Teng, D, Haj Youssef, M and Li, C (2024) When MNEs Bribe More? The Role of Managerial Discretion. Cross Cultural and Strategic Management. ISSN 2059-5794

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Abstract

Purpose This paper builds upon managerial discretion literature to study the relationship between foreign ownership and bribery intensity. Design/methodology/approach – Building on World Bank’s data of 9,386 firms from 125 countries over the period 2006–2018, this paper uses Tobit regression, ordered probit and logit models to empirically test the hypotheses. Findings This paper finds that firms have higher bribery intensity when executives have a higher level of managerial discretion. Smaller firms with slack financial resources tend to bribe more when they face more government intervention, munificent and uncertain industrial environment. Originality Extant corruption literature has addressed the effects of external institutional settings and internal corporate governance on bribery offering among MNEs. How much, and under what condition do top executives matter in bribery activities are yet to be answered. This paper integrates the concept of managerial discretion with corruption and bribery literature and offer a potential answer to the above question. In addition, prior corruption and bribery literature have primarily studied bribery through either micro- or macro-level analysis. This paper adopts multiple-level of analyses and elucidates the foreign ownership and bribery relationship from the organizational and industrial levels.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	This author accepted manuscript is deposited under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC) licence. This means that anyone may distribute, adapt, and build upon the work for non-commercial purposes, subject to full attribution. If you wish to use this manuscript for commercial purposes, please contact permissions@emerald.com
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HF Commerce > HF5001 Business H Social Sciences > HF Commerce H Social Sciences > HF Commerce > HF5601 Accounting
Divisions:	Liverpool Business School
Publisher:	Emerald
SWORD Depositor:	A Symplectic
Date Deposited:	04 Dec 2023 14:17
Last Modified:	12 Feb 2024 15:48
DOI or ID number:	10.1108/CCSM-03-2023-0039
URI:	https://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/id/eprint/22011

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