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Yang, Z, Yang, Z, Yin, J and Qu, Z (2018) A risk-based game model for rational inspections in port state control. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 118. pp. 477-495. ISSN 1366-5545
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A risk-based game model for rational inspections in port state control.pdf - Accepted Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives. Download (1MB) | Preview |
Abstract
This paper analyses the game relationship between port authorities and ship owners under the new inspection regime (NIR). Based on 49328 inspection reports from Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (2015-2017), we present a Bayesian Network (BN) model to determine vessel detention rates after adding company performance as a new indicator in PSC inspection. A strategic game model is formulated by incorporating the BN model outcomes. The optimal inspection rate from the game model can help improve port authority performance in PSC. An empirical study is conducted to illustrate the insights of the results and provide suggestions for port authorities.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Uncontrolled Keywords: | 0102 Applied Mathematics, 0103 Numerical and Computational Mathematics, 1507 Transportation and Freight Services |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD61 Risk Management T Technology > TA Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) |
| Divisions: | Liverpool Business School Maritime & Mechanical Engineering (merged with Engineering 10 Aug 20) |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| Related URLs: | |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Mar 2019 13:38 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Sep 2021 09:35 |
| DOI or ID number: | 10.1016/j.tre.2018.08.001 |
| URI: | https://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/id/eprint/10398 |
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