required for this work is found largely in specialist units.

Those staffs use that expertise to create for themselves the networks of national and international contacts that they need to obtain in timely and efficient ways the information they require. Policymakers may wish fervently for practitioners to embrace the kinds of transparent institutional arrangements for intelligence sharing that, for example, the Interpol and Europol databases aim to provide but long experience has shown that in this context the wish is rarely father to the thought (see for example, Safjański, 2013). This kind of behaviour cuts across a number of the intelligence pathologies reported by Sheptycki (2004) and others (see also for example; Stanier, 2012). In it, there are elements of institutional friction, the information silo effect and the tensions between different occupational subcultures (all highlighted by Sheptycki). Seemingly, no matter how much organisational energy is committed to those endeavours, the norm is that professionals use trusted contacts, rather than official channels, to gather or share information whenever that option exists (see for example, Occhipinti, 2015). A proper analysis of that behaviour, arguably worthy of the pathology label in its own right, is beyond this paper but this is yet another example of the significance of human factors in policing practice.

In Britain, staff in the mainstream rarely can match the knowledge and experience of their specialist colleagues and they are unlikely to have anything like as comprehensive a network of national and international contacts. As the author's study into intelligence practice revealed (James, 2016), staff in local policing units receive only rudimentary training and must rely heavily on internally generated guidance documents (currently in the form of Authorized Professional Practice – see CoP, 2016). Nevertheless, they must make the same kinds of decisions as their more experienced and better trained colleagues. That places a heavy responsibility on those routinely asked to make judgements about the

proportionality, legality, and necessity of actions that may hazard the finances and reputation of the institution and that have the potential to undermine prosecutions.

That is not to deny the positive and beneficial effects that ILP may have at the margins of policing. Most police services seem to understand that, applied appropriately, ILP is invaluable to the policing mission (see for example Hogan-Howe, 2012). Throughout the history of the public police, managers frequently have created specialist squads and departments to deal with different crime types (often linked to the activities of organised crime groups; such as human or drug trafficking) or with discrete policing problems (such as, environmental harm-inspired protests) (see Creedon, 2014). That has proved an effective strategy (if recently in Britain, a controversial one) that has ‘worked’ for at least 130 years.

The limits of policing

For many years, the policing institution was effective at lobbying its political masters (Savage, 2007). It continues to pride itself on being a pragmatic task-focused organisation but despite its rhetoric, its powers now are much more limited than once they were (see Winsor, 2012). Nonetheless, despite managers’ oft-repeated wish to stand outside of politics, all policing is political. To many outside the policing ‘bubble’, ostensibly utilitarian acts commonly amount to efforts to preserve the *status quo*; invariably, police action privileges the rights of the powerful (and often, propertied) over those of the powerless. That should not be interpreted as a criticism of the police institution or the people who represent it. Rather, it is a recognition of their historic and traditional roles in liberal democratic societies and an acknowledgement of the limits of their influence over their political masters; and their power over those they police.

Any number of police managers and public policymakers have shown themselves willing to be held as hostages to fortune, launching initiative after initiative with optimistic messages emphasising the police’s crime-fighting capabilities and the organisational and personal vigour with which they will be pursued. Taking visible and decisive action against offenders and being seen to take such action, has proved politically popular and, arguably,

has strengthened policing's claims for legitimacy. Invariably, these pronouncements have been received enthusiastically; not least within the ranks of the institution itself where 'thief-taking' and 'locking up the bad guys' are perceived to be central to the policing mission even if (as a proportion of the work) that is far from the truth.

Political safety valves can take many forms; reform is one. In the context of British policing, the putative introduction of ILP at the beginning of the 21st Century *inter alia* can be interpreted as an institutional response to successive Governments' attempts to reform what they saw, and what Government continues to see, as a costly, inefficient, and discriminatory body. ILP promised much; the ability to harness together the scientific advances in communications and information technology of the age, with novel, rational, targeted strategies to deliver cost-effective, efficient, and accountable policing. It found powerful supporters in Government and, for a time, it allowed the service to deflect criticism, which had been building for over 10 years, of its performance and values. However, it was only a question of time before it was recognised that rather than the meaningful, structural, reform Government expected, policing's enthusiasm for ILP represented no more than 'business as usual' – the standard organisationally and culturally-consistent response by the police elite to a perceived crisis.

Arguably, the impact on Britain's police service has been considerable. Even if its failure to deliver smarter, intelligence-led, policing is but one factor in the demise of police power, it is a significant one and its story provides an object lesson in the consequences of promising more than one reasonably can deliver. Policing has lost its 'special relationship' with Government; its elite members' group has been stripped of much of its authority and rebranded; the Police Federation, the staff association that represents the rank and file, finds itself under sustained attack from the Home Secretary who *inter alia* has stripped its senior officials of public funds and ended the practice of automatic enrolment into the Federation for sworn staff. Moreover, in this age of austerity for Britain's public sector, policing has borne the brunt of public sector budget cuts.^{iv}

Though it may still be an actor in structuring and shaping both political behaviour and public policy, the power of the institution to reshape the social world is, and from a libertarian perspective should be, finite. That is *inter alia* because of the disaggregated nature of modern societies and because so many aspects of human and organisational behaviour are beyond its control; for example, the institution has only the most limited influence on Government policy in relation to, education, housing, employment, or health, which in many cases are the drivers of the deviance that ultimately it may be called upon to address.

