Ridyard, RM Carrots and Sticks in Bank Governance: Time for a Bigger Stick? Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance. ISSN 1358-1988 (Accepted)

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Abstract

Purpose — This paper is pre-occupied with how bank governance can be altered to reduce risk taking and engender greater financial stability.
Design/methodology/approach — Its approach is to review existing bank governance arrangements, contemporary challenges, and alternative reforms.
Findings — It is argued that recent reforms are incomplete. Greater countervailing incentives for bank managers and shareholders are required. This prompts an inquiry into the merits and demerits of four types of reform: changes to executive compensation arrangements; the introduction of a liability standard for directors; the removal of limited liability for bank shareholders; and a criminal offence for managers.
Originality/value — Discussion illumines several problems with the current approach to bank governance and provides insights that can help direct future reform.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	1502 Banking, Finance And Investment, 1501 Accounting, Auditing And Accountability
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance K Law > K Law (General)
Divisions:	School of Law
Publisher:	Emerald
Date Deposited:	06 Aug 2018 10:32
Last Modified:	06 Aug 2018 10:32
DOI or Identification number:	10.1108/JFRC-05-2018-0084
URI:	http://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/id/eprint/9071

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