Conclusions

Intelligence-led policing's (ILP) brand is strong. Its promise to help modernise and reform policing using a novel blend of processes, structures and the technologies of the age has attracted many to its cause. Data were collected through qualitative empirical research into ILP and detective work over a period of 14 years. Thematic analysis of that data using sector standard software found that regardless of how advanced those processes, structures and so on may have been or how much vigour was employed in their name; the success of any policing initiative can never be guaranteed.

A key finding was that success or failure depended not on the ILP technologies, organisational structures, or processes that routinely receive so much attention but on people. In this context, the people assigned to collect the intelligence and to carry out intelligence-directed tasks, and the stakeholders and other people in communities who were affected by, or otherwise had an interest in, those activities. Ultimately, the failure of ILP, or indeed any putatively innovative strategy, to revolutionise public policing should come as no surprise. Revolutions seldom are 'glorious';^v their outcomes usually are hugely difficult to predict. Moreover, few welcome changes that may threaten established norms, working practices, organisational stability, continuity, power and so on. Even fewer people have the support and the revolutionary zeal to contemplate what may be tumultuous change on such a scale. These phenomena are interconnected: some in obvious, others perhaps in more

nuanced ways but they add up to the reality that in liberal democracies, with their checks, balances and safety valves, revolutions are rare; that applies in the context of state institutions just as much as it does of nation states.

Policing is complex human activity; success cannot be measured by results alone. Sometimes, its multiple strands of policy, strategy, organisational behaviour and so on (a list that potentially continues almost *ad infinitum*) cannot be unpicked and the challenges of attributing cause to effect – in this context, strategies to outcomes – simply may be too great. That may be nigh on impossible when, as is often the case with ILP, the outcomes one seeks to isolate are linked to strategies used to prevent or disrupt criminal acts before they take place. The challenges of proving a negative are well understood. That has not dissuaded some policymakers from making claims for the success of this or that strategy to increasingly sceptical publics.^{vi} Those claims sometimes seem to be based on faith or at least on the grounds that the ‘absence of evidence [for their success] is not evidence of absence’.^{vii}

Acceptable returns on investment in ILP are unlikely in mainstream policing where the knowledge, professional skills and specialist resources required for the work are in short supply and where the pressures on the police to carry out an almost infinite array of tasks with finite resources is so immense. If one of the foundations of modern policing; that the police are the people and the people are the police, is to be maintained then the responsibility for achieving those tasks must be shared between the two. Finding the right balance has proved to be no easy thing; it must constantly be renegotiated. That is unlikely to change, there are just too many variables in that relationship but surely its future health demands that the interests of communities should be to the fore and the public’s definition of order given precedence in mainstream policing in the information age, through that variety of approaches that have come to be understood collectively as community policing.

Against this backdrop, it is easy to lose sight of ILP’s strengths. When it is employed appropriately, they are considerable. Organised crime groups and those who plot to do harm to communities and/or the state, simply cannot be tackled effectively unless they are identified, understood, and targeted for sustained periods by highly knowledgeable and

skilled staff with access to specialist support and a combination of proven investigative tools and technologies and the networks that provide the means for effective collaboration and cooperation with law enforcement professionals elsewhere in the world. Largely this is how public policing has operated in liberal democratic societies for decades and there is scant evidence that ILP, or any other putatively new strategy can change that picture in meaningful ways.

Simply, it is in the higher policing context, characterised by that already long-running battle between serious and/or organized crime and law enforcement specialists, that the maximum return on investment in intelligence-led policy and practice will be achieved. That is where scarce resources should be directed rather than being dissipated in the mainstream where the risks – associated with legal process, the maintenance of the social contract, community cohesion, and human rights compliance – are far outweighed by the potential rewards. ILP's promises have proved a heady mix that policymakers and police managers have found difficult to resist but the cost of ILP; its demands on the finite resources of police organisations, and its – largely unacknowledged - threat to the legitimacy of the public police; means that without significant, structural, reform it must remain at the margins of policing. The view that ILP can revolutionise public policing is a chimera; and a costly one at that.

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ⁱ See for example; Bratton (1998) for a police perspective on what popularly, though arguably pejoratively, has come to be known as zero-tolerance policing in New York City; and Flood and Gaspar (2003) for an explanation of the UK law-enforcement community's hopes for ILP.

ⁱⁱ See James, 2016; James *et al*, 2016; James, 2014, 2013, and 2012.

ⁱⁱⁱ Principally, the Human Rights Act, 1998 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 but other legislation such as the Data Protection Act 1996 and the Freedom of Information Act, 2000. also are relevant.

^{iv} Though the pace of those cuts has slowed following the terrorist attacks on Paris.

^v The Glorious Revolution occurred in 1688 when William of Orange took the English throne from James II. The outcomes were rather less glorious for members of the Catholic church who were persecuted relentlessly by the new king.

^{vi} See for example; US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's now famous 'known unknown' soundbite (cited in Rumsfeld, 2012) and Bowling's (1999) critique of the real influence of Bratton's policing methods on murder and violent crime in New York City.

^{vii} The quote is variously attributed to the cosmologists Carl Sagan and Matthew Rees, and others.